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Introduction
Janet B. Mitchell
This book provides a balanced assessment of pay for performance (P4P), 
addressing both its promise and its shortcomings. P4P programs have become 
widespread in health care in just the past decade and have generated a great 
deal of enthusiasm in health policy circles and among legislators, despite 
limited evidence of their effectiveness. On a positive note, this movement has 
developed and tested many new types of health care payment systems and 
has stimulated much new thinking about how to improve quality of care and 
reduce the costs of health care. 
The current interest in P4P echoes earlier enthusiasms in health policy—
such as those for capitation and managed care in the 1990s—that failed to live 
up to their early promise. The fate of P4P is not yet certain, but we can learn a 
number of lessons from experiences with P4P to date, and ways to improve the 
designs of P4P programs are becoming apparent. We anticipate that a “second 
generation” of P4P programs can now be developed that can have greater 
impact and be better integrated with other interventions to improve the quality 
of care and reduce costs. 
With the March 2010 passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (officially, P.L. 111–148 and referred to hereafter as the “Affordable Care 
Act”), health care reform has moved from a much-debated policy concept to 
a major policy implementation challenge. The Affordable Care Act seeks to 
reform private health insurance regulation and practice and to extend access 
to private health insurance through subsidies and the creation of state-based 
health insurance cooperatives. Some of these provisions took effect in late 
2010, and others will take effect in the following years. Although the Affordable 
Care Act legislation is famously detailed in many areas, the operational issues 
in turning policy concepts and goals into workable programs will require 
considerable additional effort. Making health care reform work is the next 
crucial step. 
The Affordable Care Act seeks to reduce unsustainable US health care 
spending and improve health care value partly by using a wide range of 
demonstrations and pilot projects, many of which focus on P4P as a conceptual 
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model. P4P models (also known as “shared savings,” “accountable care 
organizations,” or “value-based purchasing”) reimburse providers based all 
or in part on meeting specified outcomes rather than simply paying for the 
services that the providers render. This change, in theory, offers providers 
incentives to consider the quality, value, and cost of the health care delivered 
and to shift away from the opposite incentives that traditional fee-for-service 
gives providers to increase the volume of highly profitable services. 
For the past decade, multiple Medicare demonstrations and some programs 
in the private sector have experimented and continue to experiment with the 
broad notion of P4P. As of the enactment of the Affordable Care Act, many 
of the Medicare evaluations either had just begun or have only preliminary 
results available. These preliminary results are mixed at best. They suggest 
that P4P programs cannot guarantee improved quality of care, better health 
care value, or meaningful or net health care savings—or a “bending of the cost 
curve.” Nevertheless, we can learn critical lessons from the experiences of these 
Medicare demonstrations and private-sector projects that will help us to plan 
for the considerable health care reform implementation tasks ahead.
This book identifies and evaluates the full range of issues associated with 
implementing P4P models. It gives policy makers and researchers thorough 
descriptions of alternative P4P models, examines their pros and cons, and 
discusses lessons learned from prior experience with these models. The 
authors’ experience with evaluating several Medicare P4P demonstrations 
yields a comprehensive look at how these projects have fared in the real world. 
The book consists of 12 chapters, which are not necessarily intended to be 
read in order, although the first 3 provide valuable background and conceptual 
information. Readers may pick and choose among these chapters, according 
to their interests. The brief summaries below will help guide readers as to the 
content and technical detail for each chapter.
The first chapter, “Introduction to Pay for Performance,” provides an 
overview of the historic origins of P4P and briefly describes the different forms 
that P4P models may take. For easy reference, this chapter also includes a table 
that illustrates a variety of recent and ongoing P4P projects in both the public 
and private sectors.
Chapter 2, “Overview of Pay for Performance Models and Issues,” presents 
a much more detailed discussion of P4P models. We describe both alternative 
measures of performance and incentive schemes that payers may attach to 
performance measurement. Performance measurement consists of several 
components: defining domains of performance, selecting domains to be 
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measured, selecting indicators to measure each domain of performance, 
defining the unit for performance measurement and accountability, choosing 
data sources for measuring performance, and deciding whether participation 
will be voluntary or mandatory. We also identify limitations of the P4P model. 
Chapter 3, “Theoretical Perspectives on Pay for Performance,” uses 
theoretical perspectives from economics, sociology, psychology, and 
organization theory to broaden our understanding of the range of factors 
affecting health care quality and cost outcomes, as well as the reasons a focus 
on economic incentives may have limited impact. We use these perspectives 
to describe the ways in which other factors—such as the social norms of 
professionalism among physicians, the range of motivational factors affecting 
physician behavior, and the organizational settings in which clinicians 
practice—affect the influence of economic incentives on the outcomes of P4P 
programs. 
Chapter 4, “Quality Measures for Pay for Performance,” describes the 
different types of quality measures that P4P programs can use, including 
structure, process, and outcome measures. We then review issues that 
programs should consider in selecting quality measures and comment on 
methods for analyzing those quality measures. We conclude by discussing 
public reporting of quality measures and how payers can integrate that 
approach to quality improvement with P4P programs.
Chapter 5, “Incorporating Efficiency Measures into Pay for Performance,” 
is a companion to Chapter 4. We review alternative measures of provider and 
system efficiency and technical challenges to setting efficient and equitable 
P4P payment incentives. We conclude with a discussion of risk adjustment and 
quality in the context of efficiency measurement.
Arguably, the greatest challenge in any P4P program is whom to pay. 
Chapter 6, “Who Gets the Payment Under Pay for Performance?” begins with 
a discussion of why deciding whom to pay can be so complex technically 
and politically and what factors can influence this decision. We then outline 
which specific health care entities (e.g., hospitals, physicians, integrated 
delivery systems) might receive payments under P4P, depending on a 
patient’s condition, and evaluate the respective pros and cons of the various 
choices. Finally, we consider the related topic of what to pay for (e.g., hospital 
admission, episode of care). 
Chapter 7, “Attributing Patients to Physicians for Pay for Performance,” 
discusses another complex and controversial decision that policy makers must 
make under P4P: how to assign physicians responsibility for a defined group 
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of patients and their episodes of patient care. Assignment, or attribution, is 
necessary to reward or penalize those providers who are in the best position to 
manage a patient’s health care needs. In this chapter, we first discuss challenges 
to patient attribution and give selected examples of real-world assignment 
strategies. We then consider basic concepts and alternatives for patient 
attribution in a fee-for-service context. 
Chapter 8, “Financial Gains and Risks in Pay for Performance Bonus 
Algorithms,” is one of two highly technical chapters in this book (the other 
is Chapter 10). Once the question of whom to pay is answered, payers must 
integrate quality performance measures into financial incentive schemes. 
First, we present a range of P4P payment models and investigate their key 
parameters. This includes examining the effects on bonuses (and penalties) of 
increasing the number of quality indicators, changing their relative weights, 
and using different mechanisms to set targets. We then present multiple 
simulations of actual quality performance against preset targets and test 
the sensitivity of a payer’s expected bonuses and losses to different sharing 
arrangements and key parameters. We conclude by suggesting a few steps 
for payers to follow in designing P4P incentive programs that maximize the 
likelihood of positive responses on the part of provider organizations.
As we noted previously, recent and ongoing Medicare demonstration 
projects give policy makers and researchers an opportunity to observe how 
specific P4P pilot programs have been implemented and how successful 
these programs have been in raising quality while lowering costs. Chapter 
9, “Overview of Selected Medicare Pay for Performance Demonstrations,” 
provides an overview of each P4P demonstration, describes the key features 
of the initiative, and summarizes the current status of each project. When 
evaluation findings are publicly available, they are presented here as well. 
Chapter 10, “Evaluating Pay for Performance Interventions,” explores many 
of the technical challenges of deriving scientifically rigorous estimates of P4P 
impacts. We begin by reviewing common threats to the internal validity of 
demonstration findings that can introduce positive or negative bias into the 
quantitative estimate of P4P effects. Because most Medicare demonstrations 
employ quasi-experimental designs, we then introduce the theory and 
approaches underlying the selection of representative comparison groups 
that are necessary to isolate intervention effects from other confounding 
baseline and temporal factors. Having considered alternative ways to form the 
comparison group, we then investigate two external threats to valid findings 
that are quite common in P4P demonstrations. These threats undermine the 
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generalizability or replicability of P4P effects to a national program. In the 
last section of the chapter, we summarize how evaluators of five Medicare P4P 
demonstrations formed their comparison groups, and we critique their success 
in avoiding the various threats to validity discussed earlier in the chapter.
Chapter 11, “Converting Successful Medicare Demonstrations into 
National Programs,” examines reasons that Medicare’s significant 35-year 
experience in conducting innovative demonstration projects has had a less-
lasting impact on the current national program than might be expected. Many 
of the P4P projects described in this book are Medicare pilot projects, or 
demonstrations, which test both the administrative feasibility and success of 
various performance models. For both technical and political reasons, win-
win initiatives that reduce costs while raising quality have been elusive. This 
chapter will help policy makers understand the potential barriers to turning a 
successful pilot project into an accountable care organization or similar entity, 
as the Affordable Care Act mandates.
Finally, Chapter 12, “Conclusions: Planning for Second-Generation Pay 
for Performance,” draws on the analyses and lessons from earlier chapters and 
recommends steps for improving future P4P programs. We review the main 
problems with private markets and incentives in health care that motivated 
the development of P4P programs in the first place. We next summarize the 
major shortcomings of the first generation of P4P programs. This is followed 
by a set of policy and implementation recommendations to improve on current 
initiatives and develop more effective second-generation P4P programs. We 
conclude with a brief analysis of the P4P provisions in the Affordable Care Act 
and suggest ways that those provisions could be implemented most effectively 
by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services, who is 
granted fairly wide latitude by Congress for implementing the P4P provisions 
of the law.
This book is the most definitive and comprehensive review to date of P4P. 
We believe that the many lessons learned in this book can help guide the 
Secretary and other policy makers in designing, implementing, and evaluating 
P4P programs under the Affordable Care Act. These lessons may also greatly 
benefit private-sector insurers as they seek to redesign their own payment and 
quality improvement systems. 

Introduction to Pay for Performance
Michael G. Trisolini
Chapter 1
In just the past decade, pay for performance (P4P) programs have become 
widespread in health care despite a lack of rigorous evidence to support their 
effectiveness and a lack of consensus about how to design and implement 
these programs. A positive feature of this movement is that new types of 
health care payment systems have been developed and tested. Because of its 
focus on rewarding quality of care performance, P4P has also provided added 
momentum for improving quality in health care. The Affordable Care Act, 
passed in 2010, features a range of P4P initiatives and pilot programs under the 
closely related rubric of value-based purchasing. 
The enthusiasm for P4P in health policy circles, however, echoes earlier 
enthusiasm for national health insurance (in the 1960s and 1970s) and for 
capitation and managed care (in the 1990s). Both of these policy initiatives 
failed to live up to their early promise. National health insurance was only 
partially implemented through Medicare; capitation and managed care 
were implemented broadly but soon scaled back. Whether P4P will prove to 
have more staying power than those movements is not yet clear. The more 
rigorous evaluations to date have shown P4P programs to have limited impact 
(Christianson et al., 2008). The variety of P4P programs and the organizational 
and health policy contexts in which they have been implemented (McDonald 
et al., 2009) make summary judgment difficult. 
The term pay for performance is used in a number of different ways by 
different writers and practitioners. A good general definition is that P4P is an 
approach used to provide incentives to physicians and health care provider 
organizations to achieve improved performance by increasing quality of care 
or reducing costs. In this sense, P4P differs from the predominant fee-for-
service (FFS) payment system that provides incentives for producing defined 
health care services (e.g., ambulatory care visits, hospital admissions). A 
common criticism of FFS, which P4P is intended to address, is that FFS 
rewards providers for producing higher volumes of health care services without 
direct assessment of the effect on quality of care or overall costs of the health 
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care system. By providing direct financial incentives tied to quality of care 
performance measures and cost of care performance measures, P4P should 
provide countervailing incentives that directly promote improved quality and 
reduced costs.
This chapter includes five sections that provide context and background on 
P4P. The first section reviews the historical factors that led to the current policy 
interest in P4P. The second describes the different types of P4P programs 
currently active, including private sector, public sector, and international 
examples. The third section discusses the roles that physicians can take in the 
implementation of P4P. The fourth section compares P4P with public reporting 
of quality measures, another increasingly popular policy option for promoting 
quality improvement. The fifth section summarizes the challenges and promise 
of P4P. 
Why pay for performance?
Health policy has traditionally focused on the usually competing goals of 
increasing access, containing costs, and improving quality. P4P has become 
prominent primarily as a means to improve quality of care, and sometimes for 
improving efficiency or reducing costs as well. At the same time, P4P has its 
roots in health sector policies and problems that developed from earlier efforts 
to expand access and contain costs. For most of the past 50 years, US federal 
and state health policy initiatives have focused primarily on increasing access 
and containing costs. This section reviews several key points in the history of 
health policy that provide context for P4P and clarify why interest in the P4P 
concept has increased so much in recent years.
Historical Policy Focus on Access and Cost
The passage of Medicare and Medicaid legislation in 1965 was a landmark 
accomplishment that increased access to health care for millions of elderly, 
low-income, and other Americans who did not have health insurance through 
employer-based or commercial plans. In 1973, Congress extended Medicare 
eligibility to people with disabilities and those with end-stage renal disease. At 
the time, those initiatives were expected to lead to universal access through 
national health insurance. Several national health insurance proposals were 
introduced in Congress in the 1970s, but none were ultimately passed into law 
(Starr, 1982).
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The 1970s was also a period of new awareness of health care cost escalation 
and concerns for its containment. One result of expanding access to third-
party insurance coverage was increased costs, especially in the contexts of 
primarily FFS reimbursement for physicians, cost-based reimbursement 
for hospitals, and rapid innovation in health care technology. As a result, 
federal health policy began to turn from emphasizing access to a new focus 
on cost containment. New initiatives in the 1980s included the development 
of Medicare’s prospective payment system for hospitals using diagnosis-
related groups (DRGs) and development of the resource-based relative value 
scale for physician fees (Altman & Wallack, 1996). In the 1990s, initiatives 
included expansion of capitated reimbursement options and enrollment for 
Medicare and Medicaid insurance plans (Hurley & Somers, 2001; Zarabozo & 
LeMasurier, 2001). 
In the 1980s and 1990s, private health insurance plans also faced cost-
containment concerns from employers, who demanded reductions in high 
rates of health care cost inflation. In the context of increasing international 
competition, such inflation often adversely affected their business prospects. 
In response, private plans turned increasingly to capitated reimbursement and 
followed Medicare’s lead by implementing prospective payment systems for 
hospitals and fee schedules for physicians. Many employers liked capitation 
because it sets a fixed annual limit on per capita health care costs, unlike FFS, 
which allows open-ended per capita costs. 
Capitation also has two theoretical advantages for quality improvement. 
First, it allows health care providers and clinicians to be more flexible in 
tailoring treatment to individual patients’ needs, without being restricted by 
a fee structure that may limit the types of interventions that are reimbursed. 
Second, capitation provides more incentives for preventive care than FFS does 
because insurance plans can benefit financially if patients have fewer future 
illnesses. When enrolled patients have fewer illnesses, health plans pay less to 
health care providers for medical treatments and thus incur lower costs in the 
context of fixed annual revenue per person.
 These incentives can include both primary and secondary prevention. 
Primary prevention involves reducing risk factors, such as cholesterol 
levels, before physicians diagnose disease. Secondary prevention involves 
early detection or diagnosis of disease so that physicians can apply early 
interventions, which usually cost less. Some large health plans, such as Kaiser 
Permanente, that had long periods of continuity with enrollees took advantage 
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of these incentives to improve both primary and secondary prevention for 
enrollees for selected higher cost chronic diseases, such as kidney failure 
(Tompkins et al., 1999). However, the quality improvement incentives of 
capitation often were limited in practice because enrollees in most health 
insurance plans switched plans too frequently for any one plan to reap the cost 
savings rewards from more effective preventive care (fewer future illnesses) or 
early intervention (fewer complications). 
Capitation also has two key weaknesses, however, and these eventually 
led to a public backlash and forced insurance plans to cut back on capitated 
reimbursement. First, capitation gives providers and health plans incentives 
to profit by selecting healthier patients (with lower costs) rather than by 
improving the quality of care. Second, capitation gives providers and payers 
incentives to increase profits by undertreating patients once health plans 
receive the up-front capitated revenues. Although some capitated health plans 
avoided these temptations and used incentives to improve care in creative 
ways, enough insurance plans focused on patient selection or undertreatment 
for short-term profits to erode public confidence in capitation by the end of 
the 1990s, and capitation’s promise as an alternative to FFS faded. This led to a 
search for new policy initiatives that could provide alternatives to FFS, which 
contributed to the recent surge of interest in P4P. 
Quality and Value Rise to the Forefront 
Up until the 1990s, the task of ensuring health care quality was left largely to 
the medical profession and hospital accreditation organizations. Government 
agencies and private health insurance companies shied away from intruding 
on what they viewed as the professional domain of physicians. Medical 
associations successfully established and defended that professional autonomy 
throughout most of the twentieth century, enabling physicians to earn high 
salaries and enjoy high status in US society (Starr, 1982). As recently as 
the mid-1990s, Congress almost withdrew funding for the US Agency for 
Health Care Policy and Research (AHCPR; now the Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, AHRQ) because of lobbying by orthopedic surgeons. 
The surgeons were upset by AHCPR publication of clinical guidelines that cast 
doubt on the value of some orthopedic surgical procedures for low back pain. 
Nonetheless, starting in the 1990s, several developments led to increasing 
policy concerns about quality of care. A health policy movement aimed at 
value-based purchasing introduced quality of care into health care payment 
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proposals in the 1990s. In this context, “value” is usually defined as focusing on 
both quality and cost at the same time in purchasing and delivering health care 
(Thomas & Caldis, 2007). The goal is to organize health care purchasing efforts 
and incentives to achieve either higher quality care for the same cost, or the 
same quality care for lower cost, or possibly even higher quality care for lower 
cost. As with P4P, value-based purchasing contrasts with the prevailing FFS 
reimbursement system, where the incentives encourage higher utilization of 
health care services, which does not necessarily raise quality and often raises 
costs. Value-based purchasing did not catch on in the 1990s because concerns 
about quality of care were not as strong at the time (Meyer et al., 1997). 
However, in the following decade quality became a much larger focus in health 
policy initiatives as several notable studies highlighted inconsistencies in the 
quality of care.
 Recent studies have found large and unexplained variations in rates 
of health care utilization and clinical outcomes across geographic areas, 
questioning the traditional reliance on the medical profession to ensure the 
uniform delivery of high-quality care (Davis & Guterman, 2007; Wennberg 
et al., 2002). Since 1999, several landmark publications, most notably from 
the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and RAND, have highlighted widespread 
problems with patient safety and quality of care (IOM Board on Health 
Care Services, 2000; 2001; McGlynn et al., 2003). These studies have helped 
to galvanize federal and state governments, private employers, and private 
health insurance plans to focus their policy, regulatory, and management 
interventions more directly on measuring and improving the quality of care.
Policy makers’ frustration with the lack of success of cost-containment 
initiatives has also led to a renewed focus on value in health care in recent 
years. If high costs are inevitable in the high-technology environment of US 
health care, then the quality-of-care benefits should also be high. However, 
several studies of variations in health care spending from high-cost to low-cost 
regions did not find any evidence that patients in high-cost regions received a 
higher quality of care (Davis & Guterman, 2007; Fisher et al., 2003a, 2003b). 
Comparisons with health care systems in other countries have also 
highlighted the poor value Americans receive for the high cost of US health 
care. The United States spends far more than any other high-income country 
on health care, both as a percentage of gross domestic product and on a per 
capita basis. At the same time, available measures of health care outcomes such 
as infant mortality, child mortality, maternal mortality, and life expectancy 
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in the United States are poor compared with those of other industrialized 
countries (IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2007). Moreover, most other 
industrialized countries have national health insurance covering all or most of 
their citizens, which may explain some of the differences in outcomes. Many 
countries that spend much less on health care perform much better than the 
United States on these outcome measures. Even some developing countries, 
such as China and Costa Rica, spend far less on health care per capita and have 
outcomes similar to those in the United States.
Promise of Pay for Performance
The increased interest in P4P programs is based on the belief that the health 
care payment system can be designed to offer incentives to improve the quality 
of care provided in multiple settings, including physicians’ offices, hospitals, 
and other types of provider organizations. This is intended to ensure that 
patients and payers receive good value for high levels of spending on health 
care. Moreover, many economists have supported the idea of linking payment 
and quality, based on their traditional focus on using pricing signals to produce 
internally motivated changes in supplier (physician or health care provider 
organization) behavior rather than relying on more cumbersome regulatory 
mechanisms that try to impose external rules, reporting requirements, and 
other structures that suppliers often evade. 
Traditional FFS reimbursement in health care has been useful in improving 
access to care, but it lacks incentives for improving quality. In a sense, FFS 
reimbursement was originally viewed as paying for quality, because it enabled 
formerly uninsured people to have much better access to licensed doctors and 
hospitals, who were assumed to provide high-quality care because of formal 
medical training, professional ethics, and accreditation status. 
P4P is intended to bring incentives for improving quality of care directly 
into the payment system. By paying for specified standards of quality care, P4P 
may help equalize quality across different regions of the country and among 
different providers in the same region. P4P can also include explicit incentives 
for other goals, such as reducing costs or improving coordination of care 
among providers.
Up until the 1990s, quality assurance in health care focused mainly on 
inputs or structural factors, such as physicians being licensed after receiving 
degrees from accredited medical schools, and hospitals receiving accreditation 
based on evaluations of staffing, facilities, equipment, administrative 
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procedures, and related measures. In contrast, most P4P programs include a 
focus on process factors that assess quality of care through the ways in which 
doctors and hospitals provide medical care to patients. Process measures 
of quality scrutinize the tests and procedures administered to patients with 
particular diseases, as well as pharmaceuticals and other interventions used 
in treatment, explicitly to check for errors or missed tests or treatments—for 
example, whether people with diabetes have at least annual tests to check on 
their disease, and whether people with heart disease are avoiding high blood 
pressure levels.
 P4P enables quality assurance and quality improvement programs to move 
beyond information sharing and managerial sanctions to disbursing payments 
based on process measures of quality of care. As recently as the 1980s, such 
second-guessing of medical treatment was largely unknown. P4P programs 
sometimes include structural measures of quality for performance assessment, 
but process measures have been the main focus. P4P programs focus mainly 
on providing financial incentives, but linking them to nonfinancial, systems 
interventions for improving processes of care is another approach that could 
be tried in the future—for example, linking P4P process of care incentives to 
point-of-care decision support and collaborative care models (Bufalino et al., 
2006). 
P4P programs could also include a broader focus on health care outcomes 
as the basis of payment for quality. Outcomes include reducing morbidity 
and mortality and improving quality of life and patient satisfaction. P4P 
programs are beginning to include some types of outcome measures of 
performance (e.g., with patient satisfaction surveys), although they are using 
them much less frequently than process measures of care. Process measures 
are usually easier than outcomes to measure and are considered to be more 
closely related to clinician or provider organization performance (given that 
other factors besides medical care can affect patient outcomes). However, 
exploring ways to expand the use of outcome measures is one potential area for 
future development of P4P programs. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS), on its Hospital Compare Web site, has made initial efforts for 
measurement and public reporting of outcomes measures for hospitals, which 
could lay the groundwork for including more outcomes measures in hospital 
P4P programs. 
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Varieties of pay for performance
P4P can mean a number of different things in both concept and practice. The 
field is still young and evolving, with new programs being designed and tested 
every year. Because of the pace of innovation, the terminology for describing 
P4P programs is not yet standardized. The primary variation in defining pay 
for performance is in the definition of performance, which varies by the aspects 
of care or results being rewarded. The main definitions of P4P include the 
following:
•	 Pay for quality. These programs can assess quality in several ways, using 
structure, process, outcome, or coordination of care measures. Such 
programs may also use composite measures to quantitatively combine 
multiple quality indicators into a single metric.
•	 Pay for reporting. Often termed P4R, pay for reporting focuses on 
provider reporting of quality-related data. These programs usually intend 
to develop into pay for quality once providers become more comfortable 
with the validity and reliability of the quality measures and data collection 
procedures.
•	 Pay for efficiency. Paying for efficiency generally means rewarding 
cost reduction or cost containment. Cost measures may include annual 
expenditures for patients with chronic diseases or episode-based spending 
measures for patients with acute illnesses. Alternately, efficiency-based 
programs may use health care utilization measures that focus on the 
number of physician visits or hospital days per patient per year. Some 
payers have also developed composite measures or indexes of efficiency to 
profile and compare provider performance.
•	 Pay for value. This approach combines quality and cost measures. For 
example, a pay for value program may reward providers for improving 
quality while keeping cost constant or reducing cost while maintaining 
or improving quality. Payers may give providers simultaneous incentives 
for increasing quality and containing costs and then allow the providers 
to sort out the best approaches for responding to both incentives. The 
Affordable Care Act health reform legislation took this approach with 
hospital P4P in its Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (HVBPP), 
in which cost savings are guaranteed through across-the-board reductions 
in hospital reimbursement; hospitals are then able to earn back a portion 
of the lost reimbursement through performance on quality measures. As a 
result, both cost and quality factors are included in the HVBPP. 
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The Leapfrog Group and Med-Vantage, Inc., have conducted nationwide 
surveys of P4P programs in recent years to provide a more comprehensive 
picture of the range and scope of the programs in operation or being developed 
across the country. The Leapfrog Group is a coalition of employers working 
to improve health care quality and affordability; Med-Vantage is a company 
that conducts surveys and provides services related to health care quality 
and cost performance analysis. Their surveys on P4P included programs 
sponsored by payers and health plans serving enrollees covered by private 
health insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid. They identified 148 organizations 
that were P4P program sponsors in 2006; 62 percent of these were commercial 
payers, 21 percent were government sponsors, 10 percent were coalitions 
or employers, and 7 percent were still in the process of development (Baker 
& Delbanco, 2007; Med-Vantage, 2006–2007). Moreover, the 148 program 
sponsors sometimes provided multiple programs; as a result, the survey found 
a total of 258 P4P programs, with 130 targeted at primary care physicians, 72 
for specialist physicians, and 56 for hospitals or other health care facilities. In 
addition, these surveys have tracked growth in the number of P4P programs, 
from 52 in the 2003 survey to 120 in 2004, 220 in 2005, and 258 in 2006. 
Table 1-1 includes 15 examples of P4P programs: 4 from the private sector, 
10 from the public sector, and 1 international program from the United 
Kingdom. Table 1-1 illustrates the broad range of P4P program designs that 
payers use. The table compares programs across four design factors: (1) types 
of providers targeted, (2) performance measures used, (3) types of performance 
targets, and (4) the size of the financial incentives. This table provides 
descriptions of the P4P programs discussed in the following chapters, and thus 
provides reference summaries of them.
The providers targeted in the P4P programs in Table 1-1 include individual 
physicians, physician groups, disease management organizations, and hospitals. 
P4P can include other types of health care providers, but these types are the 
ones most widely involved to date. 
The performance measures included in the programs in Table 1-1 focus 
mainly on clinical process measures of quality, but some also include other 
measures. Several programs include structural measures of information 
technology (IT) investment, use of electronic medical records, and 
organization of care. Outcome measures are included in some programs 
through patient satisfaction indicators. Cost or resource utilization measures 
are sometimes included through assessment of drug utilization, annual cost per 
patient or per beneficiary, or cost per patient per month.
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Table 1-1: Comparison of Selected Pay for Performance Programs
Pay for Performance 
Program Providers Targeted Performance Measures Performance Targets Size of Financial Incentives
1. Private Sector
Integrated 
Healthcare 
Associationa 
•	 Physician organizations in 
California serving enrollees of 
7 large health plans
•	 Clinical quality 
•	 Patient satisfaction 
•	 Information technology 
investment 
•	 Measures and weighting vary 
by year and by health plan
•	 Thresholds (1 health plan) 
•	 Relative rankings (6 health plans), physician 
groups in most plans in the 50th to 100th 
percentile paid on a sliding scale 
•	 Public reporting of performance included as 
a nonfinancial incentive 
•	 About 1.5% of physician group 
compensation (2004 average) Goal of 
increasing to 10% of compensation 
Bridges to 
Excellenceb
•	 Physicians and physician 
organizations in Albany, Boston, 
Cincinnati, and Louisville
•	 Diabetes care measures 
•	 Heart/stroke care 
•	 Physician office care—
implementing information 
management systems
•	 Per member per year (PMPY) bonus for 
meeting requirements for certification in 
physician recognition programs in each 
measure category
•	 $80–$100 PMPY for diabetes patients 
•	 $50 average PMPY for meeting physician 
office criteria
Hawaii Medical 
Service Association 
(Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Hawaii)c
•	 Physicians treating preferred 
provider organization plan 
enrollees in Hawaii
•	 Clinical performance 
•	 Patient satisfaction
•	 Use of electronic records 
•	 Medical and drug utilization
•	 Rankings of physicians relative to scores of 
other practitioners
•	 Ranged from 1% to 7.5% of physicians’ 
base professional fees in 2003 
•	 Average total payment of $4,785 per 
physician in 2003
Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Michigan 
Rewarding Resultsd 
•	 Hospitals in Michigan •	 Joint Commission on the 
Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations measures 
•	 Medication safety measures 
•	 Community health 
•	 Efficient utilization
•	 Thresholds •	 Up to 4% increase in diagnosis-related 
group (DRG) payments per admission
2. Public Sector
Medicare Physician 
Group Practice 
Demonstratione
•	 Large multispecialty physician 
groups—10 groups each with 
at least 200 physicians, located 
in 10 different states
•	 Annual cost per beneficiary 
•	 32 ambulatory care quality 
measures for diabetes, heart 
failure, coronary artery disease, 
hypertension, and preventive 
care
•	 Percentage reduction in cost more than 2% 
greater than comparison group 
•	 Quality targets with both fixed thresholds 
and improvement over time
•	 Up to 5% of combined Part A and Part B 
expenditures for assigned beneficiaries, 
depending on both cost and quality 
performance
Medicare Health  
Support Pilot 
Programf 
•	 Private disease management 
companies 
•	 Cost per beneficiary per month, 
includes beneficiaries with 
diabetes or heart failure
•	 Threshold of 5% cost savings, compared to a 
randomized control group
•	 Up-front management fees paid to each 
company, but none achieved the 5% 
savings required to retain at least some 
fee revenue
Performance targets in Table 1-1 focus mainly on preset thresholds but also 
include examples of improvement-over-time targets and rankings of providers 
against one another. A number of variations are also found (e.g., using tiered 
thresholds to provide increasing rewards for increasing levels of performance).
The size of P4P incentives has typically been modest in US programs; 
those included in Table 1-1 reflect this pattern. P4P incentives in the United 
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Table 1-1: Comparison of Selected Pay for Performance Programs
Pay for Performance 
Program Providers Targeted Performance Measures Performance Targets Size of Financial Incentives
1. Private Sector
Integrated 
Healthcare 
Associationa 
•	 Physician organizations in 
California serving enrollees of 
7 large health plans
•	 Clinical quality 
•	 Patient satisfaction 
•	 Information technology 
investment 
•	 Measures and weighting vary 
by year and by health plan
•	 Thresholds (1 health plan) 
•	 Relative rankings (6 health plans), physician 
groups in most plans in the 50th to 100th 
percentile paid on a sliding scale 
•	 Public reporting of performance included as 
a nonfinancial incentive 
•	 About 1.5% of physician group 
compensation (2004 average) Goal of 
increasing to 10% of compensation 
Bridges to 
Excellenceb
•	 Physicians and physician 
organizations in Albany, Boston, 
Cincinnati, and Louisville
•	 Diabetes care measures 
•	 Heart/stroke care 
•	 Physician office care—
implementing information 
management systems
•	 Per member per year (PMPY) bonus for 
meeting requirements for certification in 
physician recognition programs in each 
measure category
•	 $80–$100 PMPY for diabetes patients 
•	 $50 average PMPY for meeting physician 
office criteria
Hawaii Medical 
Service Association 
(Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Hawaii)c
•	 Physicians treating preferred 
provider organization plan 
enrollees in Hawaii
•	 Clinical performance 
•	 Patient satisfaction
•	 Use of electronic records 
•	 Medical and drug utilization
•	 Rankings of physicians relative to scores of 
other practitioners
•	 Ranged from 1% to 7.5% of physicians’ 
base professional fees in 2003 
•	 Average total payment of $4,785 per 
physician in 2003
Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Michigan 
Rewarding Resultsd 
•	 Hospitals in Michigan •	 Joint Commission on the 
Accreditation of Healthcare 
Organizations measures 
•	 Medication safety measures 
•	 Community health 
•	 Efficient utilization
•	 Thresholds •	 Up to 4% increase in diagnosis-related 
group (DRG) payments per admission
2. Public Sector
Medicare Physician 
Group Practice 
Demonstratione
•	 Large multispecialty physician 
groups—10 groups each with 
at least 200 physicians, located 
in 10 different states
•	 Annual cost per beneficiary 
•	 32 ambulatory care quality 
measures for diabetes, heart 
failure, coronary artery disease, 
hypertension, and preventive 
care
•	 Percentage reduction in cost more than 2% 
greater than comparison group 
•	 Quality targets with both fixed thresholds 
and improvement over time
•	 Up to 5% of combined Part A and Part B 
expenditures for assigned beneficiaries, 
depending on both cost and quality 
performance
Medicare Health  
Support Pilot 
Programf 
•	 Private disease management 
companies 
•	 Cost per beneficiary per month, 
includes beneficiaries with 
diabetes or heart failure
•	 Threshold of 5% cost savings, compared to a 
randomized control group
•	 Up-front management fees paid to each 
company, but none achieved the 5% 
savings required to retain at least some 
fee revenue
States generally range up to only about 5–10 percent of baseline provider 
reimbursement. The UK program is notable because it includes much larger 
incentives relative to baseline reimbursement, with a goal of increasing family 
practitioners’ income by 25 percent. 
(continued)
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Table 1-1: Comparison of Selected Pay for Performance Programs
Pay for Performance 
Program Providers Targeted Performance Measures Performance Targets Size of Financial Incentives
Premier Hospital 
Quality Incentive 
Demonstrationg
•	 Hospitals—250 throughout the 
United States
•	 35 inpatient process quality 
measures for heart failure, 
acute myocardial infarction, 
pneumonia, coronary artery 
bypass graft, surgery, and hip 
and knee replacement; one 
outcome measure for mortality 
•	 Composite quality measure 
scores calculated to determine 
incentives for each condition
•	 Competition against other hospitals in 
each module; top decile received 2% bonus 
payment for each clinical condition module, 
second decile gets 1% bonus
•	 Penalties of 2% and 1% for bottom deciles in 
third year
•	 Average bonus was $71,960 per year; 
range of $914 to $847,227
Care Management 
for High-Cost 
Beneficiaries 
Demonstrationh 
•	 Care management 
organizations—6 total, in 
different regions of the country
•	 Cost per beneficiary, including 
beneficiaries with one or more 
chronic diseases and high costs 
or high-risk status
•	 Cost savings per beneficiary for Medicare •	 Up-front monthly fees paid to each 
care management organization; 
demonstrated Medicare savings required 
to retain the management fee revenue
Medicare 
Participating Heart 
Bypass Center 
Demonstration i
•	 Seven hospitals with affiliated 
physician groups 
•	 Sites selected for demonstrated 
quality of care, high volumes of 
the selected surgical procedure, 
and willingness to offer CMS 
a discount on the average 
combined FFS payments to 
hospitals and physicians for the 
selected procedures 
•	 CMS paid single negotiated 
global rate for all Parts A and B 
inpatient hospital and physician 
care associated with heart 
bypass surgery (DRGs 106 and 
107)
•	 Cost savings below the negotiated global 
payment rate 
•	 Hospitals also compete to be admitted to 
the program to gain marketing benefits from 
recognition as a Medicare Participating Heart 
Bypass Center 
•	 Hospitals shared global payments with 
surgeons and cardiologists based on cost 
savings 
•	 Participating hospitals allowed to 
market a demonstration imprimatur as 
a “Medicare Participating Heart Bypass 
Center” 
Medicare Acute 
Care Episode (ACE) 
Demonstration j
•	 Five hospitals with affiliated 
physician groups 
•	 Sites selected for demonstrated 
quality of care, high volumes of 
the selected surgical procedure, 
and willingness to offer CMS 
a discount on the average 
combined FFS payments to 
hospitals and physicians for the 
selected procedures 
•	 CMS paid single negotiated 
global rate for both Part A and 
Part B services for selected 
cardiac and orthopedic surgical 
services and procedures
•	 Cost savings below the negotiated global 
payment rate 
•	 Hospitals also compete to be admitted to 
the program to gain marketing benefits from 
recognition as a Value-Based Care Center
•	 Hospitals shared global payments with 
surgeons and physicians 
•	 Participating hospitals allowed to market 
a demonstration imprimatur as a “Value-
Based Care Center” 
Medicare 
Physician-Hospital 
Collaboration 
Demonstrationk  
(Another very similar 
demonstration is the 
Medicare Hospital 
Gainsharing 
Demonstration)
•	 Integrated Care Consortium 
•	 Focus on gainsharing between 
hospitals and physicians based 
on Medicare reimbursement for 
episodes of care, including both 
acute and long-term care
•	 Hospitals make payments to 
physicians based on achieved 
net savings over episodes of 
care, where payments are based 
on improvements in quality or 
efficiency resulting in savings
•	 Focus on net savings, with quality 
performance targets required for physicians 
to be eligible for incentive payments
•	 Physician payments limited to 25 
percent of Medicare payments made to 
physicians for similar cases 
(continued)
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Table 1-1: Comparison of Selected Pay for Performance Programs
Pay for Performance 
Program Providers Targeted Performance Measures Performance Targets Size of Financial Incentives
Premier Hospital 
Quality Incentive 
Demonstrationg
•	 Hospitals—250 throughout the 
United States
•	 35 inpatient process quality 
measures for heart failure, 
acute myocardial infarction, 
pneumonia, coronary artery 
bypass graft, surgery, and hip 
and knee replacement; one 
outcome measure for mortality 
•	 Composite quality measure 
scores calculated to determine 
incentives for each condition
•	 Competition against other hospitals in 
each module; top decile received 2% bonus 
payment for each clinical condition module, 
second decile gets 1% bonus
•	 Penalties of 2% and 1% for bottom deciles in 
third year
•	 Average bonus was $71,960 per year; 
range of $914 to $847,227
Care Management 
for High-Cost 
Beneficiaries 
Demonstrationh 
•	 Care management 
organizations—6 total, in 
different regions of the country
•	 Cost per beneficiary, including 
beneficiaries with one or more 
chronic diseases and high costs 
or high-risk status
•	 Cost savings per beneficiary for Medicare •	 Up-front monthly fees paid to each 
care management organization; 
demonstrated Medicare savings required 
to retain the management fee revenue
Medicare 
Participating Heart 
Bypass Center 
Demonstration i
•	 Seven hospitals with affiliated 
physician groups 
•	 Sites selected for demonstrated 
quality of care, high volumes of 
the selected surgical procedure, 
and willingness to offer CMS 
a discount on the average 
combined FFS payments to 
hospitals and physicians for the 
selected procedures 
•	 CMS paid single negotiated 
global rate for all Parts A and B 
inpatient hospital and physician 
care associated with heart 
bypass surgery (DRGs 106 and 
107)
•	 Cost savings below the negotiated global 
payment rate 
•	 Hospitals also compete to be admitted to 
the program to gain marketing benefits from 
recognition as a Medicare Participating Heart 
Bypass Center 
•	 Hospitals shared global payments with 
surgeons and cardiologists based on cost 
savings 
•	 Participating hospitals allowed to 
market a demonstration imprimatur as 
a “Medicare Participating Heart Bypass 
Center” 
Medicare Acute 
Care Episode (ACE) 
Demonstration j
•	 Five hospitals with affiliated 
physician groups 
•	 Sites selected for demonstrated 
quality of care, high volumes of 
the selected surgical procedure, 
and willingness to offer CMS 
a discount on the average 
combined FFS payments to 
hospitals and physicians for the 
selected procedures 
•	 CMS paid single negotiated 
global rate for both Part A and 
Part B services for selected 
cardiac and orthopedic surgical 
services and procedures
•	 Cost savings below the negotiated global 
payment rate 
•	 Hospitals also compete to be admitted to 
the program to gain marketing benefits from 
recognition as a Value-Based Care Center
•	 Hospitals shared global payments with 
surgeons and physicians 
•	 Participating hospitals allowed to market 
a demonstration imprimatur as a “Value-
Based Care Center” 
Medicare 
Physician-Hospital 
Collaboration 
Demonstrationk  
(Another very similar 
demonstration is the 
Medicare Hospital 
Gainsharing 
Demonstration)
•	 Integrated Care Consortium 
•	 Focus on gainsharing between 
hospitals and physicians based 
on Medicare reimbursement for 
episodes of care, including both 
acute and long-term care
•	 Hospitals make payments to 
physicians based on achieved 
net savings over episodes of 
care, where payments are based 
on improvements in quality or 
efficiency resulting in savings
•	 Focus on net savings, with quality 
performance targets required for physicians 
to be eligible for incentive payments
•	 Physician payments limited to 25 
percent of Medicare payments made to 
physicians for similar cases 
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Table 1-1: Comparison of Selected Pay for Performance Programs
Pay for Performance 
Program Providers Targeted Performance Measures Performance Targets Size of Financial Incentives
CMS Cancer 
Prevention 
and Treatment 
Demonstration for 
Ethnic and Racial 
Minorities l
•	 Six cancer centers •	 Implementation of patient 
navigator programs to reduce 
disparities in cancer care for 
racial and ethnic minorities
•	 Enrollment of patients in the program for 
care navigator services
•	 Variable by site, includes start-up 
payments of $50,000 per site, payments 
for surveys administered per patient, and 
capitation payments to sites depending 
on the cost of patient navigator services
Medicare 
Coordinated Care 
Demonstrationm 
•	 Disease management 
organizations, including 
5 commercial disease 
management firms, 3 academic 
medical centers, 3 community 
hospitals, 1 integrated delivery 
system, 1 long-term care 
facility, and 1 retirement 
community 
•	 Cost per beneficiary per 
month, including beneficiaries 
with diabetes, heart failure, 
coronary artery disease, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, 
and other chronic conditions 
•	 Quality measures included for 
evaluation, but were not used to 
determine incentive payments
•	 Programs at financial risk if savings 
on Medicare outlays on intervention 
beneficiaries were less per month than 
the monthly management fee paid to the 
programs by CMS
•	 Up-front management fees ranging from 
$80 to $444 per beneficiary paid to each 
program, but none achieved cost savings 
for Medicare net of the management 
fees
Local Initiative 
Rewarding Results 
Demonstrationn 
•	 Physicians and physician 
groups serving Medicaid-
focused health plans in 
California
•	 Well-child, well-adolescent, 
and Health Plan Employer Data 
and Information Set quality 
measures
•	 Varied by plan, with focus on thresholds for 
performance-based risk pools, capitation 
increases, and bonus payments 
•	 Varied by plan (e.g., bonus payments 
ranged from $50 possible per child to 
$200 per child)
3. Other Countries
British National 
Health Serviceo 
•	 Family practitioners (primary 
care physicians) throughout the 
United Kingdom 
•	 146 indicators, including clinical 
quality measures for 10 chronic 
diseases, organization of care, 
and patient experience
•	 Sliding scale of thresholds with points 
awarded for achieving several different tiers 
for each measure, up to a maximum of 1,050 
points overall per practice
•	 Goal of increasing family practitioners’ 
income by 25% 
•	 Payments were $133 per point ($139,650 
maximum per year) in 2004–2005 and 
$218 per point ($228,900 maximum) in 
2005–2006 and beyond 
CMS = Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; 
DRG = diagnosis-related group; FFS = fee-for-
service; PMPY = per member per year.
a  Folsom et al., 2008; IOM Board on Health Care 
Services, 2007; Lempert & Yanagihara, 2006; 
Young et al., 2007.
b  Bridges to Excellence, 2008; Folsom et al., 2008; 
IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2007; Young 
et al., 2007.
c  Gilmore et al., 2007; IOM Board on Health Care 
Services, 2007.
d  Folsom et al., 2008; Young et al., 2007.
e  Kautter et al., 2007; Trisolini et al., 2008.
f  Cromwell et al., 2008.
g  CMS, 2009b; Davidson et al., 2007; Glickman et 
al., 2007; Grossbart, 2006; Lindenauer et al., 2007.
h  CMS, 2005, 2009a.
i  CMS, 1998a; 1998b.
j  CMS, 2009b.
k  CMS, 2007.
l  CMS, 2008.
m  Peikes et al., 2009.
n  Felt-Lisk et al., 2007; Folsom et al., 2008;  
Young et al., 2007.
o  Campbell et al., 2007; Doran et al., 2006; Epstein, 
2006, 2007.
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Table 1-1: Comparison of Selected Pay for Performance Programs
Pay for Performance 
Program Providers Targeted Performance Measures Performance Targets Size of Financial Incentives
CMS Cancer 
Prevention 
and Treatment 
Demonstration for 
Ethnic and Racial 
Minorities l
•	 Six cancer centers •	 Implementation of patient 
navigator programs to reduce 
disparities in cancer care for 
racial and ethnic minorities
•	 Enrollment of patients in the program for 
care navigator services
•	 Variable by site, includes start-up 
payments of $50,000 per site, payments 
for surveys administered per patient, and 
capitation payments to sites depending 
on the cost of patient navigator services
Medicare 
Coordinated Care 
Demonstrationm 
•	 Disease management 
organizations, including 
5 commercial disease 
management firms, 3 academic 
medical centers, 3 community 
hospitals, 1 integrated delivery 
system, 1 long-term care 
facility, and 1 retirement 
community 
•	 Cost per beneficiary per 
month, including beneficiaries 
with diabetes, heart failure, 
coronary artery disease, chronic 
obstructive pulmonary disease, 
and other chronic conditions 
•	 Quality measures included for 
evaluation, but were not used to 
determine incentive payments
•	 Programs at financial risk if savings 
on Medicare outlays on intervention 
beneficiaries were less per month than 
the monthly management fee paid to the 
programs by CMS
•	 Up-front management fees ranging from 
$80 to $444 per beneficiary paid to each 
program, but none achieved cost savings 
for Medicare net of the management 
fees
Local Initiative 
Rewarding Results 
Demonstrationn 
•	 Physicians and physician 
groups serving Medicaid-
focused health plans in 
California
•	 Well-child, well-adolescent, 
and Health Plan Employer Data 
and Information Set quality 
measures
•	 Varied by plan, with focus on thresholds for 
performance-based risk pools, capitation 
increases, and bonus payments 
•	 Varied by plan (e.g., bonus payments 
ranged from $50 possible per child to 
$200 per child)
3. Other Countries
British National 
Health Serviceo 
•	 Family practitioners (primary 
care physicians) throughout the 
United Kingdom 
•	 146 indicators, including clinical 
quality measures for 10 chronic 
diseases, organization of care, 
and patient experience
•	 Sliding scale of thresholds with points 
awarded for achieving several different tiers 
for each measure, up to a maximum of 1,050 
points overall per practice
•	 Goal of increasing family practitioners’ 
income by 25% 
•	 Payments were $133 per point ($139,650 
maximum per year) in 2004–2005 and 
$218 per point ($228,900 maximum) in 
2005–2006 and beyond 
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Private Sector Pay for Performance Programs
The private sector programs in Table 1-1 have several noteworthy features. 
The Integrated Healthcare Association (IHA) program includes multiple types 
of quality measures, including structure (IT investment), process (clinical 
quality), and outcome (patient satisfaction) measures. IHA is the largest 
P4P program in the United States, covering 8 million health plan members 
(Folsom et al., 2008; IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2007; Lempert & 
Yanagihara, 2006; Young et al., 2007). IHA also emphasizes public reporting 
of performance results through a commitment to transparency for its P4P 
program, which is not the case for most other P4P programs. 
A coalition of large employers developed the Bridges to Excellence program. 
It focuses on recognizing physicians for achieving high-quality care (Bridges 
to Excellence, 2008; Folsom et al., 2008; IOM Board on Health Care Services, 
2007; Young et al., 2007). Bridges to Excellence implemented four original 
regional programs (Albany, Boston, Cincinnati, and Louisville) and later 
expanded to include additional regions and clinical conditions.
The Hawaii Medical Service Association is a local health insurance 
organization affiliated with Blue Cross Blue Shield. The Hawaii Medical Service 
Association started its P4P program in 1999, making it one of the longest 
running programs in the US (Gilmore et al., 2007; IOM Board on Health 
Care Services, 2007). It provides some of the largest incentive payments in the 
United States, up to 7.5 percent of baseline provider reimbursement.
The Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan program is an example of private-
sector P4P that focuses on hospitals (Folsom et al., 2008; Young et al., 2007). 
It includes patient safety performance measures that other P4P programs have 
not widely applied.
Public Sector Pay for Performance Programs
Medicare is the largest public-sector sponsor of P4P programs to date, as 
reflected in the examples provided in Table 1-1; it sponsors most of these 
programs. A more detailed description of many of these Medicare P4P pilot 
programs can be found in Chapter 9. The role Medicare plays in sponsoring 
and championing P4P programs will only grow in coming years as a result 
of the Affordable Care Act health care reform legislation Congress passed in 
March 2010. That legislation mandates several new or expanded Medicare P4P 
programs and also provides funding for new pilot programs that will be largely 
Medicare-focused as well. Because Medicare is the largest payer for health 
care in the United States, many commentators have called for it to lead the 
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way in designing and implementing P4P programs, with the goal of providing 
precedents for private-sector payers, as it did in the 1980s, when Medicare led 
development of prospective payment for hospitals, and the private sector soon 
followed suit.
The Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration includes both 
cost and quality performance measures; it expects participating groups to 
respond to both incentives at the same time (Kautter et al., 2007; Trisolini et 
al., 2008). In order to provide incentives to providers at varying initial levels of 
measured quality performance, the demonstration includes both threshold and 
improvement-over-time targets for quality measures. 
The Medicare Health Support Pilot Program targets private disease 
management companies (Cromwell et al., 2008). It focuses on P4P incentives 
for cost containment, but also includes quality-of-care measures to enable a 
more global evaluation of performance. This program includes a randomized 
evaluation design; this rigorous approach has not been widely used to study the 
impacts of P4P.
The Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration is a public sector 
example of hospital P4P (CMS, 2010; Davidson et al., 2007; Glickman et al., 
2007; Grossbart, 2006; Lindenauer et al., 2007). CMS awarded more than $24 
million to participating hospitals in the first 3 years of this demonstration. 
It also includes payment penalties on lower performing hospitals starting in 
the third year of the demonstration; this disincentive complements the bonus 
payments made to higher performing hospitals. This approach differs from that 
of most P4P programs, which reward positive performance but do not impose 
penalties for poor performance.
The Care Management for High-Cost Beneficiaries Demonstration is an 
FFS demonstration that focuses on providing incentives for cost containment 
(CMS, 2005, 2009a). The participating beneficiaries have one or more 
chronic diseases and either high-cost or high-risk status. Care management 
organizations that participate in the demonstration receive up-front fees as 
incentives but must demonstrate Medicare savings to retain the fee revenue. 
The Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center Demonstration ran from 
1991 to 1996 and thus is an earlier example of P4P than the other programs 
included in Table 1-1 (CMS, 1998a, 1998b). It was a bundled payment 
demonstration, in which Medicare paid hospitals and physicians a combined 
rate for all inpatient Part A and Part B services for coronary bypass surgery 
DRGs. (Medicare pays reimbursements for hospitals and physicians separately 
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under traditional FFS.) Bundling reimbursements provided an incentive for 
hospitals and physicians to work together to reduce overall inpatient costs 
because, under the demonstration, they could share any savings achieved if 
their combined costs were lower than the combined payment rate. Quality of 
care performance was assessed in the application process, and participating 
hospitals were allowed to market a demonstration imprimatur as a “Medicare 
Participating Heart Bypass Center.” This approach differs from most P4P 
programs that measure quality performance after the program begins 
operations. This approach is termed a Centers of Excellence (CoE) model. 
A more recent CoE model P4P program is the Medicare Acute Care Episode 
Demonstration (CMS, 2009b). This demonstration was implemented in 2009 
and includes a bundled payment for both Part A and Part B services provided 
during an inpatient stay. This demonstration includes a range of both cardiac 
and orthopedic procedures. As in the Participating Heart Bypass Center 
Demonstration, quality of care will be assessed in an application process and 
approved centers will be able to market themselves as “Value-Based Care 
Centers.”
Gainsharing is the focus of the Medicare Physician-Hospital Collaboration 
Demonstration (CMS, 2007). It is intended to use incentive payments from 
hospitals to physicians to align their financial incentives under Medicare 
reimbursement, where hospitals can benefit financially from lower costs 
of care in relation to their fixed DRG reimbursement, but physicians have 
countervailing incentives to increase volumes of care to increase their 
reimbursement. Under this demonstration, integrated delivery systems that 
include hospitals can provide incentive payments to physicians for up to 25 
percent of the Medicare payments the physicians would receive for similar 
cases. However, the payments must be linked to net savings that result from 
improvements in quality and efficiency over espisodes of care, and not based 
on increases in volumes of patients or other factors. 
P4P programs have sometimes been criticized for providing incentives 
that could increase disparities in care, but the CMS Cancer Prevention and 
Treatment Demonstration for Ethnic and Racial Minorities includes payments 
for programs specifically intended to reduce disparities (CMS, 2008). This 
demonstration is based on a structure measure of quality—enrollment of 
patients in programs that have patient navigators, who are staff who help 
minorities to gain better access to preventive care and cancer treatment care. 
Payments are made to the participating programs based on the number of 
patients enrolled in these programs. 
 Introduction to Pay for Performance 25
The Medicare Coordinated Care Demonstration included a diverse set of 
15 disease management organizations based at academic medical centers, 
community hospitals, an integrated delivery system, a long-term care facility, a 
retirement community, and for-profit disease management companies (Peikes 
et al., 2009). The program paid the disease management organizations’ monthly 
management fees, averaging $235 per beneficiary, to improve coordination of 
care for chronic diseases, reduce costs, and maintain or improve quality of care. 
In addition to other interventions, all of the disease management organizations 
assigned enrollees to nurse care coordinators. However, an evaluation study 
found that none of the programs produced statistically significant cost savings 
relative to a control group.
The Local Initiative Rewarding Results Demonstration focuses on providers 
that treat Medicaid enrollees (Felt-Lisk et al., 2007; Folsom et al., 2008; Young 
et al., 2007). Unlike the other P4P programs profiled in Table 1-1, this program 
emphasizes health care services for children. To date, most P4P programs have 
focused on clinicians and provider organizations that treat adults. 
Pay for Performance Programs in Other Countries
The United Kingdom, through the British National Health Service, has 
implemented the largest P4P program (Campbell et al., 2007; Doran et al., 
2006; Epstein, 2006, 2007). It is noteworthy for its nationwide scope, very large 
number of quality measures (146 measures that cover 10 clinical conditions, 
organization of care, and patient experience), and large financial incentives for 
providers (which can be 25 percent or more of family practitioners’ incomes). 
By comparison, the P4P programs implemented in the United States to date are 
much less ambitious. 
P4P programs with published documentation have yet to develop in 
additional countries. It will be interesting to see in coming years if other 
countries follow the examples of the United States and United Kingdom 
by developing P4P programs, and what types of program designs they may 
pursue.
the role of providers in pay for performance Implementation
The potential conflict between the financial incentives included in P4P 
programs and physicians’ interest in maintaining their professional autonomy 
has raised concerns that physicians should be involved from the outset in 
designing and implementing P4P programs. Although both public-sector and 
private-sector P4P initiatives have stressed the importance of this approach, 
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the best way to organize physicians’ participation in P4P programs may vary 
widely across different regions, communities, and provider organizations. 
Payers may supply providers with periodic feedback through performance 
reports that anticipate future P4P performance assessments and bonus 
payment calculations. The frequency of reporting and the amount of detail in 
these reports can be organized at many levels, however, and it is still unclear 
what is the best approach. Lag time between clinical activity and receipt of 
feedback reports is a common concern in that the lag may lessen the value of 
reports to providers. Some providers have emphasized the need for real-time 
information from electronic medical records or other on-site information 
systems, to provide prompts to physicians during patient visits to alert them 
about tests or preventive treatments that a patient may need and that will affect 
their quality performance scores.
the Question of public reporting
Public reporting of quality measure results for health care providers is another 
quality improvement strategy that has gained popularity among policy makers 
in recent years. For example, Medicare recently began reporting a series of 
quality measures for individual hospitals on its Hospital Compare tool within 
its public Web site, www.medicare.gov. The goal is to provide the public with 
better information on how hospital quality of care can be measured objectively, 
and to enable consumers to compare the quality performance of individual 
hospitals. P4P and public reporting of quality performance are not necessarily 
linked, but some payers, notably the Integrated Healthcare Association in 
California, have developed both in tandem. The IHA views public reporting as 
important for promoting transparency in the quality performance results used 
to determine the financial incentives paid to health care provider organizations 
under P4P programs (Lempert & Yanagihara, 2006). Congress also linked 
P4P and public reporting in the Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program 
included in the Affordable Care Act health reform legislation. 
However, other payers often choose to keep P4P performance data 
confidential to enhance physician cooperation and buy-in to P4P programs. 
Physicians may view P4P quality measures as limited to a subset of overall 
clinical performance issues (some of which may be hard to measure 
quantitatively) and vulnerable to overemphasis if payers make results public.
Public reporting also requires that results be presented in formats that 
consumers who lack clinical or statistical expertise can easily understand. 
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If sophisticated statistical analysis is part of the P4P methodology, then 
consumers may be misled about the significance of results. 
In addition, some P4P methodologies may not lend themselves to public 
reporting. For example, rankings of providers and payment of P4P incentives 
for the top one or two deciles can mask absolute levels of high-quality 
performance for the third or fourth deciles. As a result, provider rankings 
based on quality measures may sometimes indicate only very small differences 
in actual quality measure performance. 
Conclusion
P4P encompasses a broad range of interventions and programs, and we are 
only beginning to discover its potential. A number of program design options 
have yet to be explored, and several types of existing programs, particularly pay 
for efficiency and pay for value, warrant more extensive testing. The Affordable 
Care Act is expected to facilitate testing of new P4P models in coming years. 
To date, P4P program results have not lived up to the original expectations, 
but evaluation studies indicate that impacts are possible and that policy, 
organizational, and professional culture contexts may be intervening variables 
that affect the success of P4P programs. 
The challenge for the future is to identify ways to design P4P programs 
that are better aligned with other interventions at the individual physician, 
practice site, group practice, hospital, delivery system, community, and policy 
levels. Policy makers need to address numerous practical and policy problems 
to make P4P more effective—for example, how to avoid or mitigate incentives 
for physicians to select more affluent patients under P4P, which might increase 
their measured quality and increase existing disparities in care. A related issue 
is ensuring that facilities that serve higher numbers of lower-income patients 
receive sufficient funding so they can compete effectively for P4P incentive 
payments. 
Subsequent chapters of this book explore the range of theoretical, 
design, implementation, and evaluation issues related to P4P programs, and 
review how these programs can be improved for greater impact. Existing 
programs have focused on relatively simple theoretical models that assumed 
straightforward effects of financial incentives on quality and cost outcomes. In 
the future, payers and policy makers need to test more sophisticated models 
and programs that may be termed second-generation P4P, in which P4P is 
one element of broader health policy and health care delivery interventions. 
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These ideas are discussed further in Chapter 12, the concluding chapter. 
Second-generation P4P should reinforce the financial incentives of P4P with 
other types of quality improvement and efficiency improvement initiatives 
implemented at multiple levels of the health care system, rather than relying on 
financial incentives alone. 
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Overview of Pay for Performance  
Models and Issues
Gregory C. Pope
Chapter 2
For the purposes of this chapter, we define “pay for performance” (P4P) as a 
set of performance indicators linked to an incentive scheme. The performance 
indicators are the performance component of P4P, and the incentive scheme 
is the pay component. In health care, P4P contrasts with traditional fee-for-
service (FFS) payment, which pays for quantity of services without regard to 
performance. 
This chapter considers the elements that go into designing P4P systems. 
A very large number of specific P4P schemes can be formed from various 
combinations of the elements described in this chapter. Given the lack of 
compelling evidence for particular approaches, payers have experimented 
with many different approaches. P4P encompasses a large range of real-world 
programs that have not yet coalesced into a small number of accepted models. 
All P4P programs, however, are based on decisions about a common set of 
design elements. 
This chapter presents measures of performance and the incentive schemes 
that payers (e.g., health plans or government programs such as Medicare 
or Medicaid) may attach to performance measurement. We identify the 
limits of the P4P model and offer alternative ways to reach the same goals. 
For concreteness and simplicity, throughout this chapter we focus mostly 
on situations in which payers apply incentives to health care provider 
organizations (including group practices, hospitals, and integrated delivery 
systems) and physicians or other clinicians. Payers, health plan sponsors, 
and policy makers can apply many of the same principles and even specific 
approaches in other situations (e.g., employers or the government giving 
incentives to health plans).
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Measuring performance
P4P systems attempt to reward explicitly measured dimensions of 
performance. Performance measurement consists of several components: 
defining domains of performance, selecting domains to be measured, selecting 
indicators to measure each domain of performance, defining the unit for 
performance measurement and accountability, choosing data sources for 
measuring performance, and deciding whether participation will be voluntary 
or mandatory.
Defining Domains of Performance
The first crucial step in designing a P4P system is defining the domains or 
dimensions of performance that the program might reward. In health care, 
performance domains might include clinical outcomes, clinical process 
quality, patient safety, access to and availability of care, service quality, patient 
experience or satisfaction, cost efficiency or cost of care, cost-effectiveness, 
adherence to evidence-based medical practice, productivity, administrative 
efficiency and compliance, adoption of information technology, reporting of 
performance indicators, and participation in performance-enhancing activities. 
We discuss these in turn below.
Clinical outcomes. The ultimate goal of health care is to maintain or improve 
patient health status. Clinical outcomes are, therefore, a desired performance 
domain. Outcome measures include mortality, morbidity, functional status, 
quality of life and quality-adjusted life years (QALYs), and avoidance of acute 
exacerbations of chronic conditions. However, using outcomes to measure 
quality faces challenges (Eddy, 1998). Some outcomes, such as mortality, are 
rare or observed only with a long time lag. Outcomes such as functional status 
can be expensive to measure in large populations. Also, outcomes can be 
influenced by many factors, and some important ones (e.g., patient adherence 
to recommended care) may be outside of physicians’ control.
Clinical process quality. Given the limitations in using clinical outcomes 
to judge performance, process measures are currently the most widespread 
method that evaluators use to assess clinical quality. Examples of process 
measures include eye examinations, lipid tests for patients with diabetes, and 
mammograms for women in certain age groups. Compared with outcomes 
measures, process measures are often frequent and controllable. In recent years, 
the efforts of several national bodies—including the US Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, the National Committee for Quality Assurance, the 
American Medical Association, and the National Quality Forum—have 
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substantially increased the number of available clinical guidelines and detailed 
quality process measure specifications. However, quality measurement 
in health care is not as straightforward as one might hope. Professional 
organizations, policy makers, and regulating bodies often base clinical 
guidelines and quality measures more on expert opinions than on the results 
of randomized controlled trials. While process quality measures may still 
be appropriate in many cases, there are not always well-established linkages 
between process quality measures and final outcomes of interest (see Chapter 4 
for more on quality measures).
Patient safety. Reports of the large numbers of patients injured by medical 
care have stimulated interest in improving patient safety by reducing medical 
errors (Kohn et al., 1999). An example of a patient safety performance measure 
is the rate of hand washing among hospital patient care employees (a higher 
rate of washing reduces the rate of patient infections).
Access and availability of care. Measuring enrollee access to care may be 
especially important in settings, such as capitated payment systems, that have 
incentives to withhold services. The health plan, which controls the benefit 
design and provider network, is often a natural unit for measuring access.
Service quality. “Service quality” refers to nonclinical aspects of the patient 
experience that may be valuable to patients. Service quality can include such 
factors as patient waiting time to see physicians, patient telephone or e-mail 
access to provider organizations, convenience and length of office hours, and 
so forth.
Patient experience or satisfaction. Patient reports, which researchers usually 
obtain from patient surveys, provide evidence of provider organization or 
physician performance from the point of view of the patients who receive 
medical care. Typical domains include how individual physicians are rated 
for attributes such as communication; whether patients have difficulty getting 
referrals, tests, or care; whether patients receive needed care; whether patients 
receive care quickly; how well physicians communicate; how good physicians’ 
customer service is; and how provider organizations and physicians submit 
and process claims. The number of existing patients who have changed doctors 
or new patients who have selected doctors can also be used to infer patient 
experience or preferences.
Cost efficiency or cost of care. Cost efficiency refers to the cost of providing 
a given level of quality of care or health outcome. Together with the quality 
of care, cost efficiency defines the value of care (see Chapter 5 for more about 
efficiency). An example of a cost efficiency measure is the cost of producing 
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an extra QALY. Cost of care is the cost of producing an intermediate health 
care services output. Examples of cost of care measures include the rate of 
prescribing generic drugs by a physician or within a health plan, hospital days 
per 1,000 health plan enrollees, case mix–adjusted hospital average length 
of stay, and cost per episode of care. Because cost of care measures are much 
easier to quantify than cost efficiency measures, they tend to be much more 
prevalent than the latter measures (Hussey et al., 2009).
Cost-effectiveness. Cost-effectiveness refers to the relative cost of alternative 
interventions that produce desired outcomes such as improvement in health 
(e.g., QALYs). To reduce continued increases in health care costs, P4P 
programs may provide incentives for more cost-effective medical treatment 
patterns. For example, P4P might reward physicians who order fewer expensive 
diagnostic imaging tests that are not considered medically necessary by clinical 
practice guidelines.
Adherence to evidence-based medical practice. Medical practice 
encompasses many practice styles, some of which do not rely on evidence-
based standards of care (Wennberg et al., 2004). Adhering to evidence-based 
standards of care may enhance physicians’ quality and efficiency. P4P may 
reward physicians for following clinical practice guidelines in their treatment 
of patients (e.g., following an evidence-based decision algorithm when 
deciding on ordering advanced imaging tests for low-back pain).
Productivity. Productivity refers to the amount of output per unit input. 
Payers may wish to measure and explicitly reward productivity in situations 
in which base compensation for physicians or provider organizations is not 
tightly tied to work effort and generated output. For example, if physicians are 
salaried, a payer may want to find a way to reward productivity to stimulate 
work effort, efficiency, and provided services.
Administrative efficiency and compliance. Administrative compliance refers 
to performance outside the clinical and patient domains on indicators that 
may be relevant to payers. For example, a health plan might want to reward 
provider organizations and physicians based on their electronic submission of 
claims (invoices) for medical treatment, timely submission of claims, and low 
error rates in claims submission.
Adoption of information technology. Most payers consider measuring 
information technology (IT) critical to improving the coordination, quality, 
and efficiency of care. For example, payers might reward organizations 
and physicians based on physicians’ use of electronic software to order 
prescriptions for their patients. This use may both lower costs and improve 
quality by reducing medication errors.
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Reporting of performance indicators. Especially early in the implementation 
of a P4P system, complete reporting of requested performance indicators may 
be an important measure of performance. For P4P to be comprehensive, fair, 
and equitable, provider organizations and physicians must report performance 
indicators frequently and accurately. “Pay for reporting” is a first step toward 
improving the data to which payers apply incentives.
Participation in performance-enhancing activities. Payers may provide 
incentives for physicians to participate in performance-enhancing activities. 
Participation in such activities could include attending collaborative quality-
improvement workgroup meetings and developing quality improvement action 
plans. The limitation of this “pay for participation” is that payers can measure 
the fact that participation occurred but not the performance outcomes of 
participation.
Selecting Performance Domains for Measurement
Some P4P systems may be comprehensive and include many domains of 
performance; others may focus on only a single domain. Payers may implement 
systems in stages, starting with a single domain and gradually adding others. 
Payers may determine domains, specific performance indicators, and the 
relative size of rewards by considering numerous variables: the importance of 
individual domains; the goals of the program; the availability of meaningful 
measures; the potential for clinical improvement; existing problem areas; and 
cost, burden, and data availability (Dudley & Rosenthal, 2006; Sorbero et al., 
2006).
Importance and goals. Some domains may be more important to the 
priorities of the sponsor of the P4P system (e.g., a health plan) or to its 
members or clients (e.g., enrollees) than others. Many P4P programs focus 
on clinical quality of care. For example, California’s Integrated Healthcare 
Association (IHA) P4P program weights clinical quality at 50 percent of total 
performance (McDermott & Williams, 2006). As another case in point: in six 
Rewarding Results demonstration sites, the weight on clinical quality ranges 
from 40 to 100 percent (Young et al., 2007). Patient satisfaction is also often 
weighted heavily; for example, the IHA program weights it at 30 percent. 
Early in the implementation phase, to facilitate implementation of the system, 
programs may place more weight on adopting IT and reporting systems and on 
reporting performance indicators. The California IHA program weights IT at 
20 percent.
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Availability of meaningful performance measures. The availability of 
meaningful (reliable, valid, and significant) performance measures varies 
across domains. Performance in domains for which a larger number of 
meaningful measures is available is likely to be assessed more accurately, 
facilitating inclusion of these domains in P4P programs.
Potential for improvement. Payers have fewer reasons to focus on 
domains in which performance is difficult to improve (e.g., domains in which 
performance is already high) than on domains in which the need and potential 
for improvement are substantial. A wide range of performance in a domain 
may indicate that it has considerable potential for improvement.
Current problems or areas of poor performance. P4P programs may 
emphasize areas in which current performance is poor or needs improvement. 
Focusing measurement and incentives on problem areas can lead to 
improvements in these areas.
Cost, burden, and data availability. P4P programs are more likely to include 
domains for which data are available or can be generated at low cost without 
undue burden on providers or health plan enrollees. For example, domains 
with measures for which programs can obtain data from existing computerized 
administrative data systems or health insurance claims are typically easier to 
implement than domains with measures that require new methods of medical 
chart abstraction or patient surveys.
Selecting Performance Indicators for Measured Domains
Once P4P programs choose the domains they will include in their systems, 
they need to specify indicators of performance for each of these domains. 
Good performance indicators should be valid, reliable, important, relevant, 
specific, controllable, actionable, efficient, and cost-effective.
Validity. The indicators should be valid indicators of the performance 
dimension that they purport to measure. Programs may choose indicators that 
have been peer reviewed and endorsed by a national accreditation organization 
(for example, the National Quality Forum). If programs use process-of-care 
indicators, the indicators should be linked with the ultimate outcome of 
interest (e.g., patient mortality, morbidity, or functional status).
Reliability. The indicators should be reported as consistently as possible 
across participants and across time. The sample size of patients that the 
indicators use should be large enough for statistically reliable calculation 
of rates. The data underlying the measurement process should be reliable. 
Physicians may dislike P4P programs that they feel do not measure their 
performance accurately.
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Importance and relevance. Indicators should measure an important or 
relevant aspect of the performance domain to which they correspond. An 
outcome indicator, for example, should measure a significant aspect of patient 
health, such as mortality or functional status, and there should be evidence that 
physicians’ actions can appreciably affect it. A process indicator should measure 
a process that has a demonstrable link to health outcomes of interest and that is 
under the control of physicians. 
Specificity and controllability. The indicators should be specific to the 
performance domains they measure. They also should be specific to factors 
under the control of the entity whose performance is being measured. 
Indicators should match accountability with control. For provider organiza tions 
and physicians, one advantage of process measures over outcome measures is 
that process measures often measure factors under the direct control of provider 
organizations and physicians, whereas patient and other characteristics may 
affect outcomes measures in ways that are difficult to adjust for. 
Actionability. The indicators should provide information that provider 
organizations and physicians can act upon to improve performance.
Efficiency. The indicator set should be the smallest possible that is still 
broad enough to cover the performance domain. Too many quality measures 
may impose excessive data collection costs on provider organizations and 
physicians, and the sheer number of measures may cause a lack of focus in 
quality improvement activities. On the one hand, with many indicators, the 
potential reward from improving performance for any one indicator may be 
too small to justify the investment in doing so. On the other hand, having 
too few performance measures creates the risk that provider organizations or 
physicians will focus too narrowly on the selected measures while ignoring 
other dimensions that are important for overall performance in a domain. 
Cost-effectiveness and cost benefit. P4P programs prefer indicators that 
have greater expected benefit of improved performance relative to their costs 
of collection and compliance. It should be possible to improve, collect, and 
report indicators in a cost-effective manner. The data needed to calculate the 
indicator should be available at a reasonable cost. The cost of complying with 
and reporting a performance indicator should correspond with the expected 
benefits of improved performance on the measure.
The availability of indicators that score highly on these criteria may vary 
greatly across performance domains and across particular settings. Hence, at 
the current time, implementing P4P programs that emphasize certain domains 
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(e.g., clinical quality) rather than others (e.g., cost efficiency) may be more 
feasible.
Defining the Unit for Performance Measurement and Accountability
P4P systems differ in whose performance is measured. Performance may be 
measured for any or all of the following: provider organizations and physicians, 
disease management companies and other third-party care management 
organizations, and health plans. We discuss the issues for each of these target 
units of analysis below.
Provider organizations and physicians. Most commonly, health care 
P4P systems apply directly to provider organizations and physicians. These 
entities directly deliver services; therefore, they have the most direct control 
over important aspects of performance such as clinical quality. The provider 
organizations and physician entities that are held accountable in P4P programs 
may be classified into three broad categories.
•	 Institutional providers. Institutional providers include hospitals, nursing 
facilities, and home health agencies. Institutions are important targets of 
P4P for several reasons. First, a large percentage of health care spending 
occurs in institutions. Second, institutions are often large organizations 
with considerable resources. They are more likely to have sophisticated 
information systems that can capture and report performance 
measures. Also, they are more likely to have the management systems 
and organizational structures to respond to incentives to improve 
performance. Third, institutions typically treat large patient populations. 
Thus, events (e.g., treated patients) that are eligible for performance 
measurement occur frequently and allow statistically reliable and valid 
measurement of performance. Fourth, institutions facilitate attributing 
responsibility for care. For example, one and only one hospital is 
responsible for a given hospital stay.1 An example of a P4P program in 
which institutions are the unit of accountability is Medicare’s Premier 
Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration, which rewards or penalizes 
hospitals for their performance on selected inpatient quality measures.
•	 Physicians and other clinicians. Clinicians, particularly physicians, 
control most health care spending because they make the decisions about 
whether to order or authorize care. For this reason, P4P programs tend 
1 This assertion assumes that a patient is not transferred from one hospital to another. Quality 
measures often exclude such cases.
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to measure the performance of physicians and other clinicians. P4P 
programs often focus on the performance of primary care physicians 
(PCPs) because the PCPs may be responsible for managing patients’ 
overall care. The United Kingdom’s General Medical Services Contract, 
for example, rewards PCPs for their performance on 146 performance 
measures (Doran et al., 2006). Although fewer performance measures 
exist for specialist physicians, those physicians are also important because 
they control a considerable portion of health care spending, including 
many high-cost and possibly discretionary services. Payers sometimes 
hold specialists accountable for episodes of specialty care beginning with 
primary care referral or first contact with a patient.
Patients often receive treatment from several different physicians. 
Assigning responsibility to particular physicians is a problem for open 
access insurance arrangements that do not require enrollees to select 
primary care gatekeepers. Some P4P systems allow multiple physicians 
to earn incentive payments (e.g., all physicians who provided at least one 
or two primary care visits for the patient). These are often termed the 
one-touch or two-touch rules for assignment. Other P4P systems require 
a plurality of primary care visits to determine which provider is assigned 
performance accountability. Managed care systems or medical home 
systems that require patients to select an accountable PCP at the time 
of enrollment avoid this problem, at least on the primary care level. See 
Chapter 7 for more on patient attribution to physicians or organizations.
Ideally, programs should measure the performance of the individual 
physicians who provide care to particular patients. Alternatively, 
programs can measure the performance of the physician group. The 
group has the advantages of larger sample size and greater statistical 
reliability for performance measurement, and it may also have 
organizational mechanisms to provide feedback to individual physicians. 
Further, rewarding groups of providers—including support staff—
emphasizes interdependence and team delivery of health care (Young 
& Conrad, 2007). Measuring the physician group also reduces concerns 
about determining accountability among multiple physicians who may be 
treating a patient because some or all of those physicians may practice in 
the same group. 
For these reasons, P4P programs often focus on physician groups 
for patient assignment and performance accountability measures 
(Christianson et al., 2006; Rosenthal et al., 2006). For example, the 
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Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration requires a plurality of 
visits for assignment, but it assigns patients to groups, not to individual 
physicians (Kautter et al., 2007). Physician groups may be traditional 
integrated group practices, other physician organizations such as 
independent practice associations, or virtual groups (e.g., hospital 
medical staff or all physicians practicing in a geographic area) established 
for the explicit purpose of performance measurement.
•	 Integrated delivery systems and other combinations of providers. 
Payers may evaluate integrated delivery systems (IDSs), physician-
hospital organizations, or other organizational forms that combine 
provider types on both professional and institutional components of 
performance. Measurement at the level of the IDS allows payers to 
attribute larger bundles of care, such as episodes, to the provider units 
they are profiling. Moreover, measurement at this level recognizes and 
incentivizes the coordination of care across multiple provider types.
Disease management companies and other third-party care management 
organizations. In some P4P models, payers may hold a third party, outside 
of provider organizations, responsible for performance (e.g., the quality 
or efficiency of care). For example, the Medicare Health Support Pilot 
Program holds third-party disease management organizations (e.g., for-
profit organizations that payers hire to monitor patients’ chronic conditions) 
accountable for aspects of the care provided to Medicare beneficiaries enrolled 
in the traditional FFS program. Third-party organizations have certain 
advantages over provider organizations in achieving performance objectives. 
They can exploit economies of scale in developing and implementing 
specialized disease management programs; because they serve large 
populations for relatively little cost, third-party organizations perform well 
on cost-effectiveness and cost efficiency. Also, unlike health care providers, 
third-party organizations do not face the disincentive of foregone revenues 
when they reduce their clients’ use of health care services. However, because 
third-party organizations do not provide care directly, they must establish 
mechanisms to gain the cooperation of and influence the behavior of patients 
and physicians.
Health plans. Health insurance plans are a natural unit for performance 
measurement because they are responsible for arranging all care for covered 
conditions and services for enrolled members. Because members are enrolled 
in health plans, the health plans are clearly responsible for their care. 
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Many individuals have a choice of multiple health plans. The availability of 
comparative information about the quality and efficiency of health plans may 
aid individuals in choosing health plans. Employers, governments, or other 
health plan sponsors can establish incentives at the health plan level and then 
let plans be responsible for transmitting the incentives to downstream provider 
organizations.
The health plan is an aggregated level of measurement that is far removed 
from the individual physicians who treat patients. Given heterogeneity among 
physicians in a plan network, an individual who enrolls in a plan that has a 
certain rated performance may receive care that deviates substantially from 
this average, depending on the particular physician who supplies treatment. 
Hence, performance measurement at the health plan level does not obviate the 
need for measurement at disaggregated levels (e.g., at the level of the individual 
physician).
Data Sources for Measuring Performance
Depending on the domain or specific indicator, a variety of data sources may 
be used to measure performance in P4P programs. The central clinical quality-
of-care domain is typically measured by one or more of three data sources: 
administrative claims, medical records, and patient surveys. Claims data are 
useful for some types of quality measures that are consistently and reliably 
recorded in those data and that are used primarily for billing by provider 
organizations reimbursed through FFS. For example, one measure that payers 
commonly derive from claims data is whether patients with diabetes have 
had annual HbA1c testing. An important benefit of claims data is that no 
additional data collection burden is placed on provider organizations and 
physicians because the data have already been submitted to payers for billing 
purposes. This benefit does not exist for providers who are reimbursed by 
capitation, however, because they often do not submit claims for individual 
visits, hospital admissions, or other types of medical services. Claims may also 
have reporting lags (e.g., when pharmacy data are held by contracted pharmacy 
benefit managers and the data are not easily available to health plans or payers) 
(Young & Conrad, 2007). Another limitation of claims data is that they contain 
a restricted range of clinical information.
Medical records are generally superior to claims for determining more 
clinically detailed quality measures. The high cost of manual medical records 
data collection is often viewed as a barrier, however. Widespread adoption 
of electronic medical records (EMRs) might mitigate this concern, although 
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the dissemination and use of EMRs remains limited in medical practice. The 
lack of standardization across medical records is also an issue in judging 
performance.
Patient surveys are useful for some types of data, such as patient satisfaction 
or patient experience of care measures that cannot be collected from other 
sources. However, provider organizations and physicians may be concerned 
about whether patients are able to report accurately on technical aspects of 
medical care. Also, patient surveys can be expensive and a burden to patients, 
and they can suffer from low response rates and nonresponse bias.
Mandatory Versus Voluntary Participation in Pay for Performance
Voluntary programs are easier to implement than mandatory programs, 
and provider organizations and physicians are less likely to resist the 
implementation of voluntary programs than required programs. Moreover, 
providers who expect to do well are more likely to participate in voluntary 
programs than providers who do not expect to do well. The lack of 
participation by poor performers may limit the ability of voluntary programs 
to improve overall system performance. 
In programs that offer bonuses for good performance, voluntary 
participation may lead to the same results as a mandatory program because 
provider organizations and physicians may choose to participate based on the 
likelihood of earning a bonus. Thus, if a program is voluntary, the sponsor 
must offer incentives that lead at least some provider organizations and 
physicians to want to participate because they expect that the rewards they can 
achieve under the program will exceed the costs of participating. P4P programs 
that are less favorable to providers (e.g., those that involve penalties for poor 
performance or downside financial risk) may need to be mandatory. A strategy 
that payers may use is to start with a voluntary program to demonstrate 
feasibility and work out operational problems and then gradually increase 
the penalties for nonparticipation or eventually mandate participation as a 
condition of eligibility for receiving any reimbursement.
Incentive Schemes to reward performance
Given a measurement of performance, an incentive scheme to reward good 
performance (or penalize bad performance) is the second crucial ingredient of 
a P4P program. This section discusses the elements of P4P incentive schemes. 
We consider how to fund incentive payments and to structure financial 
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incentives. As well as discussing direct incentives to provider organizations and 
physicians, we also address financial and nonfinancial incentives that programs 
can offer patients for using high-performing providers.
Funding of Performance Payments
P4P systems must identify a source of funding for the performance incentives. 
According to the Institute of Medicine Board on Health Care Services (2007), 
three possibilities are existing payments, generated savings, and new money
Existing payments. Redistributing existing payments is attractive to payers 
because they do not have to add money to the system. One justification 
for using existing payments to reward quality is that payers already expect 
high-quality care, and they should not have to add new money to payments 
to expect provider organizations and physicians to supply high-quality care. 
However, this approach inevitably means that low-quality providers will receive 
lower payments than before.
Generated savings. Generated savings are those produced by high 
performance. Payers often claim that improving quality of care (e.g., reducing 
medical errors and complications of care) will generate savings. Generated 
savings are also attractive to payers because they do not require new money 
and because savings are a prerequisite for any performance payments. Basing 
performance payments on generated savings favors efficiency improvements 
and quality enhancements that generate savings.
New money. Provider organizations and physicians may justifiably 
argue that performance payments should be funded out of new money if 
improving and reporting performance requires new investments and higher 
costs on their part. For example, improving and reporting performance may 
require providers to invest in expensive IT equipment and training and to 
hire additional support personnel (e.g., nurse case managers and IT support 
workers). However, adding new money to the system raises the question of 
how cost-effective the program is. The question that arises is whether the 
performance gains that will result from the system are worth its extra cost.
Performance Benchmarks
P4P programs must establish benchmarks against which performance is judged 
and that will trigger performance payments. The benchmarks that programs 
choose can significantly affect the amount of P4P performance payments and 
the extent to which P4P schemes reward high quality or improvements in 
quality. The choice of a benchmark is thus a critical decision that each P4P 
program should tailor to its goals (Werner & Dudley, 2009). P4P programs 
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have three possible benchmarks for rewarding performance—absolute 
performance, improved performance, and relative performance—discussed 
below.
Absolute performance (target attainment). Some performance indicators 
may have natural benchmarks. For example, for clinical process-of-care 
indicators and practice guidelines, payers expect that every patient satisfying 
the relevant eligibility criteria should receive the indicated service (and/or not 
receive an obsolete or contraindicated service). The natural benchmark and 
goal for such indicators is 100 percent compliance or performance. In real-
world situations, 100 percent compliance is unlikely because of patient refusal 
and other factors, but payers may establish a high absolute threshold or target 
for rewarding performance (e.g., 90 percent). A target provides a clear, simple, 
direct standard of expected performance.
Target attainment tends to reward existing high performance, not 
necessarily improvement. Provider organizations and physicians that exceed 
the target at baseline can enjoy performance payments without improving 
their performance, although they must maintain it. Conversely, providers 
with low performance may see high targets as unattainable and may not 
attempt to improve. Therefore, if the goal of P4P is to improve overall system 
performance, not merely to reward current high performers, absolute 
thresholds have drawbacks (Rosenthal et al., 2005). 
Improved performance. Explicitly rewarding improved performance focuses 
P4P on improving overall system performance, rather than just rewarding 
existing high performers. Both low and high performers are rewarded only 
if they improve compared with their past performance. However, if payers 
only reward improvement, then low-performing provider organizations and 
physicians may find it easier than their high-performing counterparts to earn 
performance payments because improving from a low rather than a high 
starting point is easier. Giving greater rewards to low-performing provider 
organizations and physicians, even if they are improving, may lack face validity 
and appear inequitable to high performers. One way of ameliorating these 
concerns would be to phase out rewards based on improvement after some 
period of time (Institute of Medicine [IOM] Board on Health Care Services, 
2007), under the logic that providers should be able to transition to a high 
absolute level of performance within a limited period of time.  
Relative performance. A third approach is to reward relative performance. 
In this approach, payers identify a comparison group for the participating 
provider organizations and physicians. An advantage of rewarding relative 
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performance is that the comparison group defines the performance 
benchmark, relieving the program designers of the need to choose a particular 
reward threshold and adjust it over time. If the general level of performance 
improves over time, the performance benchmark automatically adjusts upward. 
Moreover, payers can define regional or local comparison groups, customizing 
the benchmark to local conditions and baseline performance. Payers can risk 
adjust comparisons among groups to standardize for differences in group 
composition in at least two ways.
First, payers can use a usual care comparison group. One variant of 
relative incentives defines a comparison group of provider organizations and 
physicians who are not participating in the P4P program. For example, several 
of Medicare’s FFS P4P demonstrations (discussed in detail in Chapter 9) 
compare the performance of participating providers to that of nonparticipating 
providers as representatives of the usual standard of care. An advantage of 
a usual-care comparison group is that the payer can potentially reward all 
participating provider organizations and physicians, if they all exceed the 
performance of their (nonparticipating) usual-care comparison group. In 
a relative ranking approach (discussed next), payers reward only the top 
performers among the participants. If P4P participation is voluntary, payers 
may benefit from creating the potential for all participating providers to 
earn a reward. A usual-care performance standard presents a more feasible 
improvement target for low-performing providers than high absolute and 
relative performance criteria do, but such a standard does not reward below-
average performance. Identifying a nonparticipating comparison group may 
not be feasible in all situations. If a program is extended to all providers to 
maximize its impact, no nonparticipating providers will exist. Then the only 
feasible comparison group is other participating providers.
Second, payers can use an approach based on a relative ranking of provider 
organizations. Sometimes called the “tournament” approach or “yardstick 
competition,” this variant ranks participating provider organizations and 
physicians and rewards only those in the top ranks. Medicare’s Premier 
Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration uses this method, rewarding only 
hospitals in the top two deciles of quality performance (2 percent payment 
bonus for the top decile and 1 percent bonus for the second decile). This 
approach does not consider absolute performance. Thus, high-ranked 
provider organizations and physicians will be rewarded, even if their absolute 
performance is poor, and low-ranked providers will not be rewarded, even 
if their absolute performance is good. The tournament approach provides 
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the greatest incentive for improvement to the provider organizations and 
physicians who are near the threshold that defines the top-ranked providers. 
Provider organizations and physicians who are already top performers or poor 
performers have less incentive to improve. Top performers can simply maintain 
their current relative performance, and poor performers may have difficulty 
substantially improving their current rankings. Penalties for poor performance 
can be added to spur quality improvement among relatively poor performers.
This is a competitive approach that will not foster collaboration among 
providers. Competitive ranking requires provider organizations and physicians 
to outperform others in order to earn a P4P bonus payment. This can stimulate 
higher levels of quality improvement because no one knows in advance how 
high performance needs to be to earn the bonus payments. However, sample 
size can sometimes be an issue in differentiating providers’ ranks because 
random variation may affect the measured performance results and hence 
the levels of P4P bonus payments. For example, one study found that smaller 
hospitals had a greater risk for misclassification in rankings than larger 
hospitals when this type of target-setting was simulated (Davidson et al., 2007). 
Also, relative ranks may not distinguish substantively different performance, 
and ties (identical scores) may be problematic.
Combined benchmark approaches. The various approaches to establishing 
performance benchmarks are not mutually exclusive. The different incentives 
and distribution of rewards established by alternative benchmarks may be used 
in combination. For example, Medicare’s Premier Hospital Quality Incentive 
Demonstration combines all the following four elements: a target attainment 
award for hospitals exceeding median performance; a top performer award for 
the top-ranked 20 percent of hospitals; an improvement award for hospitals 
that attain targets and are in the top 20 percent of improvement; and a 
threshold penalty for hospitals scoring below the ninth decile of performance 
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services [CMS], 2009b). In Medicare’s 
Physician Group Practice Demonstration, participating physician group 
practices can satisfy quality performance standards by exceeding either (1) an 
absolute threshold (75 percent compliance on process quality measures), (2) 
an improvement threshold (reducing the gap between baseline performance 
and 100 percent attainment by 10 percent or more), or (3) an external relative 
target (established with reference to the performance of Medicare private 
health plans) (Kautter et al., 2007). 
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Graduated or tiered rewards. Rewards based on achieving a single 
performance benchmark using any of these approaches—absolute, improved, 
or relative performance—have the disadvantage of not giving incentives for 
improvement along the entire spectrum of performance. This limitation can 
be addressed by a system of graduated or tiered rewards that increase as the 
level of performance rises. For example, in the absolute approach, a payer 
may give a reward to provider organizations or physicians for exceeding 70 
percent compliance on a process quality measure, a larger reward for exceeding 
80 percent compliance, and a still larger reward for exceeding 90 percent 
compliance. Improvement rewards can also be graduated, with payers giving 
larger rewards for greater improvements. A graduated relative reward system 
might give a reward to provider organizations and physicians in the top 50 
percent, a larger reward for those in the top 25 percent, and a penalty for those 
in the bottom 10 percent. All rewards systems are likely to have a minimum 
performance threshold below which no rewards are given. 
Continuous rewards (percentage of patients receiving recommended 
care). An alternative approach is not to rely on specific thresholds of 
performance at all but to pay provider organizations and physicians more for 
each appropriately managed patient, episode, or recommended service. For 
example, a PCP could be paid more for each patient in her panel who had 
diabetes and had received clinically recommended eye and foot examinations. 
Under this model, physicians at any level of performance will always do better 
by achieving recommended care processes for more patients. 
Rebasing benchmarks. Over time, the general level of performance may 
improve. Approaches that use absolute thresholds or improvement from 
baseline to reward performance should eventually rebase to a higher level of 
expected performance. Payers must find a balance between not rebasing too 
often, which gives provider organizations and physicians too little reward for 
performing well or improving performance, and rebasing too infrequently, 
which gives provider organizations and physicians too little incentive to 
continue improving performance. In the context of cost efficiency, the payer 
can financially capture the initial efficiency gain by rebasing (i.e., by lowering) 
provider payment rates, and thereby give the provider an incentive to achieve 
further efficiency improvements from the new, higher-efficiency baseline.
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Implementing Financial Incentives
P4P programs may implement financial incentives in a wide variety of ways. 
Several typical approaches to distributing incentive payments are discussed 
below.
Bonus or withhold. One common approach to distributing reward payments 
is through a bonus pool, which is disbursed at the end of the measurement 
period (e.g., annually) and is contingent on performance. A bonus pool can 
be funded either by using new money or by withholding a portion of regular 
payments throughout the year. For physicians, payers might withhold 5 or 
10 percent of physicians’ fees or employers might withhold a small percentage 
of premiums paid to health plans. The Excellus/Rochester (New York) 
Individual Practice Association Rewarding Results demonstration project 
returned to individual physicians 50 to 150 percent of a 10 percent withhold 
based on relative performance. The Blue Cross of California Preferred Provider 
Organization Rewarding Results demonstration made available a bonus of 
up to $5,000 to physicians, based on their performance on selected clinical 
indicators (Young et al., 2007). In the context of health plans, some employers 
have put a percentage of health plan premiums at risk, with payments 
contingent on performance on administrative services measures (e.g., 
percentage of claims processed accurately), clinical quality, member access to 
services, and data reporting (Bailit & Kokenyesi, 2002). About 2 percent of the 
premium is typically put at risk.
Penalties. Payers may reduce payments to provider organizations and 
physicians who do not achieve an acceptable level or improvement of 
performance. For example, in year 3 of Medicare’s Premier Hospital Quality 
Incentive Demonstration, participating hospitals faced a 1 percent payment 
reduction if they scored below the 9th decile baseline quality level and a 2 
percent reduction if they scored below the 10th decile baseline level (CMS, 
2009b). 
Fee schedule adjustment. In FFS environments, payers may adjust fee 
schedule payments up or down, depending on performance, by adjusting 
the fee schedule conversion factor that translates fee schedule relative value 
units per service into dollar payments. For example, a PCP might be paid 
105 percent of an insurer’s base fee schedule if he or she ranked in the top 
25 percent of network PCPs on performance measures. The Blue Cross Blue 
Shield of Michigan Rewarding Results demonstration allows participating 
hospitals to earn up to a 4 percent diagnosis-related group fee enhancement 
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for meeting absolute thresholds of performance on selected quality measures 
(Young et al., 2007).
Per-member payment. In capitated environments, or plans in which patients 
are enrolled with PCPs, a health plan might pay providers an additional or 
incremental per member per month or per member per year payment that is 
contingent on measured performance. For example, the Bridges to Excellence 
Rewarding Results demonstration pays a per patient per year bonus of $100 
for diabetes care and $160 for cardiac care based on National Committee for 
Quality Assurance performance recognition (Young et al., 2007).
Differential payment update. Payers can reward provider organizations 
and physicians that perform well with a update factor to their payments that is 
higher than those given to provider organizations and physicians that perform 
poorly. For example, under the Medicare Reporting Hospital Quality Data for 
Annual Payment Update program, hospitals that did not report designated 
quality measures received a 0.4 percent reduction (later raised to a 2 percent 
reduction) in their annual payment update (CMS, 2009a).
Payment for provision of a service. A payer can establish payment, or 
enhanced payment, for services that further the goals of the P4P program. 
For example, if raising the rate of mammography screening is a quality goal 
of a P4P program, then the payer can increase the provider payment for 
mammography. Payers could also institute payments for activities involving 
coordinating and managing patient care. These might include completing an 
annual patient health-risk assessment and action plan or performing patient 
education activities.
Payment for participation or payment for reporting. Programs might pay 
provider organizations and physicians to engage in performance-enhancing 
activities, such as developing quality improvement action plans, attending 
continuing education programs, or implementing computerized physician 
order entry. Alternately, payers might pay provider organizations and 
physicians for reporting performance measures, as in Medicare’s Physician 
Quality Reporting Initiative, which pays successfully reporting physicians 
2 percent of their Medicare covered allowed charges.
Lack of payment for poor performance. Payers can deny payment for 
services that appear to be ineffective, harmful, or inefficient. Notably, payers 
may deny payment for preventable medical errors or their sequelae, including 
performing surgery on the wrong patient or body part, leaving a foreign 
object in a patient during surgery, or wrongly prescribing or incorrectly 
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administering drugs. Since October 1, 2008, Medicare no longer pays for extra 
costs associated with eight preventable occurrences, including transfusion with 
the wrong blood type, pressure ulcers, and certain hospital-acquired infections.
Shared savings. Payers can give providers incentives to improve efficiency 
and generate savings by allowing them to share in the realized savings. For 
example, in Medicare’s Physician Group Practice Demonstration, Medicare 
retains 20 percent of annual measured savings and shares up to 80 percent with 
participating provider groups, depending on the quality performance (Kautter 
et al., 2007).
Quality grants or loans. A provider could apply to a payer for a grant 
to implement quality-enhancing infrastructure changes, such as an EMR 
or patient registry. Payers could commit to invest or lend capital to high-
performing providers to build their delivery systems.
Single versus multiple reward pools. Payers can set up multiple reward 
pools to reward performance in the services supplied by each different type 
of provider organization or physician. For example, one reward pool might 
focus on hospital services, a second on PCP services, and a third on specialist 
physician services. With multiple pools, payers can attribute accountability 
more easily, but a smaller number of pools or linked pools increase the 
incentives for coordination of care and overall efficiency. For example, 
given the primary role of physicians in hospitalization, payers might partly 
fund physician performance payments out of the hospital pool if one of the 
performance goals is to keep enrollees out of the hospital. In the long run, as 
provider organizations that can take responsibility for entire episodes of care 
evolve, consolidating multiple pools into a single pool can establish better 
incentives for overall efficiency.
Magnitude and Risk of Financial Incentives
Several important characteristics of financial incentive schemes will affect 
provider response to them. Among the more important are the magnitude of 
the incentive and the financial risk to which programs subject the provider 
organizations and physicians. Payer design choices affect these characteristics. 
Payment frequency is also an important implementation issue.
Magnitude of incentives. Payers must decide on the magnitude of 
performance incentives that they will offer to providers. The necessary 
incentive will depend on the cost to the provider of the intervention that the 
payer is rewarding. Prescribing more generic drugs may be relatively costless, 
but coordinating a patient’s care through a nurse case manager is not. The 
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incentive per provider depends on the total payout and the proportion of 
providers who will receive the incentive. Extending incentive payments to 
more providers will involve a higher proportion of providers in the incentive 
scheme but will lower the incentive payment per provider, holding total 
payments constant. If a payer has a small market share, then to represent a 
meaningful incentive to provider organizations and physicians it may have 
to offer a larger incentive per member than payers with larger market shares 
would need to offer. 
Most P4P systems have started out with incentives of limited size, although 
the United Kingdom’s program is an exception. Reasons for limiting the size 
of incentives include concerns about the validity and reliability of quality 
measurement and data collection, the controversy created by payment 
disparities between providers, and provider market power to resist P4P 
programs. Many P4P systems in the United States provide incentives of below 
5 percent of providers’ total FFS incomes, although this amount may grow over 
time (Dudley & Rosenthal, 2006). 
In this context, studies and reviews of the scientific literature on P4P have 
reported only limited evidence of its impact (Mullen et al., 2010; Petersen et 
al., 2006; Rosenthal & Frank, 2006; Sorbero et al., 2006). However, given the 
limited size of the incentives implemented in P4P to date, one can ask whether 
evaluation results showing no impact or limited impact of P4P are a fair test 
of this new approach to provider payment. Indeed, recent evidence has shown 
more positive effects of P4P, although studies have found that the effect size 
remains modest in most cases and the largest effects are often for provider 
organizations and physicians that have started at lower levels of performance 
(Campbell et al., 2007; Felt-Lisk et al., 2007; Gilmore et al., 2007; Glickman et 
al., 2007; Golden & Sloan, 2008; Grossbart, 2006; Lindenauer et al., 2007). One 
review suggests that incentives of about 5 percent of total physician earnings 
are large enough to attract “meaningful attention” from physicians (Young et 
al., 2007).
Nonfinancial factors may either enhance or dilute the effects of financial 
payments under P4P; they may certainly affect the size of the incentive 
payments that are needed to improve performance. Incentive payments that 
payers make to organizations such as hospitals or physician groups may have 
diluted (or enhanced) effects in relation to the individual physicians working 
in those organizations (Christianson et al., 2006; Young & Conrad, 2007). The 
organizations may or may not transmit the incentive payments directly to 
the physicians. Conversely, some physicians in group practices may free-ride 
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on the efforts of their colleagues. Organizations and payers may also support 
P4P programs in complementary ways, with investments in electronic health 
records, public reporting of performance, patient incentives for adherence 
to care, education of boards of directors, feedback reports to providers, and 
staff support for case management and care coordination (IOM Board on 
Health Care Services, 2007). Senior staff may work actively to promote an 
organizational culture that fosters quality improvement and collaboration 
among staff. Large incentive payments may generate more quality-maximizing 
behavior but may also break down the norms of clinical teamwork that are 
needed to improve quality. Large incentive payments may also lead to gaming 
or manipulation of measurement systems that could defeat the purpose of P4P.
Risk to providers. An important aspect of a P4P financial incentive program 
is the financial risk to which programs subject provider organizations and 
physicians. Different designs of P4P programs may greatly affect the amount 
and type of risk that participating providers face. We discuss different aspects 
of provider risk below.
•	 Upside versus downside risk (“carrots versus sticks”). Shared-savings 
incentives involve only upside bonus risk. If provider organizations and 
physicians generate savings, then they benefit by sharing in those savings. 
If provider organizations and physicians do not realize savings, the status 
quo ante is maintained, so provider organizations and physicians face no 
downside risk. A withhold, however, involves downside risk because the 
payer will not return the withhold to the provider unless the provider 
has met performance objectives. If participation in a P4P program is 
voluntary, positive incentives will be necessary to induce providers to 
participate.
•	 Limitations on risk. Provider risks in P4P systems are typically 
capped. For example, withholds are limited to 5 or 10 percent of provider 
payments, which is the largest amount that provider organizations and 
physicians can lose because of poor performance. Upside risk is also 
typically limited. For example, in Medicare’s Physician Group Practice 
Demonstration, the maximum performance payment that participating 
providers may earn is 5 percent of the target expenditure amount.
•	 Additional versus foregone revenues. Process quality measures may 
involve the provision of additional services, which are separately 
reimbursed under FFS payment. Because provider organizations’ and 
physicians’ costs of meeting the performance objective are entirely or 
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largely covered, the risk that they incur by meeting the performance 
objective is low. The necessary incremental P4P incentive may be small. 
Other quality interventions reduce needed services, thus reducing 
provider organizations’ or physicians’ revenues under FFS payment and 
thereby creating a foregone revenue risk. For example, better ambulatory 
management of care may reduce hospital admissions, which would lower 
inpatient revenues for IDSs. In this case, the P4P incentive may need to 
be larger to offset the foregone revenues (e.g., the provider organization 
could share in generated savings). Alternatively, the provider organization 
may realize substantial cost savings because of reduced utilization, or 
it may be operating at capacity and can replace lost utilization from the 
queue of patients waiting to use its services. To avoid the disincentive 
of foregone revenues, a payer may give the performance incentive to an 
entity that does not forego revenue, such as a physician group without 
an affiliated hospital or a third party such as an independent disease 
management organization.
•	 Business risk of performance-enhancing investments. Improving 
performance typically requires providers to make investments in systems 
and processes to improve and report their performance. Provider 
organizations and physicians incur business risk in making these 
investments because there is usually no guarantee that investments will 
lead to performance payments. The larger the required investments and 
the greater their perceived risk, the less likely provider organizations and 
physicians are to make them. One aspect of risk is the certainty of reward. 
Absolute thresholds or improvement targets have greater certainty than 
relative rewards, which depend on the performance of other provider 
organizations and physicians. 
An approach that payers can take to reduce the business investment 
risk is to pay an upfront fee, either a lump sum “grant” or a periodic per-
member payment, that finances a provider organization’s or physician’s 
performance-enhancing investments. This ameliorates the provider 
organization’s or physician’s cash flow concerns, given the lag between 
the necessary investments and the realization of performance payments. 
The greatest reduction in provider risk occurs if the upfront fee does not 
depend on ultimate performance. Alternatively, the upfront fee can be 
used only as an advance on ultimate performance payments. In this case, 
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the provider is at risk for the fee and ultimately for the investments it 
supports.
Payment frequency. The frequency of P4P payments may also be an issue 
(Young et al., 2005). Annual payments are common, but more frequent 
payments may provide more visibility for P4P programs and have more impact 
on provider behavior. However, more frequent payments will necessarily be 
smaller and thus may dilute a behavioral response. More frequent payments 
may also raise administrative burden and cost.
Nonfinancial Incentives
P4P programs may also use nonfinancial incentives. Nonfinancial incentives 
may require less investment on the part of payers and may be less threatening 
to providers, whose income is not directly affected. Nonfinancial incentives 
include performance profiling, public recognition, technical assistance, practice 
sanctions, reduced administrative requirements, and automatic assignment of 
patients (Llanos & Rothstein, 2007). 
In performance profiling, payers provide confidential feedback to providers 
on their performance. Public recognition, discussed in greater detail in the 
next section, publicizes provider performance and recognizes high-performing 
provider organizations and physicians. Technical assistance might occur 
when the payer provides help to providers in improving, for example, their 
achievement rates related to process-of-care criteria. A practice sanction might 
involve an insurer’s excluding provider organizations and physicians from 
the provider network until they meet a threshold level of quality or efficiency 
performance. Reduced administrative requirements could involve quality 
audits of provider organizations and physicians every other year instead of 
annually if they meet specified performance thresholds. 
In the Medicaid context, enrollees may be automatically assigned to health 
plans, provider organizations, or physicians (Kuhmerker & Hartman, 2007). 
In other contexts, payers may also automatically assign patients who fail to 
choose their own plans, provider organizations, or physicians. The payer or 
sponsor managing the enrollment process (e.g., state government or employer) 
can direct more patients to higher-performing plans, provider organizations, 
or physicians by automatically assigning more patients to them. Providers not 
achieving a minimum level of performance may not be assigned any patients. 
Assuming they are not already at capacity, automatic assignment provides an 
incentive for plans or providers to perform better because they will receive 
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more enrollees or patients without incurring marketing or other acquisition 
costs to enroll them.
Incentives for Patients to Use High-Performing Providers
Steering patients to high-performing provider organizations and physicians 
creates an indirect but potentially powerful incentive for providers to improve 
their performance. Even a small proportion of patients changing their 
providers based on these incentives could represent significant revenue risk 
for provider organizations and physicians. From a patient’s point of view, these 
incentives maintain freedom of provider choice but create consciousness of 
quality and cost differences among provider organizations and physicians. For 
example, a patient can continue to patronize a high-cost provider organization 
or physician if he or she chooses to do so, but the patient will have to pay more 
for this choice and must weigh the perceived quality or other advantages of the 
provider against the higher cost.  The ability to use financial incentives may be 
limited for some populations, such as Medicaid enrollees, who may not be able 
to afford significant out of pocket payments.
Nonfinancial incentives. Nonfinancial incentives may be used prior to, 
in lieu of, or together with financial incentives. They provide a means of 
introducing the concept of performance measurement with less controversy 
than with financial incentives. Nonfinancial incentives create reputational 
effects that may drive referrals and patient choice.
•	 Public reporting or report cards. The mildest form of patient incentive 
is public reporting of quality and cost efficiency information for provider 
organizations and physicians. These reports are sometimes known as 
report cards. Public reporting arms patients with information that may 
help them choose provider organizations and physicians, although there is 
no clear reason why patients should prefer to go to more efficient provider 
organizations or physicians unless these providers offer lower patient 
out-of-pocket costs. Provider organizations and physicians may feel peer 
pressure, or pressure from their own internal norms of professionalism, 
competence, or competition, to improve their performance scores. 
Public reporting may also be a first stage in the introduction of patient 
incentives, to vet the performance measures and work out the kinks in the 
system.
•	 Designation of high-performing provider organizations/Centers 
of Excellence. The next step may be to designate certain provider 
organizations as superior in some way, perhaps on both cost and quality. 
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For example, payers may designate certain provider organizations as 
Centers of Excellence, giving those groups an imprimatur of quality. 
This designation is designed to steer patients to these groups even in 
the absence of financial incentives to use these providers. Provider 
organizations may be willing to accept a discounted payment from the 
payer to achieve this designation.
Financial Incentives. To create stronger patient incentives to use high-
performing provider organizations, payers may introduce financial incentives. 
Payers may implement financial incentives and categorize provider 
performance in several ways.
•	 Differential premiums. Health plans may require their members to 
choose a health care system from which to receive their care or a PCP to 
direct and authorize their care. At the point of annual enrollment, lower 
health plan premiums may be charged to members who choose higher-
performing health care systems.
•	 Differential cost sharing. Payers may impose financial incentives at 
the point of service rather than at the annual premium stage. The basic 
procedure is to create differential cost sharing based on the measured 
performance of provider organizations so that patients pay less to use 
higher-performing providers. Payers may charge lower copayments, 
coinsurance, and/or deductibles for higher-performing provider 
organizations and physicians.
•	 Provider tiering. Payers may classify provider organizations and 
physicians into tiers based on cost and quality performance. The FFS rates 
(e.g., discount off Medicare payment rates) that the provider offers the 
payer may measure cost performance. Alternatively, cost performance 
could be measured by case-mix–adjusted episode or per-patient-per-
month expenditures that the provider organization or physician incurs 
for episodes or patients attributed to it. These latter approaches measure 
performance in controlling use as well as price charged per service. Payers 
may employ standard approaches to measuring process, outcome, or 
structural quality. Payers charge patients lower premiums or cost sharing 
for using providers in the higher-performance tiers.
•	 Centers of Excellence. In this approach, payers do not rank all provider 
organizations into tiers. Rather, payers award a smaller number of 
provider organizations the special designation of Centers of Excellence 
for specified procedures or episodes of care, such as expensive organ 
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transplants, or heart or orthopedic surgeries, based on their charge to 
the payer and the quality of care that they provide for these episodes. 
Patients may be required to use these centers or receive lower cost sharing 
or premium reductions for receiving care for these procedures at the 
designated centers. The goal of this approach is to consolidate volume 
into these centers and to use the resulting higher volume to drive quality 
improvement and cost reductions.
•	 Other methods. Other ways of structuring consumer incentives also 
exist. For example, one of the Medicaid health plans in the Local Initiative 
Rewarding Results P4P demonstration tried providing low-income 
parents with gift certificates as incentives to bring children in consistently 
for well-child visits, but the effort was unsuccessful in that case. Only 
about 3 percent of the parents sent in cards to document well-child visits 
to receive their gift certificates (Felt-Lisk et al., 2007).
Health plan provider network designation. For certain types of health 
plans, plan sponsors create networks of providers. In health maintenance 
organizations (HMOs), enrollees generally have no coverage for out-of-
network providers. In preferred provider organizations (PPOs), enrollees have 
some out-of-network coverage but face higher cost sharing if they use out-of-
network providers. Health plans may base their provider network selection 
largely on the cost and quality performance of provider organizations and 
physicians. Cost is typically the payment rate that the provider organization or 
physician is willing to accept from the health plan, and quality may be based 
on simple credentialing or more sophisticated quality indicators. Network-
based health plans provide a means of translating provider performance into 
differential premiums or cost sharing for patients.
Limitations of pay for performance
Although P4P is currently a powerful movement in health care, payers and 
policymakers should recognize its limitations. This section discusses those 
limitations and approaches to dealing with them. The next section identifies 
some alternatives and complements to P4P.
Lack of Valid, Reliable, and Important Performance Indicators
Measuring performance in health care can be quite difficult. Quality of care, 
for instance, is influenced by many physician, patient, health care system, 
and environmental factors. Determining the marginal contribution of a 
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provider organization or physician to a given process or outcome is often 
challenging (Hahn, 2006). Also, many areas of medical practice suffer from 
large uncertainties about the best approaches. The relationship between many 
health care processes and outcomes is difficult to discern. The number of times 
that payers can observe recommended processes and especially outcomes for 
individual physicians is often small, leading to concern about the statistical 
reliability of performance measurement. 
Health care expenditures, often used to measure efficiency, are subject 
to enormous variation because of patient case mix, which is unrelated to 
efficiency. It is challenging to hold constant or adjust for this underlying 
patient health status variation so that payers can distinguish differences of 
a few percentage points in the efficiency of provider organizations. Large 
sample sizes—a minimum of 10,000 to 15,000 patients per profiled provider 
unit—and powerful risk adjustment methodologies that provider organizations 
cannot manipulate are necessary but often not available (Kautter et al., 2007; 
Nicholson et al., 2008).
In these circumstances, reliably isolating, measuring, and attributing the 
incremental contributions of individual provider organizations, physicians, 
or even health plans to quality or efficiency is difficult. Available performance 
indicators are often driven by the data (e.g., administrative billing data) that are 
available at reasonable cost and that have usually been collected for purposes 
other than measuring performance. Administrative data have limitations, 
however; for example, they may lack the clinical detail necessary to measure 
quality of care adequately. The result is that payers may base P4P programs on 
available performance indicators rather than important or optimally measured 
performance indicators. 
Provider organizations are understandably concerned about having their 
performance judged on measures that may not be valid, reliable, or important. 
Approaches to improving the value of a P4P program include focusing on 
areas that have a high degree of consensus about appropriate medical practice, 
that amass accurate data and sample sizes sufficient to measure performance 
reliably, that represent important areas of medical practice in terms of quality 
or cost, and adjusting for as many noncontrollable factors as possible. Using a 
transparent and relatively simple performance assessment and reward system 
can also promote understanding and acceptance by provider organizations and 
physicians (Folsom et al., 2008).
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Lack of Comprehensive Performance Indicators
Even if performance can be gauged accurately in some areas, comprehensive 
performance measurement may not be possible or may be too costly to 
obtain. If such assessments are not comprehensive, provider organizations 
and physicians may focus on improving their performance in the areas 
that can be measured and neglect areas that are not examined or rewarded. 
Performance could actually deteriorate in unmeasured areas, and this 
unintended consequence may be more important to ultimate outcomes than 
measured areas. One solution to this problem is to rotate measures among 
multiple areas across performance periods (e.g., across years), so that provider 
organizations and physicians cannot consistently do well by focusing on only 
one performance domain or narrow set of indicators.
Prescriptiveness or Lack of Flexibility of Performance Measures
Process measures may use considerable detail to specify how patients should 
be treated in specific circumstances. If the goal of a P4P program is to promote 
the adoption of certain evidence-based care processes, this level of detail 
may be an advantage, especially when exceptions processes are available to 
excuse justified noncompliance with recommended care. Alternatively, the 
performance measurement approach may be overly prescriptive and may 
intrude on provider organizations’ and physicians’ autonomy, flexibility, 
and ability to use professional judgment to decide the best course of care 
in particular situations (Epstein et al., 2004). Measuring and rewarding the 
ultimate outcomes of interest rather than detailed intermediate care processes 
allows provider organizations and physicians to have the autonomy and 
flexibility to determine the best means to achieve ultimate outcomes.
Lack of Cost-Effectiveness
Implementing and administering a P4P program may be quite costly. P4P 
programs may impose large costs on provider organizations. Simply reporting 
performance measures may be quite expensive for provider organizations, 
especially for solo practices, smaller groups, or institutions with limited 
resources and when reporting requires large fixed investments. Such providers 
may need to purchase and implement complex information systems and 
collect and validate expensive data. The investments required to improve 
performance may also be costly, depending on the performance measure. 
Provider organizations may have to hire additional staff to manage patient care 
(e.g., to document which patients are not receiving recommended care and to 
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convince them to receive it), purchase information technology systems, and 
allocate portions of individual physicians’ time to complying with performance 
indicators. 
Payers also have burdens for administering P4P programs. They must 
define performance measures, collect and process the necessary data, evaluate 
performance, disseminate results, and implement incentives. Payers must 
involve, educate, assist, and adjudicate appeals from provider organizations 
and physicians. Organizations and physicians are likely to demand higher 
reimbursement from payers to defray their costs of reporting performance 
measures and otherwise participating in a P4P program.
The value of the performance gains that one can reasonably expect from 
a P4P system may not clearly justify the large costs that the system imposes 
on both providers and payers. The business case for P4P may be especially 
hard to make when the financial gains from improved performance are likely 
to mostly accrue in the future—as may be true with better management of 
chronic disease—but the costs are immediate. The imbalance of short-run 
costs and long-run savings is especially difficult to justify in settings, such as in 
employer-based health insurance, that have a high turnover of plan members; 
the principal reason is that the gains are not likely to accrue to the same health 
plan or even to the same employer as the one that incurs the initial cost.
Given these considerations, sponsors of P4P programs should evaluate all 
performance indicators for cost-effectiveness. For example, insurers with a 
high rate of patient turnover may wish to focus on measures that have short-
term payback. The Medicare program, or the government more generally, has 
more reason to establish P4P efforts that can invest in improving longer-term 
performance.
Unintended consequences. P4P incentive payments may have unintended 
consequences that could be detrimental in several ways. One concern is that 
physicians may begin to avoid taking on more “difficult” patients so that 
they can avoid scoring poorly on quality or efficiency (Epstein et al., 2004). 
However, difficult patients—such as those with multiple chronic diseases or 
low socioeconomic status—may need high-quality, coordinated health care 
more than other patients. 
Performance measures may be risk adjusted for the characteristics of 
patients to reduce or eliminate providers’ disincentive to accept high-risk 
patients; that is, programs might disburse higher payments to providers 
for taking on more difficult patients (IOM Board on Health Care Services, 
2007). Risk adjustment is complex and controversial, however. Adjusting 
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quality indicators for patient characteristics may implicitly create a lower 
benchmark standard for the care of high-risk patients, who often have lower 
socioeconomic status, are minorities, and have worse health than other 
patients. Moreover, whether (or to what extent) provider organizations and 
physicians trust the currently available risk adjustment systems to protect them 
from the potential for negative performance assessments in P4P programs is 
not clear (Dudley & Rosenthal, 2006). If provider organizations and physicians 
believe that P4P payments put a substantial portion of their compensation at 
financial risk, they may demand as a condition of participating a risk premium 
(higher payments) from payers to compensate them for this risk (Nicholson 
et al., 2008).
Another potential unintended consequence of P4P would be exacerbated 
disparities in care (IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2007; Karve et al., 
2008). For example, provider organizations in high-income communities 
might be able to fund IT and quality improvement systems at a higher level 
than organizations in low-income communities, thereby earning a larger 
share of P4P bonus payments. A study of P4P in Medicaid health plans found 
that provider organizations often reported lacking the office staff and systems 
needed to respond to the quality improvement incentives, and they did 
not have the financial resources needed to hire more staff and install better 
information systems (Felt-Lisk et al., 2007). 
In general, P4P incentives have the potential to either narrow or widen 
disparities in health care (Chien et al., 2007). P4P programs can be designed to 
reduce disparities in care, if that is established as an explicit goal; however, very 
few P4P programs to date have been designed explicitly either to limit their 
impact on disparities or to actively reduce them. One program that has is the 
CMS Cancer Prevention and Treatment Demonstration for Ethnic and Racial 
Minorities, a randomized controlled trial that uses patient navigators to reduce 
racial and ethnic disparities in cancer screening and treatment (Mitchell et al., 
2008). Demonstration sites receive monthly capitation payments to provide 
navigation services for beneficiaries enrolled in the intervention arm of the 
study.
Payers may also be vulnerable to unintended consequences. In the United 
Kingdom, doctors initially met more targets than projected, resulting in 
much larger payouts than the government had expected (Epstein, 2006). This 
produced a larger deficit for the National Health Service than the government 
had anticipated. Advocates of P4P programs may believe that they will reduce 
costs, but an exclusive focus on improving quality, especially service underuse 
as indicated by process-of-care measures, may or not may not reduce long-run 
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costs. In the short run, under FFS payment, payer costs are likely to rise as 
additional services are provided (Hahn, 2006).
Difficulty of Patient Attribution
In situations in which many provider organizations or physicians treat 
individual patients without coordinated care, attributing care to individual 
provider organizations or physicians may be difficult; similarly, ascertaining 
which provider organizations or physicians are responsible for the observed 
processes or outcomes is challenging. Analysts may use various attribution 
rules, but none of these may be ideal (see Chapter 7 for more on patient 
attribution to physicians or organizations). An alternative approach to using 
attribution rules is to institute a voluntary or mandatory system in which 
patients choose a provider organization or physician (e.g., a primary care 
gatekeeper or “medical home”) that is assigned overall responsibility for 
managing the patient’s care. However, making such assignments mandatory 
may conflict with patient freedom of choice. Inherent conflicts may 
exist between complete patient freedom of provider choice and provider 
responsibility in P4P programs. Organizational changes that clarify provider 
responsibility—changes that to some degree may compromise patient freedom 
of choice—may be necessary precursors to effective P4P programs.
Multiple Payers with Inconsistent Programs
Most provider organizations and physicians treat enrollees who, together, 
are covered by multiple private insurers and government programs. If each 
payer implements its own P4P program with different performance measures, 
reporting requirements, and incentive schemes, the costs to provider 
organizations and physicians of participation or compliance will be much 
higher than with a single, coordinated P4P program. Working with multiple 
programs is likely to result in confusion and to dilute the impact of P4P (Hahn, 
2006). The obvious solution is for payers to coordinate their programs, which 
they have done in some cases, such as the Integrated Healthcare Initiative 
in California. However, coordinating programs may be costly and difficult, 
especially among competing private insurers, when P4P programs are an 
aspect of competitive advantage or coordination may be subject to antitrust 
restrictions.
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alternatives and Complements to pay for performance
Payers and policymakers can consider using several alternative approaches 
instead of or in combination with P4P to further the goals of improving 
the quality and efficiency of medical care. The main ones are provider 
reimbursement; professionalism/provider education; quality regulation and 
accreditation; malpractice insurance; market competition, reputation, and 
public reporting; and incentives to patients or enrollees.
Provider Reimbursement
The basic system that payers use to reimburse provider organizations and 
physicians embodies incentives for quality and efficiency. FFS and capitation 
are the two canonical reimbursement systems. FFS rewards the provision 
of extra services; thus, it tends to perform well on access but poorly on 
cost efficiency. Capitation rewards withholding services; therefore, it tends 
to perform well on cost efficiency but poorly on access. A payer that is 
particularly concerned about its members’ access to care may find using FFS 
provider reimbursement more effective than adopting a P4P program that 
rewards good performance on access measures. Similarly, a payer particularly 
concerned about cost efficiency and controlling costs might want to use 
capitated reimbursement rather than pay for performing well on cost efficiency 
indicators.
P4P programs can be added to the underlying reimbursement system 
to reinforce its incentives or to provide incentives for performance that the 
reimbursement system does not. In the latter circumstance, if a P4P program is 
going to be incremental to FFS provider reimbursement, the program logically 
should include a focus on cost efficiency. A P4P program that is added to 
capitated reimbursement would logically incorporate a focus on access.
In terms of incentives for quality, if higher quality is associated with the 
provision of more services, FFS promotes higher quality. FFS contains no 
incentives to achieve the ultimate outcome (i.e., good health) and may be 
inimical to it if achieving good health involves providing fewer services (e.g., 
avoiding medical mistakes that require additional treatment). Capitation 
provides incentives to avoid mistakes and invest in cost-effective quality 
enhancements that reduce long-run costs, but a basic incentive of capitation is 
to provide fewer services, especially expensive ones, which may be inconsistent 
with high-quality care.
Given these considerations, a P4P program that has the goal of improving 
the quality of care may be a useful supplement to either FFS or capitated 
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provider reimbursement. The form of the P4P program should complement 
the underlying reimbursement system. For example, an extra per member 
per month payment for good quality performance is feasible in a capitated 
environment, while a higher fee schedule conversion factor for high-
quality provider organizations and physicians could only be used in a FFS 
environment. 
Professionalism/Provider Education
Payers may rely on providers’ sense of professionalism to promote good care. 
That is, provider organizations and physicians may provide good care because 
that is “the right thing to do,” because they are being paid to care for patients 
and want to do their job well. For physicians, the power of professional 
training, ethics, and norms of patient-centered behavior are important factors 
that may limit the impact of financial incentives from P4P (Golden & Sloan, 
2008). Intrinsic motivation—the internal reward of performing a task for its 
own sake—may be as important for some providers as extrinsic motivation 
from P4P incentive payments, peer and community recognition, and other 
external factors. 
The statistics that show that the current health care system provides 
recommended care inconsistently (McGlynn et al., 2003) have somewhat 
undermined this professionalism argument and have abetted the rise 
of P4P programs with explicit financial incentives for high-quality care. 
Professionalism may not be enough to ensure high-quality care, but it is an 
important adjunct to financial incentives. Provider profiling, feedback, and 
education fit in with the professionalism approach. Programs may attain 
performance improvements, the argument goes, by educating provider 
organizations and physicians about their performance and relying on their 
sense of professionalism to improve, even without public reporting and 
financial incentives.
Quality Regulation and Accreditation
An alternative to offering financial incentives is regulating quality. Payers 
and accreditation bodies may regulate provider organizations and physicians 
with minimum quality standards. For example, government programs such 
as Medicare and Medicaid and private accreditation organizations such as 
the Joint Commission review the credentials, eligibility, and suitability of 
provider organizations and individual physicians to provide care paid for 
by their programs or member organizations. State agencies may license 
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organizations and physicians to allow them to operate legally. These licensure, 
program approval, and accreditation assessments may review structural and 
other quality indicators as well as legal compliance, malpractice actions, and 
other factors. If provider organizations or physicians do not satisfy these 
organizations’ quality and other standards, payers can deny payment for 
provided care and regulating bodies can prohibit provider organizations and 
physicians from practicing medicine.
Quality regulation can ensure that all provider organizations and physicians 
meet a minimum threshold of measured quality, but achieving improvements 
in quality above the minimum threshold may be cumbersome and expensive. 
If something is so critical to quality that a payer feels that all organizations 
and physicians that it pays must have it, then mandating it as a condition of 
eligibility for the payer’s reimbursement can be effective. For aspects of quality 
in which a higher rate of performance is desirable but 100 percent compliance 
is infeasible, prohibitively expensive, or not critical, it makes more sense for a 
P4P program to offer incentives for compliance rather than to mandate it.
Malpractice Insurance
Legal actions against provider organizations and physicians by patients who 
believe they have suffered adverse outcomes of care create an incentive for 
providers to avoid medical mistakes and furnish, if not high-quality care, 
at least the usual standard of care. Physicians and provider organizations 
purchase malpractice insurance against lawsuits, but if their policy premiums 
are experience rated, those who suffer more adverse malpractice judgments 
will pay higher insurance premiums.
However, the legal system is a limited mechanism for maintaining and 
improving the quality of medical care. Only a small portion of adverse 
medical events result in malpractice lawsuits, and many malpractice claims 
are unrelated to physician negligence (Weiler et al., 1993). P4P programs 
can provide a much more comprehensive and systematic measurement of 
the quality performance of provider organizations and physicians than the 
occasional malpractice lawsuit. Another problem with relying on the legal 
system is that malpractice lawsuits are very expensive (e.g., lawyer’s fees) and 
time consuming. A P4P program may be a much more cost-effective and 
timely means of improving quality than the legal process. The legal process 
does have the advantage of compensating some victims of poor medical care, 
however, which is not a feature of P4P programs.
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Market Competition, Reputation, and Public Reporting
In typical markets, competition among sellers (provider organizations and 
physicians) and seller reputation are important forces for maintaining quality. 
If sellers do not maintain their quality and reputation for quality, buyers 
(patients) will buy from other sellers or lower the price that they are willing to 
pay to low-quality sellers. Competition on quality can be enhanced through 
credible third-party measurement and reporting of seller quality (Nicholson 
et al., 2008). 
The health care market is different from typical markets in several important 
ways. One is the presence of insurance, which means that payment for medical 
services is mostly made by the insurer, not out of pocket by the patient. A 
second is that quality is difficult to measure and judge in health care, especially 
for many patients. These factors create a strong role for the payer to ensure 
and promote quality in health care markets. Competition on and reputation 
for quality are important in health care, just as they are in other industries. 
One way in which the health care payer can promote quality is by measuring 
and publicly reporting the quality performance of provider organizations and 
physicians. Moreover, the payer’s role in purchasing care means that it can also 
create payment incentives around the quality of care, as in a P4P program.
Incentives to Patients or Enrollees
P4P tends to focus on provider organizations and physicians rather than 
patients, although, as mentioned earlier, payers may use provider performance 
measurement to create incentives for patients to patronize high-performing 
providers. An alternative or complement to provider P4P is patient or enrollee 
P4P. Rather than giving provider organizations and physicians an incentive 
for the proportion of their patients complying with a process quality measure, 
payers could give patients direct incentives to comply, either through a direct 
payment or lower insurance cost-sharing for the service in question (so-called 
value-based insurance design). For example, payers could give patients with 
diabetes an incentive payment to keep their blood sugar under control, or 
they could reduce these patients’ cost sharing for annual eye examinations. 
Some companies give employees incentives for lifestyle changes (e.g., lower 
health insurance premiums for nonsmokers, bonuses for losing weight or 
participating in fitness programs). Enabling patients to benefit from P4P 
payments is an explicit acknowledgement that they are part of what economists 
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call the health care production function. However, only a limited number of 
programs include patients in P4P incentive payments today. 
Patient incentives can complement provider incentives. Patient incentives 
can address concerns that provider organizations and physicians have 
sometimes expressed about being held accountable for quality performance for 
patients who do not adhere to prescribed tests and treatments. For example, 
physicians may prescribe angiotensin-converting enzyme inhibitors or 
angiotensin II receptor blockers for patients with heart failure, but physicians 
cannot force the patients to fill the prescriptions or take the medications as 
prescribed. Similarly, a study of P4P in Medicaid health plans found that low-
income parents often lacked time and transportation needed to bring children 
in consistently for well-child visits that were included in P4P assessments (Felt-
Lisk et al., 2007). 
Clearly, direct patient incentives are not appropriate for some of the 
more technical aspects of medical care that are not under patient control 
(e.g., avoiding surgical mistakes). Patient and provider incentives may be 
more complements than substitutes, but for performance measures that are 
ultimately under patient control, such as lifestyle, it is an empirical question 
whether provider or patient incentives are more effective in improving 
performance. On the efficiency side, consumer-directed health plans put 
consumers in charge of managing their own health care and focus financial 
incentives on the consumer. Demand side (consumer, patient) efficiency 
incentives are an important complement to supply side (provider organization, 
physician) efficiency incentives.
Concluding Comments
P4P has substantial conceptual appeal. It seems logical that payment should 
be related to demonstrated performance on the objectives established by the 
payer. However, P4P is a general framework for payment, not a specific method 
that can be applied in every situation. As this chapter illustrates, a very large 
variety of performance measurement and payment schemes can fall under the 
rubric of P4P. The success or failure of P4P in particular applications depends 
on how payers evaluate performance and structure incentives. As is often true, 
the devil is in the details. 
Because P4P is a general conceptual framework, considerable 
experimentation and evaluation is likely to continue for some time. We are 
unlikely to conclude that P4P universally fails or succeeds. Over time, payers 
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and policy makers will discover and disseminate the successful elements 
of P4P and discard the unsuccessful elements. Payers and policy makers 
will incorporate the successful elements of P4P into other big conceptual 
frameworks, such as managed care.
A major limitation of P4P is that implementing it well in practice is often 
difficult. Achieving a valid, reliable, and comprehensive measurement of 
performance in an area as complex as medical care is extremely challenging. 
Structuring financial incentives to achieve the intended goals while avoiding 
unintended consequences can also be difficult. The theory of optimal incentive 
contracts shows that when available performance measures are “noisy” 
(imprecise in their relation to the outcomes of ultimate interest) and “distorted” 
(improving the measure does not necessarily improve the outcome of ultimate 
interest), the proportion of compensation that should be based on them 
is lower (Baker, 2002). Thus, payers should be cautious about tying a large 
proportion of physician and other provider reimbursement to incomplete and 
flawed performance measures. P4P may prove most useful in specific, narrow 
applications in which an accurate assessment of performance can be obtained. 
Because of the diversity of P4P programs and their contexts and 
environments, evaluating and generalizing individual programs is hard, 
too. Whether evaluation results from one P4P program will apply to other 
programs is rarely, if ever, clear (Hahn, 2006). Rigorous evaluation evidence 
to support P4P’s impact on quality of care and other performance metrics 
remains limited (IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2007; Christianson et al., 
2008; Damberg et al., 2009; Epstein, 2007).
P4P is not a panacea for improving health care (Sorbero et al., 2006). 
We need to consider it as part of a set of complementary and substitutable 
strategies to achieve payer objectives, such as those discussed in this chapter. 
P4P is not necessarily the best strategy, or even appropriate, in all situations. 
Nicholson et al. (2008) discuss circumstances under which P4P is more or 
less useful. An important contribution of the P4P movement, however, is 
payers’ increased emphasis on holding provider organizations and physicians 
accountable for the value of their health care, rather than simply paying for 
the volume of care. This orientation, the P4P framework, has the potential to 
eventually contribute significantly to improving the quality and efficiency of 
health care. 
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Theoretical Perspectives on  
Pay for Performance
Michael G. Trisolini
Chapter 3
The widespread enthusiasm for pay for performance (P4P) in recent years 
reflects an underlying theory that we can improve the quality and efficiency 
of medical care by focusing on economic incentives. By paying more for 
evidence-based preventive care services and denying payment for preventable 
complications, to cite two examples, we can provide financial incentives that 
we expect will encourage physicians and health care provider organizations 
to improve the quality of care. Similarly, by paying bonuses for efficiency 
improvements, such as reducing hospital admissions per 1,000 chronic disease 
patients, we expect to motivate reductions in utilization of care and overall 
costs. However, the documented impacts of P4P to date have not lived up to 
expectations. 
This chapter examines theoretical perspectives from economics, sociology, 
psychology, and organization theory to broaden our understanding of the 
range of factors affecting health care quality and cost outcomes and better 
understand why the focus of P4P on economic incentives has had limited 
impact. These theoretical perspectives describe the ways in which other 
factors—such as the social norms of professionalism among physicians, 
the range of motivational factors affecting physician behavior, and the 
organizational settings in which clinicians practice—affect the influence of 
economic incentives on the outcomes of P4P programs. 
For example, we can view basic concepts in sociology and economics 
as presenting contrasting theories of physician behavior (Gray, 2004). The 
sociological perspective emphasizes physicians’ extensive training and 
socialization, and the way in which that context leads them to provide good-
quality care except in cases in which negative financial incentives disrupt their 
efforts. The economic perspective argues that financial rewards are important 
in motivating physicians (and workers of all types), and thus we need to 
implement financial incentives that focus specifically on quality of care. This 
approach will ensure that physicians do not neglect quality in favor of other 
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goals—such as the volume of care provided—that may be more remunerative 
in some situations. In reality, both perspectives have merit, so we should view 
neither in isolation. P4P programs, however, may need to emphasize either 
approach, depending on the range of policy, technology, organizational, 
motivational, and patient factors present in a particular medical practice 
setting.
The high levels of complexity in today’s health care sector mean that 
focusing solely on economic incentives may have unintended consequences. 
For example, despite the recent advances in medical technology, physicians 
still must often make high-stakes diagnoses and treatment decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty and ambiguity (Town et al., 2004). Scientific data 
from randomized controlled trials, systematic evidence reviews, and other 
products of evidence-based medicine may be available for only a minority 
of a physician’s patients. Patients with multiple chronic diseases may present 
clinical challenges for which few scientific guidelines are available; the full 
range of interactions between different diseases and treatments may be 
unknown. Patients’ actions, which physicians cannot always anticipate, can 
also enhance or hinder the effects of treatments. Physicians may practice 
in multiple settings and treat patients covered by a range of different health 
insurance plans. Moreover, the legal system impinges on health professionals 
and provider organizations through the threat of malpractice suits and myriad 
regulatory requirements. As a result, physicians and provider organizations 
may respond in unexpected ways to the economic incentives of P4P programs 
because the incentives are operating in the context of these other forces that are 
also at work at the same time in the health sector. 
The next section of this chapter reviews theoretical perspectives from 
economics, sociology, psychology, and organization theory, with a focus on 
the ways in which they all can have implications for P4P. The final section of 
the chapter discusses the need for a multidisciplinary, composite model that 
includes the broad range of factors affecting the behavior of physicians and 
health care organizations. It also reviews how policy makers can use a broader 
model of that type to improve the design of P4P programs and increase their 
impact on health care outcomes. 
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theoretical perspectives on health Care
Economics
Market mechanisms that make economic incentives effective for price setting 
and cost-control in other industries often weaken or fail the health care sector 
for two main reasons: (1) insurance payment for medical services, and (2) 
lack of consumer knowledge regarding the desired attributes of medical care. 
Health insurance lowers the net price of care to consumers, resulting in higher 
utilization at lower marginal value. Economists term this tendency the “moral 
hazard”: patients who have health insurance often consume more health care 
than they would otherwise (and raise the overall costs of health care), because 
they are not paying out of their own pockets. Consumers may also overvalue or 
undervalue a broad array of medical services by lacking knowledge regarding 
exactly how these services contribute to quality of care in terms of accurately 
diagnosing and treating their diseases and symptoms. As a result, consumers 
delegate most medical diagnosis and treatment decisions to professional 
experts, most prominently physicians. 
Arrow (1963), in his foundational article on health economics, recognized 
the asymmetry of information between patients and physicians. A decade later, 
economists began developing new theories of the value of information—for 
example, in analysis of used car “lemons”—that provided analytic approaches 
to address the problem of physicians as imperfect “agents” for their patients 
(Akerlof, 1970). These new approaches focus on “agency theory,” which 
examines optimal contracts and payment systems between principals (patients, 
insurers) and agents (physicians) under conditions of uncertainty and 
information asymmetry (Christianson et al., 2006; Eisenhardt, 1989; Golden & 
Sloan, 2008; Robinson, 2001; Town et al., 2004). 
Agents can take advantage of information asymmetry to increase earnings, 
reduce work hours, or increase their prestige with colleagues. Physicians 
may spend less time ensuring that they correctly diagnose one patient’s 
condition so that they can see other patients and gain additional revenue. 
After making the diagnosis, physicians may choose a more expensive course 
of treatment to increase their own billings or those of colleagues whom 
they expect to reciprocate with future referrals. Physicians can also earn 
supplemental income if they hold equity ownership in facilities used to test or 
treat patients (e.g., ambulatory surgery centers, laboratories, imaging centers). 
Clinical uncertainty can exacerbate this situation. When clinical guidelines 
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do not provide specific guidance on treatment protocols, as is often the case, 
physicians may have more latitude regarding ordering tests and treatments. 
All these factors could compromise quality of care in subtle, hard-to-
measure ways. As in most principal-agent problems, the principals have 
difficulty monitoring the quality of the work the agents provide. Even if it 
were technically feasible, the cost of monitoring quality may be prohibitive for 
individual patients. As a result, health care consumers cannot make optimal 
purchasing decisions, unlike those in other sectors of the economy, where 
quality and price information is more evenly distributed between consumers 
and producers. 
To make matters worse, most physicians in the United States are reimbursed 
on a fee-for-service (FFS) basis, which the business sector calls “piece-rate” 
compensation. Economists generally view piece-rate compensation as a poor 
solution to the principal-agent problem in that it encourages exploitation of 
information asymmetries (Robinson, 2001). Piece-rate compensation gives 
physicians financial incentives to increase the quantity of services provided at 
the expense of quality when the deficiencies in quality are difficult to detect. 
P4P is intended to address these principal-agent problems in health 
care in two ways: (1) by providing objective quality measures and (2) by 
linking payment to improvements in performance. First, evidence reviews 
or physician consensus panels develop clinical guidelines that are used to 
develop quality measures. National groups such as the National Committee 
for Quality Assurance and the National Quality Forum oversee development 
and dissemination of these measures. Patients and their insurers can rely on 
these organizations to help them in their roles as principals, by reducing their 
information asymmetries with physicians and hospitals. Second, by linking 
some portion of physician or hospital payment to improvements in these 
objective measures of quality performance, P4P provides economic incentives 
for improving quality rather than for increasing the quantity of services 
provided, as is the case under FFS.
The P4P economic incentives for improving quality can be effective, but 
countervailing economic incentives are often strong and the design of P4P 
programs sometimes underestimates them. Two large and countervailing 
economic factors are the much larger size of FFS reimbursement compared 
with P4P payments and the threat of malpractice lawsuits that encourages the 
practice of defensive medicine. Both of these forces provide strong economic 
incentives to increase use of health care services without necessarily focusing 
 Theoretical Perspectives on Pay for Performance 81
on those that increase quality of care. This could be one explanation for the 
limited impact of P4P programs, when examining only other economic factors, 
even before considering the sociological, psychological, and organizational 
factors discussed later in this chapter.
The business sector’s experience with P4P provides additional perspectives 
regarding the economic incentives often promoted in the health policy debate 
over P4P. The business sector uses a different terminology for P4P, calling it 
“variable pay,” a category that includes piece-rate payment, merit-based pay, 
bonuses, profit-sharing plans, gainsharing, and employee stock ownership 
plans (Robbins & Judge, 2009). In the business sector, the goal is to move 
away from basing pay increases on time on the job or seniority, as has been 
traditional in some industries, and instead shifting to a system in which at 
least a portion of an employee’s pay is based on an individual or organizational 
measure of performance. However, contrary to many health sector policy 
makers’ impression of the success of P4P economic incentives in the business 
sector, research has shown only mixed results from variable pay systems in 
business settings. 
P4P programs in health care are similar to the business sector model known 
as merit-based pay, in which performance appraisal ratings drive pay increases. 
Research in business organizations has shown that if merit pay systems are well 
designed, and if employees perceive a strong relationship between performance 
and rewards, they can succeed in improving employees’ motivation (Robbins & 
Judge, 2009). 
However, business researchers have also found that, in practice, merit 
pay systems have at least five types of limitations (Robbins & Judge, 2009; 
Packwood, 2008). First, the merit pay is only as valid as the performance 
ratings on which it is based, and both workers and managers often perceive the 
ratings as problematic. For example, the impact of merit pay on the volume of 
production may be larger because it is easier to measure volume than quality 
in most industries. Second, the amounts available for pay raises may fluctuate 
based on economic conditions unrelated to an employee’s performance, 
so good performance may sometimes result only in small rewards. Third, 
organized groups of workers, such as unions, may resist attempts to institute 
individual rewards for individual performance that may undermine group 
cohesion. Fourth, individual rewards provide disincentives for cooperation and 
collaboration among employees. Fifth, both employees and managers express 
frustration about the time and effort required for the performance review 
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process, which often fails to achieve genuine pay for performance. Similar 
concerns have also emerged in regard to health-sector P4P efforts.
Rynes and colleagues (2005) reviewed the management literature and 
found little evidence regarding the impact of merit pay systems, which they 
found surprising in the context of their widespread use as P4P programs in the 
business sector. Available studies they reviewed showed mixed impacts of merit 
pay, some positive and some null. They noted that the difficulties of clearly 
linking pay to performance and challenges in developing credible measures of 
performance impeded rigorous research on this topic. Jenkins and colleagues 
(1998) conducted a meta-analysis of 39 studies to examine the quantitative 
impact of business-sector P4P programs. They found a positive relationship 
between financial incentives and performance quantity, but no relationship 
with performance quality. Packwood (2008) found that no available studies 
provide conclusive proof of positive impacts of variable pay plans on business 
results.
In sum, although economic incentives are important, they may not be 
sufficient alone to ensure that P4P programs are effective, in either the health 
sector or the business sector. Policy makers must also consider additional 
factors and incorporate them into the design of health care P4P programs. 
Sociology
Medical education provides one of the most intensive technical training and 
professional socialization processes of any occupation (Town et al., 2004). The 
technical training is long, including 4 years of medical school and 3 or more 
years of residency. The training is also rigorous: extensive memorization of 
anatomy and physiology; detailed practice in analytical reasoning for diagnosis 
and treatment; extensive review of the range of available diagnostic tests, 
therapeutic procedures, and pharmaceutical treatments; detailed practice in the 
use of technologies; and training for the emotional detachment and confidence 
needed to conduct often painful and invasive procedures on patients. The 
socialization that accompanies this technical training in medicine has several 
common features:
•	 commitment	to	taking	strong	personal	responsibility	for	patients;
•	 high	degree	of	dependability	when	working	in	medical	teams;
•	 confidence	in	knowledge	and	skills	as	a	medical	professional;
•	 commitment	to	patient	care	decisions	based	on	scientific	judgment	when	
possible, but under uncertainty when necessary;
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•	 emotional	detachment	from	processes	and	outcomes;
•	 strong	peer	orientation	toward	physician	colleagues;
•	 rigid	lines	of	authority	and	decision	hierarchies;	and
•	 commitment	to	long,	hard	hours	of	work	in	a	high-technology	and	high-
risk environment.
Medical training teaches physicians to take personal responsibility for 
their patients and to be highly dependable. In the operating room and at the 
bedside, physicians must exude confidence in their ability to diagnose and 
recommend when and how to treat. Whatever doubts they may have must be 
quickly cleared up (e.g., with another test) or sublimated when interacting with 
patients and families. Because physicians may make life and death decisions, 
medical training teaches them the limits of their knowledge and the truism 
that some patients simply respond differently from everyone else to treatment. 
They often seek out specialized expertise from their physician colleagues who 
may be able to help avert mistakes and who understand these issues as few 
others do. At the same time, physicians learn that they often need to proceed 
with a treatment in situations of clinical uncertainty, which occur much 
more frequently than the general public realizes. This leads to an emotional 
detachment from their patients that is necessary in order to be able to return to 
work the next hour or the next day after an experience of failure (Kirk, 2007). 
Since the 1920s, medicine has met all of the sociological characteristics of 
a profession, in being a service occupation supported by prolonged training 
and specialized knowledge that determines its own standards of education and 
training. It successfully recruits the best and the brightest students, controls its 
own licensing boards, influences legislation to advance its own interests, and, at 
least historically, has remained mostly free of formal lay evaluation and control 
(Cockerham, 2007). Ultimately, clinicians become different from most other 
people in ways that are key to understanding how best to reward them (or not) 
for their services under P4P. 
In their training, physicians become accustomed to hierarchical 
arrangements as they move from student to resident to attending physician. 
In addition, given the downside risks from incompetence, merit and scientific 
qualifications necessarily play a prominent role in career progression. 
Consequently, physicians often have greater difficulty than nonphysicians in 
accepting direction from those with less training in their field (e.g., health 
insurance company staff sending them P4P quality performance reports with 
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highlighted areas for improvement or hospital business managers pressuring 
them to change practice patterns to reduce costs). They will not “suffer 
fools gladly” if a P4P approach is inconsistent with their perception of what 
constitutes a necessary and effective course of care.
At the same time, in recent years the cumulative effect of written guidelines, 
second opinion requirements, documentation requirements, and regulatory 
intrusions into their practice has touched off a process in medicine that 
sociologists term “deprofessionalization” (Cockerham, 2007). Medical work, 
no longer the sole purview of physicians, is now under greater scrutiny by 
patients, health care provider organizations, health insurance organizations, 
business corporations, and government agencies. Health care purchasers want 
to know more about what exactly they are getting for their money. Ironically, 
medicine’s technical capability to diagnose and treat diseases has steadily been 
increasing during this time, over the past several decades, just as the medical 
profession’s autonomy has been diminishing. 
Studies have found that physicians often have difficulty living up to the 
public tenets of medical professionalism, and this has eroded their public 
support. Core tenets such as always providing the highest quality care for 
patients, putting patients’ interests ahead of the physician’s own career or 
financial interests, and commitment to science, are ideals—but hard to fulfill 
in the realities of practice with heavy workloads and uncertain reimbursement 
(Wynia, 2009). For example, physicians are often unwilling to criticize one 
another in public for fear of reprisals and in recognition of common interests 
(Cockerham, 2007). In a physician survey of attitudes and behaviors toward 
professionalism, Campbell et al. (2007) found that 
•	 85	percent	believed	that	physicians	should	disclose	all	medical	errors	to	
affected patients,
•	 77	percent	believed	physicians	should	undergo	periodic	recertification,	
•	 46	percent	had	personal	knowledge	of	one	or	more	serious	medical	errors	
and did not report them to the hospital or other relevant authorities in 
every case, 
•	 45	percent	had	encountered	impaired	or	incompetent	colleagues	and	had	
not reported them,
•	 36	percent	would	order	an	unneeded	magnetic	resonance	imaging	(MRI)	
scan for low back pain if a patient requested it,
•	 31	percent	were	not	accepting	uninsured	patients	who	were	unable	to	pay,	
and
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•	 24	percent	would	refer	patients	to	an	imaging	facility	in	which	they	had	
an investment and would not inform the patient of that investment. 
These results indicate that the ethical and professional standards 
highlighted, and perhaps idealized, during a physician’s professional training 
have been difficult to sustain. 
P4P can cut two ways in response to physicians’ concerns about 
deprofessionalization. If external government agencies or insurance 
organizations impose P4P, physicians may perceive the move as contributing 
to deprofessionalization. On the other hand, if physician groups themselves 
organize P4P programs, then this approach could reinforce physicians’ 
leadership in quality of care measurement. It could also provide additional 
payment for services that often go unreimbursed under FFS, such as case 
management and patient and family education, thereby helping physicians to 
improve quality of care (Wynia, 2009). In these ways, the influence of concerns 
regarding professionalism on physicians’ responses to the economic incentives 
of P4P could be either positive or negative, and they could enhance or inhibit 
the impact of P4P.
Psychology
We can also apply psychological theories and concepts to understand physician 
behavior for analysis and design of P4P programs. Herzberg’s two-factor 
theory postulates two types of factors that affect workers’ motivation in 
many industries and organizational settings: (1) motivators that encourage 
productive work and (2) dissatisfiers (Herzberg, 1966; Shortell & Kaluzny, 
2006). Golden and Sloan (2008) similarly categorized motivators as extrinsic 
and intrinsic. Table 3-1 includes examples of extrinsic and intrinsic motivators 
for physicians.
Table 3-1. Extrinsic and intrinsic work motivators for physicians
Extrinsic Motivators Intrinsic Motivators
Money, fringe benefits, perquisites 
(discretionary fringe benefits)
Accomplishment of difficult tasks, correct 
diagnoses, effective treatments
Workload, working conditions Learning new skills 
Avoiding paperwork, bureaucracy Link between effort and successful outcomes
Extent and nature of job hierarchy Autonomy, flexibility
Recognition, status Collegial relationships with peers
Patients’ appreciation Contributing to the community and the profession
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Motivators external to the person include pay, fringe benefits, vacation time, 
large offices with windows, reserved parking spaces, and first-class travel. Job 
conditions such as burdensome workloads and poor working conditions are 
external dissatisfiers that discourage productivity. Most people rebel against 
paperwork that takes time away from accomplishing tasks and against illogical 
bureaucracy that frustrates performance, autonomy, and flexibility. By contrast, 
professionals generally accept a supervisory hierarchy in the workplace if it 
is based on objective criteria (e.g., competence, experience, education). Most 
people appreciate external recognition or praise by their supervisors, peers, and 
clients, especially if it leads to enhanced status, higher pay, and more control 
over decisions affecting their work and performance. 
Intrinsic, self-motivating factors include a person’s satisfaction in 
accomplishing a challenging task for its own sake and the satisfaction derived 
from learning new skills or knowledge. The closer one’s own effort can link 
to success, the more internal motivation workers may have to make the extra 
effort. Most people prefer more control over their work environment and 
support staff, which is closely associated with power over production activities. 
Most professionals prefer a collegial work environment, interacting with peers 
in solving problems. The following discussion reviews the ways in which 
physicians often react to extrinsic and intrinsic motivators.
Money is one of the main motivators for most people. When physicians 
rank their priorities, money is in the top five, although not always number one 
(Shortell & Kaluzny, 2006). Physicians make an enormous investment of time 
and money in their training, and they usually view this as requiring financial 
returns from high salaries or private-practice income. Increasingly, this 
encourages medical students and residents to pursue training in higher-paying 
medical and surgical specialties. As a result, we can expect the economic 
incentives of P4P to have a significant influence on physician behavior that 
may encourage improvements in quality of care (if other factors also support 
that goal).
Heavy workloads and time pressures, however, can negatively affect 
physicians’ ability and willingness to adhere to clinical guidelines and 
quality measures based on those guidelines (Mechanic, 2008). Long lists 
of guidelines for good medical practice, each reasonable on its own, often 
overwhelm physicians. Primary care physicians often view patient visit times 
as being unduly shortened and expected patient workloads as too high; they 
increasingly experience high levels of stress and burnout. As a result, their 
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willingness to respond to quality and cost-control measures included in P4P 
programs can sometimes be limited.
Most physicians value recognition and praise from their peers and 
patients. The profession places much emphasis on local community and 
national recognition that comes through research publications, conference 
presentations, medical professional society awards, government testimony, and 
the media. Recognition can result from developing novel clinical procedures, 
conducting groundbreaking research studies, spearheading new quality 
improvement innovations, or leading health policy making efforts. P4P 
programs that include recognition for quality-improvement accomplishments 
will likely achieve better support from physicians.
Intrinsic rewards are another powerful motivator for the medical profession. 
Physicians train intensively to perform complex tasks that require them to 
marshal other doctors, nurses, technicians, drugs, and devices in the care of 
both routine and potentially life-threatening problems. Completing these tasks 
successfully, caring for patients often over many years, and sometimes saving 
lives or curing diseases, provides psychological rewards unmatched in most 
other occupations. 
Wynia (2009) reviewed evidence that indicates financial incentives can 
damage intrinsic motivation. He noted that the work of physicians, with its 
cognitive sophistication, open-ended thinking, and professional ethos, is 
exactly the type for which financial rewards may have negative impacts on 
intrinsic motivation. He warned that P4P could have unintended negative 
effects on quality (contrary to the economic perspective, which holds that 
explicit payment should improve quality) if not carefully designed to avoid 
this pitfall. For example, P4P programs may have fewer negative impacts on 
intrinsic motivation if (1) rewards focus on the group or team level instead of 
the individual physician, (2) physicians are able to retain a sense of professional 
control through designing the ways certain types of atypical patients can be 
excluded from quality measurement, and (3) physicians are involved in the 
efforts toward developing the quality measures themselves. 
Physicians highly prize the acquisition of new skills in a rapidly changing 
technological environment. For the primary care and medical specialist, the 
choice of new drugs provides increasing challenges and rewards. For the 
surgical specialist, endoscopic, robotic, and minimally invasive procedures 
offer similar challenges and rewards. Rapid change in medical technologies 
brings with it rapid skill obsolescence, however. Maintaining competence is 
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complicated by the need to keep abreast of the rapidly growing body of medical 
research. The number of journal articles reporting on randomized clinical 
trials alone reached 30,000 in 2005 (Mechanic, 2008). Risk of mistakes and 
professional embarrassment or failure rises with the rate of skill obsolescence, 
undermining physician confidence and adding to the overall time pressures of 
the medical profession. P4P can support acquisition of new skills and use of 
new technologies by updating quality measures frequently to incorporate new 
clinical guidelines and new types of treatments. 
Organization Theory
Economic agency theory focuses on the simple example of an individual 
physician as the agent treating a single patient as the principal. However, 
the individual physician may not only be an agent for the patient, but also a 
principal for his or her physician group. The physician group, in turn, may be 
negotiating fees with health insurance organizations as an agent on behalf of all 
physicians in the group as principals. The multidisciplinary teams of primary 
care physicians, specialist physicians, surgeons, nurses, technicians, and other 
health care professionals that are usually needed to provide health care further 
complicate the principal-agent relationships.
Because P4P programs commonly apply to provider organizations such as 
physician groups, hospitals, or integrated delivery systems (IDSs)—and not 
to individual physicians—we can expect organizational structures, processes, 
and cultures to affect the impact of P4P in both positive and negative ways. 
Indeed, organizational theorists often view improving quality of care as 
an organizational problem (Kimberly & Minvielle, 2003). Four strands 
of organization theory can shed light on potential P4P program impacts: 
(1) ownership, (2) institutional layers, (3) cultures, and (4) change management 
and quality improvement.
Ownership. Economic studies of payment effects on organizations often 
assume that the affected individuals are employees or owners but not both 
(Town et al., 2004). However, physician group practices are better characterized 
as worker-owned firms (Robinson, 2001). Hospitals and integrated delivery 
systems are often nonprofit organizations, with employees and oversight from 
community-based boards of directors, but not owners who have a claim on 
profits. Salaried physicians employed in large provider organizations and sole 
proprietorship in solo physician practices represent two ends of a spectrum 
of organizational complexity. In practice, clinicians experience a wide array 
of middle-ground ownership approaches; one commonly found in physician 
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groups bases physician compensation on a mix of salary and productivity 
standards based on relative value units such as weighted numbers of visits 
provided per month. Notably, this approach can accommodate P4P fairly easily 
by adding either groupwide or individual physician quality-of-care measures to 
the productivity measures for determining physician compensation.
Ownership can include partnerships, stock options, and numerous other 
arrangements that tie pay to financial performance in varying ways. Because 
physician-owners share in the financial returns from capital investments in 
buildings and equipment, they naturally respond to payment systems in ways 
different from physicians who are strictly on salary, with no vested interest 
in recommending more tests, procedures, or hospital admissions. Benefits 
of worker-ownership include an increased willingness to take risks that may 
translate into greater clinical and organizational elasticity in response to P4P 
incentives. A downside of worker-ownership can be an excessive focus on 
maximizing revenue. 
Institutional layers. Health care is unusual in that lower levels of institutions 
are often not completely part of higher ones. In this situation, we can view 
health care organizations as an “incompletely contained hierarchical nest” 
(Town et al., 2004, p. 104S). Patients often see more than one physician. 
Physicians, in turn, often work in more than one clinical group or 
department. Physician groups usually contract with multiple health insurance 
organizations. A practicing physician can work and interact with at least five 
different organizational layers: (1) other physicians, (2) multispecialty groups, 
(3) multigroup provider organizations (e.g., independent practice associations, 
physician hospital organizations, IDSs), (4) multiple health insurance plans, 
and (5) varying consumer health plan choices within insurance plans (e.g., 
health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations, point of 
service plans) (Landon et al., 1998). 
Moreover, each of these five layers may implement programs or systems 
aimed at influencing medical practice and health care quality in different 
ways, such as selecting or profiling physicians, promoting or discouraging 
particular types of services, implementing incentives though P4P, and 
implementing constraints through utilization review or limited investment 
in medical technologies. All of the influence strategies need to be aligned 
with P4P programs if P4P incentives are to be effective. If the other strategies 
are working at cross purposes, then the impact of P4P will likely be blunted. 
A case in point might be conducting a stringent review of “unnecessary” 
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services (such as preventable hospital admissions) and making some P4P 
bonus payments based on that measure, on the one hand, while at the same 
time paying most of physicians’ compensation according to their revenue 
productivity in terms of FFS billings or relative value units, on the other hand. 
Still unclear is how physician groups respond to multiple, sometimes 
conflicting, payment arrangements that can range from FFS to capitation. 
Physicians in a group may see some patients with health insurance plans 
that reimburse using FFS (so higher utilization of care means higher 
reimbursement for the physician group), and then see other patients, even 
on the same day, with insurance plans that are capitated (so higher utilization 
means lower profit margins for the physician group, because reimbursement 
is fixed in advance and higher utilization means higher costs). Physicians in 
a group may treat patients differently depending on insurance coverage, or 
physicians may be blinded to the varying financial incentives. P4P incentives 
can add to that mix of broader payment incentives, but the overall impact 
of P4P may be hard to predict in the context of this already complex mix of 
incentives that often have much larger financial impacts on the group or the 
individual physician than those included in P4P programs.
Organizational culture. Physician groups and other health care 
organizations vary widely in their cultures. Some emphasize cooperation 
among physicians and other staff and free flow of information, whereas others 
emphasize competition among physicians, which can result in hoarding of 
information (Town et al., 2004). One study found collegiality, innovativeness, 
and autonomy to be negatively related to quality of care, whereas 
organizational trust/identity and emphasis on information flow were positively 
associated with quality (Smalarz, 2006). Many so-called integrated provider 
organizations exhibit multiculturalism by combining under one corporate 
umbrella different medical professions, divisions, departments, and teams that 
compete with one another more than they cooperate (Ferlie & Shortell, 2001). 
A clash of cultures is often even more pronounced between physicians and 
health care managers (Shortell & Kaluzny, 2006). Physician culture is based 
on socialization from medical school, biological cause-effect relationships, 
short time frames for action, and responsibility and autonomy in caring 
for one’s own patients. Managerial culture, by contrast, is grounded in the 
social sciences and business schools, and emphasizes less-clear-cut cause-
effect relationships, longer time horizons, population averages, teamwork, 
and financial performance. Physicians sometimes resist managers’ efforts 
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to standardize clinical practices to improve organizational performance on 
quality measures included in P4P programs. Alternatively, physicians may 
be more inclined to support efforts to develop clinical guidelines and quality 
measures spurred by medical professional societies and termed “evidence-
based medicine.” 
Change management and quality improvement. The ability of an 
organization to implement changes in medical care practices can also influence 
its ability to improve quality of care. The organization literature in health care 
identifies six main characteristics associated with organizational change in 
health care: (1) leadership (commitment to both quality and efficiency for 
financial success); (2) a culture of learning (willingness to acknowledge and 
correct mistakes and utilize evidence-based care); (3) working in teams across 
professions and clinical and functional departments; (4) effectively using health 
information technology; (5) care coordination across sites and services; and 
(6) patient-centered medicine (involving patients as active managers of their 
own care) (Institute of Medicine [IOM] Board on Health Care Services, 2001; 
Christianson et al., 2006; Ferlie & Shortell, 2001; Grol et al., 2007; Klein & 
Sorra, 1996; Lukas et al., 2007; Town et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2006). 
The Institute of Medicine (IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2001) 
has identified four stages of development that health care organizations need 
to move through to achieve high-quality care. These stages, presented in 
Table 3-2, also reflect the six characteristics associated with organizational 
change identified above. We can identify many health care organizations 
operating at Stage 2 or 3 already; few have achieved Stage 4. From this 
perspective, most health care organizations need to implement additional 
organizational changes to move to Stage 4 to achieve the highest quality of care 
possible. 
Stage 4 organizations may be more responsive to P4P and better able to 
benefit from its incentives. However, if they have already achieved high levels 
of teamwork, patient involvement, and integration of information technologies, 
they also may not need external P4P programs to improve quality as much as 
other providers do. As a result, provider organizations that are actively working 
to move across these stages of development may actually show the largest 
measured impact of P4P programs on quality if the financial incentives help to 
facilitate the organization’s advancement to a higher stage.
One of the lessons learned from total quality management programs is 
that quality improvement is hard to accomplish when financial incentives are 
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not aligned to reward quality improvements at the systems level (Kimberly & 
Minvielle, 2003). Physicians and hospital administrators commonly complain 
that FFS incentives in the prevailing health care reimbursement systems reward 
quantity, not quality. As a result, when financial pressures on institutions are 
high, they may focus more on quantity and billings at the expense of quality. 
A widespread concern among management and financial staff at hospitals 
and physician groups has been the lack of evidence to support the business 
Table 3-2. Four stages of organizational development in health care
Stage Description
1.  Traditional private practice •	 Fragmented delivery system
•	 Physicians work independently; rely on journals, 
conferences, and peers to stay current
•	 Information technology absent in most settings
•	 Minimal use of allied health personnel
•	 Passive patients
2.  Limited coordination of care •	 Well-defined referral networks
•	 Continued specialty-oriented care
•	 Limited evidence-based practice
•	 Minimal information technology
•	 Increased patient information and informal involvement 
in care
3.  Team-based care •	 Team-based clinical care common
•	 Some use of nonphysician clinicians
•	 Evidence-based guidelines applied in some practices
•	 Information technology broadly applied, but most 
applications are stand-alone 
•	 Formal recognition of patient preferences
4.  High-performing health care 
organizations
•	 Highly coordinated care—across provider groups and 
settings of care—over time
•	 Evidence-based practice the norm
•	 Sophisticated information technology linking all systems 
and groups; automated decision support
•	 Extensive clinical measurement and performance 
feedback to clinicians; continuous quality improvement
•	 Extensive training and use of nonphysician clinicians
•	 Patients actively involved in treatment decisions
Source: Adapted from IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2001.
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case for quality improvement efforts (Reiter et al., 2007). P4P programs can 
help to address that concern by linking reimbursement directly to quality 
measures and ensuring that the financial benefits from quality improvement 
efforts accrue to the organization that provided the investments required to 
implement them. Total quality management initiatives may be unsustainable 
without positive, systemwide financial incentives for improving quality. 
Contingency theory: a Multidisciplinary perspective on p4p
As the preceding section indicates, developing a theoretical model of P4P 
requires a breadth of multidisciplinary perspectives: economic, organizational, 
psychological, and sociological. All of these perspectives include factors 
that can enhance or impede the intended impact of P4P programs. These 
perspectives must be accounted for in considering the range and complexity of 
policy, institutional, and technological factors at work in the health sector. As 
a result, P4P theories are likely to remain contingent, applicable under certain 
prescribed conditions but subject to reconsideration as factors from one or 
more of the disciplinary perspectives are modified. These theories will still be 
useful as long as policy makers understand that they apply to particular sets of 
institutional circumstances and that they can generalize to new circumstances 
only cautiously. 
This type of theoretical situation is well known in management theory, in 
which “contingency theory” is one of the mainstream viewpoints (Shortell & 
Kaluzny, 2006). The central idea of contingency theory in management is that 
organizations and their subunits should develop structures, staff, cultures, and 
systems differently depending on the specific environments and technologies 
with which they are involved. Given that health care organizations operate in a 
very wide variety of environments and institutional relationships, and apply a 
broad range of different technologies, the contingency perspective has strong 
applicability (Shortell & Kaluzny, 2006). For example, quality improvement 
initiatives and P4P programs might well be organized differently depending 
on the local, state, and national policy environment each organization faces, 
the nature of the diseases and patients being treated, the types of physician 
and employee skills available, the internal organizational culture, the degree of 
teamwork among physicians and nonphysician health care professionals, and 
the extent of available health information technology. 
However, this means that it will not be possible to develop a mathematical 
theory of P4P. Any mathematical theory that attempted to be comprehensive, 
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accounting for all of these complexities of real-world policy environments, 
institutional arrangements, and health care organizations, would be analytically 
intractable (Escarce, 2004). Conversely, efforts to provide for analytical 
tractability could be successful only by a degree of simplification that would 
compromise the value of a mathematical theory in making testable predictions. 
Nonetheless, the multidisciplinary model points to particular factors 
that policy makers can use to enhance the impact of P4P programs. Policy 
makers can consider these insights in the contingency theory perspective and 
apply them where the combination of policy, technological, and institutional 
circumstances indicate they are likely to be beneficial for P4P programs. The 
rest of this chapter describes three examples of these types of multidisciplinary 
perspectives: (1) reinforcing medical professionalism, (2) patient-centered 
teams and bundled payment, and (3) centers of excellence (CoEs). 
Reinforcing Medical Professionalism
P4P can help physicians to regain some of the benefits of medical 
professionalism and the related intrinsic motivation in several ways. For 
example, P4P revenues can support medical practice innovations to contribute 
to physician satisfaction (Mechanic, 2008; Trisolini et al., 2008). Additional 
P4P funding may enable physicians to have more time to establish stronger 
partnerships with patients, promote competent practices based on best 
available evidence, improve chronic care management, and improve patient 
satisfaction (Mechanic, 2008). Similarly, cognitive services provided by 
primary care physicians suffer financially by being more tightly linked to time 
with patients, a factor often down-weighted in physician fee schedules in 
comparison with medical and surgical procedures. Many advocates of doctor-
patient partnerships believe that primary visits lasting about 30 minutes are 
often needed, but this is a pattern of care that insurers are unlikely to reimburse 
adequately (Mechanic, 2008).
In this situation, health insurers can use P4P to supplement reimbursement 
to primary care physicians by focusing on primary care–oriented quality 
measures as the basis for P4P bonus payments. Longer patient encounters, 
often involving nonphysician clinicians, are more financially viable when extra 
P4P reimbursement will come from quality-of-care improvements achieved 
through those new patterns of care. Hence, P4P can open up other ways of 
practicing that may enable primary care physicians to escape the visit-centric 
emphasis of ambulatory care that is often their only way to gain adequate 
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FFS reimbursement (Trisolini et al., 2008). The economic incentives of P4P 
can reinforce both the sociological perspective on professionalism and the 
psychological perspective on intrinsic motivation that many physicians deem 
important. This will enable P4P programs to have improved opportunities for 
significant impacts on quality-of-care outcomes.
Patient-Centered Teams and Bundled Payment
Most P4P programs have opted to focus financial incentives for quality 
improvement not on individual physicians, but rather on higher levels of 
the health care system, such as multispecialty physician groups or hospitals. 
This approach recognizes the teamwork orientation of modern medical 
care organizations within the incentive system, providing incentives for 
collaboration among clinicians and recognizing better coordination of care. 
It is also consistent with Wynia’s (2009) emphasis on focusing P4P on team 
or group rewards rather than individual physician rewards, to avoid or 
mitigate damage that financial incentives may do to intrinsic motivation. In 
addition, P4P programs could be targeted to lower organizational levels, such 
as a diabetes disease management program that requires teamwork among 
endocrinologists, primary care physicians, nurses, and diabetes educators. 
P4P payment for episodes of care also make possible broader, cross-
institutional teams. Episodes, which may last 30 days or more beyond a 
hospital discharge, allow bundling of P4P reimbursement across a range 
of providers, such as hospitals, physicians, and post–acute care providers. 
The opportunity to earn P4P revenue can enhance the integration of all of 
these different types of health care teams and reduce the risks of promoting 
competition and fragmentation of care if P4P focuses on the individual 
physician level.
Centers of Excellence
An alternative P4P approach, CoEs can also recognize and financially reward 
tightly integrated, high-performing, clinical care organizations. Physician-
hospital or ambulatory primary care groups could receive a CoE imprimatur 
after a thorough examination of their quality-of-care performance. This 
approach has the advantage of more explicitly recognizing an organization’s 
holistic performance, and P4P linked to CoE can provide incentives for 
organizational change toward higher stages of organizational development, 
described in Table 3-2. The CoE imprimatur could also enhance physicians’ 
and other clinicians’ reputations on the regional or national stage; this positive 
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effect could complement the financial rewards that P4P programs provide and 
increase their impact.
In sum, theoretical perspectives from several different disciplines can aid 
in the design of P4P programs by identifying factors likely to enhance or 
inhibit the effects of P4P. A multidisciplinary or “composite” perspective from 
contingency theory will enable the design of P4P programs to better respond 
to the range of factors that may affect their success. This approach will enable 
P4P to move beyond the simpler theory underlying most early P4P programs, 
which focused on economic perspectives, and enable P4P to improve its impact 
on health care quality and cost outcomes. 
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Quality Measures for  
Pay for Performance
Michael G. Trisolini
Chapter 4
Concerns about quality of care have accelerated since the 1990s, as studies 
by Wennberg, Fisher, and others have documented large and unexplained 
variations in rates of health care utilization and clinical outcomes across 
geographic areas, calling into question the traditional approach of relying 
on the medical profession to deliver high-quality care uniformly (Davis & 
Guterman, 2007; Wennberg et al., 2002). Since about 2000, several landmark 
publications have highlighted widespread problems with patient safety and 
quality of care, most notably from the Institute of Medicine (IOM) and the 
RAND Corporation (IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2001; Kohn et 
al., 1999; McGlynn et al., 2003). These studies helped to galvanize a policy 
consensus, leading the federal government and private health insurance 
plans to increasingly focus policy, regulatory, and management interventions 
more directly on quality of care measurement, quality improvement 
programs, and financial incentives for quality improvement through pay for 
performance (P4P).
P4P programs have focused primarily on quality of care measures to assess 
provider performance. Although other performance evaluation approaches, 
such as efficiency measures, are possible for P4P, those in policy circles 
currently perceive the lack of incentives for improved quality in the prevailing 
fee-for-service (FFS) payment systems as a major problem in the US health 
care system. As a result, P4P programs have focused mainly on addressing this 
problem. 
This chapter reviews issues regarding the application of quality measures 
in P4P programs. The first section of the chapter provides background, 
including conceptual frameworks for quality of care, and reviews organizations 
that develop and certify quality measures. The second section discusses 
different types of quality measures, including structure, process, and outcome 
measures (Donabedian, 1966). The third section reviews issues in selecting 
quality measures for P4P programs. The fourth section describes methods for 
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analyzing quality measures for P4P. The fifth section discusses public reporting 
of quality measures and how that separate approach to quality improvement 
can be integrated with P4P programs.
Background 
Two major conceptual frameworks have been developed for health care quality, 
one by Donabedian (1966) and the other by the IOM (IOM Board on Health 
Care Services, 2001). Researchers and policy makers can use both to guide 
development and implementation of quality measures for P4P. Other models 
are available (IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2006), but the Donabedian 
and IOM frameworks are the most widely used. This section describes both 
models, although we emphasize Donabedian’s framework because developers 
of P4P programs use it more frequently than the IOM model. 
Donabedian’s model focuses on the concepts of structure, process, and 
outcome for defining quality of care. Despite being first published more than 
40 years ago, this model remains a leading paradigm. The key elements can be 
described as follows:
Structure—the inputs into the health care production process. These include 
physicians, nurses, and other staff; medical equipment; facilities; information 
technology; administrative support systems; medical supplies; pharmaceuticals; 
and other resources. Problems may arise if inputs are not available when 
needed to treat a patient or when health professionals do not view the 
capabilities of inputs as optimal. For example, from a structure perspective, 
high-quality care may entail using clinical teams, including board-certified 
cardiologists, to treat patients with advanced heart failure rather than relying 
solely on primary care physicians.
Process—the procedures used to diagnose a patient, prescribe a course of 
testing or treatment, and ensure that the testing and treatment are carried 
out in accordance with clinical guidelines or norms of medical practice. 
Process problems are often classified as underuse, misuse, or overuse of tests 
or treatments (IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2001; Chassin & Galvin, 
1998). For example, from a process perspective, high-quality care may be 
associated with laboratory testing of diabetic patients at least once a year 
for their levels of glycosylated hemoglobin (HbA1c). To be useful, process 
measures must have been demonstrated to be statistically and clinically 
associated with corresponding outcome measures. For example, appropriate 
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colorectal cancer screening is a process measure known to reduce mortality 
attributable to colon cancer. 
Outcome—the ultimate goals of reducing morbidity and mortality and 
improving quality of life (QOL) and patient satisfaction. Quality analysts 
can identify problems by comparing outcomes achieved for patients with the 
outcomes expected for similar patients with the same disease. For example, 
from an outcome perspective, high-quality care may be associated with a 
reduced frequency of relapses for patients with multiple sclerosis (MS) because 
such care reduces the morbidity that patients suffer.
Quality measures focused on structure are easier to measure, but they 
may have only limited impact on the final outcomes of interest. Process 
measures assess the actual medical treatment that physicians and other health 
professionals provide. However, they may require detailed data collection 
through costly medical record reviews to obtain the clinical data necessary 
to identify patients for the measures’ denominators and clinical events for 
their numerators. Administrative data such as insurance claims may enable 
less costly measurement for some types of process measures, but most 
cannot be measured in this way. Combinations of administrative and chart 
review data collection (“hybrid” measures) have been encouraged by the 
National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) as an efficient approach. 
Electronic medical records (EMRs) may someday reduce the data collection 
burden for process measures, but they are still not widely implemented. The 
technical specifications for process measures may also be costly to develop 
and keep updated because of changes in medical practices and technologies 
and development of new pharmaceuticals; such changes may cause shifts in 
the lists of inclusion and exclusion criteria for denominators and numerators 
used to calculate performance rates. Outcome measures may be ideal in 
theory, because they represent the ultimate goals of interest, but they are often 
difficult to measure, especially in a timely fashion. For example, variation in 
mortality outcomes may appear only many years after patients have received 
medical treatment. In addition, many factors can affect variation in mortality 
and other outcomes besides the quality of medical care, for example, age, 
comorbidities, diet, exercise, and risky behavior. Consequently, physicians and 
provider organizations, such as hospitals and physician groups, may consider 
it inappropriate to hold them accountable for quality of care measured by 
outcomes unless complex risk adjustments are applied. QOL and other patient-
reported outcomes are costly to measure because they require primary data 
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collection through direct responses from patients in formal surveys. Patient-
reported outcomes data cannot be collected from secondary data, such as 
insurance claims, that do not include patient surveys. Finally, poor outcomes, 
which are often rare and therefore more difficult to measure, lead to sample 
size issues. 
As a result, not one of these three categories—structure, process, or 
outcome—is always better than the others for quality measurement, and P4P 
programs have applied all of them in practice to assess quality. P4P programs 
use process measures more frequently than the other types of measures 
because they represent a middle ground, physicians and other clinicians are 
more familiar with them, and process measures make clear what must be 
improved in care processes in comparison with outcome measures. However, 
process measures also have shortcomings and are often complemented by 
structure measures, outcome measures, or both. 
The IOM presented its conceptual model of factors affecting health care 
quality in its Crossing the Quality Chasm report (IOM Board on Health Care 
Services, 2001). This report focused on six goals for improving health care. As 
the report noted, health care should be
•	 Safe—avoiding injuring patients with the care that is intended to help 
them.
•	 Effective—providing services based on scientific knowledge to all who 
could benefit and refraining from providing services to those not likely to 
benefit (avoiding underuse, misuse, and overuse).
•	 Patient-centered—providing care that respects and is responsive to 
individual patient preferences, needs, and values and ensuring that patient 
values guide all clinical decisions.
•	 Timely—reducing waits and sometimes harmful delays for both those 
who receive and those who give care. 
•	 Efficient—avoiding waste, in particular waste of equipment, supplies, 
ideas, and energy.
•	 Equitable—providing care that does not vary in quality because of 
personal characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, geographic location, 
and socioeconomic status (pp. 39-40).
The Donabedian and IOM models overlap in many areas. The IOM’s 
goal of safe care relates to all three of Donabedian’s concepts. For example, 
a structure intervention to implement computerized physician order entry 
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(CPOE) for drug prescriptions may prevent overdoses of chemotherapy 
drugs, or dangerous interactions between drugs a patient may be taking. 
A process intervention could also prevent overdoses by requiring multiple 
nurses to check dosages before they administer drugs. If these interventions 
are successful, then the beneficial outcomes are reduced rates of morbidity and 
mortality for patients taking these drugs.
The IOM’s aims for effective, patient-centered, and timely care all relate 
to Donabedian’s concept of process. The aim of patient-centered care also 
relates to outcomes that are measured using patient surveys of QOL, patient 
satisfaction, or experience of care. 
However, the IOM model includes additional concepts of cost and access 
in its domains of efficient and equitable care. We prefer to maintain the 
conceptual distinctions between the overall health policy goals of increasing 
quality, reducing cost, and improving access, which are often used as a larger 
conceptual framework for analyzing health services. For example, quality is 
often associated with measuring the performance of clinicians or provider 
organizations. Access is often associated with measuring the performance of 
health care systems that may cover regions or an entire country. Cost is usually 
considered separately from quality, and discussions of cost tend to focus on the 
analysis of financial resources and budgets used for providing care.
Researchers and policy makers can use the IOM’s aims for efficient and 
equitable care to develop performance measures for P4P programs that are 
separate from measures of quality. We view those concepts as useful for P4P 
programs, although we present efficiency measures in a separate chapter of 
this book (Chapter 5) to maintain the conceptual distinctions between quality, 
cost, and access goals. Researchers and policy makers can also develop access 
measures of performance that are separate from quality measures. The access 
measures may, for example, be included alongside quality measures in P4P 
programs that focus on vulnerable populations, such as Medicaid enrollees. 
types of Quality Measures 
Following our focus on Donabedian’s model, we categorize quality measures 
for P4P programs into structure, process, and outcome. This section describes 
examples of all three types and illustrates how P4P programs have applied 
them.
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Structure Measures 
Health professionals and policy makers sometimes view structure measures 
as less valuable than process or outcome measures because they are further 
removed from the ultimate goal of improving outcomes. Structure measures 
indicate only the potential for providing or improving quality of care; they 
do not directly measure the clinical processes of care or health outcomes 
that more closely represent true quality. Also, fewer structure measures are 
available for ambulatory care than for inpatient care (Birkmeyer et al., 2006), 
although that situation may change in coming years, with expanded emphasis 
on implementing systems that support health care delivery, such as EMRs and 
chronic disease registries.
Some individual health professionals may view structure measures as unfair 
if the individuals score low on them but have high quality in terms of outcomes 
(Birkmeyer et al., 2006). Moreover, linkages between structural measures and 
outcomes may be evident at health system or community levels, but they may 
not differentiate individual clinicians well.
In recent years, health care accreditation organizations have moved away 
from their traditional reliance on structure measures to focus more on 
process measures. For example, the Joint Commission has moved toward 
using measures of process and outcome (Hurtado et al., 2001). Several quality 
monitoring organizations have also begun to focus more on process and 
outcome indicators than they previously did. For example, the NCQA has 
developed and periodically updated a set of Healthcare Effectiveness Data 
and Information Set (HEDIS) indicators used to measure quality in private 
managed health care plans, Medicare, and Medicaid (National Committee 
for Quality Assurance [NCQA], 2006). Federal quality improvement efforts, 
including Medicare’s Physician Quality Reporting Initiative and the Hospital 
Quality Initiative, have also focused on process and outcome measures 
(Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services [CMS], 2008a, 2008b).
Nonetheless, some structure measures have been found effective in 
promoting quality. In addition, they are usually easier to measure than process 
or outcomes, so data collection is both less challenging and less expensive. 
They may also be efficient in the sense that one structure measure may relate to 
several different diseases or outcomes (Birkmeyer et al., 2006). 
The Leapfrog Group is a proponent of several specific structure measures of 
quality (Birkmeyer & Dimick, 2004; Leapfrog Group, 2008). Its focus includes 
three structure measures for hospitals:
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•	 Computerized physician order entry—Studies have shown that 
physicians can significantly reduce prescribing errors when they use 
CPOE to highlight incorrect dosages, drug interactions, or patients’ 
allergies to prescribed drugs.
•	 Intensive care unit (ICU) physician staffing—ICUs staffed with critical 
care specialists (sometimes referred to as intensivists) can reduce the risk 
of patients’ dying in the ICU.
•	 Evidence-based hospital referral—For patients needing certain types 
of complex medical procedures, referral based on scientifically evaluated 
factors, such as the number of times a hospital has performed a procedure 
each year, has been shown to reduce the risk of death. 
All of these measures can potentially be applied in P4P programs, and the 
Leapfrog Group has provided assistance to health plans and payers using them 
in P4P. A recent study confirmed the Leapfrog Group’s claims about the value 
of these structure measures of quality (Jha et al., 2008). It found that hospitals 
that implemented these three types of patient safety–oriented interventions 
also had improved process and outcome measures of quality—including 
lower 30-day mortality rates—for patients with acute myocardial infarction, 
congestive heart failure, and pneumonia. 
Although the Leapfrog Group has received the most attention in policy 
circles for its focus on structure measures of quality, several payer groups 
have also used structure measures in their P4P programs. For example, some 
programs have provided incentives for health care professionals to invest in 
information technology, implement electronic health records (EHRs), or use 
EHRs. These programs include the Integrated Healthcare Association, Bridges 
to Excellence, and the Hawaii Medical Services Association (IOM Board on 
Health Care Services, 2007; Bridges to Excellence, 2008; Gilmore et al., 2007; 
McDermott et al., 2006). 
Payers and health care plans are particularly interested in the development 
and use of EHRs or EMRs because they have the potential to improve 
coordination of care and reduce medical errors. For more than a decade, many 
commentators have noted this potential, but the high costs of these systems in 
relation to the benefits received at the physician practice level have hampered 
implementation. As a result, most small and medium-sized physician practices 
have been slow to adopt EHRs and EMRs. This means that P4P programs with 
incentives for EHR or EMR implementation could provide a useful catalyst for 
improving the business case for these systems at the physician practice level.
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Organizational interventions are another type of structure measure. The 
United Kingdom’s (UK’s) P4P program applies a substantial number of these 
interventions to assess performance of family practitioners in the National 
Health Service (Department of Health, 2004; Doran et al., 2006a, 2006b). 
The UK P4P system is noteworthy because it has 146 quality measures, the 
largest number of any P4P program. Of these, 76 are classified as clinical 
quality indicators, and another 70 are classified as organizational and patient 
experience quality measures. Our review of these measures reveals that many 
of them are structure measures of quality. For example, the 76 clinical quality 
indicators are classified into 11 chronic disease domains. For each domain, the 
first indicator is a structure measure of whether the practice has a register of 
the patients with that disease (e.g., “DM 1. The practice can produce a register 
of all patients with diabetes mellitus”; Department of Health, 2004). Similar 
indicators are repeated for the other 10 disease domains (e.g., hypertension, 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, and cancer), thus the 76 clinical quality 
indicators are actually 11 structure measures and 65 clinical process measures. 
The UK’s 70 organizational and patient experience quality measures include 
31 structure measures, according to our review (e.g., “Records 3: The practice 
has a system for transferring and acting on information about patients seen 
by other doctors out of hours”; Department of Health, 2004). The wording of 
this measure uses structure language about the presence of a system, rather 
than process language about the percentage of patients seen by other doctors 
who were transferred to new doctors and for whom clinical information was 
acted on. The other structure measures from among these organizational and 
patient experience indicators are worded in similar ways, often referring to 
the presence of a system rather than to how the system should be applied in 
medical practice. 
Therefore, the UK’s P4P program uses 42 structure measures, which is 29 
percent of the overall total of 146 quality measures. This is a higher percentage 
of structure measures than most US P4P programs use, although the difference 
may reflect the much larger overall number of indicators in the UK program 
compared with US programs. The UK program uses 104 process measures—
in absolute numbers, more process measures than are used in any US P4P 
programs, even if the percentage of process measures is lower in the UK 
program than in some US programs. 
The current interest in “medical homes” in the United States can be viewed 
as another type of structure intervention for quality of care. Medical homes 
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are sometimes proposed for additional per capita or per visit bonus payments 
to physicians because they are expected to improve coordination of care, 
case management, information technology, and continuity of primary care. 
As a result, medical homes could be a focus of implementation incentives in 
P4P programs as structure measures of quality, similar to P4P programs that 
provide incentives for implementing EMRs.
Process Measures
Process measures are procedures or treatments that are designed to improve 
health status or prevent future complications or comorbidities. In most cases, 
a process measure is a dichotomous indicator of whether the process was 
performed during the recent past (e.g., whether patients taking interferon 
drugs had liver function tests in the past 6 months). When characterizing 
health professional and provider organization performance, a process measure 
is expressed as the proportion of eligible patients who received the procedure. 
Process measures are often limited to certain subgroups of patients for whom a 
particular treatment process applies. 
A benefit of process measures is that health professionals recognize them as 
reflecting routine clinical care. In many cases research studies have found them 
to be associated with outcomes, although this is not always well established 
and it is becoming increasingly less acceptable to use process measures that 
lack an evidence base. Process measures may also provide positive spillover 
effects, such as raising clinicians’ awareness about quality measures and clinical 
guidelines (Birkmeyer et al., 2006). 
Process measures are important to consider because they are usually more 
practical for data collection and monitoring than outcomes are for quality 
improvement programs (IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2006; Eddy, 
1998; Jencks et al., 2000). Four characteristics of process measures make 
them more feasible than outcome indicators for routine quality monitoring. 
First, outcomes often occur with lower frequency than do associated process 
indicators. For example, breast cancer deaths occur at a rate of only about 1 per 
1,000 women older than 50 years of age (an outcome indicator). In contrast, 
NCQA and Medicare apply process indicators specifying that all women ages 
50 to 69 should be receiving biennial mammograms for breast cancer screening 
(Kautter et al., 2007; NCQA, 2006). 
Second, outcomes often require long periods for evaluation of effects 
(Palmer, 1997). For example, to get outcomes measured as 5- to 10-year cancer 
survival rates, it will take at least 5 to 10 years and probably longer because of 
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data reporting lags. Routine evaluation of process indicators can usually be 
done annually or even more frequently, depending on how many patients with 
a particular disease physicians treat in any given month or year. 
Third, factors outside the control of health plans, health care organizations, 
or clinicians who treat patients with chronic diseases often affect outcomes. In 
contrast, process of care measures are, by definition, primarily under health 
professionals’ control and usually do not require risk adjustment. 
Fourth, significant improvements in processes are generally larger in relative 
terms than improvements in outcomes, which makes it easier to measure the 
former and easier to identify significant changes. This aspect enables P4P 
programs to base incentive payments on more statistically reliable data.
Process measures have another appealing aspect. One of the key steps in 
quality improvement is identifying the cause of problems and improving the 
associated care processes. Unlike outcome measures, process measures target 
which area of care needs to be improved, although the health care organization 
still needs to ascertain how to achieve the improvement needed. 
Nonetheless, just because process measures are usually easier to specify, 
measure, and track from year to year does not mean that P4P programs should 
use them exclusively. An important consideration with process measures is 
whether they are clearly linked to improved outcomes or at least to a higher 
likelihood of improved outcomes. Researchers have developed a range of 
methods to assess the strength of scientific evidence that underlies clinical 
practice guidelines, quality measures, and quality improvement programs 
(Lohr, 2004). However, the extent of currently available evidence to support 
links between process indicators and outcomes varies widely (Birkmeyer et 
al., 2006). Process measures recommending routine laboratory testing may be 
good clinical practice, but the results of testing, and the degree of follow-up 
that health professionals provide, are more closely linked to outcomes than to 
whether testing was done.
Outcome Measures
Ultimately, people care most about outcomes, including morbidity, mortality, 
QOL, functioning, and patient satisfaction. Improved outcomes are the 
desired consequences of quality improvement efforts. For example, for 
treatment of MS, outcomes may be measured through physical and mental 
functional status indicators (which can be either physician reported or patient 
reported), disability, complication rates (e.g., urinary tract infections, pressure 
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ulcers), frequency of relapses, standardized measures of health-related QOL, 
standardized measures of patient satisfaction, and other indicators. 
In addition, implementing a system of outcome measurement may 
itself improve outcomes—a “Hawthorne effect”—beyond the interventions 
that may be related to particular outcomes (Birkmeyer et al., 2006). For 
example, surgical morbidity and mortality in VA hospitals fell dramatically 
after measurement began in 1991, to an extent too large to explain solely by 
organizational or process improvements. 
To date, P4P programs have used outcome measures less frequently than 
process measures, even though outcome measures are preferable in theory 
because they represent the ultimate health care goals. As noted, researchers 
have raised concerns regarding the strength of the relationship between 
structure or process quality measures and the outcomes they target. In 
addition, focusing on outcome measures is expected to encourage innovation 
in health care services more than would focusing on process measures 
(Sorbero et al., 2006). Unless process measures are updated frequently, which 
could be costly, they may reinforce existing care patterns rather than encourage 
development of new treatment methods that improve outcomes even more.
Thus, moving P4P programs toward more direct use of outcome measures 
where possible may be beneficial. Physicians and other clinicians may want to 
maintain a mix of process and outcome measures in P4P programs, however, 
given that process measures provide more specific information about particular 
care processes that need to be improved. 
One concern is that multiple factors outside of the health care system 
can affect outcome measures, a problem that is commonly cited. As a result, 
physicians and other clinicians may not consider it fair to be held accountable 
for outcome performance. For example, many different physicians and other 
health professionals may treat patients with cardiovascular disease, and patient 
factors regarding diet, exercise, and adherence to medications may play a large 
role in mortality rates. Risk adjustment for outcome measures can be expensive 
if it is done in detail using data from medical records, and it may be inadequate 
if done using administrative data that, though usually less expensive, contain 
less clinical detail (Birkmeyer et al., 2006). However, recent efforts to add 
present on admission (POA) codes in hospital medical records will enable 
better analysis of outcomes for hospitals (Jordan et al., 2007; Pine et al., 2007). 
POA codes help to determine whether complications and comorbidities were 
acquired by patients during a hospital stay, and thus can be attributed to the 
care provided at the hospital.
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Another problem with measuring outcomes is that sample sizes may be 
small for surgical outcomes or rare diseases. This means that statistical analysis 
of performance improvement may be unreliable, so P4P programs cannot pay 
bonuses with confidence in these situations. 
An issue with patient-reported outcomes, such as those reflecting QOL or 
health status, is that they require patient surveys, which may impose costs that 
provider groups find difficult to sustain. Lower cost options are not readily 
available because these types of outcomes require primary data collection from 
patients.
In general, outcomes can be categorized into two types: clinician-reported 
outcomes and patient-reported outcomes. Both can be applied in P4P 
programs.
Clinician-Reported Outcomes
Clinician-reported outcomes are those that physicians or other health 
care professionals measure and record. They can be further classified as 
“intermediate” outcomes (e.g., blood pressure levels or HbA1c levels that put 
patients at risk for severe complications or comorbidities, or stage of cancer 
at diagnosis) and final outcomes (e.g., decubitus ulcers causing morbidity, or 
mortality). Medical records are primary data sources for collecting clinician-
reported outcomes, but P4P programs can also use laboratory databases and 
claims data for some types of outcome measures. 
Intermediate outcomes. Intermediate outcomes measure clinical results, so 
they can be viewed as outcomes rather than process measures, but they are not 
final outcomes in the sense of being direct measures of morbidity or mortality. 
Blood pressure levels are important outcomes that provide information on 
patients’ risks for heart disease and stroke. As a result, control of blood pressure 
is a goal that makes sense to reward through P4P programs. Similarly, HbA1c 
levels can indicate risks for diabetics to develop several severe complications, 
including retinopathy, nephropathy, and neuropathy. 
A positive feature of intermediate outcomes is that they are closer than 
process measures to the final clinical outcomes of interest, so they provide 
a closer link to final outcomes. For example, HEDIS process measures 
include measuring blood pressure periodically for patients with heart disease 
or hypertension, and testing for HbA1c levels periodically for diabetics. 
However, just because the tests were conducted does not mean that the clinical 
indicators of interest were brought under control. Thus, focusing on the levels 
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themselves—the intermediate outcomes—is preferable to targeting only the 
frequency of testing. 
Another positive feature of intermediate outcomes is that they can be 
measured more frequently than final outcomes. As a result, P4P programs 
that focus on providing routine performance assessments and periodic (often 
annual) bonus payments to physicians and other health professionals can use 
them more easily. For example, among patients with diabetes, neuropathy can 
result in foot or leg infections that require amputations, but these events occur 
much less frequently than elevated levels of HbA1c. Amputation rates can be 
tracked as performance measures, but they may require much larger samples 
of diabetic patients than are available for most physician practices or even 
larger group practices. Because amputations occur less frequently than HbA1c 
tests, they may not provide the routine data needed for annual performance 
assessments for P4P bonus payment determinations. 
A third positive feature of intermediate outcomes is that they may not 
require risk adjustment for appropriate performance assessment, in contrast 
to mortality and other final outcomes. Appropriate levels of blood pressure 
and HbA1c are standardized for most patients, and although patient factors 
enter into the levels achieved, physicians and other clinicians can usually be 
held accountable for average levels achieved over groups of patients. Physicians 
may not be able to control patients’ diet and exercise patterns completely, but 
most accept responsibility for working with their chronic disease patients 
to control blood pressure and HbA1c, especially when patients are at risk 
for complications associated with elevated blood pressure or HbA1c. Risk 
adjustment may still be indicated for some types of intermediate outcomes, 
but it may be implemented more easily than for final outcomes, with fewer 
variables and data collection requirements. 
As a result, a promising approach for P4P programs would be to work more 
aggressively to expand the range of intermediate outcomes that they use to 
assess provider performance. They can also increase the weighting provided 
to these measures relative to others. Intermediate outcomes represent a 
middle ground between the more controllable process indicators, which may 
not be closely linked to final outcomes, and the final outcomes of interest, 
which would be ideal performance measures—if they were easier to measure 
frequently and if it were easier for providers to link the final outcomes to their 
efforts. 
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In addition, Current Procedural Terminology (CPT-II) codes have now 
been developed for some intermediate outcomes, such as HbA1c levels for 
diabetics, so these outcomes can now be measured using administrative claims 
data instead of relying solely on more expensive chart review (American 
Medical Association, 2008). More work is needed to expand the list of CPT 
codes for intermediate outcomes, and to expand the extent to which health 
professionals use them for billing for clinical services, but the technical 
groundwork has been laid in the CPT coding system. 
Final outcomes. Clinician-reported final outcomes can include a range of 
morbidity, functional status measures, and mortality measures. Morbidity 
measures include medical and surgical complications that can be used in P4P 
programs, although they apply primarily to hospitals or other institutional 
providers. Decubitus ulcers are an example of a preventable complication that 
can develop during hospital stays or among nursing home residents. Because 
they are preventable for most patients, they can serve as a useful outcome 
measure for P4P programs. They usually occur infrequently, however, so they 
may need to be measured as average rates over large groups of patients. 
Other types of hospital-related complications, such as postsurgical 
infections, readmission rates within 1 to 3 months of discharge, and “never” 
events, such as surgery on the wrong body part, can also serve as final outcome 
measures. These outcome measures include patient safety quality indicators 
that the US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) and others 
have developed (AHRQ, 2003). An advantage of these complication-related 
outcome measures is that they do not require risk adjustment in most cases, 
because patient safety indicators such as avoiding postsurgical infections apply 
to most patients. In addition, these indicators are clearly under the control of 
hospitals and their medical staff because they occur during the patient’s stay in 
the hospital, nursing home, or other medical facility. As a result, clinicians are 
more willing to accept responsibility for these types of final outcome measures. 
For example, when Medicare recently announced that it would not reimburse 
hospitals for admissions that resulted in “never” events, there was little 
resistance from the hospital or physician community. 
Functional outcomes comprise measures of activities of daily living (ADLs), 
instrumental activities of daily living (IADLs), time to walk 25 feet, established 
scales such as the Functional Independence Measure (FIM), and others. Health 
professionals often use such outcomes in rehabilitation services assessments, 
to judge patients’ progress in recovery from illness, or to assess levels of 
disability. These measures have promise for P4P because they can be measured 
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frequently and can show significant changes resulting from effective treatment 
in many situations. Assessments of MS patients routinely use clinician-
reported outcome measures of physical and cognitive function, including the 
Expanded Disability Status Scale, Multiple Sclerosis Functional Composite, 
neuropsychological tests, and others (Cohen & Rudick, 2007; Coulthard-
Morris, 2000; Joy & Johnston, 2001; Rothwell et al., 1997). 
However, functional outcomes suffer from at least two concerns. First, 
they may require risk adjustment like other types of outcomes, because 
factors unrelated to the quality of medical care can affect them. Second, many 
functional outcomes rely to some extent on the clinician’s judgment for scoring 
each patient on the measures or scales. This can make the functional outcomes 
more vulnerable to gaming by health professionals and providers, especially 
when P4P programs use scores to calculate bonus payments.
Mortality is the ultimate final outcome, although mortality measures can be 
a sensitive topic for both patients and clinicians. In principle, P4P programs 
could use mortality rates or risk-adjusted mortality rates for performance 
assessment. Aligning health professionals’ financial interests in keeping the 
patient alive as long as possible may improve mortality outcomes. However, 
patients and their families may understandably be concerned if the presence 
of a P4P program implied that physicians would not be doing all they could to 
keep patients alive in the absence of P4P financial incentives. 
At the same time, researchers have conducted much statistical analysis in 
recent years to create risk-adjusted mortality rates for several diseases and 
populations. Quality improvement efforts and public reporting of mortality 
outcomes have used these rates. For example, risk-adjusted mortality rates 
have been reported publicly for several years on Medicare’s Dialysis Facility 
Compare Web site (Trisolini & Isenberg, 2007), the State of New York has 
reported publicly on risk-adjusted mortality rates for cardiac surgeons for 
many years (Jha & Epstein, 2006), and Medicare recently began reporting 
risk-adjusted mortality rates for some types of patients on its Hospital 
Compare Web site (CMS, 2009). These measures have been well tested, so they 
presumably could be extended for use in P4P programs.
Patient-Reported Outcomes
Patient-reported outcomes have the advantage of providing data on outcomes 
that can be collected only from patients; broadly speaking, such outcomes 
can include QOL, patient satisfaction, and patient experience of care. Patient 
satisfaction data are already used in P4P programs, including those sponsored 
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by the Integrated Health Care Association, the Hawaii Medical Services 
Association, and the British National Health Service (Doran et al., 2006b; 
Gilmore et al., 2007; McDermott et al., 2006). Health professionals might 
be expected to object to P4P programs tying financial rewards to subjective 
indicators such as patient satisfaction, but the success of these three large P4P 
programs in implementing these patient-reported outcome measures indicates 
that clinician acceptance is possible. 
Standardized patient satisfaction scales for quality measurement and public 
reporting have become widely accepted in recent years, which has helped 
to promote their use in P4P programs. AHRQ developed the Consumer 
Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems in the 1990s, and it now 
includes a family of standardized patient surveys that have broad acceptance 
for assessment of health plans, hospitals, physician groups, and other provider 
organizations (AHRQ, 2007, 2009).
Clinical trials of new drugs and evaluations of health service interventions 
have used QOL scales, such as the SF-36 or SF-12, to monitor outcomes of care, 
and these types of scales have potential for use in P4P programs. Medicare 
has also publicly reported QOL scales in recent years through the Health 
Outcomes Survey (NCQA, 2006). These scales can include broad, generic 
measures of functioning, such as the Physical Component Summary (PCS) 
and Mental Component Summary (MCS) scales for the SF-36 or SF-12. They 
can also include more specific measures of particular symptoms, such as the 
Modified Fatigue Impact Scale (MFIS; National Multiple Sclerosis Society, 
1997a). With a wide range of both general health and symptom-specific QOL 
scales developed in recent years, P4P programs have many options if they wish 
to measure QOL performance.
Some QOL scales have been developed for particular diseases, such as the 
Kidney Disease Quality of Life Scale (Hays et al., 1994). The National Multiple 
Sclerosis Society developed a multipurpose patient survey instrument for 
measuring a range of outcomes, the Multiple Sclerosis Quality of Life Inventory 
(MSQLI; National Multiple Sclerosis Society, 1997a, 1997b). The MSQLI 
includes the 21-item MFIS and nine other scales that measure outcomes related 
to generic physical and mental health, pain, sexual satisfaction, bladder control, 
bowel control, visual impairment, perceived deficits (cognition), and social 
support. Several other disease-specific QOL measures for MS have also been 
developed in recent years (Burks & Johnson, 2000; Nortvedt & Riise, 2003). 
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Patient-reported outcomes can also include other types of functioning 
scales; some overlap with clinician-reported outcomes such as those assessing 
ADLs, IADLs, and mobility for rehabilitation programs. For example, for MS 
two disability scales focus mainly on walking ability: the Extended Disability 
Status Scale (EDSS), which neurologists assess, and the Patient-Determined 
Disease Steps (PDDS), which patients can assess. In theory, P4P programs 
could use either or both measures to assess performance, although in MS, the 
goal is usually slowing the decline in function rather than improving function. 
It is interesting that P4P programs have used patient satisfaction scales 
to date but not QOL scales. This may stem from health professional and 
provider organization concerns that factors outside their control can affect 
QOL and thus would require risk adjustment. For example, one study that 
used QOL scales to assess the performance of Medicare providers used several 
demographic and comorbidity variables for risk adjustment (Trisolini et al., 
2005). In contrast, patient satisfaction is more under the control of physicians 
and other health professionals and providers because it largely reflects the 
patient’s experience of receiving care from the clinician. Moreover, private 
health insurance plans may include patient satisfaction in P4P programs 
because it helps them attract enrollees into their plans and thus affects their 
ability to compete against other health insurance companies.
Issues in Selecting Quality Measures for p4p programs
Data Sources and Administrative Burdens
The three basic data sources for measuring quality of care indicators are 
medical records (paper-based or electronic), patient surveys, and administra-
tive data (including enrollment records, insurance claims, and facility records). 
Each has advantages and disadvantages (Berlowitz et al., 1997). 
Medical records. Medical records have the advantage of including much 
more detailed clinical information than do administrative data: for example, 
the specific clinical values provided by laboratory test results for HbA1c for 
diabetics, assessments of the patient’s severity of illness, physical examinations, 
pharmaceutical prescriptions, neurological tests that physicians conducted, 
results of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) tests and other radiology 
examinations, and clinicians’ or providers’ notes about treatments and the 
patient’s status. They also provide more complete information than do claims 
data on diagnoses, complications, and comorbidities because claims rely on 
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coding that information, and coding efforts may be incomplete for some types 
of diagnoses and complications.
As a result, medical record abstracts are important data sources for quality 
measures when process interventions or outcomes depend on identifying 
patients with a particular clinical or functional status that cannot be identified 
through claims data or patient surveys. For example, appropriate interventions 
and expected outcomes will vary between MS patients depending on whether 
they have relapsing-remitting or progressive forms of the disease (Noseworthy 
et al., 2000).
The main disadvantage of medical records is the high cost of collecting 
those data in many circumstances, particularly when the records are paper-
based or when EMRs do not include the specific data necessary for quality 
measures. The manual medical record abstraction process necessary in such 
circumstances can be very labor intensive; usually a trained nurse must 
ensure accuracy, and medical record coders and administrators may also 
be involved. However, large sample sizes may become increasingly available 
in EMRs as implementation of EMRs spreads, at least for larger physician 
groups and integrated delivery systems. In theory, EMRs could reduce the 
cost of data collection substantially, by enabling access to data already stored 
in digital format, like claims data. However, at present EMRs are available 
only in a limited number of hospitals and physician groups, and smaller 
physician practices have had even lower implementation rates. Comprehensive 
availability of EMRs for all health professionals and provider organizations 
across the country remains a long-term goal that may take many years to 
achieve despite the initiative in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
of 2009 to fund implementation of EMRs.
Another weakness of medical records, and even EMRs, is that a given 
patient’s medical data can be fragmented across the multiple medical records 
maintained by the different physician practices, hospitals, and other providers 
treating the patient. Efforts to develop community-wide health information 
exchanges (HIEs), to enable more comprehensive access to a patient’s data, 
are still in the pilot phase. EMR vendors are working to make their systems 
compatible with one another to better promote development of HIEs, but this 
effort, too, remains in the development phase.
Patient surveys. Surveys can provide unique types of data for measuring 
quality indicators. For example, some types of outcomes, such as patient 
satisfaction, can be measured only through patient surveys. Surveys can be 
used to collect data on physical functioning, mental functioning, and social 
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support for a range of diseases. Disease-specific symptoms, such as fatigue, 
urinary dysfunction, bowel dysfunction, and sleep satisfaction, can also be 
captured in survey scales. Standardized QOL survey instruments often capture 
both generic and disease-specific outcomes data (e.g., National Multiple 
Sclerosis Society, 1997a, 1997b) by including a mix of scales. Researchers 
and policy makers can analyze those patient-reported quality measures 
independently or in conjunction with physician-reported measures of 
complementary outcomes that may be included in a patient’s medical record.
Patient surveys have two main disadvantages, however. First, they can 
be costly, depending on how they are administered, whether by trained 
interviewers (in person or by phone) or not. Mail surveys may be a relatively 
low-cost option in many cases, but they often suffer from lower response 
rates and higher rates of missing data. Conversely, when trained interviewers 
conduct in-person interviews, the costs of administering the survey are 
higher, but the data may be more complete. Many studies have struck a middle 
ground, using telephone surveys, which can be conducted by interviewers or 
with computer assistance. 
In recent years, online surveys have become more common, and they may 
enable less expensive survey data collection to become more widespread in 
the future. At present, the more limited availability of Internet access for low-
income respondents and the more limited willingness of elderly or chronically 
ill patients to participate in online surveys pose problems. However, these 
concerns will likely diminish considerably in the future as online access and 
Web use become more routine for most Americans. Online surveys also have 
the advantage of enabling automated skip patterns and immediate prompts to 
respondents for out-of-range values and missing data.
The second disadvantage of patient surveys is reliance on patient recall. 
For infrequent events (such as use of some types of health services) or long 
recall periods, this drawback may result in inaccurate data. Where possible, 
combining patient surveys with administrative data can avoid this problem, 
such as by using surveys for QOL outcomes that require patient responses 
and administrative claims data for hospital days and other utilization or cost 
outcomes. 
Researchers must also guard against unexpected variations in patient 
responses due to cultural, racial, ethnic, language, educational, or 
socioeconomic differences among respondents. Survey instruments often 
require translations into multiple languages, and researchers may conduct 
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cognitive testing, reading level testing, and other types of pretesting with 
different patient groups prior to widespread implementation of surveys.
Administrative data. In quality measurement, analysts commonly apply 
two types of administrative data: enrollment records and insurance (billing) 
claims data. Quality measurement also sometimes uses clinical data systems—
laboratory and pharmacy—although they more closely relate to EMRs while 
often containing some administrative data.
Administrative data have the advantage of being a low-cost data source: they 
are already stored in digital format for other purposes, so they are less difficult 
to access and analyze. Researchers often apply administrative data to identify 
denominator inclusions and exclusions for quality measures. For example, 
quality measures for treatment of diabetics are often limited to patients 
between the ages of 18 and 75 (NCQA, 2006), for whom age data and ICD-9 
diagnosis code data used to identify the denominator population are often 
accessed through administrative data. A lack of detailed clinical information, 
however, such as the results of laboratory tests, is a common weakness of 
administrative data; in addition, diagnosis code data often need to be screened 
or validated to ensure accuracy. 
Enrollment data are useful for the basic demographic information needed 
for both process and outcome indicators, such as age, gender, insurance 
coverage, and death dates. These data are usually included in databases with 
one record per patient; generally, they are easy to use for data analysis, but only 
rarely do they provide all of the information needed for quality measures. 
Claims data are useful for some types of process measures, in situations in 
which the claims data are reasonably complete and provide sufficiently detailed 
clinical information. Two good examples are indicators for pharmaceutical 
utilization (e.g., whether MS immunomodulatory disease-modifying drugs 
have been in continuous use) and laboratory test utilization (e.g., whether 
patients taking interferons receive liver function tests and complete blood 
counts with platelet counts every 6 months). However, in a recent study on 
MS quality indicators (Trisolini et al., 2007), we found claims data to be 
limited in their applicability for MS quality measurement in many ways, for 
they did not have sufficiently detailed or consistent data on some types of 
important diagnoses (e.g., urinary tract infections), important treatments 
(e.g., intravenous corticosteroids), or episodes of illness (e.g., MS relapses). In 
addition, claims data do not contain any information on a patient’s course of 
MS (i.e., relapsing-remitting, secondary progressive, primary progressive, or 
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progressive relapsing); on patient-reported outcomes such as QOL, functional 
status, or satisfaction; or on physician-reported outcomes such as EDSS scores. 
Claims data do have several advantages. First, they are reasonably complete 
for the data they collect, because they are used primarily for billing purposes; 
health professionals and providers thus have a direct financial incentive to 
ensure that all bills are submitted for reimbursement. Second, they usually 
include data on all of the clinicians and provider organizations treating a 
patient and thus avoid one of the weaknesses of medical records data: patient 
records that may be fragmented across the different health professionals and 
facilities providing treatment. Third, they enable analysis of quality measures 
using large sample sizes, including up to thousands of patients at a time. The 
large numbers of enrollees that many private health insurance plans cover, and 
even larger numbers that public payers such as Medicare and Medicaid cover, 
make this possible. 
Risk adjustment of quality measures can also use claims data, because 
they include variables such as age, gender, diagnoses, and others that risk 
adjustment models often apply. For example, the risk adjustment model applied 
for hospital mortality measures in Medicare’s Hospital Compare Web site 
(CMS, 2009) uses claims data. With the advent of Medicare’s requirement for 
POA coding of comorbid conditions, the potential for more accurate coding in 
claims data has increased considerably.
In sum, all three data sources have advantages and disadvantages for 
quality measurement. Efforts to measure quality indicators for P4P programs 
should consider all three options before selecting the most suitable source—or 
sources—for each indicator. A comprehensive set of quality indicators can 
include contributions from all three sources. The choice for each P4P program 
may depend on a range of factors, including budget constraints, preferences for 
the types of quality measures to be collected, and the need for patient surveys, 
if the program desires data on QOL or patient satisfaction outcomes.
Number of Quality Measures
P4P programs have included widely varying numbers of quality measures. The 
United Kingdom’s program includes 146 quality measures, far more than any 
of the P4P programs in the United States have used. In contrast, the Medicare 
Physician Group Practice Demonstration includes 32 quality measures, which 
were phased in over several years (Kautter et al., 2007). Private-sector P4P 
programs typically include fewer measures than those in the public sector.
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How many quality measures to include in a P4P program depends on 
several considerations. Using a larger number of measures poses three risks: 
(1) increasing the administrative burden on both P4P program administration 
and on participating health professionals and provider organizations; (2) 
making the results more complex and cumbersome for health professionals 
and provider organization staff to interpret; and (3) requiring use of measures 
less closely linked to health outcomes or less well studied. Data verification and 
audit costs may increase greatly as the number of measures increases, although 
sampling providers or measures (or both) to be audited can reduce this burden. 
Physicians often express concern about the dozens of clinical guidelines and 
quality incentives they face, at the same time that they perceive themselves 
to be under pressure to see more patients and complete more paperwork. 
Under the circumstances, some quality measures may be ignored—especially 
in situations where P4P incentives for individual quality measures may affect 
only a small percentage of physician income or provider organization revenue. 
An advantage of including a larger number of quality measures is a more 
comprehensive evaluation of the care provided.
The pros and cons of including smaller numbers of quality measures in 
a P4P program are generally the converse of those for larger numbers of 
measures. The positives of fewer quality measures include less administrative 
burden, lower overall program costs, and easier interpretation of results. The 
negatives include the danger of focusing provider attention on a subset of the 
important clinical areas and the risk of financial incentives’ being focused 
on just a few measures. The financial incentives could motivate clinician or 
provider behavior that focuses too much on the clinical conditions included 
in the P4P program. Studies have found that high performers in some clinical 
areas are not necessarily high performers in other clinical areas (Sorbero et 
al., 2006). Although professional ethics and peer review may blunt the impact, 
inappropriate financial incentives nonetheless remain a risk. Given that 
hundreds of thousands of physicians practice in the United States, it is likely 
that some percentage will succumb to financial temptation. Even if this portion 
represents only 1 percent of all physicians, it would mean that thousands of 
physicians could be involved in such dubious financial and clinical practices. 
Another potential advantage of including fewer structure or process 
measures is that researchers can focus on measures more closely linked 
with outcomes. For example, the Leapfrog Group initially focused on just 
three structure measures that had clear links to outcomes. Similarly, process 
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measures could focus more on immunization or pharmaceutical indicators that 
have more evidence for impacts on outcomes than on other measures that may 
be less closely associated with outcomes or that have less evidence to support 
the relationship. 
Intermediate outcomes, such as blood pressure and HbA1c levels, could 
be substituted for process measures to provide closer links to final outcomes. 
For example, in its total of 146 quality measures, the UK P4P system included 
many structure measures, most of which have not been rigorously studied for 
impact on outcomes. The UK system will be a valuable test of a P4P program 
with a larger number of quality measures, but there is a need for a closer 
examination of the structure measures it used to reach its high number of 
quality measures. 
Another issue is whether to weight all of the quality measures equally in 
calculating provider performance scores. Equal weighting makes it easier for 
health professionals, provider organizations, and policy makers to interpret the 
results but may not reflect the underlying value of the different measures or 
the underlying level of evidence supporting different measures. For example, 
HEDIS includes quality measures for treatment of diabetics that focus on both 
the frequency of HbA1c testing and the levels found in that testing. The quality 
measure focusing on the level of HbA1c could be weighted more heavily in 
calculating provider performance because it is more closely related to patient 
outcomes than is the frequency with which the HbA1c tests were conducted.
Types of Quality Measures to Include
The IOM’s (2006) report on performance measurement criticized the focus 
of most current quality measures on specific types of health professionals, 
provider organizations, or settings of care, such as only on physicians, 
medical offices, or hospitals. That report recommended expanding quality 
measurement to include three other types of quality measures:
•	 Composite measures—documenting whether a patient has received 
all recommended services for a particular condition (and perhaps for 
multiple conditions). Composite measures of process and intermediate 
outcomes may show greater room for improvement than individual 
measures and may be more closely related to final outcomes than single 
measures are. In calculating composite measures, analysts can apply 
weighting schemes to give higher weight to quality measures identified 
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as more closely related to either final outcomes or cost savings. All-or-
nothing measures may require success on each of a set of measures to be 
considered at the same time.
•	 Population-based measures—aggregating results for a given region or 
with breakdowns by population subgroup on socioeconomic status, race, 
or ethnicity to test for the presence of disparities. These aggregations 
can be done on several levels, such as groups of clinicians and provider 
organizations, delivery systems, a community, or a geographic region.
•	 Systems-level measures—analyzing performance across diseases, 
conditions, clinical specialties, or departments. Researchers and policy 
makers can define systems to include a continuum of care across 
ambulatory, inpatient, and long-term care services within a given 
community. 
These alternate approaches to quality measurement have the potential 
to broaden the focus of current P4P programs, moving beyond the current 
emphasis on individual clinician, clinician group, or hospital accountability. 
For example, using these alternate types of quality measures could promote 
more shared accountability for quality performance across multiple health 
professionals and provider organizations, a goal that the IOM (2006) 
report highlighted for development of a national system of performance 
measurement. This approach may include rewarding the complete set of 
clinicians and providers included in the care of a patient, or participating in 
a system of care in a community. Such a step does open up the risk of “free 
riders,” however, in that some clinicians or provider organizations may not be 
fully motivated to improve quality, preferring to benefit from improvements 
in performance measures that result from the efforts of the other professionals 
or provider organizations being assessed with them. However, this broader 
approach is consistent with management literature that emphasizes the value 
of applying group incentives in addition to individual incentives (Packwood, 
2008). P4P systems could also pursue such a strategy, for example, basing some 
bonus payments on physician group or provider organization incentives and 
some on incentives at the level of the community, region, or health care system. 
In that way, providers could earn bonus payments based on both their own 
work and their contributions as part of a broader community of professionals 
and provider organizations that are treating patients in a given region or 
system of care. This approach mitigates the risk of free riders by tying some 
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incentives directly to provider performance but also preserves some incentives 
for broader regional or systemwide performance results.
Room for Improvement in Performance
Another consideration for selecting quality measures is the degree to which 
there is room for improvement in performance on the measure. Ideally, P4P 
systems would select measures that have large opportunities for improvement, 
both because this represents good public health practice and because it enables 
health professionals and provider organizations to demonstrate improvement 
in quality. Conversely, if there is little room for improvement in a quality 
measure, where providers have already achieved high performance scores, 
then payers have less motivation to reward improvements, and providers have 
fewer opportunities to demonstrate improvement. For example, in recent 
years the NCQA removed one of its hospital quality measures—beta blocker 
treatment after myocardial infarction—because hospitals had improved 
their performance to a high average level, leaving little room for additional 
improvement.
Cost Containment
P4P programs have focused mainly on quality improvement, but both public 
and private payers have major concerns about cost containment as well. 
Quality improvement advocates have claimed that improving quality may 
in some situations also reduce costs, but evidence for that dual benefit is 
limited. In theory, better care for diabetics can reduce complications such as 
retinopathy, nephropathy, and neuropathy, thereby reducing or avoiding the 
future costs of treating those complications. However, many other factors 
can affect the actual levels of costs incurred by diabetic patients, such as age, 
comorbidities, and low-income status. Moreover, for most payers, the time 
horizon required to reap cost savings for reduced complications of diabetics is 
too long, meaning that they lack strong incentives to implement programs that 
address such complications. 
Several types of quality improvements are fairly closely linked to cost 
savings, however. First, patient safety measures that improve quality by 
reducing adverse drug events, hospital-acquired infections, or surgical errors 
will directly affect costs by reducing hospital admissions, lengths of stay, 
or readmissions. Disease management programs that target heart failure 
patients for more intensive ambulatory care, case management, and nurse-
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led home care can also reduce hospital admissions and result in cost savings 
(Anderson et al., 2005). Several chronic diseases known as ambulatory care 
sensitive conditions (ACSCs) provide opportunities for cost savings through 
reduced hospital admissions, and quality measures based on ACSCs have 
been published as Prevention Quality Indicators (PQIs; AHRQ, 2001). The 
essential idea of ACSCs is that through improved primary health care and 
preventive care, achieved by enhancing quality or access (or both), chronic 
disease patients will be less prone to complications or exacerbations of their 
illnesses that will result in hospitalizations. Given that hospital admissions are 
very high-cost events in health care, ACSCs have the benefit of linking quality 
improvement more directly to cost savings than many other types of quality 
measures, which may take many years to realize their cost impacts.
Although both public and private payers have goals to improve quality of 
care as an end in itself, both may sometimes opt to target quality measures 
for P4P programs that also have demonstrated cost savings. For private 
payers, such a strategy can help reduce the premiums they charge business 
customers, thus providing a competitive advantage. For public payers, limited 
governmental budget resources may lead to a dual focus on measures that can 
simultaneously promote both cost savings and quality improvement.
A related issue is how to fund the bonus payments to providers in P4P 
programs. Some programs require bonus payments to be funded by cost 
savings demonstrated by the participating health professionals or provider 
organization. This is the approach that Medicare’s Physician Group Practice 
Demonstration took (Kautter et al., 2007). Other P4P programs, such as that 
of the Integrated Healthcare Association, have provided “new money” for P4P 
bonus payments.
Methods for analyzing Quality Measures for p4p programs
Risk Adjustment
Ensuring fair performance assessments when using outcome measures 
often necessitates risk adjustment or stratification of performance results by 
population subgroups. For example, many factors apart from the quality of 
medical treatment affect outcome measures such as patient mortality (most 
notably, the patient’s age and the number and severity of diseases). As a result, 
when analysts or policy makers use mortality as a quality measure, comparing 
health professionals and provider organizations on raw mortality statistics 
can be misleading. At worst, those types of comparisons might encourage 
 Quality Measures for Pay for Performance 125
clinicians and provider organizations to avoid treating older or sicker patients 
who most need their care, because such patients would adversely affect 
mortality performance measurements. 
For example, the New York State cardiac surgery mortality report cards 
are based on data that are risk adjusted to better ensure fair performance 
assessment of surgeons (Jha & Epstein, 2006). Similarly, Medicare’s Dialysis 
Facility Compare Web site provides public reporting of mortality data 
associated with kidney dialysis facilities only after risk adjustment using a 
broad range of variables (Trisolini & Isenberg, 2007). At the same time, existing 
statistical models used for risk adjustment do not fully explain the range 
of factors affecting mortality outcomes. That is why researchers still prefer 
randomization of patients in evaluating outcomes from new pharmaceuticals 
in clinical trials (Palmer, 1995). Randomization controls for unmeasured and 
unknown factors affecting outcomes, whereas statistical models used for risk 
adjustment can only apply factors that can be measured. As a result, payers 
and policy makers have not yet been comfortable with moving from public 
reporting of risk-adjusted mortality outcomes to including mortality outcomes 
in P4P programs. Public reporting can include caveats, but bonus payments in 
P4P programs must be based on specific quantitative results, which leaves less 
opportunity to include qualifying statements regarding interpretation of the 
results.
Researchers and policy makers sometimes propose risk adjustment for 
process measures of quality (although in practice they are less often risk-
adjusted). One rationale is that patient adherence to prescribed tests and 
pharmaceutical treatments may be lower for patients in lower socioeconomic 
groups or different racial or ethnic minority groups than in other populations. 
As a result, some health professionals and provider organizations argue that 
process measures such as HbA1c testing for diabetics or blood pressure levels 
should be risk-adjusted to account for patient factors affecting adherence. 
For example, Zaslavsky and Epstein (2005) found that racial, income, and 
education variables affected some HEDIS quality measure scores for health 
plans significantly, although the rates for most plans changed by fewer 
than 5 percentage points. Similarly, Mehta et al. (2008) found that patient 
characteristics (including age, body mass index, race, and type of insurance) 
and hospital characteristics significantly, but modestly, affected hospital process 
measures for treatment of acute myocardial infarction. 
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Nonetheless, a countervailing concern is that one could interpret risk 
adjustment for these types of factors as endorsing lower-quality care for low-
income or minority patients. One method proposed to mitigate this concern 
is to stratify quality results for public reporting by patient-level factors, 
including insurance status, low income, and minority status. For example, 
NCQA requires that HEDIS quality measures for health plans be presented 
separately for different types of health insurance, including commercial 
insurance, Medicaid, and Medicare (Zaslavsky & Epstein, 2005). This approach 
could be extended to include other sociodemographic variables where sample 
sizes permit. P4P programs, however, may still face challenges of variable 
incentives for health professionals and provider organizations if the perception 
remains that avoiding treatment of certain population subgroups could 
improve performance scores and increase bonus payments. This problem 
could be mitigated if payers could provide higher P4P bonus payments for 
quality performance in treating patients in population subgroups known to 
be associated in the aggregate with worse outcomes or lower adherence to 
prescribed treatments.
Another approach that some quality measurement efforts use is for 
clinicians to document the prescription or recommendation for testing and 
to use that as the measure of quality, thus removing the effect of patient 
adherence from quality measurement. In most cases P4P program analysts will 
need medical record data for this measurement, because administrative claims 
data do not yet routinely capture this type of information. That drawback 
may change, however, if the new codes for the CPT-II system become more 
widely adopted; they allow coding for “patient reasons” (including refusal 
or nonadherence) why a given patient may not have undergone a particular 
test (American Medical Association, 2008). This new type of CPT coding 
reduces physicians’ incentive to avoid the more difficult patients who may 
adversely affect their measured quality performance. A potential risk is that 
physicians will overuse these codes for patient exclusions, and thereby game 
the performance assessment calculations to increase their bonus payments. 
Auditing patient records to verify the exclusions is one approach for mitigating 
this risk. 
Identifying High-Quality Providers
P4P programs can take several different approaches to identifying high-quality 
health professionals and provider organizations that qualify for P4P bonus 
payments through meeting quality goals or targets. Three basic methods are 
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(1) threshold targets, (2) improvement-over-time targets, and (3) comparison 
with other providers. 
Threshold targets. The most common method for identifying high-
quality clinicians and provider organizations in P4P programs, the threshold 
approach mainly offers simplicity and ease of understanding for clinicians. 
For example, “For patients with diabetes, 75 percent will have an HbA1c test 
at least once per year.” The target is clear from the outset so practitioners and 
provider organizations know what specific number to aim for. A disadvantage 
is that providers starting at lower levels of quality may perceive thresholds as 
unattainable if the thresholds are set very high. Another disadvantage is the 
lack of incentives for further quality improvement above the threshold. 
Results from the P4P program in the United Kingdom provide some 
evidence to support this latter point: an evaluation study found that initial 
gains in quality in the first 2 years of that program were significant, but 
gains slowed markedly in the third and fourth years when there were few 
additional financial incentives for further improvement (Campbell et al., 2009). 
These results must be interpreted cautiously, however, because there was no 
comparison group available for this P4P program, given that all UK family 
practitioners were included in it. As a result, the evaluators had to rely on an 
interrupted time-series analysis in their study design. Nonetheless, the results 
are consistent with the concern about lack of further incentives once threshold 
targets are achieved by providers in a P4P program that relies on that type of 
target. 
One way to mitigate concerns of initially low-performing providers is to 
establish a series of thresholds, with successive incentives for higher levels of 
performance in a “stair step” model. For example, threshold-based P4P bonus 
payments could start at 40 percent performance (where 100 percent is perfect 
performance, with all denominator patients receiving the indicated numerator 
interventions) and increase with every 5 percentage points achieved, up to 80 
percent. In this way, providers may be able to achieve the first two or three 
levels of incentives even if they cannot achieve all nine possible levels. They 
can then aim to achieve higher levels of incentives in future years of the P4P 
program as they are able to further improve quality performance. In this 
way, the threshold approach can motivate providers at lower levels of initial 
performance because they can earn some performance payments in even the 
first year of a P4P program. 
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P4P programs can apply several methods for setting specific performance 
levels for the threshold targets. For example, programs can use (1) consensus 
goals that P4P payers and participating health professionals and provider 
organizations have set through joint discussion and agreement, (2) levels 
set by payers to promote a “reasonable” degree of quality improvement, (3) 
target levels benchmarked to levels that other high-quality clinicians and 
provider organizations already achieve, and (4) comparison with other quality 
measurement programs to find targets these programs may have set for similar 
populations or similar quality measures.
Improvement-over-time targets. Improvement-over-time targets establish 
a baseline from a provider’s own prior performance level and then evaluate 
current period performance starting from that level. For example, “Providers 
should achieve at least a 5 percent increase in performance from the prior year.” 
An advantage of this approach is that providers starting from low levels of 
initial performance can view these targets as attainable. However, this approach 
has two disadvantages. First, providers at high levels of prior performance may 
find additional improvement difficult to achieve. For example, if a provider is 
already at 90 percent performance or above on a particular quality measure, 
then a 5 percent improvement may be difficult. Second, payers may object to 
rewarding providers at low levels of performance even if they are achieving 
improvements from even lower performance in the prior year. For example, if 
a provider improves from 10 percent to 15 percent from one year to the next, 
that 50 percent improvement may still represent a much lower absolute level of 
performance than that of all other providers in the P4P program.
P4P programs can set improvement-over-time targets in several ways. 
They can use percentage improvements (e.g., 5 percent), percentage-point 
improvements (e.g., 5 percentage points), or reductions in performance gaps 
(e.g., 10 percent reduction in the gap between 100 percent performance and 
the prior year’s performance level). 
The Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration uses the 
reduction-in-performance-gaps approach (Kautter et al., 2007), which has 
the advantage of requiring larger percentage improvements at lower levels 
of initial performance and smaller improvements at higher levels of initial 
performance. For example, if the initial performance is 40 percent, then the 
gap from the perfect score of 100 percent is 60 percent, and the 10 percent 
improvement target represents a 6 percentage point improvement. As a result, 
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the target would be 46 percent performance in the year being assessed. In 
contrast, if the initial performance is 80 percent, then the gap is 20 percent 
and the target is just 2 percentage points’ improvement, or 82 percent. In this 
way the reduction-in-performance-gaps approach mitigates one disadvantage 
of improvement-over-time targets, by requiring more improvement from low 
performers and less improvement from high performers.
Another way to mitigate the disadvantages of both the threshold and 
improvement-over-time targets is to adopt a combined approach that includes 
both types of targets in one P4P program. The Medicare Physician Group 
Practice Demonstration adopted such an approach, which included both 
threshold targets and improvement-over-time targets (Kautter et al., 2007). 
Physician group practices participating in the demonstration can meet any 
of the targets to earn performance bonus payments. In this way, the program 
established positive incentives for physician group practices at both high and 
low initial levels of initial and ongoing performance. 
Comparison with other providers. The third approach to identifying high-
quality performance is to compare providers with one another. In this method, 
P4P programs consider only those who perform better than their peers to 
be high quality and deserving of P4P bonus payments (irrespective of their 
absolute levels of performance). For example, P4P programs could award 
incentive payments to the top 20 percent of providers. The Premier Hospital 
Quality Incentive Demonstration, which compared more than 200 hospitals 
using a range of different quality measures, used this approach (Lindenauer et 
al., 2007). 
This approach contrasts with both the threshold and improvement-over-
time approaches, in which P4P programs allow all providers the possibility of 
earning incentive payments. The comparison approach focuses on rewarding 
only the highest performers from among those participating in the P4P 
program. 
The comparison approach has at least two disadvantages. First, even 
low absolute levels of performance may earn rewards, as long as any given 
provider’s performance is higher than that of the others. Second, providers 
do not know in advance what their goal is, because it depends on their peers’ 
performance levels. Some may consider themselves unlikely to perform in the 
highest 20 percent, and they may therefore lose their motivation to improve 
(at least by this incentive alone).
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Another option with the comparison approach is to include penalties for 
low performers at the same time as providing rewards for high performers. 
This option may provide an additional (negative) incentive for those who do 
not think they have the potential to reach the top 20 percent. 
Statistical Analysis of Quality Improvement
Statistical confidence in P4P results can be problematic when individual 
physicians or small physician practices are the units of accountability. In many 
of these situations, only small numbers of patients may be available for the 
denominator populations for some types of quality measures in any given 
practice; as a result, random statistical fluctuations may account for observed 
performance on quality measures. Minimum sample sizes per quality measure 
may need to be as high as 411 patients, a figure HEDIS used to indicate a 
sample size sufficient to provide confidence that the detectable difference in 
performance is 10 percentage points (NCQA, 2006). 
Achieving sample sizes of 411 or more for diabetics, for example, may 
require a focus on large physician groups, hospitals, integrated delivery 
systems, combinations of smaller physician practices into networks or 
virtual groups, or a geographic area such as a city or county that contains 
a higher number of providers. It may be easier to achieve sufficient sample 
sizes for population-based quality measures that do not focus on patients 
with particular diseases such as diabetes. For example, quality measures for 
influenza vaccinations include all people ages 50 or older in the denominator 
population. 
Analysts and policy makers sometimes consider smaller sample sizes 
acceptable if quality measurement can include the entire population of patients 
in a physician practice, rather than a sample, so that the observed number 
of patients can be considered the true number and not subject to random 
statistical fluctuation. However, a countervailing argument is that the observed 
patient population and quality performance levels may vary randomly over 
time, so, from that perspective, the population of patients a physician practice 
treats in any one year is still a sample of the patients treated over multiple 
years. From that perspective, application of statistical analysis and calculation 
of confidence intervals is still needed, and the intervals may be very wide when 
only small sample sizes are available.
 Quality Measures for Pay for Performance 131
public reporting of Quality Measures
Researchers and policy makers generally view public reporting of quality 
performance as a distinct approach to promoting quality improvement, 
separate from P4P programs. For example, the Medicare Web sites Hospital 
Compare, Nursing Home Compare, and Dialysis Facility Compare all provide 
online data that consumers and medical professionals can view to check on 
the quality-of-care performance of those types of provider facilities in all 
regions of the United States. Similarly, for many years the NCQA has provided 
comparative quality performance data on managed care organizations through 
its HEDIS program. These efforts and others aim solely to enable public 
reporting of quality-of-care performance data, unrelated to any direct financial 
incentives that P4P programs would include. Public reporting can provide 
indirect financial incentives, however, by potentially motivating patients to 
“vote with their feet” and thus increase utilization and revenue for higher 
quality providers. In most cases this is only a potential effect, however, and 
evidence of its impact on patient behavior is limited.
Despite the conceptual distinction between P4P and public reporting 
initiatives, several P4P efforts have integrated public reporting into their 
programs. Most notably, the IHA established public reporting of the quality 
performance results used in its P4P program as one of its program’s guiding 
principles to promote public transparency of P4P incentives. 
Many P4P programs adopt a different strategy, releasing quality 
performance data only to participating clinicians and provider organizations—
and not to the public. This is consistent with the methods that many 
continuous quality improvement (CQI) programs use, giving feedback of data 
only to the providers that the program is assessing; the aims are to preserve 
confidentiality of performance results and to promote providers’ willingness to 
participate in CQI initiatives. By avoiding public reporting, staff of these CQI 
programs argue that they are increasing provider participation, decreasing the 
risk of “defensive medicine,” such as avoiding sicker or more difficult patients, 
and forestalling efforts by providers to game the data collection efforts. 
In general, it seems appropriate to limit public reporting to situations in 
which practitioners or provider organizations have developed a good level of 
experience with a set of P4P quality indicators and the methods for identifying 
performance targets. Especially in the early stages of P4P programs, many 
clinicians may be concerned about the fairness of quality measurement 
methods and performance assessments. They may prefer that public reporting 
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of results wait until the performance measurement system has been better 
tested, and better established through several years of measurement cycles, 
so that confidence in the accuracy and appropriateness of the quality data has 
become well established.
P4P programs might also consider several middle ground approaches that 
entail more limited public reporting. For example, public reporting could 
focus on aggregated results by region or for groups of providers rather than 
individual clinicians or provider organizations. In this way the public could 
view the P4P program’s overall results, but those of individual clinicians 
and provider organizations would still remain confidential. In addition, P4P 
programs could present individual physician or physician group results while 
masking the names of the physicians or physician groups with code numbers 
to prevent performance results from being associated directly with them. Such 
middle ground public reporting efforts could facilitate some degree of public 
transparency while mitigating clinicians’ and provider organizations’ concerns.
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Chapter 5
The early pioneers of pay for performance (P4P), such as US Healthcare (now 
Aetna), launched P4P in the mid-1980s, and the movement grew dramatically 
in the 2000s. At the end of 2007, there were 148 P4P sponsors nationwide; 
commercial P4P sponsors were the most prevalent. P4P programs most often 
focus on clinical quality; however, as of 2006, 23 percent of P4P sponsors 
included efficiency or cost of care as one of their domains (Baker & Delbanco, 
2007). This chapter examines the use of efficiency measures in P4P programs.
P4P was born during the nation’s backlash against the cost-control emphasis 
of managed care. Hence, P4P programs tended to restrict their focus to quality, 
patient satisfaction, and, to some extent, adoption of information technology 
(Robinson, 2008; Robinson et al., 2009). Several seminal Institute of Medicine 
(IOM) reports on health care quality and safety also galvanized a call to action 
that led to the rise of P4P programs (e.g., IOM Board on Health Care Services, 
2001; Kohn et al., 1999). However, health care cost growth in the United States 
has overshadowed the original concerns. Determinants of this cost growth 
include (1) population aging, (2) general economic growth, (3) expansions 
of insurance coverage, and most important, (4) expansion of technological 
capabilities of medicine (White, 2007). Technological advances are likely to 
yield new and desirable medical services in the future, fueling further spending 
growth and imposing difficult choices in spending on health care versus 
alternatives. Spending growth will depend largely on how the health care 
system responds to future technological change (Congressional Budget Office, 
2008). 
This chapter presents a broad overview of efficiency measures in P4P 
programs. After first providing the motivation for including efficiency in P4P, 
we review definitions of efficiency. We follow this with an examination of the 
measurement of efficiency and a discussion of the evaluation of efficiency 
measures and measurement challenges. Then we discuss risk adjustment and 
quality in the context of efficiency measurement. Finally, we offer conclusions. 
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Motivation for Including efficiency in pay for performance
Evidence is strong that substantial inefficiencies exist in the US health care 
system (Safavi, 2006). First, per capita health care spending varies widely across 
the United States; substantial variations in cost per patient, however, are not 
correlated with overall health outcomes. For example, analysis of composite 
quality scores for medical centers and average spending per patient shows 
no correlation. Even among elite medical centers, costs vary substantially. 
Some regions are more likely than others to adopt low-cost, highly effective 
patterns of care, whereas some tend to adopt high-cost patterns of care and 
deliver treatments that provide little benefit (or even cause harm) (Orszag, 
2008). Second, the per capita health care expenditure in the United States is 
2 times greater than that of most other developed countries; it is nearly 1.5 
times greater than the per capita spending of Switzerland, which is the second 
highest spending nation (Reinhardt et al., 2004). However, these expenditures 
in the United States result in quality outcomes that are indistinguishable from 
those in other nations (Hussey et al., 2004). In fact, a recent international 
survey finds that the United States lags behind other developed countries 
on important measures of access, quality, and use of health information 
technology (Schoen et al., 2009).
Researchers estimate that 30 percent of Medicare’s costs could be saved 
without negatively affecting health outcomes if spending in high- and medium-
cost areas were reduced to the level in low-cost areas; they further hypothesize 
that these estimates could be extrapolated to the health care sector as a whole 
(Fisher, 2005; Wennberg et al., 2002). Further, analysts should consider not 
only static estimates of one-time potential savings for the US health care 
system but also dynamic estimates of potential savings over time. 
Unlike the health care industry, other industries have discovered efficiency 
improvements sufficient to lower the cost of services by 2.5 to 6.5 percent 
annually, thereby offsetting the cost-additive impact of new technologies. In 
contrast, annual efficiency gains achieved in the US health care system are 
much lower, leaving a 2.5 percentage point gap between health care spending 
growth and gross domestic product (GDP) growth (Milstein, 2008). If the gap 
between health care spending growth and GDP growth continued over this 
century, then more than 100 percent of the increase in GDP growth would be 
required for health care spending. However, if health care spending grew only 
one percentage point faster than GDP growth, health care spending over this 
century would be “affordable,” although still about 50 percent of GDP growth 
(Chernew et al., 2009). 
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One can make a strong argument for including efficiency as a criterion for 
health care payment. One reason is simply the inefficiency in the health care 
system. Further, many costs have been attributed to inefficient practices within 
the control of providers and individual practitioners. This factor—combined 
with the relationship between health care users and providers regarding the 
cost of care—places a burden on payers to reward efficient behavior to stretch 
the available resources (Safavi, 2006). Consensus is growing that meaningful 
cost control will require changing the fee-for-service (FFS) system to reward 
both quality and efficiency. 
Efficiency-based payments are, however, not new. For several decades, 
payers have compensated physicians based on relative value work units and 
have compensated hospitals based on patient diagnosis and complexity. Even 
under these systems, however, payers have not held costs in check adequately, 
efficiency is not what it should be, and further reform is necessary (Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission [MedPAC], 2005a). 
Defining efficiency
To measure efficiency, and ultimately to apply efficiency measures to a P4P 
program, analysts must define efficiency. Several organizations have developed 
definitions of efficiency. For example, the IOM defines efficiency as avoiding 
waste, including waste of equipment, supplies, ideas, and energy (Berwick, 
2002; IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2001). However, to date no broad 
consensus has emerged on how to define efficiency for the health care system. 
In general, efficiency is concerned with the relationship between health care 
outputs and resource inputs. Outputs can be defined as health care services 
(e.g., episodes of care) or final health outcomes (e.g., quality-adjusted life 
years, or QALYs). Inputs can be defined as physical inputs (e.g., nursing days) 
or financial inputs (e.g., costs). In addition to the relationship between health 
care outputs and resource inputs, efficiency might also be concerned with the 
relationship between health care services and final health outcomes. We now 
present some of the general definitions of health care efficiency that have been 
used (or could be used) in establishing efficiency measures.
Cost Efficiency
Payers and purchasers of health care services (as well as many health 
economists) tend to define efficiency as cost efficiency, which is generally 
defined as either the maximization of health care services for a given cost 
or the minimization of cost for a given level of health care services. Such 
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cost efficiency measures are independent of measures of health outcomes, 
but P4P programs should consider such outcomes along with available 
clinical effectiveness and patient experience measures when evaluating the 
performance of providers. In the context of this discussion, cost efficiency 
refers to the total cost for treatment of specific conditions relative to a cost 
standard. It reflects the combination of quantity and mix of health care services 
as well as the unit prices for these services, and generally it is risk adjusted 
(Thomas, 2006).
Economic Definitions
Health economists sometimes differentiate between three types of efficiency: 
technical efficiency, productive efficiency, and allocative efficiency (Palmer 
& Torgerson, 1999; Varian, 1992). Technical efficiency refers to the physical 
relation between physical inputs and outputs (in which outputs can be health 
care services or health outcomes). Technical efficiency is achieved when the 
level of output is maximized from a given set of physical inputs, but it cannot 
be used to compare alternative interventions, for example, in which one 
intervention produces the same output with less of one resource and more of 
another.
Productive efficiency refers to either the maximization of output for a 
given cost or the minimization of cost for a given level of output (note that 
when outputs are defined as health care services, then productive efficiency 
is equivalent to cost efficiency). Productive efficiency permits assessment of 
relative value for interventions with directly comparable outputs. It cannot, 
however, address the impact of reallocating resources at a broader level.
Allocative efficiency accounts for both productive efficiency and the 
efficiency of output distributed across the community. This type of efficiency 
occurs when resources are allocated to maximize the welfare of the community. 
Allocative efficiency implies productive efficiency, which in turn implies 
technical efficiency.
Cost-Effectiveness
Cost-effectiveness analysis is a method used to evaluate the costs and outcomes 
of interventions designed to improve health (Gold et al., 1996). For a given 
condition and population, treatment options 1 and 2 (e.g., new treatment 
versus old treatment) can be compared by calculating the incremental cost-
effectiveness ratio (ICER), which is the difference in costs between options 
1 and 2 divided by the difference in outcomes. The ICER is the “price” of the 
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additional outcome purchased by using option 1 rather than option 2, generally 
in dollars per QALY. If the price is low enough, then option 1 is cost-effective 
(American College of Physicians, 2000). When option 1 has both lower costs 
and better outcomes than option 2, then option 1 is “dominant” relative 
to option 2. Thus, an efficient health care system necessarily would choose 
option 1 over option 2. However, when option 1 has both higher costs and 
better outcomes than option 2, then neither option is dominant relative to the 
other. In this case standard definitions of efficiency do not apply, and cost-
effectiveness analysis could be used to develop efficiency measures.
At the present time, no agency in the United States formally establishes 
standards for cost-effectiveness analysis outcomes. However, most researchers 
consider interventions costing less than $50,000/QALY to be very cost-effective 
and those costing more than $100,000/QALY not to be cost-effective (Brown 
et al., 2008). Other countries and international organizations have formally 
established cost-effectiveness thresholds. For example, the United Kingdom’s 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) recommends that 
a health care technology should have a cost-effectiveness threshold of £20,000 
to £30,000 (approximately $31,000 to $46,000 in mid-2010 US dollars) per 
QALY gained (NICE, 2009; Culyer, 2009). The World Health Organization 
(WHO) recommends that countries use a cost-effectiveness threshold that is 
1 to 3 times their per capita GDP (WHO, 2001).
efficiency Measurement
Health care efficiency measurement has been a subject of intense research 
by academics, vendors, and various health care stakeholders such as payers, 
providers, and individual health professionals. The Southern California 
Evidence-Based Practice Center (McGlynn & Southern California Evidence-
Based Practice Center, 2008; see also Hussey et al., 2009) has provided a useful 
typology for efficiency, which explicates the content and use of efficiency 
measures. Their typology for efficiency has three tiers:
•	 Perspective:	Who	is	evaluating	the	efficiency	of	what	entity	and	why?
•	 Outputs:	What	type	of	product	is	being	evaluated?
•	 Inputs:	What	resources	are	used	to	produce	outputs?
Unfortunately, much of the peer-reviewed research on efficiency 
measurement is fragmented; it tends to focus on the production of 
specific health care outputs and services without a general theoretical or 
methodological framework (Chung et al., 2008). Further, most measures 
144  Chapter 5
that payers use have been developed by vendors and are proprietary. We now 
discuss the current state of efficiency measurement, focusing on hospital and 
physician efficiency measurement. 
Hospital Efficiency Measurement
The majority of peer-reviewed literature on health care efficiency measurement 
relates to the production of hospital care. Academics often use sophisticated 
empirical techniques called “frontier modeling” to identify best-practice 
output-input (cost) relationships and to gauge how much efficiency levels 
of given hospitals deviate from these frontier values (Bauer, 1990). These 
empirical techniques include data envelopment analysis (DEA) and stochastic 
frontier regression (SFR). Although DEA and SFR models yield convergent 
evidence about hospital efficiency at the industry level, they produce divergent 
evidence about the individual characteristics of the most and least efficient 
hospitals (Chirikos & Sear, 2000).
Academic studies such as these generally measure hospital efficiency from 
the perspective of hospitals. In terms of P4P, however, payers and purchasers 
have perspectives different from those of hospitals. Therefore, to date, payers 
and purchasers have not shown much interest in the academic approach to 
hospital efficiency measurement. Fortunately, hospital efficiency indicators 
from the perspective of payers and purchasers have been developed (Thomas, 
2006):
•	 Hospital	stays:	Several	hospital	efficiency	indicators	use	hospital	stays	as	
the unit of analysis. These hospital efficiency indicators include average 
length of stay, early readmission rate, and hospital payments. These 
indicators generally adjust risk by adjusting hospitals’ actual values 
upward or downward to account for the case mix (case type and severity) 
characteristics of the patients treated.
•	 Episodes	of	care:	Evaluators	use	episodes	of	care	to	incorporate	pre-
hospital services (e.g., office visits, radiology examinations), post-hospital 
services (e.g., medications, physical therapy), and professional fees 
into efficiency calculations. Case-mix-adjusted episode payments can 
be calculated for a given condition group (e.g., stroke) or for multiple 
conditions.
•	 Cohort-based,	longitudinal	patient-level	indicators:	These	indicators	use	
the patient as the unit of analysis and note differences among cohorts of 
patients in outcomes occurring during an observation period. 
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According to MedPAC, “Ideally, we would want to limit our set of efficient 
hospitals to those that not only have high in-hospital quality and low unit 
costs but also have patients with low risk-adjusted overall (across all services) 
annual Medicare costs” (MedPAC, 2009, p. 65). However, MedPAC goes on to 
point out that the risk adjustment and standardization of these cost data still 
need refinement before they can be used for cross-sectional comparisons of 
efficiency. Thus, to measure hospital efficiency, MedPAC focuses on outcome 
measures (e.g., mortality, readmissions) and inpatient costs, but not overall 
costs. Inpatient costs per discharge are adjusted for factors beyond the 
hospital’s control that reflect the financial structure of the hospital rather than 
efficiency. Specifically, costs are standardized by adjusting for case mix, area 
wage index, prevalence of outliers and transfer cases, and the effects of teaching 
activity and service to low-income Medicare patients on costs per discharge. 
MedPAC also adjusts for differences in interest expenses because those do not 
reflect operational efficiency. MedPAC developed efficiency rankings based on 
the dimensions of hospital outcomes and inpatient costs (MedPAC, 2009).
Physician Efficiency Measurement
Ratio-based efficiency measures have been used mostly to evaluate physician 
efficiency. For example, Pope and Kautter (2007) developed a population-
based methodology for profiling the cost efficiency and quality of care of 
large physician organizations (POs) by comparing the efficiency index 
for a PO with an index for a peer group defined as all POs in the Boston 
metropolitan statistical area (Pope & Kautter, 2007; see also US Government 
Accountability Office, 2007). They assigned patients to POs based on the 
plurality of outpatient evaluation and management visits (Kautter et al., 2007) 
and standardized costs across the POs by adjusting for health status risk using 
the hierarchical conditions categories model (Pope et al., 2004), county, and 
teaching and disproportionate-share hospital payments. Using the patients 
assigned to each PO, Pope and Kautter defined an efficiency index for the 
organization as follows:
 Efficiency Index =  
When actual per capita expenditures equal predicted per capita 
expenditures, then the efficiency index equals 1.00; this means that the 
observed expenditures of patients assigned to the PO equal the expenditures 
expected for these patients. In this case, the PO is neither efficient nor 
Actual Per Capita Expenditures
Predicted Per Capita Expenditures
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inefficient relative to expectations. When the efficiency index is less than 
1.00, actual expenditures are less than predicted, and the PO is more efficient 
than predicted. Conversely, if the index is greater than 1.00, the PO is less 
efficient than predicted. This is the standard statistic used in efficiency profiling 
exercises, and it is often referred to as “observed/expected” (Thomas et al., 
2004).
Commercial vendors have developed most physician efficiency measures 
used by purchasers and payers; for that reason, most such measures are 
proprietary. The main application of these measures is to reduce costs through 
P4P, tiered product offerings, public reporting, and feedback for performance 
improvement. These vendor-based measures of efficiency generally fall into 
two main categories: population-based and episode-based (McGlynn & 
Southern California Evidence-Based Practice Center, 2008; see also Hussey et 
al., 2009). 
Population-based measures classify a patient population according to the 
morbidity burden for a given period (e.g., 1 year). Efficiency is measured by 
comparing the costs/resources used to care for that risk-adjusted population 
for a given period, and a single entity such as a PO is responsible for the 
care of that defined population. Episode-based measures use diagnoses and 
procedure codes from claims or encounter data to construct discrete episodes 
of care. Efficiency is measured by comparing the physical/financial resources 
used to produce an episode of care; attribution rules based on the amount of 
care provided by each provider are applied to attribute episodes to particular 
providers, after additional risk adjustment is applied (McGlynn & Southern 
California Evidence-Based Practice Center, 2008; see also Hussey et al., 2009).
Population-based approaches to efficiency assessment include measuring 
the risk-adjusted rate at which a certain intervention is performed across 
physicians’ patient populations (e.g., number of hospitalizations or diagnostic 
tests per 1,000 patients) or measuring the risk-adjusted total costs associated 
with primary care physicians’ patient populations over a year (MedPAC, 
2005a). Episode-based approaches are often considered more actionable and 
more applicable to specialists than population-based approaches are. However, 
population-based approaches can measure the overall performance for a 
population (Leapfrog Group & Bridges to Excellence, 2004) and may be more 
conducive to risk adjustment (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services 
[CMS], 2009a). 
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Although current strategies for addressing health care costs emphasize 
physician performance measurement and commonly use an efficiency 
index such as one of those described here, using an efficiency index for 
P4P at the level of individual health practitioners might hinder the goal of 
reducing overuse of services. An efficiency index might not always reflect 
costs generated by overuse: costs of increased but appropriate care and costs 
associated with correcting underuse also could result in a higher efficiency 
index. An alternative approach is to identify key cost drivers and then, instead 
of focusing on cost reduction per se, focusing on reducing unnecessary 
variation and eliminating overuse; this approach places cost reduction in the 
larger context of quality improvement (Greene et al., 2008).
Finally, cost-effectiveness analysis is an approach worth considering 
in measuring physician efficiency (Gold et al., 1996). Because the costs of 
treatments have finite limits, the largest incremental cost-effectiveness ratios, 
and hence the most inefficient uses of limited resources, occur when more 
expensive interventions provide little or no health benefit (American College 
of Physicians, 2008). Services with low cost per QALY (e.g., beta blockers for 
high-risk patients after heart attack) are cost-effective, meaning that these 
services deliver considerable value per unit cost. Services with a high cost per 
QALY (e.g., left ventricular assist device—as compared with optimal medical 
management—in patients with heart failure who are not candidates for a 
transplant) are not cost-effective (Cohen et al., 2008; Drexler, 2010). In this 
context, primary care physicians or groups that manage the overall care of 
attributed patients who receive a high rate of discretionary, low-value, high-
cost services relative to their peers are relatively economically inefficient. For 
cases in which alternative treatments of varying known cost-effectiveness are 
available for the same condition, specialist physicians or groups that provide a 
higher rate of more cost-effective treatments are more economically efficient. 
In addition, MedPAC (2005b) has suggested that Medicare could begin 
to use available cost-effectiveness analysis to prioritize P4P and disease 
management initiatives. As an example, for the screening of chronic kidney 
disease among the Medicare population, cost-effectiveness analyses could help 
inform policymakers about which populations (such as patients who have 
diabetes) would generate the most favorable ratios of health gain to spending.
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evaluation of efficiency Measures and Measurement Challenges
For hospital or physician efficiency measurements to be widely accepted in 
the market, they should be feasible for health plans to implement, credible 
and reliable for consumers, and fair, equitable, and actionable for providers. 
Specifically, according to the Leapfrog Group & Bridges to Excellence (2004):
•	 Efficiency	measures	should	be	actionable	by	plans,	providers,	and	
clinicians, enabling them to identify opportunities for improvement and 
to compare their performance with that of others.
•	 Efficiency	measures	must	be	operationally	focused	and	feasible	for	plans,	
benefit administrators, and health professionals to implement without 
creating undue burden on staff and resources.
•	 Methods	used	in	calculating	efficiency	measures	and	the	application	
of those methods should reflect the overall, true cost of care and the 
appropriate locus of control. The methods should allow for appropriate 
risk adjustment and for peer-to-peer comparisons.
•	 All	efficiency	measures	should	be	sound,	evidence-based,	and	valid,	and	
they should produce timely results.
•	 Use	of	efficiency	measures	to	evaluate	providers	should	be	reasonable	and	
should avoid gaming by any party; publication of these measures should 
lead to overall improvements benefiting purchasers, plans, providers, 
health professionals, and consumers.
Ideally, efficiency measures would possess each of these attributes. 
Measurement challenges present a formidable barrier to achieving these 
attributes, however. Greenberg (2006) provides a good discussion of these 
measurement challenges and makes seven key points.
First, effective efficiency measurement may require data from multiple 
sources, which may not always be available or accessible. Second, pooling data 
across multiple payers can be a valuable approach to collecting information 
on provider performance. However, technical adjustments must be used to 
standardize the information. Third, attributing care to accountable health care 
providers is a key process step in evaluating performance. This is particularly 
true when physician incentives are tied to performance. Fourth, achieving 
a sufficient sample size is a challenge for many forms of measurement, 
especially evaluations of individual physicians’ performance. The adequacy 
of sample sizes and adjustments for case mix have a great impact on validity 
of measurement. Fifth, performance of hospitals and physicians is usually 
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not consistent across all efficiency measures. This factor makes it difficult 
to provide a simple ranking to guide consumer or purchaser choices and 
introduces challenges to reporting provider performance across multiple 
measures. Sixth, physicians and hospitals often want to understand the 
approaches and methods underlying performance measurement; thus, 
“showing the math” and offering tools for various users to understand the 
information is an important goal. Finally, measuring efficiency may have 
unintended consequences. For example, inadequate severity adjustment may 
cause providers with more complex patient populations to be designated 
“inefficient.” 
risk adjustment
Risk adjustment is potentially the biggest challenge to measuring efficiency. 
Risk adjustment is the statistical process used to identify and adjust for 
differences in patient characteristics (or risk factors) before comparing 
outcomes of care. The purpose of risk adjustment is to facilitate an equitable 
and accurate comparison of outcomes of care across health care organizations 
or providers (CMS, 2009b). Lack of adequate risk adjustment has been an 
important barrier to the widespread application of efficiency measurement 
in the Medicare program, including both hospital efficiency measurement 
(MedPAC, 2009) and physician efficiency measurement (CMS, 2009a).
Analyses of hospital cost as an efficiency indicator involve comparing 
patients’ actual hospitalization costs with their expected costs, with expected 
cost estimates based on patients’ diagnoses, severity, and demographics. In 
hospital efficiency calculations, the function of risk adjustment is to estimate an 
expected value for each hospital stay, outpatient visit, episode of care, or other 
unit of service being analyzed, so that efficiency estimates can properly account 
for differences among hospitals in the case mix, severity, and demographics of 
patients being treated (Thomas, 2006). 
In general, analysts use one of two types of risk-adjustment methodologies: 
categorical risk adjusters and regression-based risk adjusters (Thomas, 2006). 
An example of a categorical risk adjuster is Medicare severity diagnosis-
related groups (MS-DRGs), which are used for Medicare hospital inpatient 
FFS payment. MS-DRGs are a patient classification system that can relate the 
types of patients that a hospital treats (i.e., its case mix) to the costs incurred 
by the hospital (CMS, 2009c). An example of a regression-based risk adjuster 
is the proprietary Symmetry Episode Risk Groups, which predict current and 
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future health care usage for individuals and groups by creating individual 
risk measures that incorporate episodes-of-care methodology, medical and 
pharmacy claims information, and demographic variables (Ingenix, 2006). 
The choice of the most appropriate risk-adjustment methodology depends on 
several factors, including predicted outcome, analytical time frame, relevant 
population, purpose, and performance (Thomas, 2006). 
In measuring physician efficiency performance, a key statistical challenge 
is to minimize the influence of patient health status variation, and the health 
status of a panel of patients, on an individual physician’s score. Separating the 
practice pattern of the physician from the health status variation of the patients 
is a key element of efficiency measurement. Several factors, if left uncontrolled, 
could influence the results of efficiency measurement. These include variation 
in (1) patient health status, (2) severity of illness (within the condition affecting 
the patient), (3) the case mix in each physician’s panel of patients, and (4) the 
number of episodes (or patients) assigned to each physician and associated 
susceptibility to high outlier influences (Pacific Business Group on Health & 
Lumetra, 2005).
Thomas and colleagues (2004) examined the consistency among risk-
adjusted efficiency measures for physicians, investigating whether different 
risk-adjustment methodologies produce differences in practice efficiency 
rankings for a set of primary care physicians. They calculated patient risk 
scores for six of the leading risk-adjustment methodologies and observed 
moderate to high levels of agreement among the six risk-adjusted measures of 
practice efficiency. They pointed out, however, that the consistency of measures 
does not prove that practice efficiency rankings are valid. For that reason, they 
advise that analysts should exercise caution when using practice efficiency 
information. 
efficiency and Quality
As the AQA Alliance (2009a, 2009b) has discussed, “efficiency of care” and 
“value of care” measures have not been evaluated in the same way as clinical 
quality measures have been. Cost of care measures can inform the development 
of true efficiency and value measures. Definitions related to performance 
measures are as follows:
•	 Cost	of	care	is	a	measure	of	total	health	care	spending.
•	 Efficiency	of	care	is	a	measure	of	cost	of	care	associated	with	a	specified	
level of quality of care.
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•	 Value	of	care	is	a	measure	of	a	specified	stakeholder’s	(e.g.,	payer’s)	
preference-weighted assessment of a particular combination of quality 
and cost of care performance.
Although most of the literature on hospital efficiency does not account 
for quality outcomes, some does. For example, a study sponsored by The 
Leapfrog Group (Binder & Rudolph, 2009; Robinson & Center for Health 
Systems Research and Analysis, University of Wisconsin–Madison, 2008) 
rated efficiency on four procedures or conditions: coronary artery bypass 
graft, percutaneous coronary intervention, acute myocardial infarction, and 
pneumonia. To assess resource utilization, the study measured severity-
adjusted average length of stay (ALOS), inflated by readmission rate. For 
outcomes, it considered risk-adjusted mortality rates. For the resource 
utilization measure, it calculated the observed ALOS in the facility relative to 
the expected ALOS in the facility, in which the expected ALOS was based on 
a linear regression model calibrated on all-payer National Hospital Discharge 
Survey data.
Medicare publicly reports hospital outcome measures on its Hospital 
Compare Web site (http://www.hospitalcompare.hhs.gov); this information 
includes 30-day readmission measures for acute myocardial infarction, heart 
failure, and pneumonia (CMS, 2009d). Given that hospital readmissions can 
be considered both a quality of care measure and a cost-efficiency measure, 
one could argue that these measures bridge the gap between quality of care and 
efficiency. 
Physician efficiency measures ideally should be combined with measures of 
quality of outputs. Unfortunately, to date, most physician-oriented, episode-
based measures of efficiency do not control for patient outcomes (Safavi, 
2006). There are practical reasons for this. In many areas of health care, no 
good quality indicators exist; in others, outcome information is not readily 
available because of ongoing reliance on paper medical records (Milstein & 
Lee, 2007). However, payers and other stakeholders have begun testing models 
for rewarding both quality and efficiency (Davis & Guterman, 2007). For 
example, responding to soaring health care costs and double-digit increases 
in health insurance premiums, the Integrated Healthcare Association, an 
association of health plans, hospital systems, and medical groups in California 
that manages the state’s P4P program, has expanded the program to include 
efficiency. For the first time, the new measures add information on cost and 
resource use alongside existing P4P quality measures (Robinson et al., 2009; 
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Romano, 2007). Another example is the Medicare Physician Group Practice 
Demonstration, which is Medicare’s first physician P4P initiative. The 
demonstration established P4P incentives for quality improvement and cost 
efficiency at the level of the large physician group practice. The P4P incentives 
include “shared savings” in which the physician group practices that control 
Medicare costs, while simultaneously improving quality, share in the cost 
savings (Kautter et al., 2007). Results of the demonstration to date indicate that 
the P4P incentives that the demonstration provides have resulted in modest 
cost savings (CMS, 2009e). 
Conclusions
The single most important factor influencing the US federal government’s 
long-term fiscal balance is the rate of growth in health care costs. Rising 
health care costs per patient are more important to long-term fiscal 
challenges than demographic changes are. Many other factors that play a 
key role in determining future fiscal conditions, such as Social Security, pale 
in comparison to containing the cost growth for federal health insurance 
programs. Without changes in federal law, health care spending will rise to 
25 percent of GDP by the year 2025 (Congressional Budget Office, 2007). 
Containment of health care costs will, therefore, be an especially important 
societal goal to achieve in the coming years. Incorporation of efficiency 
measures into P4P programs has shown promise as a strategy to control health 
care costs (Cutler et al., 2009). This chapter has provided a broad overview of 
efficiency in P4P.
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Affordable 
Care Act, the most comprehensive health reform legislation in half a century. 
The legislation recognizes the urgent need to address health care costs and will 
initiate a variety of P4P and other payment reform initiatives. These include 
allowing providers that are organized as accountable care organizations and 
that voluntarily meet quality thresholds to share in the cost savings they 
achieve for the Medicare program. Also, an Innovation Center within the CMS 
will test, evaluate, and expand different payment structures to reduce program 
expenditures while maintaining or improving quality of care (Kaiser Family 
Foundation, 2010). 
Finally, a broad consensus holds that spending on new medical technologies 
and drugs is the primary driver of health spending growth in the United States 
(Smith et al., 2009). This implies that, even if the health care system were 
 Incorporating Efficiency Measures into Pay for Performance 153
perfectly efficient based on standard definitions of efficiency (e.g., productive 
efficiency), the growth of health care spending may still be unsustainable in 
the long run. Because of this, cost-effectiveness analysis should be seriously 
considered as one of the tools to “bend the cost curve.” Using cost-effectiveness 
as one of the criteria for covering new medical technologies has been 
controversial in the United States (Neumann et al., 2005). As we discuss in 
this chapter, however, P4P programs could use cost-effectiveness analysis to 
develop efficiency measures, which would give incentives for providing the 
most cost-effective health care services.
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Who Gets the Payment  
Under Pay for Performance?
Leslie M. Greenwald
Chapter 6
Pay for performance (P4P) models involve several complex design elements. 
One of the most difficult—but important—of these design elements is 
determining whom P4P should reward. P4P models, in theory, work because 
they closely link positive incentives (the reward, or payment) with measurable 
performance achievements. If the performance and reward are not clearly 
related and/or if a program makes additional payments to providers or 
clinicians who are not directly responsible for performance, incentives to 
change behavior and improve care may not be effective, and the program may 
be misspending the scarce resources devoted to performance payments.
Many organizations that have experimented with P4P models have 
struggled with the issue of whom to pay. In their article describing practical 
issues related to P4P systems, Young and Conrad (2007) describe the problem 
of whom to pay in terms of “units of accountability” and consider this topic 
one of four key design issues for P4P programs. (Chapter 2 of this book also 
provides an overview of common P4P models.)
Many models focus payments on physicians and other clinicians, whereas 
others pay institutions (such as hospitals) for improved performance (Young 
et al., 2005). In the United States, performance-based payments vary widely, 
even among models that focus on physicians. They range from payments 
directed at individual physicians to those made to large group practices 
(which may include nonphysicians) (Felt-Lisk et al., 2007; Landon et al., 
1998). International models also vary; P4P models in the United Kingdom 
direct quality-improvement payments to physician practices, not to individual 
physicians (Smith & York, 2004). Although some existing models suggest 
whom to pay, literature summarizing and evaluating current P4P systems 
often notes that this area warrants more research (Folsom et al., 2008; Young & 
Conrad, 2007). 
This chapter discusses topics related to whom to pay in P4P. Although some 
literature on specific P4P models exists, publications on broader issues related 
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to the design of implementable P4P initiatives are limited. Our experience in 
the design, implementation, and evaluation of many Medicare P4P projects 
enables us to observe and formulate solution options for key implementation 
issues—such as whom to pay and what to pay for—under different P4P models. 
First, we discuss why deciding whom to pay can be such a complex issue in 
P4P models, and we note factors that can influence this decision. Second, we 
outline the options for specific health care provider entities who might receive 
payments under P4P. In discussing the options for whom to pay, we consider 
the related topic, what to pay for. This chapter concludes with a discussion of 
the respective pros and cons of the options for making payments to different 
health care providers.
What Makes the Issue of Whom to pay So Complex in Designing 
pay for performance? 
Determining whom to pay is a central design issue. Lack of a single “right” 
answer or even consensus around best practices highlights the difficulty in 
choosing among the options. Ultimately, practical options for whom to pay 
include clinical providers of health care (individual physicians, physician 
groups, hospitals or integrated delivery systems), insurers (managed 
care organizations), and other care managers (such as case management 
organizations). Which option is most practical and appropriate often depends 
on the primary goals and incentives in the P4P model. Further complicating 
the issue of whom to pay is the related issue of what to pay for. Identifying the 
most appropriate entity to reward with performance payments is difficult until 
one considers what we are paying for.
Rewarding Clinical Providers vs. Other Organizations 
Sponsors of P4P models have to make an initial decision on whether to focus 
rewards directly on clinical providers and health care practitioners (often 
physicians but sometimes also hospitals) or on other contracted organizations 
such as managed care plans or case managers (e.g., primary care case 
managers). Ideally, as several evaluations of existing models suggest, P4P 
programs must clearly tie performance payments to measurable improvement; 
otherwise, the incentive to change behavior for quality improvement is less 
effective (Folsom et al., 2008; Young et al., 2005). Many P4P programs have 
interpreted this assumption as indicating direct measurement and incentive 
payments to physicians, physician groups, or hospitals. (Chapters 3 and 8 of 
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this book provide a more detailed examination of the economic theory behind 
health care provider incentives and payments under P4P.)
The decision to focus payment on clinical providers involves the complex 
issue of whether to focus on individual health care professionals or provider 
groups. Focusing on individual clinicians has the potential to offer the 
strongest direct incentives for behavioral change; however, because of the 
limited number of cases, this method presents the greatest challenges to valid 
measurement calculation, and assigning clinical attribution is extremely 
complex. Offering incentives to provider groups weakens behavioral incentives 
for improvement, but it involves more cases, thus improving the validity 
of measurement calculation, and acknowledges the team effort of clinical 
management. 
Sponsors of P4P programs must also sometimes provide coverage through 
insurance intermediaries, such as managed care plans; this requirement makes 
direct reimbursement of providers and clinicians more complex. The majority 
of Medicaid performance-based systems, in which managed care plans and 
primary care case managers are the dominant entities that engage with states in 
P4P, face the problem of incentive weakening caused by the separation of P4P 
payments from direct providers of care (Kuhmerker & Hartman, 2007). (This 
problem occurs because most states require managed care enrollment for the 
majority of their Medicaid population.)
Paying indirect providers, such as managed care organizations, offers 
some advantages. These organizations offer larger and more diverse groups 
of patients, which in turn improves quality measurement validity. Thus, 
these organizations, more often than other smaller insurers or self-insured 
groups, are able to collect and submit performance-based data. For example, 
managed care plans already collect and submit Health Plan Employer Data and 
Information Set (HEDIS) performance data, which several state Medicaid P4P 
models already use (Kuhmerker & Hartman, 2007). In addition, modifying 
managed care organizational contracts, which potentially cover networks 
of clinicians and large blocks of patients, is far less complex than making 
modified payment arrangements with many individual health professionals. 
Directing performance payments to clinical providers and practitioners 
rather than to insurers and other organizations has both advantages and 
disadvantages. Performance payments made to providers have the benefit of 
improved incentives and greater ability to actually change patient outcomes. 
Yet incentives that under some circumstances prompt improvements in care 
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can become perverted if health care providers use their proprietary knowledge 
to select patients for care in ways that maximize their performance bonuses 
rather than optimize care. Alternatively, performance payments made to 
insurers can include broader and more diverse groups of patients, leading to 
better performance measurement accuracy and therefore wider buy-in for 
participation. However, managed care organizations can be too far removed 
from clinical care to actually change physician and hospital behavior. Although 
further removed from actual patient care, insurers can engage in biased 
selection to avoid high-risk patients that might have a negative impact on 
measured performance. 
Unfortunately, there is no single best approach. Adopting a particular 
approach may depend on whether a P4P sponsor has the technical and/or 
legal ability to modify payment arrangements with providers to incorporate 
payment-based performance standards. Adoption may also depend on the 
technical requirements of the performance measures that the program sponsor 
chooses.
Attribution of Responsibility
Attributing responsibility for outcomes is another critical factor in determining 
whom should be paid for performance (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 
7). Presumably, performance measures create the strongest incentives 
for improvement when providers and clinicians clearly define and accept 
responsibility for both success and failure. Furthermore, literature on the 
structure of P4P models suggests that parties held responsible for performance 
outcomes must have the means within their control to meet the targets 
(Durham & Bartol, 2000). 
In clinical settings, determining who is responsible for specific performance 
outcomes is far from easy. For example, P4P programs may be able to 
assign responsibility for certain process quality measures, such as rates of 
immunizations or other disease screenings, but they may be unable to ascertain 
who is responsible for a hospital readmission when a patient has multiple 
comorbidities. Quality measures that focus on clinical outcomes rather than 
specific, observable processes of care create other problems of attribution. 
Although programs commonly hold physicians responsible for 
performance targets, program sponsors note that this approach neglects the 
interdependency of physicians with other clinical professionals and support 
staff. Moreover, some staff in these categories, unlike physicians, have no direct 
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incentive to change behavior to meet specific targets (Young et al., 2005). 
Evaluators and policy makers often criticize current P4P models for their 
inability to clearly identify (and reward) the part of the health care system that 
affects a target outcome (Evans et al., 2001). This criticism assumes, of course, 
that clinical outcomes are affected primarily by a single segment of the total 
health care system, which may not be the case. 
Limited patient resources may also affect clinical providers’ or individual 
practitioners’ ability to meet performance targets. Such limitations might 
involve treating patients who do not have insurance or are otherwise unable 
to pay for certain elements of care, affecting clinical outcomes caused by 
factors beyond the control of the health care provider. When insurers (such 
as managed care organizations) are held responsible for performance, 
however, impacts on outcomes caused by lack of coverage or access may be 
more appropriate. In such instances, managed care organizations or other 
insurers may legitimately be responsible for performance because determining 
coverage and benefits is within their control. Clinical providers and individual 
practitioners may be unable to gain access to either clinical information (such 
as electronic medical records or comprehensive health information systems) 
or other resources necessary to manage care for general quality outcome 
measures. Once again, insurers or other organizations may control these 
resources. 
Young and colleagues (2005) suggest that, because of these attribution 
problems, future programs may link performance incentives to health 
care delivery teams. However, they note that the concept of setting clinical 
responsibility at a diverse team level—possibly including clinical providers 
or practitioners, as well as nonclinical and even insurer partners—may upset 
traditional notions of clinical responsibility and professional independence. 
Assigning responsibility for performance to nonclinical providers, such 
as managed care plans, in some ways inverts the concept. Managed care 
organizations do not directly provide care. They do, however, provide the basic 
resources, benefit structures, and other management rules that govern what 
care is provided to whom. 
This discussion on the difficulty of assigning appropriate responsibility—
and rewards—for clinical outcomes again highlights the lack of a consensus 
on the best approach. Difficulty assigning clinical responsibility for outcomes 
may, in reality, reflect the current fragmented system of care in the United 
States more than problems inherent in P4P systems alone. Additionally, in 
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attributing responsibility, we need to consider the role of patients themselves. 
Patient adherence or nonadherence to clinical recommendations may have a 
large effect on outcomes. Are providers and clinicians responsible for changing 
the behavior of nonadherent patients or only for recommending behavioral 
changes? Should provider and clinician performance be risk adjusted for 
patient characteristics or clinicians? Should some of the financial incentives 
of P4P be directed to patients rather than providers? We have yet to figure out 
how best to account for patient responsibility.
Defining the Unit of Care for Payment: What to Pay For
Closely related to determining whom to pay is defining the unit of care for 
which P4P programs measure and reward performance. To determine whom to 
pay, programs must also consider what to pay for—for example, care settings, 
services, diseases, and events to include. They must also consider the unit 
of care for which performance is measured. The unit of care could include 
individual services, episodes, or all services over a unit of time such as a year 
(capitation). 
Current P4P models define the unit of care in various ways. Programs 
commonly pay for a specific scope of care. For example, performance measures 
can be created that account for either all care or only inpatient, outpatient, 
or other care settings. Including a broader set of clinical care settings may be 
more likely to improve overall care than focusing on a narrower set because 
the performance measures will not artificially place care-setting boundaries 
on providers. Including more care settings may, however, also compound the 
problem of attributing responsibility for performance measures. If performance 
is based on a narrow setting (e.g., only inpatient care), then there is a greater 
focus on fewer potentially responsible providers, and appropriate assignment 
of clinical responsibility on which performance is based is more feasible. This 
narrow focus also allows programs to more closely align incentives to change 
behavior through performance payments. 
The scope of care subject to performance incentives can also include specific 
diseases, such as chronic illnesses. This condition-specific approach is typically 
used when care management organizations are a focus of P4P models because 
they most often develop a specific protocol for improving care for specific 
disease categories. 
Finally, P4P models can also focus on specific events, such as “never 
events”—preventable medical errors that result in serious consequences for 
the patient. In these instances, variants of P4P models might either withhold 
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usual payments when certain events occur (as with the never events proposed 
in the CMS Inpatient Prospective Payment System rule effective for hospital 
discharges on or after October 1, 2009). Examples of these events include 
foreign objects retained after surgery and catheter-associated urinary tract 
infections. P4P models may also base performance awards on low rates of 
medical errors or other similar negative clinical outcomes. 
P4P sponsors face a key question in defining the scope of services to be 
included in the unit of care for which they wish to measure performance. The 
most narrow, and traditional, unit is the individual service, which corresponds 
to the unit of payment in traditional fee-for-service (FFS) medicine. The 
problem with this narrow definition is that it provides a very limited basis on 
which to judge performance. Quality of care typically requires a more global 
perspective on patient management than the individual service. Similarly, 
efficiency in providing individual services is important but does not capture the 
number or intensity of services provided in the course of a patient’s treatment. 
At the other end of the spectrum from the individual service is the 
capitated unit of service. Here, a single entity, such as a health plan, is 
contractually responsible for all medical services provided to an enrollee 
over a fixed enrollment period, typically a year. Capitation clearly attributes 
all responsibility for care to a single organization. This can be a strength, but 
global capitation may be too aggregated to measure performance and focus 
incentives on individual provider organizations. Thus, interest is increasing in 
the episode of care as a unit of accountability.
An episode of care can be defined in several ways, including the following:
•	 Annual episodes. All care, or care related to the condition, provided to a 
patient with a chronic condition during a year or some other prespecified 
calendar time interval. For example, management of a congestive heart 
failure patient over an annual period might constitute a practical or easy-
to-measure episode of care.
•	 Fixed-length episodes. All care, or care related to a condition, provided 
within a fixed time window preceding and/or following an index event, 
such as initial treatment, surgical procedure, or a hospitalization for a 
medical condition. For example, a payer might bundle all services from 3 
days prior to until 30 days after a hospital stay for coronary artery bypass 
surgery into one episode.
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•	 Variable-length episodes. Care related to a medical condition (e.g., ankle 
fracture), from the initial treatment for the condition (e.g., diagnosis) 
until the course of treatment is completed (e.g., recovery and follow-up).
Which episode definition is appropriate depends on the performance 
measures that a P4P program chooses. For example, programs typically define 
specific screening process measures—such as rates of immunization, screening 
tests, or periodic medical tests or check-ups—for an episode, corresponding 
to the appropriate clinical indication. For immunizations or certain screening 
tests, such as mammography, this may be annually; for other screening tests, 
such as colonoscopy, this may be every 5 years, depending on current clinical 
guidelines. Guidelines might recommend that patients have diabetic eye and 
foot examinations every year or every 2 years. 
As another example, programs may appropriately assess other performance 
measures, such as lowering rates of rehospitalization, using a fixed-length 
post-discharge episode (e.g., 7, 14, or 30 days after discharge). Measured 
performance may be highly sensitive to the length of time after initial discharge 
that programs include in the defined episode. Using a narrow window, such 
as a 7-day post-discharge rehospitalization window, is more likely to attribute 
rehospitalization appropriately to the effects of the initial hospitalization, but it 
may not capture all of the sequelae of the initial care. A 30-day post-discharge 
definition will include more of the initial discharge’s subsequent effects, 
but it may also capture events unrelated to the initial hospital stay. Further 
complicating this approach is the ongoing debate over appropriate lengths of 
stay and post-discharge settings, which vary considerably based on the specific 
clinical diagnosis. Variable-length episodes most precisely measure care related 
to a particular medical condition, but they are the most complex to define. 
Attributing medical services to particular conditions and deciding when 
episodes begin and end may be difficult, especially for patients with multiple, 
coexisting medical problems (e.g., as is the case for many elderly patients). 
Pros and Cons of Episode Length
Some general observations highlight the pros and cons of longer versus 
shorter episodes defined for the purposes of P4P. Longer episodes allow 
better evaluation of real clinical changes. Including patient outcomes over 
months or potentially even years is more likely to document lasting changes 
in clinical performance, particularly among complex patients. For example, 
changes in care for chronic diseases are unlikely to manifest significantly 
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improved clinical outcomes over a period of only months. A recent evaluation 
of the Massachusetts Health Quality Partners program suggests that some 
performance improvements may take 2 years to show results (Folsom et al., 
2008). Longer episodes also allow programs and providers or clinicians to 
identify more clinical complications that may not necessarily be the focus of 
the performance intervention but may affect outcomes. This makes assessing 
performance more complex but may yield more accurate measurements of 
lasting quality improvement. Finally, using longer episodes of care across 
multiple provider settings allows programs to evaluate potential cost shifting. 
This may be particularly important for performance measures that focus on 
reducing cost. Programs must consider reductions in costs caused by decreased 
hospital lengths of stay and/or fewer rehospitalizations, given corresponding 
use of alternative services such as post-acute care. 
Applying longer episodes of care to defining what to pay for has downsides 
for P4P, too. The largest disadvantage is the potential dilution of the impact 
of incentive rewards for performance improvements. Evaluations of the 
Rewarding Results Demonstration sites suggest that quality improvement 
incentives should be made rapidly and frequently, potentially even multiple 
times per year (Folsom et al., 2008). This approach allows providers and 
individual practitioners to gain immediate feedback on their progress toward 
improved quality of care and strengthens their motivation to continue. 
However, although this approach is desirable for strengthening the impetus to 
improve care, it is potentially inconsistent with including longer episodes of 
care as a basis for determining what to pay for. 
Using longer, bundled episodes also substantially increases the financial risk 
that provider organizations face. The variance of episode costs rises with length 
of episode and number of services bundled into the episode. For example, 
placing hospitals at risk for readmissions—especially over a longer period—
puts them at a great deal of financial risk. Some of this risk is incurred by their 
own performance in avoiding readmissions, but over longer periods, most 
of this risk can be attributed to insurance and is unrelated to the hospitals’ 
performance. To ameliorate this insurance risk, providers should receive 
bundled episode payments to treat a large number of cases to average out the 
risk; payments should incorporate risk adjustment; and outlier, reinsurance, or 
other exceptions policies for catastrophic cases should be in place.
The alternative to defining longer episodes of care is defining shorter ones. 
Shorter episodes of care more consistently link incentive payments to changes 
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in provider behavior. Moreover, providers can more easily connect positive 
payment incentive rewards with more recent behavior changes. Also, shorter-
term outcomes are easier to attribute to specific instances of provider care, such 
as specific hospitalizations. 
However, using shorter episodes of care may reward providers for only 
short-term improvements rather than more substantive and lasting clinical 
outcomes. For example, a program may reward providers for savings observed 
during a 6-month episode; for the same patient, however, these savings could 
evaporate by the end of 12 months.
Who Gets the Money?
When moving from a disaggregated, FFS payment system to a more bundled, 
episode-based system, determining which organization receives payment for 
the episode may be contentious. For example, if post-acute care is bundled 
with hospitalizations, the post-acute providers (e.g., home health agencies or 
skilled nursing facilities) may feel threatened if a single lump-sum episode 
payment is made to the acute care hospital, which then has responsibility 
for paying the post-acute providers. Currently, these health care provider 
organizations are paid separately under distinct payment rules. P4P models 
that would place payment of currently independent providers under the 
control of another organization may lead to concerns for fiscal and/or clinical 
independence. In some cases, these various provider types will all be members 
of a unified integrated delivery system that could accept payment on behalf of 
all the providers. In many cases, however, such providers represent unrelated 
organizations. 
P4P programs will reward accountability and efficiency if payment is 
made to a single entity that is responsible for an episode and can coordinate 
care decisions and reap the rewards of improved quality and efficiency. This 
single entity may decide to reconfigure current care patterns—which is the 
point of episode payment—threatening the livelihood of existing provider 
organizations by reducing the services provided. Various bundling policies, 
transition policies, and gainsharing could be designed to try to soften 
the impact of bundled episode payment, but any dislocation in current 
arrangements would be likely to prove controversial. If a single bundled 
episode payment is made, the organization that receives it should be capable 
of and willing to manage the entire episode of care. For example, if an acute 
care hospital is to be paid for episodes that include post-acute care, the hospital 
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must be willing to contract for and manage post-acute services such as home 
health and skilled nursing services.
Options for Whom to Pay
Determining whom to pay is a difficult but critical decision for P4P programs. 
For most P4P models, we have observed six possible options: 
1. individual physicians
2. physician group practices
3. hospitals or hospital systems
4. physician-hospital organizations (PHOs) and integrated delivery systems 
(IDSs)
5. health maintenance organizations (HMOs) and other managed care 
organizations (coordinators of care that are also directly responsible and 
financially at risk for care delivery)
6. disease management organizations (organizations that coordinate care 
but do not have direct responsibility for care management). 
The choice of option depends in part on the structure and quality-
improvement focus of the specific P4P program to be implemented. These 
options are not mutually exclusive. For example, both physicians and 
hospitals can be simultaneously involved in coordinated or uncoordinated 
P4P programs. Still, each option can be evaluated for distinct advantages and 
disadvantages, generally determined by the following criteria:
•	 ability	to	convey	strong	incentives	for	performance	improvement,
•	 locus	of	care	specificity,
•	 ability	to	muster	sufficient	sample	size	for	valid	performance	
measurement,
•	 ability	to	connect	control	over	outcomes,	and
•	 ability	to	match	with	varied	scopes	of	care	(short	or	long	episodes	of	
care).
We discuss each option for whom to pay in terms of these criteria.
Paying Individual Physicians
Monitoring and rewarding individual physicians offers strong incentives 
for specific individuals to improve their performance. By rewarding, not 
rewarding, or penalizing each individual physician, payers clearly link 
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performance and payment, which is ideal for P4P models. Of course, this 
link is strongest when rewards are based on a clearly accepted method of 
performance for a specific physician. This method of choosing whom to pay 
can be appropriate for several types of care because the physician is a primary 
driver of care in almost all clinical settings. The central role of the physician 
in directing care can, in theory, make it feasible to match paying individual 
physicians for performance with a range of units of payment. In theory, payers 
could match individual physicians with payments based in many care settings, 
particularly those with an outpatient focus. Also, payers theoretically could 
match individual physicians to short and long episodes of care. However, the 
broader the setting of care (e.g., if settings include inpatient services) and the 
longer the episode, the lower the probability that an individual physician will 
be able to exert sufficient clinical control to be held accountable for all but very 
focused performance outcomes.
Paying individual physicians for performance faces numerous difficulties. 
One particularly persistent problem is gathering sufficient sample size for 
valid performance measurement. Depending on the focus of performance 
standards and the expected incidence of patients, individual physicians will 
not have a sufficient number of patients; patient outliers and large variation in 
performance metrics driven by small numbers thus become problematic. For 
example, performance measures based on general process measures, such as 
rates of immunizations, may be feasible for performance payments directed at 
physicians with a reasonable practice size (e.g., 2,000 patients). However, more 
clinically focused measurements, pertaining only to a potentially small subset 
of a clinical practice, can yield numbers too small to detect the difference 
between actual performance and expected variance among a small group of 
patients. 
This “sample size” problem is compounded by difficulties that a single 
physician may encounter in controlling all clinical activity that might affect 
performance measurement, even if that physician is a primary care specialist. 
For example, if a patient sees multiple physicians or has a hospitalization (or 
both), these health care system encounters may affect the performance of a 
single P4P participating physician, yet that participating physician could not 
control all factors that may have affected his or her performance (for better 
or worse). FFS insurance structures just exacerbate this problem because 
physicians have only limited control over the health care services that patients 
consume; patients are free to see specialists or other physicians and to receive 
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a wide range of health care services that do not require prior authorization or 
review by a single physician. Exceptions to this general rule are demonstration 
or other pilot projects requiring primary care management. This problem is 
less frequent in managed care settings in which primary care physicians may 
act as gatekeepers. Still, the compliance of other providers and the patient with 
review of services by a primary care or other coordinating physician can vary 
widely. 
Paying Groups of Physicians
Moving away from paying individual physicians solves some problems but also 
causes new ones. 
Groups of physicians who are rated and rewarded collectively are more 
likely to generate sufficient sample size for valid performance measurement 
than are single physicians. A larger group of physicians, particularly a 
multispecialty group working together in a coordinated way, is also more 
likely to control patient outcomes over a wider scope of care settings. For 
example, if the group includes both primary care and internal medicine, 
medical subspecialties, and surgeons, care is far more likely to be coordinated 
and controlled over a broader scope of services, making an understandable 
connection between outcomes and reward. Working examples of physician 
groups that have been organized successfully for this purpose include the 
Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration sites (this demonstration 
is described in detail in Chapter 9). Physician groups may also have 
management- or peer-based mechanisms to provide performance feedback to 
individual physicians that can facilitate initiatives to improve organizational 
care.
However, even groups of physicians will still be unable to have complete 
control over care in FFS environments when patients are not required to gain 
prior approval or are not subject to care coordination. Although patients 
can be encouraged to seek care within a group practice and many may find 
it convenient and beneficial to do so, fragmented care is still possible. Payers 
could theoretically match groups of physicians, like individual physicians, with 
payments based on many settings of care, particularly settings that primarily 
serve outpatients. Similarly, payers can, in theory, link physicians in groups 
to both short and long episodes of care. Also, as with P4P programs targeting 
individual physicians, the broader the setting of care and the longer the episode 
of care, the lower the probability that groups of physicians will be able to exert 
sufficient clinical control to be held solely accountable.
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Paying Hospitals
With respect to P4P payments, hospitals have distinctly different advantages 
and disadvantages from physicians. As an advantage, hospitals have potentially 
large numbers of patients around whom to fashion a P4P model. If hospitals 
are rewarded for their good performance of inpatient services, they can also be 
highly motivated to meet performance goals. Hospitals can also have powerful 
incentives to improve care, control costs, and meet other performance 
standards and can set facility practices, procedures, and resource allocations 
that reflect these incentives. 
Balancing these advantages as a basis for P4P payment, hospitals must work 
through physicians, who likely have the most powerful role in clinical decision 
making, to implement most clinical outcome and process improvements. If 
hospitals are not also rewarded downstream in some way, physicians may 
actually have outright disincentives to comply with performance standards 
that reduce lengths of stay, numbers of procedures, or other care that could 
negatively affect their income. For this reason, models such as the Medicare 
Centers of Excellence and the Medicare Gainsharing Demonstrations have 
incorporated physician rewards into hospital-focused P4P models. These 
demonstrations are described in detail in Chapter 9. 
Moreover, hospitals are, by their nature, limited to P4P models that focus on 
inpatient care. Thus, they may also lack the ability to control performance for 
longer episodes of care that cut across outpatient, inpatient, and post-acute care 
settings. P4P initiatives often attempt to eliminate unnecessary hospitalizations, 
and creating effective incentives for hospitals to cut their own revenue is likely 
to be difficult. Finally, hospitals rarely admit patients on their own. With the 
exception of admissions generated from emergency rooms, this function is 
largely performed by physicians. 
Paying Physician-Hospital Organizations and Integrated Delivery Systems
Among the six practical options presented, PHOs and IDSs may inherently 
have the fewest limitations for whom to pay. PHOs and IDSs are likely to 
control sufficient numbers of patients to minimize sample size problems 
and to produce reliable performance results. By coordinating care among 
physicians, hospitals, and other providers, PHOs and potentially broader 
IDSs theoretically control care and outcomes in ways that payers can measure 
across various scopes of care, including both outpatient and inpatient settings. 
Consequently, PHOs and IDSs may also have a greater span of clinical control 
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appropriate for both short and longer episodes of care, particularly if such 
organizations also coordinate post-acute care providers.
The weakness of PHOs and IDSs as units of reward in P4P models is their 
somewhat diffuse ability to convey strong incentives for behavioral change. 
Although the relative clinical breadth of providers in these multi-provider 
organizations theoretically expands the span of control over farther-ranging 
clinical outcomes, it also weakens any direct incentive that individual providers 
have to change their specific behaviors. In performance rewards made to larger 
organizations, inherently fewer direct links exist between the rewards and 
individual members of the organization. Internal reward allocation strategies 
to strengthen these ties may be difficult to develop and implement. Also, in 
an FFS environment, PHOs and IDSs rarely receive any direct payments for 
care. Their lack of control over any major flow of funds reduces their influence. 
These organizations could, however, serve as possible recipients for bundled 
physician-hospital or episode payments.
Paying Health Maintenance Organizations and Other Managed Care Organizations
Managed care organizations, such as the still-dominant HMO model, are 
financially responsible for the purchasing and financing aspects of care and, as 
such, have (at a minimum) a role in the oversight and management of clinical 
care. A purchaser (such as an employer or a state Medicaid agency) might 
reward a managed care organization (such as an HMO) if, for example, the 
managed care organization met specific performance measures such as patient 
satisfaction, HEDIS, or other quality of care standards. The twin abilities of the 
managed care organization to control financial and other resources and to set 
standards for clinical care are this model’s strengths. 
In theory, managed care organizations have the potential to control care in a 
wide range of clinical settings and across both short and long episodes of care. 
Managed care organizations also typically control large numbers of patients. 
However, depending on the relationships between managed care organizations 
and providers and the relative power of the managed care organization to 
enforce clinical guidelines and policies, P4P programs may have only a weak 
or moderate ability to connect clinical control over outcomes with incentives 
for behavioral change. This factor will vary significantly among managed care 
models. 
HMOs, which have closed provider networks, have the greatest clinical 
control over providers. Preferred provider organizations, which have looser 
networks and allow patients to use out-of-network providers with reasonable 
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cost sharing, are less able to control provider behavior and patient outcomes. 
At the furthest end of the control scale, the private FFS model of managed 
care organizations, operating without provider networks, has virtually no 
control over physician behavior. Thus, managed care organizations that 
have competitive, closed networks or that operate on a staff model are more 
likely to exert strong clinical control over provider behavior and thus to 
have the technical and data availability to make strong connections between 
performance and reward. More loosely organized managed care organizations 
that have limited or open provider networks neither exert the same clinical 
control nor have the informational resources to create incentives for providers 
to modify their behavior according to performance standards. 
Paying Disease or Care Management Organizations
Paying disease or care management organizations for performance has the 
same limitations as paying institutions (such as hospitals) without including 
the financial and resource control of IDSs. Disease or care management 
organizations are used in models of P4P most typically when these 
organizations are rewarded for meeting clinical outcome and/or cost savings 
performance measures for a specific set of patients. 
These organizations may serve large numbers of patients across multiple 
practices. This factor introduces problems of clinical control and coordination, 
depending on how well the model incorporates direct care providers, such 
as physician offices. Frequently, coordination of disease/care managers with 
physicians and other providers is difficult because these managers typically 
operate outside physician offices.
In addition, care management organizations often operate on an at-risk 
basis for their fees. This practice gives them a strong incentive to lower health 
care expenditures. It also places them in conflict with physicians, who generally 
do not share these savings. This in turn weakens the ability of care management 
P4P models to create links between system rewards (which may not be shared 
with providers at all) and the performance of physicians and other clinicians, 
who make most care decisions. When P4P programs operate in managed 
care settings and program participation and cooperation are mandatory, care 
management organizations can exert more control over the clinical care that 
network providers give. 
Care management models often focus on specific subsets of diseases, such 
as diabetes, cancer, or congestive heart failure; thus, most typically apply only 
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to very limited scopes of care. Because they generally lack a direct relationship 
with direct care providers, care management organizations have only a 
limited ability to provide care, through either short or longer episodes. On 
the positive side, disease management organizations enjoy economies of scale 
because they can replicate their model and operations nationally and even 
worldwide. Given the high fixed costs of developing care management models, 
hiring and training the necessary specialized personnel, and developing the 
technology and data management platforms, there may be a role for disease or 
care management organizations in supporting and collaborating with health 
insurers and with physician practices—especially smaller ones—for which 
these large investments are impractical.
Summary and Discussion
The previous section highlights the lack of a single best approach for whom 
to pay under P4P models. The decision is often driven by other, more 
fundamental design issues; of particular importance are the presence of an 
insurance intermediary and the nature of the target performance measures and 
populations. In short, no universally accepted best practices exist, and those 
aiming to implement P4P programs must contend, instead, with a range of 
different strengths and weaknesses. 
Table 6-1 summarizes the relative strengths and weaknesses of each of the 
six practical provider P4P models, addressing the criteria discussed earlier in 
this chapter.
Directing P4P payments to individual physicians is likely to provide the 
strongest incentives to change clinical behavior. Although other practical and 
technical problems arise in directing performance payments to individual 
physicians, the direct tie between individual performance and individual 
payment is clearly the strongest. On the other end of the scale, directing 
performance payments to disease management organizations, which have loose 
ties to and little control over key providers—particularly physicians—are likely 
to result in the weakest incentives for behavioral change. 
Regarding the appropriateness of each payment unit for various scopes of 
care, the provider payment options differ widely. The organizations that include 
and control the widest range of providers—PHOs/IDSs and managed care 
organizations—are most likely to have multiple scopes of care. 
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The six provider payment options also vary considerably in their ability to 
obtain sufficient patient sample size for accurate performance measurement. 
Unfortunately, individual physicians (who have the strongest incentives to 
respond to performance payments made directly to them) are unlikely to 
have a large enough patient base to deliver the sample sizes necessary for 
accurate and reliable performance measurement. Organizations that control 
multiple providers—PHOs/IDSs and managed care organizations (which are 
also appropriate for a range of scopes of care)—have the strongest ability to 
obtain sufficient patient sample sizes to make payments based on accurate 
performance measures. 
For some of the criteria, few of the provider payment options have clear 
relative strengths. For example, none of the models has a strong ability to 
connect payments to control of patient outcomes. The models that perform 
best on this criterion are, once again, those with the broader range of 
provider participants (PHOs/IDSs and managed care organizations). Disease 
management organizations, having the least direct control over providers, 
Table 6-1. The strengths and weaknesses of six options for whom to pay
Whom To Pay
Ability to Convey Strong 
Incentives Locus of Care Specificity
Sufficient Sample 
Size for Accurate 
Performance 
Measurement
Ability to Connect Payments to 
Control Over Outcomes
Ability to Match with Appropriate 
Payment Unit
Individual physicians Strong Most appropriate for outpatient 
care; may be appropriate for 
inpatient care
Weak Weak Most appropriate for short episodes 
of care
Groups of physicians Moderate Most appropriate for outpatient 
care; may be appropriate for 
inpatient care
Moderate to strong Weak to moderate Most appropriate for short episodes 
of care
Hospitals Moderate Appropriate for inpatient care Strong Weak to moderate Most appropriate for short episodes 
of care
Physician-hospital 
organizations/ integrated 
delivery systems
Weak to moderate, 
depending on provider 
specific allocation methods
Range in applicability to various 
scopes of care
Strong Moderate Appropriate for short and long 
episodes of care
Managed care 
organizations
Moderate to weak, 
depending on managed 
care model
Range in applicability to various 
scopes of care
Strong Moderate to high, depending 
on provider relationship
Appropriate for short and long 
episodes of care
Disease or care 
management 
organizations
Weak Range in applicability to various 
scopes of care
Moderate to strong Weak May face difficulty matching 
payments with episodes as opposed 
to specific services
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consequently have only a weak ability to connect performance payments to 
outcomes. Finally, these multiprovider organizations also have the greatest 
ability to match payments with both long and short episodes of care. 
The results presented in Table 6-1 do not suggest that any single approach 
is best. The considerations presented suggest that options that include multiple 
providers may work best for a greater number of applications. These alternative 
options balance key factors such as the strong ability to convey incentives for 
performance improvement, offer at least a moderate ability to connect rewards 
with control over outcomes, and ensure the availability of sufficient patient 
sizes for valid performance measurement. Such options include paying groups 
of physicians, hospitals, PHOs/IDSs, and managed care organizations. Various 
Medicare demonstrations are either currently operating or developing all these 
payment options.
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Attributing Patients to Physicians for  
Pay for Performance
Gregory C. Pope
Chapter 7
Pay for performance (P4P) programs often focus on physicians because 
of physicians’ control over the provision of medical services to patients. 
Physician P4P requires the attribution of patients to physicians who will be 
held responsible for their care. This chapter addresses the issue of attributing 
(or assigning) patients to physicians for the purpose of P4P when there is no 
enrollment or designation process in which patients choose a physician or a 
health care organization to manage their care. A major focus of the chapter 
is the traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) program. The chapter also 
reviews private insurance examples and literature, and many of the issues and 
concepts are similar in the Medicare and private insurance contexts.
Importance of attribution
A major criticism of much of current US health care, and the Medicare 
FFS program in particular, is the lack of accountability for patients’ care 
(Hackbarth, 2009). P4P programs are intended to remedy this deficiency by 
assigning responsibility, measuring performance, and rewarding results. The 
necessary first step in P4P is to assign physicians responsibility for a defined 
group of patients or episodes of patient care. Assignment is controversial; 
physicians contend that if their performance is to be evaluated fairly, they 
should have control over the patients or episodes of care assigned to them 
(Beckman et al., 2007). In addition to face validity, assignment affects the 
number and proportion of patients assigned to a physician. Assignment thus 
affects the statistical validity of performance assessment and the proportion 
of physicians’ care used to judge their performance. The effect of alternative 
assignment rules on measured physician performance is an empirical question 
addressed later in this chapter.
Patient assignment is an important operational issue in P4P programs. It 
defines the population for which performance will be measured. For example, 
for larger health care organizations, should programs base assignment on 
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primary care services or physicians only, or also on specialists and their 
services? If P4P programs use only primary care for assignment, they may be 
excluding from assignment sicker patients who are using mostly or exclusively 
specialist services. But organizations may not consider themselves responsible 
for—or as having control over—patients whom their primary care physicians 
(PCPs) are not managing.
Patient assignment may also have important incentive implications. In 
utilization-based attribution, physicians may attempt to avoid caring for high-
cost or nonadherent patients so that these patients are not included in their cost 
or quality profiles. Attribution can be made narrowly to individual physicians, 
or more broadly to groups of physicians and other clinicians. Narrow 
assignment may lead to more specific accountability, but broader assignment 
may foster care team collaboration (Beckman et al., 2007). 
Attribution of patients and care episodes may have high stakes for physicians. 
Many health plans perform economic (efficiency) and quality profiling of 
network physicians, using methods that entail attributing episodes of patient 
care to individual physicians (Adams et al., 2010; Mehrotra et al., 2010; Thomas, 
2006; Thomas & Ward, 2006). P4P programs may use the results of such profiles 
for determining differential reimbursement, placing clinicians and providers in 
cost and quality tiers that have differential enrollee cost sharing, or providing 
enrollees with information to aid their choice of clinician or provider.
The need to attribute patients to physician units is not uncommon in the US 
health care system, which is dominated by insurance models with fragmented 
lines of clinical responsibility. Preferred provider organizations (PPOs) are a 
dominant type of health insurance in the commercial, employer-based sector. 
PPOs typically do not require enrollees to designate a personal PCP who 
approves services (a gatekeeper). Patients may self-refer to in-network or out-
of-network providers with differential cost sharing. The dominant portion of the 
Medicare program also does not require beneficiaries to designate a responsible 
physician. About 80 percent of beneficiaries were enrolled in the traditional 
FFS program as of 2008 (Medicare Payment Advisory Commission [MedPAC], 
2009a). Medicare FFS beneficiaries have near-complete freedom of provider 
choice with no physician “in charge.”
In this chapter we first discuss the challenges to patient attribution, with 
selected examples of real-world attribution strategies. Then we consider basic 
concepts and alternatives, followed by elements of patient attribution in an FFS 
situation. The chapter concludes with comments about whether there is a “best” 
attribution rule, and the role of patient attribution in Medicare reform.
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Challenges in patient attribution 
The patient attribution process poses a complex problem in that FFS has no 
enrollment or designation process—as do managed care, medical home,1 or 
programmatic contexts—whereby patients select a physician to manage their 
care. Instead, an insurer or other entity has access to data on utilization (the 
patient’s medical services) and other information that medical provider claims 
(bills) and administrative files typically contain; such entities retrospectively 
assign patients to physicians who may reasonably be held responsible for their 
care.
Unlike the practice of attributing a population or panel of patients to a 
PCP who performs a gatekeeping function, but does not necessarily directly 
provide any services to a patient, P4P programs must assign patients on an 
activity or utilization basis to the physician(s) providing their care (that is, 
assignment must be based on medical services received) (Ingenix, 2007). 
With retrospective virtual attribution of patients, P4P programs may assign 
physicians responsibility for services that they neither delivered nor managed 
(Crosson et al., 2009); the physicians may not even know whether they are 
responsible for a patient or episode at the time of service.
Patients often see several physicians for potentially overlapping care. For 
example, Medicare FFS beneficiaries annually see a median of two PCPs and 
five specialists working in four different practices (Pham et al., 2007). When 
Pham and colleagues assigned beneficiaries to the physician who provided a 
plurality of their annual evaluation and management visits, they found that a 
median of 35 percent of beneficiaries’ visits each year were with their assigned 
physicians. The assigned physician changed from one year to the next for 
33 percent of beneficiaries. Considering all visits to any physician, a PCP’s 
assigned patients accounted for a median of 39 percent of his or her Medicare 
patients and 62 percent of visits. These findings of such extensive dispersion 
of care were present using alternative assignment rules. Pham and colleagues’ 
findings raise doubts about whether claims data can retrospectively identify a 
single physician who is primarily responsible for a Medicare beneficiary’s care, 
and whether the physician delivers a meaningful proportion of the care for 
assigned patients.
Besides the issue of numerous physicians providing care, typically 
FFS systems cannot assign clear overall clinical or financial responsibility 
1 In the medical home model, patients designate a physician practice to be their “medical home,” 
and a personal physician to coordinate and oversee their medical care.
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for a patient’s care over time. Current visit- and procedure-based FFS 
reimbursement systems pay physicians to treat particular medical problems, 
not to manage a patient’s overall care. Physician specialists focus on narrow 
medical issues that are referred to them. 
Attributing physician responsibility for care is further complicated in 
that FFS patients have the freedom to choose their providers; they face few 
limitations or preapproval requirements on seeing multiple doctors and 
seeking multiple opinions or treatment options. If one physician does not give 
a patient what he or she wants, the patient may consider moving on to another 
physician who will satisfy those demands. Patient adherence to physician 
recommendations is of course imperfect; this feature of health care can have 
direct implications for physician quality scores that are based on the percentage 
of patients who actually receive the services recommended and comply with 
physician instructions.
The FFS medical care delivery system is further fragmented between 
physicians, providers, and other sources of care. Compounding the problem is 
a lack of cooperation and integration across provider organizations, including 
their information technology and administrative systems. Pinpointing 
responsibility in such a system is challenging. Many patient and system factors 
that are beyond the control of individual physicians and group practices can 
affect the care and outcomes of patients attributed to a physician.
real-World examples of patient attribution to physicians
Despite the obstacles in the typical FFS health care delivery system described 
above, successful examples emerge of patient attribution for the purposes of 
physician P4P. 
Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration
The Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration, for example, 
creates incentives for participating physician group practices (PGPs) to 
improve the quality and efficiency of their care for assigned Medicare FFS 
beneficiaries (Kautter et al., 2007). In the demonstration, patients are assigned 
to participating physician groups if the plurality of their “allowed charges” 
for office and other outpatient evaluation and management services is with 
the group. That is, patients who receive more outpatient evaluation and 
management services (measured by allowed charges) from a given group than 
from any other physician organization are assigned to that group. 
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In general, the participating physician groups found the demonstration’s 
patient assignment methodology to be a reasonable approach: it assigned a 
set of beneficiaries for whom the groups could be held accountable for annual 
cost and quality performance (Kautter et al., 2007). Participating groups 
provided services constituting an average of 85 percent of their assigned 
beneficiaries’ evaluation and management allowed charges, and 5.4 evaluation 
and management visits per beneficiary annually. An average of about 70 
percent of the groups’ assigned beneficiary population carried over from one 
year to the next. These data indicate that the physician groups participating 
in the Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration had significant 
opportunities to manage and coordinate the care provided to their assigned 
beneficiaries. 
Massachusetts Health Quality Partners
The Massachusetts Health Quality Partners (MHQP) attributed care for 
enrollees in Massachusetts commercial and public insurance plans (including 
Medicare) to PCPs (MHQP, 2008) for the purpose of quality measurement and 
public reporting. MHQP attributed care for patients in managed care insurance 
to the PCP whom the health plan assigned to the patients. It attributed care for 
patients in PPO and Medicare FFS products to the PCP who had the highest 
volume of evaluation and management office visits with that patient in the 18 
months before the end date of the measurement period. For PPO/FFS patients 
with no visits to a PCP in the specified measurement period, MHQP attributed 
care to a visited specialist relevant to the quality indicator (e.g., a cardiologist 
for cardiac measures). 
MHQP validated its attribution method by interviewing PCP physicians 
to whom patients were assigned and found the method to be “very accurate.” 
Physicians agreed that they had seen 93 percent of the patients who had 
been attributed to them, and for 96 percent of these patients they perceived 
themselves to be at least partially responsible for managing the patient’s 
preventive and chronic care or to be their PCP. In most cases in which 
physicians did not see the patient or did not see themselves as responsible 
for that patient, another physician in their group was following the patient 
(MHQP, 2008). 
California Physician Performance Initiative
The California Physician Performance Initiative (CPPI) is a multi-
stakeholder initiative to measure and report on the performance of physicians 
throughout California (CPPI, 2010). It conducts its work under the auspices 
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of the California Cooperative Healthcare Reporting Initiative, a statewide 
collaborative of physician organizations, health plans, purchasers, and 
consumers. The CPPI has developed a system to measure and report the 
quality of patient care provided by individual physicians in California. 
It assigns CPPI patients to a single PCP with whom the patient had the 
most ambulatory/outpatient evaluation and management visits during the 
measurement year and 1 year prior. CPPI changed this rule from an earlier 
one that permitted multiple PCPs to be assigned to a single patient. The rule 
uses a 2-year assignment period to create a greater sense of ownership and 
responsibility on the part of PCPs for their assigned patients. If the visit count 
is equal for two or more PCPs, the rule assigns the patient to the PCP with the 
most recent visit. 
For indicators relevant to specialists, in contrast to those relevant for PCPs, 
CPPI assigns patients to any specialist with whom they had an evaluation and 
management visit during the attribution period. For example, it could assign 
patients with diabetes who qualify for the low-density lipoprotein screening 
measure to an endocrinologist and to a cardiologist if they had a visit with both 
during the attribution period. For patients with no evaluation and management 
visits in the measurement year, or without one with a physician of the specialty 
relevant for a measure, CPPI does not assign a physician for that measure. 
CPPI also assigns patients to practice sites, defined as physicians of the 
same specialty who share a practice address. CPPI (2009, p. 10) states, “While 
narrow accountabilities may be more consistent with physician perceptions of 
the care they provide to patients, broader accountabilities (i.e., multi-provider) 
emphasize joint responsibility for ensuring the proper management of the 
patient during each and every care encounter.” CPPI uses office-based, hospital 
outpatient, and independent clinic visits to assign patients. 
Basic Concepts and alternatives in patient attribution
Prospective vs. Retrospective
The first key aspect to consider in trying to assign patients to physicians is 
whether attribution is prospective or retrospective. In prospective assignment, 
physicians know in advance the patients they are responsible for. This is true of 
managed care gatekeeper situations in which enrollees must choose their PCP. 
It is also true of medical homes, where the patient typically must designate a 
personal physician and medical home. Also, it would be true when patients 
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must agree to and enroll in patient care interventions, such as the provider 
care management programs in Medicare’s Care Management for High-Cost 
Beneficiaries Demonstration.
To the extent that physicians have discretion to designate assigned patients, 
prospective attribution creates incentives for risk selection, that is, designating 
healthier, lower cost, or more adherent patients. However, programs can 
prospectively assign patients to physician groups or other care management 
entities without allowing discretion, using historical utilization or diagnosis 
data. For example, Medicare’s Health Support Pilot Program assigned all 
beneficiaries in a geographic area who met certain diagnostic and other criteria 
to a third-party disease management company or to a control group (Centers 
for Medicare & Medicaid Services [CMS], 2006b).
 Finally, programs use random prospective assignment algorithms in some 
cases—for example, to allocate patients who have not chosen a responsible 
health professional or provider. Some state Medicaid programs and the 
Medicare Part D prescription drug program use “auto assignment” to assign 
some enrollees to health plans or clinicians (CMS, 2006a; Llanos & Rothstein, 
2007). 
Generally, this chapter addresses situations of retrospective patient 
attribution, which is based on utilization data, and for which the beneficiaries 
themselves do not designate a preferred physician. The following discussion 
explores the key elements of retrospective assignment.
Assignment to Single or Multiple Physicians
Another important element of patient attribution is whether the rule assigns 
a patient exclusively to a single physician (unique assignment) or jointly to 
multiple physicians. For example, algorithms that assign patients to the (single) 
physician who provides the “most” care to the patient are exclusive, or unique, 
attribution algorithms. An algorithm that attributes a patient to any physician 
who “touches” the patient (that is, directly provides any care to that patient) is 
an example of a nonexclusive, or joint, assignment algorithm. Joint assignment 
acknowledges that no one physician has complete control over all aspects 
of a patient’s care. A PCP, for example, does not have complete control over 
specialist care, even if the PCP made the referral. Joint attribution algorithms 
may have weighting schemes that assign patients differentially to different 
providers—one example is assignment in proportion to the amount of care 
provided. In joint attribution algorithms, a single patient’s experience may be 
counted in multiple providers’ quality or cost profiles or performance.
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The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) (2009b) 
compared single-physician and multiple-physician attribution rules for 
Medicare episodes of care. MedPAC found that measures of resource-use 
efficiency for individual physicians that were calculated using single (compared 
with multiple) attribution of episodes were highly correlated (correlation 
coefficient of 0.95 or greater). Also, both single and multiple attribution rules 
yielded efficiency ratios that were stable across years for individual physicians. 
Multiple attribution increased the proportion of physicians who could be 
attributed the minimum number of episodes (20) specified as necessary for 
efficiency profiling. MedPAC concluded that statistical analysis did not lead to 
a clear-cut preference for single or multiple attribution. In choosing one or the 
other, P4P programs probably need to base the decision on qualitative criteria 
such as whether a payer wanted profiled physicians to focus on their referrals 
(which would favor single attribution) or to collaborate in patient care (which 
would favor multiple attribution).
Attribution to Individual Physicians vs. Physician Organizations
Also important is whether P4P programs attribute care to individual physicians 
or to physician groups, such as group practices or hospital medical staffs. 
Although attributing care to individual physicians is most specific, such an 
approach can result in insufficient patient sample sizes to measure performance 
reliably and can also pose difficult analytic problems when multiple physicians 
are providing care. By contrast, attributing care to physician groups may be 
more feasible and reliable, but doing so diffuses responsibility and incentives 
for care and does not measure intragroup variation. One advantage of attri-
buting care to groups is that some, such as traditional integrated physician 
group practices, often have internal organizational mechanisms for providing 
performance feedback and incentives to member physicians. 
Fisher and colleagues (2007) argue that payers potentially could assign 
patients to the “extended hospital medical staff,” which would take responsi-
bility for patient care. “The extended hospital medical staff is essentially a 
hospital-associated multispecialty group practice that is empirically defined by 
physicians’ direct or indirect referral patterns to a hospital” (Fisher et al., 2007, 
p. w45). The authors propose to assign physicians to the hospitals at which 
they do most of their inpatient work and would assign those who do not do 
inpatient work to the hospitals that admit the plurality of their patients. In the 
case of Medicare enrollees, for example, Fisher et al. would assign beneficiaries 
to the physician who provided most of their ambulatory care, hence also 
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assigning them to that physician’s primary hospital and its extended medical 
staff.
The extended hospital medical staff concept provides a means of 
aggregating small and solo physician practices and institutional providers into 
larger multispecialty entities to which Medicare could assign all Medicare 
beneficiaries and physicians. However, extended hospital medical staff are not 
organized in any legal or practical way to receive payment and manage patient 
care in an integrated fashion. Payers would need to expend substantial effort to 
legally define the extended medical staff organization and prepare it to accept 
responsibility for managing patient care. 
Exclusion of Patients from Attribution
A final issue is whether physicians can exclude patients from being attributed 
to them. Typically, a P4P program establishes a set of criteria for determining 
whether they will exclude or include patients in assignment in a given context. 
These criteria can encompass basic insurance eligibility, length of enrollment 
with a given insurer or program, and eligibility for the quality or cost indicator 
under consideration. For example, only patients diagnosed with diabetes are 
eligible for evaluation on indicators of the quality of care provided to diabetics.
More controversial than this type of assignment decision is whether 
physicians should be allowed to exclude selected patients for reasons such as 
nonadherence to physician recommendations or ineligibility for performance 
indicators for reasons that only the physician can ascertain. This policy 
creates obvious incentive issues for physicians to object or otherwise act to 
exclude patients from certain measures when the payer is going to judge their 
performance on assigned patients. Nevertheless, to a certain extent, issues such 
as patient nonadherence may legitimately be beyond physicians’ control.
Patient vs. Episode Assignment
Another aspect of attribution is the range of health care services included—
for example, a patient’s entire care over a period such as a year, or episodes 
of care related to particular medical conditions, acute events, or procedures. 
Attributing a patient’s entire care over a specified period reflects an integrated, 
holistic perspective on the patient’s care; this approach best suits PCPs who are 
managing a patient’s overall care, especially chronic condition care. Episodic 
care would describe care by specialists or acute care physicians, such as 
hospital-associated physicians managing an acute care episode centered on a 
hospitalization. 
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Patient Notification and Lock-In
Payers do not necessarily notify patients (beneficiaries, enrollees) about their 
assignment to providers who are participating in P4P programs. In fact, as 
long as patients’ insurance benefits, cost sharing, and freedom of provider 
choice are unaffected, P4P programs for physicians typically do not inform 
patients. However, patients may have interest in knowing that their physicians 
are participating in or subject to incentive programs that could affect their 
choice of treatment for patients, particularly programs that include incentives 
to reduce costs. 
Patient notification has several levels. A first level could be a posting 
in a physician’s office or a letter stating that the physician is participating 
in an incentive program to improve quality and efficiency. A second level 
of notification could entail identifying the specific physician to whom the 
incentive program assigned the patient, perhaps including quality and cost-
profiling results for that physician. A third use of assignment would be some 
form of incentives (e.g., differential copayments) or even lock-in for the 
patient to obtain services from the physician or physician organization to 
which he or she was assigned. Patient lock-in would require substantial patient 
education and the patient’s commitment to receive all or most of his or her 
services from a designated provider organization. Devers and Berenson (2009) 
have discussed these options—no lock-in or even notification, soft lock-in 
(incentives), or hard lock-in (requirements to use selected providers)—in the 
context of accountable care organizations for Medicare.
Geographic Unit of Assignment
Instead of utilization-based attribution methods, a different, more aggregated 
approach is to assign all physicians in an area responsibility for all residents 
of an area. An advantage of this approach is that it assigns physicians 
responsibility for nonusers as well as users of medical care. It also promotes a 
sense of collective responsibility of an entire physician community for an entire 
community of residents. Assigning patients to individual physicians—an often 
difficult problem—is not an issue. Geographic assignment promotes a focus on 
community-wide public health, prevention, and outcome measures, which can 
be measured precisely because of the large sample size and can be compared 
across areas. 
A geographic unit of accountability has several disadvantages, however. The 
major downside is its inability to distinguish between individual physicians’ 
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or practices’ performance. A more disaggregated approach to individual 
physician or practice performance measurement could be a complement to an 
additional geographic unit of accountability; they are not mutually exclusive. 
An aggregate, geographic unit could also require considerable coordination 
and integration among different payers and provider organizations, which may 
be difficult to achieve in practice. Another disadvantage of area alliances is that 
comprehensive, standardized data submission and analysis for performance 
measurement often presents a major hurdle.
elements of patient attribution in a Fee-for-Service Situation
Without patient enrollment or the designation of a responsible physician 
through managed care or medical homes, utilization of services is the only 
observable element in medical claims data that links patients to specific 
physicians or practices. The basic idea is that the physician(s) providing 
services can be considered responsible for their patients. The obvious drawback 
of this approach is that individuals who have not had any health care services 
will not be assigned to any physician. That is, for nonusers, P4P system 
administrators simply have nothing to go on in attributing responsibility. This 
lack of information can pose a serious issue in young, healthy populations 
that have many nonusers. Even in the high-utilizing Medicare FFS population, 
about 6 percent of beneficiaries do not use any Medicare-covered services 
in a year, and roughly 15 percent do not have any office or other outpatient 
evaluation and management visits, leaving little or no basis for assignment to 
a physician. Over multiyear periods, more enrollees can be assigned given that 
some of the nonusers in year 1 will have service utilization in year 2 that can be 
the basis of assignment.
The three major elements of a patient assignment algorithm based on 
utilization are as follows:
•	 the	type	of	services	that	a	program	uses	for	attribution,
•	 the	rules	for	determining	responsible	physicians	from	services	it	uses	for	
attribution, and
•	 the	type(s)	of	providers	eligible	for	assignment	or	used	in	assignment	
algorithms.
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Type of Services Used for Attribution
P4P programs generally use physician or professional services to attribute 
patients to physicians.2 Of course, physicians provide many different types of 
services. To deal with this complexity, a program is likely, logically, to use the 
type of service most closely related to the care it is attributing. For example, 
for an episode of care centered on a major surgical procedure, a P4P program 
logically attributes the patient to the surgeon who performs the procedure. 
Under one-touch rules, an attribution algorithm may assign a patient receiving 
any services from a physician—over a period such as a year or in connection 
with an episode of care—to that physician. 
In contrast, attribution rules, appropriately, assign management of chronic 
diseases to the physician(s) providing evaluation and management services. 
Typically, as in the Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration, P4P 
programs further restrict these services to those a physician provides in the 
office or other outpatient settings;3 in other contexts, programs may further 
restrict the services to “established patient” visits. Hospital inpatient evaluation 
and management services are likely to focus narrowly on the reason for 
the hospital admission; thus they are less appropriate for assigning overall 
responsibility for a patient’s care management than are ambulatory services.
Programs can also attribute acute care episodes based on evaluation and 
management services. For example, the “first contact” rule attributes the 
acute episode to the physician billing for the episode’s first evaluation and 
management visit.
Rules for Determining Responsible Physicians
The simplest approach to determining responsible physicians from utilization 
data is to assign the episode or patient to the physician providing the largest 
quantity, cost, or share of the type of services used for attribution (plurality 
rule). For example, in the Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration, 
the demonstration algorithm assigns patients to a participating group practice 
if the practice provided the plurality of office or other outpatient evaluation 
and management services for that patient. Pham et al. (2007) and McCall et al. 
(2000) also use the plurality rule as their baseline assignment method. 
2 Conceivably, programs could attribute care to physicians based on nonphysician services. For 
example, a hospital admission could be used to attribute care to the (physician) medical staff of 
the hospital (Fisher et al., 2007). Another example might be immunizations—given by a nurse 
associated with a doctor or practice in situations in which the patient never sees the doctor in 
question.
3 However, Pham et al. (2007) include inpatient claims in their baseline assignment method.
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Quantity or cost. Either quantity or cost can be the basis for defining the 
largest amount of services provided—number of visits or total payments 
for visits or professional services (Mehrotra et al., 2010). Using visit cost is 
likely to assign patients to physicians providing higher-cost visits, that is, 
specialists rather than PCPs (Sorbero et al., 2006). Total rather than visit cost 
is an alternative basis for assignment: P4P programs can attribute patients or 
episodes of care to the physician providing the highest total cost of services 
during a specified period (e.g., a year) or during the episode; in this approach, 
visits and procedures might both count. 
A very different approach is to assign a patient to any physician who 
provides any services (one or more) of a specified type to him or her (the 
one-touch rule). This is a nonexclusive assignment algorithm in which multiple 
physicians may be responsible for a single patient. Sharing responsibility could 
increase the chances of patients receiving recommended care because more 
than one physician may be responsible. Also, it encourages collaboration 
among physicians involved in a patient’s care. However, shared responsibility 
creates “free rider” incentive problems. Physicians may receive credit for a 
patient receiving recommended care even if they were not the physician who 
ensured that the patient receive the care. Conversely, when physicians ensure 
that recommended care is provided, they may be improving performance 
scores of other physicians in their peer comparison group in addition to their 
own score.
Minimum quantity or share rules. Patient assignment algorithms may 
incorporate minimum quantity or share rules, for example, assigning a patient 
to a physician who provided the most visits to the patient, assuming that the 
physician provided at least two visits within the assignment period (typically a 
year). The rationale for a minimum quantity of services is that a physician may 
need some minimum level of contact with a patient to be able to manage the 
patient’s care. Note that the minimum two-visit rule would exclude all patients 
with only one visit overall from assignment to anybody; obviously, this is also 
true for patients with no visits. Patients with no visit or one visit are likely to 
be healthier than average, thus a two-visit minimum for assignment skews the 
assigned population toward the sick.
As another illustration, a minimum-share rule might specify that a physician 
or practice be responsible for patients to whom they provided the most 
care, if the share of the patient’s care was at least 50 percent (majority rule). 
The rationale for specifying a minimum share is that holding a physician 
responsible for the care of a patient to whom he or she is providing a minority 
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of total care might be considered inappropriate. Note, however, that this rule 
would exclude all patients for whom no physician provided a majority of care 
from assignment. These cases could encompass the sickest patients, who are 
seeing multiple physicians for multiple illnesses and thus are most in need of 
care coordination. Also, over time the stability of assignment of the responsible 
provider is lower with a majority than with a plurality rule (Pham et al., 2007). 
The attribution rule could also specify lower minimum shares—for 
example, 30 percent or 20 percent—with the rationale that a physician has to 
provide some minimal share of care to be held accountable. As one example, 
in its initial analyses, MedPAC assigned beneficiary episodes to physicians 
responsible for at least 35 percent of episode evaluation and management 
dollars (MedPAC, 2009b). Pham et al. (2007) simulate a rule that assigns 
beneficiaries to any physician billing for at least 25 percent of the patient’s 
evaluation and management visits. This multiple physician assignment rule 
assigned physicians a higher proportion of their Medicare patients and visits 
but assigned fewer beneficiaries to any physician at all, compared with the 
baseline plurality assignment rule.
Using private insurer claims data, Thomas and Ward (2006) simulated 
minimum-share rules of 20, 30, and 50 percent in assigning episodes to four 
specialties (cardiology, family practice, general surgery, and neurology). With 
the 20 percent rule, for example, they assigned a physician responsibility 
for an entire episode if he or she accounted for at least 20 percent of total 
professional and prescribing costs for the episode. They would assign the 
episode to multiple physicians if two or more physicians each accounted for at 
least 20 percent of total costs. If no physician accounted for at least 20 percent 
of total costs, the episode would not be assigned to any physician. As expected, 
Thomas and Ward found that as the minimum share rose from 20 to 30 to 
50 percent, more episodes were unassigned to any physician, but fewer were 
assigned to multiple physicians.
These authors also found that cost efficiency scores for physicians were not 
highly sensitive to the attribution method because most episodes were assigned 
to only one physician regardless of the episode-attribution methodology. For 
example, when Thomas and Ward assigned episodes using the 30 percent 
minimum-share rule, they saw the following results: more than 93 percent 
of cardiology episodes, 95 percent of family practice episodes, 99 percent of 
general surgery, and 95 percent of neurology episodes were assigned to a single 
physician (Thomas, 2006). Thomas and Ward (2006) did not find a single 
episode-attribution rule to be uniformly superior for all specialties. But they 
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found it “reasonable” to attribute episodes to physicians who accounted for at 
least 30 percent of episode professional and prescribing costs.
Simulations of alternative rules. Mehrotra et al. (2010) simulated 12 
attribution rules for the purpose of assigning physicians to one of four cost 
tiers: low cost, average cost, high cost, or low sample size (fewer than 30 
assigned episodes). The 12 rules were combinations of four dimensions: unit of 
analysis (patient versus episode of care); signal for responsibility (professional 
costs versus evaluation and management visits); number of physicians 
assigned responsibility (single versus multiple); and minimum threshold for 
responsibility (majority versus plurality of visits or costs). The authors analyzed 
data on 1.1 million 2004–2005 commercial insurance enrollees between the 
ages of 18 and 65 in four Massachusetts health plans.
Mehrotra et al. (2010) found that the percentage of episodes that they could 
assign to a physician varied substantially across the attribution rules, from 
20 to 69 percent. The mean percentage of costs billed by a physician that they 
included in that physician’s own cost profile also ranged widely, from 13 to 
60 percent. Further, using the 11 alternative rules, between 17 and 61 percent 
of physicians would fall into a different cost category than when using the 
“default” rule (episode-based, costs, plurality). The authors conclude that the 
attribution rule can substantially affect the cost category to which a physician is 
assigned.
As part of investigating estimates of physician cost efficiency using episode 
groupers, Adams et al. (2010) simulated the reliability of three alternative 
rules for attributing episodes to physicians. They conducted the analysis using 
commercial insurance claims for residents of Massachusetts between the ages 
of 18 and 65. The baseline rule was to attribute episodes to the physician who 
billed the highest proportion of professional costs in that episode as long as 
the proportion was greater than 30 percent. If no physician met these criteria, 
Adams and colleagues dropped the episode from analysis. Across all specialties, 
52 percent of episodes could not be assigned to a physician.
The researchers also examined two alternative rules. One rule was to 
attribute episodes to the physician who accounted for the highest fraction 
(minimum of 30 percent) of face-to-face encounters (based on the number of 
evaluation and management visits) within the episode. In this alternative, 50 
percent of episodes could be assigned. The other alternative was a patient-based 
rule  that assigned all episodes for a patient to the physician who accounted 
for the highest fraction of professional costs for that patient (minimum of 30 
percent) over the 2-year study period. With this rule, 39 percent of episodes 
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could be attributed. The authors found that the reliability of physician cost 
profiles was lower using the two alternative rules than with their baseline rule 
(Adams et al., 2010).
McCall et al. (2000) explored alternative Medicare FFS beneficiary 
assignment criteria for process quality performance assessment of large PGPs, 
using claims data on and interviews with four “study partner” group practices. 
The researchers based assignment on evaluation and management visits, and 
the baseline attribution rule was to assign beneficiaries receiving a plurality of 
their visits from a PGP. McCall and colleagues tested a variety of alternative 
assignment algorithms, which included the following: varying the minimum 
number of evaluation and management visits and share of evaluation and 
management care provided by the PGP; weighting by the share of care at 
the PGP rather than using a plurality assignment rule; counting only visits 
provided by primary care or medical specialties rather than all specialties; and 
excluding from assignment patients residing outside the practice’s service area. 
McCall et al. (2000) found that measured PGP quality indicator 
performance was not very sensitive to the assignment algorithm. Moreover, 
almost three-quarters of PGP physicians felt definite ownership of patients 
assigned to them using the baseline attribution algorithm (plurality of all-
specialty evaluation and management services). A patient survey showed 
that 88 percent of beneficiaries recognized that most of their doctor visits 
had occurred at their assigned PGP. PGP physicians felt more responsible 
for patients with more visits and a higher share of care at the PGP.4 But the 
number of beneficiaries assigned to the practices dropped considerably 
with high thresholds for the number of visits or share of care required for 
assignment. In consultation with their technical experts panel, McCall et al. 
(2000) recommended the use of “minimalist assignment criteria” to enhance 
the statistical validity of performance measurement by increasing the number 
of assigned patients. 
4 Interestingly, physicians’ perceived responsibility for recommending care varied considerably by 
process quality indicator. Almost three-quarters of physicians felt responsible for recommending 
mammography to qualifying assigned patients, but less than one-half for recommending retinal 
eye exams, less than one-third for prescribing beta blocker after a heart attack, and less than 
one-fifth for follow-up after a mental health hospitalization. These variations were related to the 
perceived clinical consensus around performance measures and physician responsibility for the 
type of care involved (PGP physicians felt more responsible for outpatient than inpatient care, 
and less responsible for mental health care).
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Type of Physicians Used for Assignment
The third and final element of an attribution rule is the type of physician 
eligible for use in the assignment rule. For example, in a group practice context 
such as the Medicare Physician Group Practice Demonstration, patients 
assigned to any physician who is a member of the group could be assigned 
to that group. Alternatively, the rule could use only PCPs as the basis for 
assignment (patients assigned to the group’s PCPs are assigned to the group). 
Limiting the assignment to PCPs reduces the number of patients who can be 
assigned because PCPs do not provide some beneficiaries with any services; 
these are often the sickest patients, whom specialists primarily treat. Pham et 
al. (2007) found that 94 percent of Medicare beneficiaries could be assigned to 
a physician of any specialty, but only 79 percent to a PCP, based on evaluation 
and management visits. In the context of an inpatient episode, payers could 
consider radiologists, anesthesiologists, and pathologists ineligible for 
assignment. The rationale for excluding certain specialties was that they are 
unlikely to be responsible for overall management of a patient’s hospital stay. 
By contrast, certain specialists—for example, internal medicine 
subspecialists such as cardiologists and endocrinologists—may in effect 
manage the care of many individuals, especially those with chronic illnesses 
(e.g., heart disease, diabetes) that the specialty treats. For this reason, 
eliminating all specialists and specialty care from assignment is probably 
unwarranted, even when the aim is to attribute responsibility for either 
overall care or, at least, primary care. This is especially true in a population 
encompassing many individuals with multiple chronic illnesses, such as the 
Medicare population. A compromise would include in an assignment both 
PCPs and selected specialists who may be responsible for managing patient 
care. 
In attributing responsibility for episodes of care, the rule may logically hold 
that specialists are responsible when they are the primary caregiver for many 
episodes of care. In the inpatient hospital setting, payers could conceivably 
hold several physicians singly or jointly responsible; these physicians might 
include the admitting physician, the attending, hospitalists or intensivists 
managing care in the hospital, PCPs providing inpatient visits, specialists 
doing inpatient consultations, and, in surgical cases, the primary and assisting 
surgeons. For post-acute or post-discharge care, physicians who are candidates 
to be held responsible include the principal surgeon in surgical cases, primary 
care doctors, and doctors participating in post-acute care, such as physicians 
ordering home health care or managing skilled nursing care.
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Concluding Comments
Is There a Best Attribution Rule?
Most studies reviewed here have not found physician cost and quality 
performance assessment to be very sensitive to the rules used to attribute 
patients to physicians. But some (notably Mehrotra et al., 2010) have found 
important effects of attribution on results, indicating that the effects of 
attribution may be sensitive to the particular context in which it is studied and 
the range of attribution rules that are considered.  Assignment rules continue 
to be controversial and can influence face validity, statistical validity, and the 
proportion of care and patients included in performance assessment. More 
restrictive patient-assignment criteria, such as requiring more visits or a higher 
share of care for assignment, tend to increase face validity to physicians and 
their acceptance of responsibility for assigned patients. But more restrictive 
assignment criteria also reduce the number of patients assigned, which may 
threaten statistical validity, base physician performance assessment on a 
smaller share of total care provided, and leave more patients unassigned to any 
provider. 
Although P4P programs commonly use certain attribution rules (e.g., 
a plurality rule, sometimes with a minimum number of visits or share of 
care), no clear consensus has yet emerged on the “best” attribution rule(s). 
As Mehrotra et al. (2010) point out, there may be no uniformly best rule. 
The preferred rule may depend on the purpose, context, and stakeholder 
perspective. The same rule may not be best from the perspectives of 
purchasers, providers, and consumers. The conclusion is that choice of 
attribution rule should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis to satisfy the 
purpose at hand.
Patient Attribution in Medicare Reform
Patient attribution in an unmanaged, fragmented FFS environment poses many 
challenges. Exactly how successful patient attribution can be in this setting 
remains unclear. Also still uncertain is whether institutional changes such 
as requiring patients to choose managed care gatekeepers or medical homes 
are necessary to attribute responsibility for care. Reflecting this uncertainty, 
current Medicare reform efforts, such as those incorporated in the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 and in previous legislation, 
include a spectrum of relationships between beneficiaries and physicians and 
other providers. Traditional FFS Medicare, with no explicit responsibility 
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or assignment of patients to physicians, continues. Patients will likely be 
assigned to the newly established (2012) accountable care organizations 
on a retrospective basis using service utilization, without any beneficiary 
involvement or acknowledgment. In Medicare’s medical home demonstrations, 
participating patients will likely have to prospectively designate a personal 
physician and sign an agreement specifying their obligations. But they will not 
be subject to a lock-in requiring them to obtain care only from their designated 
physician. The Medicare Advantage program will continue, in which patients 
actively enroll in private health plans and, depending on the plan’s benefit 
design, may be required to obtain care exclusively from the plan’s network 
of contracted providers (or at least enjoy discounted cost sharing if they do 
so). The private sector is also trying a wide variety of approaches. Experience 
and careful evaluation studies should reveal which of these models is most 
successful and under what circumstances.
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Financial Gains and Risks in Pay for 
Performance Bonus Algorithms
Jerry Cromwell
Chapter 8
The burgeoning research on the wide geographic variation in surgery rates 
(Weinstein et al., 2004; Weinstein et al., 2006; Wennberg et al., 2006), the 
prevalence of medical errors, and the generally unacceptable quality of care in a 
variety of settings (Institute of Medicine [IOM] Board on Health Care Services, 
2001; Chassin & Galvin, 1998) has motivated both public and private health 
insurers to incorporate financial incentives for improving quality into their 
payment arrangements with care organizations. Insurers are using both reward 
and risk—carrot and stick—approaches (Bokhour et al., 2006; LLanos et al., 
2007; Epstein, 2006; Rosenthal & Dudley, 2007; Trude & Christianson, 2006; 
Williams, 2006). Payers may simply provide an add-on or allow higher updates 
to a provider’s fees, or they may pay an extra amount for a desired service (e.g., 
a $10 payment for a mammogram): a reward (carrot) strategy. Alternatively, 
payers may reduce payments or constrain fee updates for unacceptable quality 
performance: the risk (stick) strategy.
A hybrid of the two approaches uses self-financing quality bonuses. 
Under a self-financing scheme, as with Michigan Medicaid’s Health Plan 
Bonus/Withhold system (LLanos et al., 2007, p. 15), payers pay for quality 
improvements out of demonstrated savings generated by health care providers 
or managed care organizations. 
Pay for performance (P4P) arrangements use financial incentives to 
encourage changes in patient care processes that, in turn, should lead to 
improved health outcomes. Evidence-based patient care studies have produced 
a list of care processes that lead to better outcomes (Agency for Healthcare 
Research and Quality, 2006; IOM Board on Health Care Services, 2006; 
National Committee for Quality Assurance, 2006; National Quality Forum, 
2006; see Chapter 4 of this book for examples). Studies have paid much less 
attention, however, to the payout algorithms themselves. Yet the structure of 
the incentive arrangement may be as important as—or more so than—the 
quality indicators in encouraging quality improvements.
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This chapter first presents several possible P4P payment models and 
investigates their key parameters. As part of this exercise, we highlight the 
effects on bonus levels of increasing the number of indicators, of how they 
are weighted, and of how targets are set. We then simulate actual quality 
performance against a preset target and test the sensitivity of a plan’s expected 
bonus and degree of financial risk to different bonus algorithms and key 
parameters. Finally, we conclude by suggesting a few steps for payers to follow 
in designing P4P incentive programs that maximize the likelihood of positive 
responses on the part of managed care and provider organizations.
General pay for performance payment Model
Many private and state Medicaid P4P programs use a simple payment 
scheme that pays a certain amount for providing a quality-enhancing service 
(e.g., mammograms, a primary care visit). Service-specific P4P payment, 
however, is an inadequate incentive to encourage higher quality in managing 
the chronically ill with multiple health problems. The following subsection 
summarizes the general theory of P4P payment arrangements. We emphasize 
the distinction between arrangements paying on relative levels vs. rates of 
improvement in performance because they have a material effect on rewards 
and penalties. After that, we describe six common approaches, or algorithms, 
that either the Medicare Health Support Pilot Program uses or other programs 
could use, to illustrate the differential impacts of “levels” vs. “rates of 
improvement” payment strategies. 
P4P Payment Using Levels or Rates of Improvement in Performance
One likely bonus (or penalty) payment model uses several P4P indicators and 
is based on an organization’s actual performance relative to each target rate. 
The target rate for the i-th quality indicator in the p-th arrangement, tip, is 
based on an improvement over the initial baseline rate, λbase,ip :
 tip = λbase,ip(1 + E[αip]) (8.1)
where E[αip] = the payer’s implicit expected rate of improvement over baseline 
for the i-th indicator in the p-th payment arrangement. For example, the 
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payer might set a target of 75 percent based on a baseline rate of 60 percent 
with an expected improvement of 25 percent (or 15 percentage points). The 
payer might set the rate of improvement unilaterally or negotiate it with the 
organization. 
We further assume that the organization (e.g., a primary care practice or 
commercial disease management company) has formed its own expected level 
of performance, E[λip], based on a likely rate of quality improvement, E[ρip], 
due to its intervention:
 E[λip] = λbase,ip(1 + E[ρip]). (8.2)
The organization’s expectation of financial success or failure depends on 
its clinicians’ and managers’ opinions of the likelihood of their intervention’s 
effectiveness in improving quality.1 Managers, for example, may be expecting 
a one-third improvement over the baseline 60 percent, with an expected rate 
E[λ] = 80 percent > t = 75 percent. Their expected level of performance also 
is conditional on the level of investment that they intend to make in trying to 
meet the target plus a random component that would occur in any single year 
as a result of other factors (e.g., shift in patient case mix, influenza epidemic). 
We assume that the organization’s investment is at some “reasonable” level—
possibly to ensure that the organization has at least a 50 percent chance of 
achieving or exceeding the target rate. We also assume that managers’ own 
expectations of success dominate any random temporal risk, although random 
risk could dominate at high baseline quality levels with little opportunity for 
improvement.
Six Common Payment Algorithms
P4P quality payouts (or penalties) to an organization depend on the way the 
payer sets the target relative to managers’ expectations. We consider six bonus 
algorithms:2 (1) all or nothing; (2) a continuous unconstrained percentage 
between zero and 100 percent; (3) a continuous percentage constrained by a 
lower limit (LL) and upper limit (UL), or corridor; (4) a composite percentage 
score allowing above-target gains in some indicators to offset failures in other 
1  The rest of this chapter uses the term managers to mean either the managers of a commercial 
disease management organization (e.g., Health Dialog, Aetna, Healthways) or managers of a 
clinical practice involved in a P4P payment arrangement.
2  Disease management organizations in the Medicare Health Support Pilot Program used the first 
five algorithms described in Table 8-1 (McCall et al., 2008; see also Cromwell et al., 2007). This 
program is described in more detail in Chapter 9.
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indicators; (5) statistical differences above the baseline rate; or (6) rate of 
improvement over the target rate (see Table 8-1). 
In the all-or-nothing algorithm, an organization would expect a full bonus 
for a given indicator, E[Bi] = 1, if the managers’ own expected performance 
level, E[λip], equaled or exceeded the target rate; otherwise, the expected 
bonus for the indicator would be zero. With the continuous unconstrained 
arrangement, the expected bonus percentage is simply the ratio of managers’ 
expected rate of success to the payer’s target rate, up to a maximum of 
100 percent. For example, if managers’ expected success rate was 74 percent, 
with a target of 75 percent, then the organization would expect to receive 
98.7 percent (74 percent / 75 percent) of the full bonus. A constrained version 
of the continuous algorithm produces no expected bonus if managers’ expected 
success-to-target ratio is below a preset LL. For example, if the payer set an LL 
of 70 percent, the organization would expect no bonus for an indicator if its 
expected success rate was below 70 percent. Above the LL but below the UL, 
the payer pays a bonus based on how close the organization comes to meeting 
its target rate. The bonus within the LL–UL range may also be a fraction, 
θ < 1.0, of success in achieving the target. For example, if t = 75 percent and 
actual success is 72 percent, then if the payer set θ = 0.80, the payer would pay 
76.8 percent [0.80 × (72 percent / 75 percent)] of the maximum bonus. Usually 
the upper limit is the target rate, but the payer might even pay an additional 
bonus where λ > t.
Table 8-1. Six common P4P payment algorithms
Payment Arrangement Expected Bonus 
Percentage: E[Bi]
Expected Success-to-Target
1.  All or Nothing 0 E[λip] / tip < 1.0
1 E[λip] / tip ≥ 1.0
2.  Continuous Unconstrained E[λip] / tip 0 ≤ E[λip] / tip ≤ 1.0
3.  Continuous Constrained 0 E[λip] / tip < LL
θ × E[λip] / tip LL ≤ E[λip] / tip ≤ UL: 0 < θ < 1.0
UL E[λip] / tip > UL
4.  Composite ∑i ωiE[λip] / tip 0 ≤ E[λip] / tip ≤ ∞
5.  Statistical 0 E[λip] < 1.96SEλbase
1 E[λip] ≥ 1.96SEλbase
6.  Rate of Improvement 0 E[ρip] / E[αiip] < 1.0
1 E[ρip] / E[αiip] ≥ 1.0
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The first three bonus arrangements evaluate each indicator’s performance 
and payout percentage, E[Bi], separately. A group’s expected total percentage 
bonus, E[TB],3 in meeting a set of prespecified quality and satisfaction targets 
can be expressed as the maximum percentage of outlays (or management fees) 
eligible for bonuses, MPCT, multiplied by a weighted average of the bonus 
percentages that an organization might expect to achieve on each indicator 
(deleting the p-subscript for simplicity): 
 E[TB] = MPCT × {Σ  ωiE[Bi]} : {Σ  ωiE[Bi]} ≤ 1.0, (8.3)
where ωi = the weight that a payer assigns to the i-th indicator, and E[Bi] 
= the percentage of the bonus a group expects to achieve for each indicator. For 
example, if a payer proposed to increase fees to the group by a total of MPCT 
= 5 percent across 10 equally weighted indicators (ωi = 1 / N), then success on 
each indicator would raise outlays by 0.05(0.1)(1.0) = 0.5 percent = 0.005. If 
the group’s expected success on each indicator was 80 percent, then the overall 
average expected bonus percentage would be E[TB] = MPCT × (N × ω × 0.8) 
= 0.05 × (10 × 0.1 × 0.8) = 4 percent add-on to fees. Some experts have argued 
that expected bonus fractions of 4 percent are too low. Fractions may need 
to be at least 10 percent to motivate behavioral change in physicians (LLanos 
et al., 2007, p. 22). 
The fourth, composite, bonus algorithm does not evaluate each indicator 
separately. Rather, it first calculates totally unconstrained actual-to-target 
performance ratios for each indicator and then applies the weights. It then 
determines the final bonus only after averaging the unconstrained actual-to-
target ratios across all indicators.4 Because individual indicator E[Bi] ratios 
could be greater than 1.0, overachievement on some indicators can offset 
underachievement on others. It is likely that the payer would constrain the 
total bonus percentage to not exceed 1.0. 
A fifth arrangement would require only that actual performance be 
statistically higher than the baseline rate (e.g., 1.96 × SE at the 95 percent 
confidence level, where SE = standard error of mean λbase). This approach 
adjusts for random variation only and implicitly assumes (near-) zero 
intervention effectiveness. It is reasonable for payers to expect a sizable, 
positive intervention effect on most quality indicators over and above random 
annual variation. 
3 Expected percentage gains can be converted to absolute dollars by multiplying by E[TB] total 
fees paid out.
4 This approach essentially replaces {Σ ωiE[Bi]} in equation 8.3 with × {Σ  E[Bi]/N} : E[Bi] ≥ 0. 
208  Chapter 8
The sixth arrangement pays on relative rates of improvement, ρ / α, instead 
of relative levels, λ / t. This subtle difference can introduce substantially greater 
financial risk, as shown in the next section, Setting Targets.
The next three sections focus on characteristics of P4P payment 
arrangements that entail more or less financial risk for organizations affected 
by the arrangements. We begin with the theory behind setting targets using 
levels or rates of improvement in performance, followed by similar discussions 
of the financial risks implicit in the number of targets and how quality 
indicators might be weighted to reflect their link to health outcomes.
Setting targets (t)
Except for the all-or-nothing arrangement, the other payment arrangements 
in Table 8-1 are flawed in that they give “partial credit” for simply reproducing 
the baseline rate. We can see this in the following conversion formula between 
performance levels and rates of improvement:
 λ / t = λbase(1 + ρ) / λbase(1 + α) = (1 + ρ) / (1 + α) (8.4)
  = [1 / (1 + α)] + [α / (1 + α)] × (ρ / α)  
where α and ρ represent the payer- and organization-determined expected 
rates of improvement, respectively. Relative performance levels, λ / t, in the 
three payment arrangements depend not only on relative rates of expected-
to-required improvement, ρ / α, but on the preset α target improvement rate 
as well. For example, if a group made no improvement in the target indicator, 
then ρ = 0. Yet according to the ratio of expected-to-target performance, 
the success-to-target ratio λ / t = 1 / (1 + α). If the payer sought a rate of 
improvement of 25 percent, then even with no improvement in performance 
the organization could enjoy as much as 80 percent of its bonus (= 1 / 1.25) 
by simply achieving the baseline level under an unconstrained payment levels 
arrangement. 
Another way of setting targets assumes that an ideal performance level 
exists, λideal , that can apply to all regions and groups. The ideal level could 
be (1) clinically based on “perfect practice,” (2) based on local “best practice” 
among high-performing groups, or (3) nationally based when historical quality 
levels are averaged across all provider groups. A flexible payment approach 
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would base an indicator’s target on the difference between the baseline and 
ideal rates, λbase and λideal:
 ti = λbase + ψ[λideal – λbase] = (1 – ψ)λbase + ψλideal, (8.5)
where ψ ≤ 1.0 is the required fraction of the difference between the ideal 
and base rates of performance that must be closed in any performance 
period. The ψ parameter functions as an “ideal standard” weight, making 
target ti a weighted average of the base and ideal performance levels. When 
ψ = 1.0, equation 8.5 reduces to t = λideal. Any 50:50 actuarially fair α rate 
of improvement used by payers has a ψ target analog weight for the ideal 
quality level. This is shown by solving equation 8.5 for ψ and remembering 
equation 8.1:
 ψ = α / [(λideal / λbase) – 1] = [(t / λbase) – 1)] / [(λideal / λbase) – 1]. (8.6)
The weight placed on the ideal rate varies positively with the payer’s expected 
rate of improvement, α, assuming (λideal / λbase) > 1, but it also varies inversely 
with the relative difference between the ideal and base rates. If the payer 
envisions a 95 percent ideal rate but sets a target rate of 85 percent on a base 
rate of 60 percent, then its implicit improvement rate α = 0.85 / 0.60 – 1 = 0.42. 
In setting an 85 percent target, the payer implicitly assumes an ideal weight 
ψ = (0.85 / 0.60 – 1) / (0.95 / 0.60 – 1) = 72 percent. Hence, an 85 percent 
target rate requires closing only 72 percent of the gap between the base and 
ideal rates. Payers should be aware of the implications of setting α in terms of 
the percentage gap (ψ) they expect to close between the base and ideal quality 
rates. 
Paying only for positive improvement (i.e., ρ > 0), instead of an actual-to-
target ratio, provides much stronger financial incentives to improve quality. 
For example, suppose λbase = 0.50 and a payer paid no bonus if the managed 
care or provider organization failed to achieve a 25 percent improvement 
t = 1.25(0.50) = 0.625. Under this scenario, if the organization raised the 
quality indicator by one-half of the required 25 percent, or 0.5625, it would 
receive no bonus in the rate-of-improvement scenario. By contrast, under 
the continuous unconstrained arrangement, it would receive 90 percent of its 
bonus (i.e., λ / t = [1 / 1.25] + [0.25 / 1.25][0.50]). We simulate the financial 
gains (losses) involved in paying on rates vs. levels of improvement later in the 
chapter.
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Number and Interdependence of Quality Indicators (N)
Because physicians see a variety of patients every day, we need several quality 
indicators to capture even a modest share of their caseload. Spreading bonuses 
and penalties across more indicators reduces the variance of the expected 
gain (Research & Education Association, 1996, p. 266). Big bonuses or 
penalties are less likely as the number of indicators increases. Assuming that 
managers are risk averse and seek to reduce the likelihood of a zero bonus (or 
a large penalty) across all indicators, they should prefer more indicators. Yet 
diversifying their risk across more indicators may not be optimal if managers 
have negotiated “easily attainable” targets on one or two indicators. Moreover, 
because any positive correlation among indicators raises bonus (or penalty) 
variance, we also simulate the risk effects of varying degrees of indicator 
interdependence.
Quality Indicator Weights (ω)
Uncertainty surrounds not only the success of interventions that improve 
care processes but also the responsiveness of metrics such as life-years saved 
to better processes of care (Landon et al., 2007; Siu et al., 2006; Werner & 
Bradlow, 2006). This is why payers and clinicians are inclined to give some 
quality indicators more weight than others. Using simulation methods, we 
explore whether using dramatically different weights for some indicators 
substantially raises the rewards and risks associated with bonus payouts.
Simulation Methods
To determine the variation in indicator-specific expected bonus fractions 
under alternative payment algorithms, we simulated performance by using 
500 random trials from a normal distribution of an organization’s actual 
improvement rates. Results were essentially identical using 1,000 trials. If 
organizations are risk-averse, the likelihood function should be right-skewed 
and more weight given to below-target performance. We adjusted for risk 
aversion by simulating expected performance below target, which should give 
results similar to those from a log-normal or similar uncertainty distribution. 
We assumed no feedback loop of bonus payments on an organization’s 
investment in raising quality, which should produce a downward bias in 
expected bonus payments.5 
5 We assumed no feedback loop of bonus payments on an organization’s investment in raising 
quality, which should produce a downward bias in expected bonus payments. It is reasonable 
to assume that organizations facing low expected bonuses would invest more to raise their 
payments—at least up to a point—to increase their bonuses or minimize their penalties.
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An important unknown is the effectiveness of quality-improvement 
interventions when baseline levels are very low, which is why we simulated 
some expected bonus impacts at a low baseline level of 20 percent (see 
Simulation 4b later in this section). We simulated an actual rate of 
improvement ρipd = E[ρip] ± ripdSEρ for 500 trials for each of five indicators 
(i) for the p-th payment arrangement; ripd is a random normal variable around 
the expected rate of improvement as a consequence of any single trial. 
In the baseline simulation, we assume that the organization expects to meet 
the payer’s required improvement rate, E[ρ] = α = 0.25, with a medium level of 
uncertainty σρ = 0.125 (coefficient of variation [CV] = 0.50). Thus, if a single 
draw from a random normal distribution was 1.96, then the organization’s 
expected rate of quality improvement for an indicator would be E[ρ] = 0.25 
+ 1.96(0.125) = 0.495, and E[λ] / t = 1.495 / 1.25 = 1.196 above target. A 
random draw of only 0.20 would give a simulated success-to-target rate of 0.98 
(1.225 / 1.25). The resulting relative performance ratios are then converted to 
individual indicator payout percentages using the bonus algorithms described 
in Table 8-1. We determined a final overall bonus percentage by aggregating 
across five indicators using equal weights. 
We simulated the impacts of the six payment algorithms on the level and 
variability in gains (paybacks) that organizations face, while varying key 
elements in the final payout structure listed below:
1. Organizational uncertainty (ρ) about achieving target growth rate 
(α = 0.25): 
1a. Low uncertainty: standard deviation of 0.051 and  
CV = 0.051 / 0.25 = 0.20 
1b. High uncertainty: standard deviation of 0.165 (CV = 0.66)
 Greater organizational uncertainty about an intervention’s success should 
result in a greater expectation of smaller (no) bonuses or larger penalties, 
depending on payment arrangement.
2. Number and correlation of quality indicators
2a. 10 indicators (all equally weighted)
2b.  Two pairs of indicators correlated 50 percent; a fifth uncorrelated
 Having more indicators reduces the likelihood of very small bonuses 
(or large penalties). Greater correlation among indicators works in the 
opposite direction to raise the likelihood of bigger gains or losses.
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3.  Unequal indicator weights: one indicator weighted 50 percent and four 
of five each weighted 12.5 percent
 Weighting one or more indicators disproportionately can increase the risk 
of small bonuses or large penalties. 
4.  Expected levels arrangements (λ / t)
4a.  Organization’s expected performance level, λ, is two-thirds of payer’s 
required improvement rate α = 0.25 on λbase = 53.3 percent: (λ / t) = 
0.622 / 0.666 = 0.934 = 53.3[1+0.67(0.25)]/53.3(1.25)
4b.  Organization’s expected performance level is one-half of payer’s 
required improvement rate α = 1.5 on a low λbase = 20 percent: 
(λ / t) = 0.35 / 0.50 = 0.70
4c.  Organization’s expected performance level is 1.5 times 
payer’s required improvement rate α = 1.96(SEλ = 0.01054) 
on λbase = 53.3 percent using a 95 percent confidence interval: 
(λ / t) = 0.564 / 0.533 = 1.019
 Organizations that expect to exceed the target and its implicit rate of 
improvement over baseline will expect a higher total bonus or smaller 
penalties. 
5. Expected rate of improvement arrangements, E[ρ] / α
5a. Neutral expected-to-target growth: E[ρ] / α = 1
5b. Robust required target growth: E[ρ] / α = 0.67
 Paying bonuses on rates of improvement over baseline and not on 
actual-to-target levels requires organizations to substantially improve 
quality to receive any bonuses. Neutral expected target growth assumes 
that the organization’s expected improvement just equals the payer’s 
required target rate of improvement. Robust target growth assumes that 
the organization’s expectation of improvement falls one-third short of the 
payer’s “ambitious” rate of improvement.
results
Table 8-2 presents the mean and first quartile threshold bonus percentages 
that would be paid out under scenarios that vary by several key parameters. 
The first four payout algorithms in Table 8-1 are shown as columns in Table 
8-2: all-or-nothing, continuous unconstrained, continuous constrained 
(LL = 90 percent; UL = 100 percent; θ = 50 percent bonuses between limits), 
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and composite. The fifth and sixth P4P payment algorithms in Table 8-1 are 
simulated as rows 4c and 5a,b in Table 8-2. The baseline and simulations 1a 
through 4c base final bonus percentages on relative success-to-target quality 
levels, λ / t. Simulations 5a and 5b pay bonuses under each of the four P4P 
columns only if a provider or managed care organization improves on some or 
all of the quality indicators.
Baseline Simulation
Using the baseline simulation parameters, Table 8-2, top row, the all-or-
nothing payment arrangement (columns 1 and 2), has an expected baseline 
bonus payout of 0.50, or 50 percent, averaged across the five indicators, with 
a lower first-quarter threshold of 40 percent. Although an organization has 
a 50:50 chance of no bonus on any particular indicator in the all-or-nothing 
arrangement, it has only a 25 percent chance of receiving 40 percent or less 
of its maximum bonus because success on some indicators offsets failure on 
others. Of 500 baseline all-or-nothing trials, only 15 resulted in no overall 
bonus payout at all, whereas another 250 trials had one or more failures out 
of five indicators. The rest of the trials enjoyed successful payouts on all five 
indicators.
Organizations paid on a continuous unconstrained algorithm (columns 
3 and 4, top row) could expect to receive 96 percent of their overall bonus 
percentage, on average, under the baseline scenario. Such a high percentage 
results from the payer’s making minimum bonus payments of 1 / (1 + α) 
= 1 / 1.25 = 80 percent or more—even when the organization simply achieves 
the baseline rate with no improvement. 
When baseline bonuses are constrained to just 50 percent when success-to-
target ratios are between 90 percent and 100 percent with no bonus below 0.90 
of the target (columns 5 and 6, top row), the expected bonus percentage falls 
from 96 percent to 67 percent. The high first-quartile threshold of 60 percent 
implies a low likelihood of a very small bonus payout, even with a highly 
constrained bonus structure.
Under the baseline composite payment algorithm (last two columns, top 
row), an organization that expected to achieve the required improvement rate 
of 25 percent could expect to receive 100 percent of its overall bonus. The 
“composite” payment expectation is even higher than under the continuous 
unconstrained algorithm because it allows indicator-specific bonus payments 
in excess of 100 percent to offset lower bonus percentages on some indicators. 
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Table 8-2. P4P simulation results
Bonus Payout Percentagesa
Parameter All-or-Nothing
Continuous 
Unconstrained
Continuous 
Constrainedb Composite
Mean 25%ile Mean 25%ile Mean 25%ile Mean 25%ile
Baseline Simulationc 0.50 0.40 0.96 0.95 0.67 0.60 1.00 0.97
1. Uncertaintyd
1a. Low: σ(ρ) = 0.051 0.50 0.40 0.98 0.98 0.75 0.70 1.00 0.99
1b. High: σ(ρ) = 0.165 0.50 0.40 0.95 0.93 0.64 0.50 1.00 0.96
2. Number/Correlation of Indicators
2a. 10 indicators 0.51 0.40 1.00 0.95 0.68 0.60 1.00 0.98
2b. 2sets-of-5 correlated 50% e 0.48 0.25 0.96 0.94 0.66 0.50 1.00 0.96
3. Weights f
1 ω = 0.50; 4ω = 0.125 0.48 0.25 0.96 0.94 0.66 0.50 1.00 0.96
4. Expected Levels Arrangements E[λ] / t
4a. E[Δλ] = 0.67(Δt = 0.133) g 0.15 0.00 0.89 0.86 0.33 0.20 0.90 0.87
4b. E[Δλ] = 0.50(Δt = 0.30)h 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.68 0.00 0.00 0.70 0.68
4c. E[Δλ] = 1.50(1.96SEλ) i 0.59 0.40 0.97 0.95 0.73 0.60 1.00 0.96
5. Expected Improvement Arrangements (ρ / α) j
5a. E[ρ] / α = 1.00 0.50 0.40 0.81 0.73 0.54 0.40 0.99 0.84
5b. E[ρ] / α = 0.67 0.15 0.00 0.50 0.39 0.18 0.00 0.49 0.34
a  Percentages based on 500 random normal trials.
b  Bonuses of 50 percent for 0.90 < λ / t < 1.0, and 0 or 1.0 at lower level/upper level.
c  Based on five equally weighted, uncorrelated indicators, α = 0.25 target improvement rate, σ(ρ) = 0.125, baseline rate 
λbase = 53.3 percent.
d  σ(ρ) = the standard deviation of an organization’s own expected intervention effectiveness over baseline.
e  Two pairs of five indicators correlated 50 percent; fifth indicator uncorrelated.
f  One indicator weighted 50 percent; remaining four equally weighted.
g  Organization expects to achieve only two-thirds of payer’s targeted 25 percent improvement rate on 
λbase = 53.3 percent, λ / t = 0.622 / 0.666 = 0.934.
h  Organization expects to achieve only one-half of payer’s targeted 150 percent improvement rate on 
λbase = 20 percent, or λ / t = 0.35 / 0.50 = 0.70.
i  Organization expects to achieve 50 percent above 5% confidence threshold = 1.96 times SE based on 1,000 patients 
on λbase = 53.3 percent, or λ / t = 0.564 / (0.533 + 0.01045) = 1.038.
j  Bonuses based on actual vs. target rates of improvement, not absolute levels.
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Levels-Based Simulations
Financial losses from varying the degree of organizational uncertainty, the 
number of indicators, how indicators are weighted, and the correlation among 
indicators (simulations 1a–3) differ little from the baseline simulation as long 
as an organization (1) believes it has at least a 50:50 chance of just achieving 
the target growth rate, and (2) is paid on its actual-to-target rate of success. 
The type of payment arrangement—not the parameters—determines expected 
bonuses when conditions (1) and (2) exist. 
Bonuses (or penalties) can change radically if an organization’s expectation 
of success is less than 50:50 (simulations 4a and 4b). The expected bonus 
percentage under an all-or-nothing algorithm falls from 50 percent (baseline 
simulation) to 15 percent if an organization’s expected improvement rate 
was only two-thirds of the target growth rate (simulation 4a, column 1). 
A constrained algorithm with no bonus below 90 percent of the target 
(4a, column 5) produces an expected bonus of only 33 percent. Unconstrained 
and composite bonuses are much less sensitive to robust (ambitious) target 
growth rates relative to organizations’ expectations. This is because any level 
of quality relative to the target generates substantial bonuses that would not 
be paid at all in an all-or-nothing payment arrangement or only in a limited 
fashion in a constrained payment scenario. 
Consider, next, simulation 4b. It may be unrealistic for a payer to assume 
that an organization has a fair chance to raise the baseline rate by 30 percentage 
points to 50 percent from a very low 20 percent baseline over a short 
demonstration period. If an organization that faced a 30 percentage point 
required increase (i.e., Δt = 1.5[20%] = 0.30) felt that it could achieve only one-
half of that rate of improvement over baseline (simulation 4b), then expected 
bonuses in the all-or-nothing and constrained payment arrangements fall to 
zero. This is because of the organization’s relatively narrow (assumed) range of 
medium uncertainty, σ(ρ) = 0.125, which is around its lower expected rate of 
improvement. Continuous and composite bonus arrangements would continue 
to pay out 70 percent on average (columns 3 and 7), even when an organization 
expected to achieve only one-half the target rate of 50 percent on a baseline 
quality level of 20 percent. Again, these two arrangements continue to pay a 
high percentage of bonuses by always rewarding an organization for achieving 
a fraction of the target. 
As shown in simulation 4c, setting the target at only the upper limit of a 
95% confidence level around the baseline level requires little in the way of 
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quality improvement—especially for large intervention populations. With 
1,000 patients, 1.96 times the standard error around the mean baseline 
rate of 53.3 percent produces a higher quality target of only 56.4 percent 
(3.1 percentage points higher). All-or-nothing expected bonuses increase from 
50 percent in the original baseline simulation to 59 percent if the organization 
believes its intervention’s effectiveness would be 1.5 times as high as the 
targeted increase of just 3.1 percentage points. Constrained bonuses increase 
from 67 percent to 73 percent (column 5). Continuous and composite bonuses 
remain at nearly 100 percent because of the high baseline floor and an overall 
ceiling on the full bonus. 
Improvement Rate Simulations
Even when an organization’s expected rate of improvement is equal to the 
payer’s required rate (simulation 5a), bonuses in the continuous unconstrained 
and constrained models decline from 96 percent and 67 percent in the baseline 
simulation to 81 percent and 54 percent, respectively. This is because paying 
only for positive growth rates, unlike levels, does not reward organizations 
if they achieve zero improvement over baseline. All-or-nothing bonuses 
are unaffected by paying on rates vs. levels because the arrangement never 
pays anything when failing to meet the target. In stark contrast, composite 
payment arrangements treat levels and rates of improvement the same when 
organizations expect to achieve the required rate of improvement—again 
because of offsetting large bonus percentages for some indicators. 
Because paying on quality improvement factors out the baseline bias 
inherent in paying on levels, average expected bonuses generally fall to their 
lowest levels if an organization expects to achieve only two-thirds of the 
targeted improvement rate (simulation 5b). The continuous constrained 
arrangement pays only 18 percent on average. Even the generous composite 
arrangement has an average expected bonus percentage of only about 50 
percent.
Discussion
Payers naturally seek the most cost-effective way to reward managed care 
organizations and provider groups when they improve quality. This requires 
that quality bonuses be neither too easy nor too difficult to achieve. Based on 
our simulation results, their strategy should be to
•	 select	process	quality	indicators	that	are	closely	linked	to	patient	
outcomes,
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•	 set	challenging	target	levels	over	baseline	performance	levels	and	not	
targets that are only statistically greater than baseline, and 
•	 base	bonuses	(or	penalties)	on	rates	of	improvement	over	baseline	
(e.g., 20 percent improvement on a 50 percent baseline, or 10 percentage 
points) and not on target levels that pay bonuses even if the intervention 
only reproduces the baseline (50 percent) level.
Payers should think of “challenging” targets as a weighted average of the 
baseline and the ideal levels. Setting the ideal weight too high will produce 
unreachable targets that can discourage any serious investment in quality 
improvement. All-or-nothing or tightly constrained payment methods are 
particularly punitive if targets are not reasonably achievable over short periods. 
At the other extreme, simply requiring organizations to achieve a target that 
is only statistically different from the baseline rate implicitly assumes very 
little true intervention effect—especially for large patient populations—and 
guarantees sizable bonus payouts.
Payers should avoid unconstrained and composite P4P arrangements if they 
choose to pay on performance levels. Both essentially guarantee organizations a 
very high percentage of their total bonus (or very little payback of management 
fees). Constrained continuous and composite payment arrangements can 
produce more stringent, efficient bonus payouts (or more meaningful 
penalties) when based on rates of improvement instead of intervention vs. 
baseline levels. 
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Overview of Selected Medicare Pay for 
Performance Demonstrations
Leslie M. Greenwald
Chapter 9
Several current pay for performance (P4P) initiatives began as Medicare 
pilot projects, or demonstrations, that test both the administrative feasibility 
and outcomes-defined “success” of the individual performance models. 
This approach of pilot testing P4P initiatives allows Medicare policy makers 
to determine the models that best meet their intended goals and can be 
operationalized at an acceptable level of administrative cost and burden 
to physicians and health care provider organizations, insurers, and other 
stakeholders. Reliance on testing through demonstrations also allows policy 
makers to identify lessons learned and opportunities for improvement, and to 
adapt aspects of new initiatives that do not work—all on a manageable scale 
not possible with full implementation through a program the size of Medicare. 
Demonstrations also identify the most successful variants within a general type 
of innovation—such as P4P—for replication, expansion, and possible national 
application.
As one of the largest public insurers in the world, Medicare has played a 
special role in pilot testing a wide range of health care programs, in addition 
to P4P. The Medicare program has several advantages in testing health care 
innovation. First, because Medicare is a major publicly funded program, 
Congress often makes funding available both to support technical development 
of P4P and other innovations and for comprehensive independent evaluations 
of the pilot programs. Second, the Medicare program operates in a way 
that makes large amounts of administrative data available for development 
of a variety of P4P models, supports their implementation, and allows for 
relatively efficient evaluation options. Finally, because of Medicare’s size and 
importance in the clinician and provider marketplace, it is often more feasible 
for this public program to gather practitioners and providers and other 
organizations willing to engage in demonstration projects to develop and 
evaluate P4P demonstration options (as well as other policy pilot projects). 
Thus, complex new initiatives such as proposed Medicare P4P models start 
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out as demonstrations, with national implementation an implicit future 
goal (although national implementation of a demonstration is rare, a topic 
discussed in further detail in Chapter 11 of this book).
Medicare has a rich history of demonstration projects for even as relatively 
recent a policy initiative as physician or provider P4P. The dozens of new 
Medicare P4P and other related demonstrations mandated under the 
Affordable Care Act continue policy makers’ reliance on the Medicare program 
to test new ideas for health care reform. 
This chapter summarizes a range of the Medicare P4P demonstrations 
currently completed or near implementation. The demonstrations described 
here are not exhaustive of all the P4P demonstrations the Medicare program 
has considered, designed, or implemented. As a result of health care reform 
under the Affordable Care Act, this list will expand significantly. Rather, 
this selection of demonstrations is intended to give the reader a sense of the 
kinds of P4P projects that have been tried under Medicare and, when the 
information is available, whether they were successful in improving health care 
efficiency and quality of care. As a group, they may give some signals as to the 
possible success of P4P models in future years under reform.
Table 9-1. Overview of Medicare P4P demonstrations  
Demonstration 
Name Summary Description Demonstration Status and Available Findings
Care Management Pay for Performance Demonstrations
Medicare 
Coordinated Care 
Demonstration
Demonstration’s goal was to identify intervention components that 
save the government money while maintaining quality of care or 
possibly improving the quality through better coordination of the 
chronically ill—without net increase in Medicare spending.
•	 Implemented in 2002 
•	 Of 15 programs, only 1 had statistically significant reduction in hospitalizations. All 
programs saw increases in Medicare expenditures for care for intervention population 
between baseline and demonstration period. None of the 15 produced statistical 
savings in Medicare outlays on services relative to control group, but 2 had higher costs. 
Clinical measures showed few, scattered effects of self-reported flu and pneumococcal 
vaccinations, mammography, or other routine diabetic and CAD tests. No pattern of 
patient responses suggested that preventable hospitalizations had been reduced. 
Medicare Health 
Support Pilot 
Program
The pilot is testing a P4P third-party non–health care provider 
contracting model. MHSOs aimed to improve clinical quality, increase 
beneficiary and clinician/provider satisfaction, and achieve Medicare 
program savings for chronically ill Medicare FFS beneficiaries with 
targeted conditions of heart failure and/or diabetes.
•	 Implemented in 2005/2006 
•	 Only limited positive impacts achieved on positive improvements in patient overall 
satisfaction. No statistically significant findings for clinical interventions relative to 
comparison group. Limited Medicare savings achieved in first 18 months, but none of the 
gains were statistically significant.
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Table 9-1. Overview of Medicare P4P demonstrations  
Demonstration 
Name Summary Description Demonstration Status and Available Findings
Care Management Pay for Performance Demonstrations
Medicare 
Coordinated Care 
Demonstration
Demonstration’s goal was to identify intervention components that 
save the government money while maintaining quality of care or 
possibly improving the quality through better coordination of the 
chronically ill—without net increase in Medicare spending.
•	 Implemented in 2002 
•	 Of 15 programs, only 1 had statistically significant reduction in hospitalizations. All 
programs saw increases in Medicare expenditures for care for intervention population 
between baseline and demonstration period. None of the 15 produced statistical 
savings in Medicare outlays on services relative to control group, but 2 had higher costs. 
Clinical measures showed few, scattered effects of self-reported flu and pneumococcal 
vaccinations, mammography, or other routine diabetic and CAD tests. No pattern of 
patient responses suggested that preventable hospitalizations had been reduced. 
Medicare Health 
Support Pilot 
Program
The pilot is testing a P4P third-party non–health care provider 
contracting model. MHSOs aimed to improve clinical quality, increase 
beneficiary and clinician/provider satisfaction, and achieve Medicare 
program savings for chronically ill Medicare FFS beneficiaries with 
targeted conditions of heart failure and/or diabetes.
•	 Implemented in 2005/2006 
•	 Only limited positive impacts achieved on positive improvements in patient overall 
satisfaction. No statistically significant findings for clinical interventions relative to 
comparison group. Limited Medicare savings achieved in first 18 months, but none of the 
gains were statistically significant.
The demonstration projects described in this chapter are organized into 
three categories: 
•	 Care	management	P4P	demonstrations—projects	that	use	a	third-party	
care management organization or other strategies to coordinate Medicare 
beneficiary care
•	 Physician-focused	P4P	demonstrations—projects	that	base	P4P	models	
around outpatient and ambulatory care and/or use the physician group as 
the primary responsible organization
•	 Hospital-focused	P4P	demonstrations—projects	that	base	P4P	around	
hospital-based care and use the hospital as the primary responsible 
organization
This chapter provides an overview of each P4P demonstration, describes the 
key features of the initiative, and summarizes the status of each project. When 
evaluation findings to date are publicly available, they are presented here. 
Some readers may not be interested in the full demonstration details 
provided here and may choose to refer to the detailed descriptions only 
to supplement points or references made in other chapters of this book. 
Therefore, Table 9-1 summarizes the P4P demonstration projects described in 
this chapter. 
(continued)
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Table 9-1. Overview of Medicare P4P demonstrations  
Demonstration 
Name Summary Description Demonstration Status and Available Findings
Care Management 
for High-Cost 
Beneficiaries 
Demonstration 
Demonstration’s principal objective was to test care management 
models for Medicare beneficiaries who are high cost and have complex 
chronic conditions, with goals of reducing future costs, improving 
the quality of care, and improving beneficiary and clinician/provider 
satisfaction. 
•	 Implemented in 2006 
•	 No evaluation findings publicly available.
Cancer Prevention 
and Treatment 
Demonstration
Demonstrations were aimed at reducing disparities in cancer 
screening, diagnosis, and treatment among racial and ethnic minority 
Medicare beneficiaries through use of peer navigators. Peer navigators 
help steer Medicare beneficiaries through health care system. 
•	 Implemented in 2006/2007 
•	 Publicly available evaluation results focus on implementation issues. Based on available 
results, five of six demonstration sites encountered difficulty in identifying eligible 
beneficiaries and enrolling them in a demonstration, resulting in substantially fewer 
participants than initially projected.
Physician-Focused Pay for Performance Demonstrations
Medicare 
Physician 
Group Practice 
Demonstration
Medicare’s first physician P4P initiative. PGP demonstration establishes 
incentives for quality improvement and cost efficiency at level of 
physician group practice. Goals included (1) encouraging coordination 
of health care furnished under Medicare Parts A and B, (2) encouraging 
investment in administrative structures and processes for efficient 
service delivery, and (3) rewarding physicians for improving health care 
processes and outcomes.
•	 Implemented in 2005 
•	 CMS has publicly reported evaluation of results through second demonstration year. In 
the second performance year, 4 of the 10 participating physician groups earned a total 
of $13.8 million in performance payments for improving quality and cost efficiency of 
care as their share of a total of $17.4 million in Medicare savings. When adjusted for 
predemonstration expenditure trends, reduction in expenditures was $58 per person, 
or 0.6% less than the target, and not statistically different from zero. Between base year 
and second demonstration year, 4 of 7 claims-based quality indicators showed greater 
improvement among PGP-assigned beneficiaries than among comparison beneficiaries. 
This improvement was statistically significant at 5% level.
Medicare 
Medical Home 
Demonstration
A medical home is a physician-directed practice that provides care 
that is accessible, continuous, comprehensive, and coordinated and is 
delivered in context of family and community. Some variants combine 
use of health information technology and/or electronic medical 
records as a care-coordination tool.
•	 Implementation pending coordination with medical home mandates in Affordable Care 
Act health care reform legislation.
Hospital-Focused Pay for Performance Demonstrations
Medicare 
Participating Heart 
Bypass Center 
Demonstration
Under this demonstration, government paid a single negotiated global 
price for all Parts A & B inpatient hospital and physician care associated 
with bypass surgery. Demonstration was to encourage regionalization 
of procedure in higher-volume hospitals and to align physician with 
hospital incentives under bundled prospective payment. Hospitals 
shared global payment with surgeons and cardiologists based on cost 
savings. CMS allowed participants to market a CoE demonstration 
imprimatur referring to themselves as a “Medicare Participating Heart 
Bypass Center.” Medicare patients were not restricted to demonstration 
hospitals for their surgery.
•	 Implemented in 1991 
•	 Over the demonstration’s 5 years, Medicare program saved $42.3 million on the 13,180 
bypass patients treated in the seven demonstration hospitals. About 85% of savings 
came from demonstration discounts, another 9% from volume shifts to lower-cost 
demonstration hospitals, and 5% from lower post-discharge utilization. 
Expanded 
Medicare Heart 
and Orthopedics 
Centers of 
Excellence 
Demonstration
Developed as follow-on to Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center 
Demonstration. Expanded demonstrations were to include more 
cardiovascular procedures and major orthopedic procedures such as 
hip and knee replacement.
•	 Not implemented due to health care provider resistance. 
(continued)
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Table 9-1. Overview of Medicare P4P demonstrations  
Demonstration 
Name Summary Description Demonstration Status and Available Findings
Care Management 
for High-Cost 
Beneficiaries 
Demonstration 
Demonstration’s principal objective was to test care management 
models for Medicare beneficiaries who are high cost and have complex 
chronic conditions, with goals of reducing future costs, improving 
the quality of care, and improving beneficiary and clinician/provider 
satisfaction. 
•	 Implemented in 2006 
•	 No evaluation findings publicly available.
Cancer Prevention 
and Treatment 
Demonstration
Demonstrations were aimed at reducing disparities in cancer 
screening, diagnosis, and treatment among racial and ethnic minority 
Medicare beneficiaries through use of peer navigators. Peer navigators 
help steer Medicare beneficiaries through health care system. 
•	 Implemented in 2006/2007 
•	 Publicly available evaluation results focus on implementation issues. Based on available 
results, five of six demonstration sites encountered difficulty in identifying eligible 
beneficiaries and enrolling them in a demonstration, resulting in substantially fewer 
participants than initially projected.
Physician-Focused Pay for Performance Demonstrations
Medicare 
Physician 
Group Practice 
Demonstration
Medicare’s first physician P4P initiative. PGP demonstration establishes 
incentives for quality improvement and cost efficiency at level of 
physician group practice. Goals included (1) encouraging coordination 
of health care furnished under Medicare Parts A and B, (2) encouraging 
investment in administrative structures and processes for efficient 
service delivery, and (3) rewarding physicians for improving health care 
processes and outcomes.
•	 Implemented in 2005 
•	 CMS has publicly reported evaluation of results through second demonstration year. In 
the second performance year, 4 of the 10 participating physician groups earned a total 
of $13.8 million in performance payments for improving quality and cost efficiency of 
care as their share of a total of $17.4 million in Medicare savings. When adjusted for 
predemonstration expenditure trends, reduction in expenditures was $58 per person, 
or 0.6% less than the target, and not statistically different from zero. Between base year 
and second demonstration year, 4 of 7 claims-based quality indicators showed greater 
improvement among PGP-assigned beneficiaries than among comparison beneficiaries. 
This improvement was statistically significant at 5% level.
Medicare 
Medical Home 
Demonstration
A medical home is a physician-directed practice that provides care 
that is accessible, continuous, comprehensive, and coordinated and is 
delivered in context of family and community. Some variants combine 
use of health information technology and/or electronic medical 
records as a care-coordination tool.
•	 Implementation pending coordination with medical home mandates in Affordable Care 
Act health care reform legislation.
Hospital-Focused Pay for Performance Demonstrations
Medicare 
Participating Heart 
Bypass Center 
Demonstration
Under this demonstration, government paid a single negotiated global 
price for all Parts A & B inpatient hospital and physician care associated 
with bypass surgery. Demonstration was to encourage regionalization 
of procedure in higher-volume hospitals and to align physician with 
hospital incentives under bundled prospective payment. Hospitals 
shared global payment with surgeons and cardiologists based on cost 
savings. CMS allowed participants to market a CoE demonstration 
imprimatur referring to themselves as a “Medicare Participating Heart 
Bypass Center.” Medicare patients were not restricted to demonstration 
hospitals for their surgery.
•	 Implemented in 1991 
•	 Over the demonstration’s 5 years, Medicare program saved $42.3 million on the 13,180 
bypass patients treated in the seven demonstration hospitals. About 85% of savings 
came from demonstration discounts, another 9% from volume shifts to lower-cost 
demonstration hospitals, and 5% from lower post-discharge utilization. 
Expanded 
Medicare Heart 
and Orthopedics 
Centers of 
Excellence 
Demonstration
Developed as follow-on to Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center 
Demonstration. Expanded demonstrations were to include more 
cardiovascular procedures and major orthopedic procedures such as 
hip and knee replacement.
•	 Not implemented due to health care provider resistance. 
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Care Management p4p Demonstrations
A large group of P4P demonstration projects center on the concept of disease 
and chronic care management: that by implementing specifically targeted 
chronic care/disease management interventions, we can improve beneficiaries’ 
adherence to self-care and other preventative approaches that can potentially 
reduce overall costs of acute care. Under these demonstrations, the Medicare 
program pays disease management organizations (sometimes on a risk basis) 
for managing patients with specific target conditions such as diabetes and 
congestive heart failure (CHF). Medicare pays the organizations based on a 
per beneficiary per month (PBPM) fee. Under many of these models, disease 
management firms forfeit some or all of their fees if they fail to achieve savings 
targets.
Table 9-1. Overview of Medicare P4P demonstrations  
Demonstration 
Name Summary Description Demonstration Status and Available Findings
Medicare Acute 
Care Episode 
Demonstration
Most recent iteration of CoE P4P model. Demonstration offers bundled 
payments and increased flexibility in financial arrangements between 
participating hospital-physician consortia. Will also focus on methods 
for improved quality of care for bundles of heart and orthopedic 
hospital-based procedures. Approved demonstration sites will be 
allowed to use term “Value-Based Care Centers” in approved marketing 
programs.
•	 Implemented in 2009 
•	 No evaluation findings publicly available.
Premier Hospital 
Quality Incentive 
Demonstration
Demonstration recognizes and provides financial rewards to hospitals 
that demonstrate high-quality performance in hospital acute care. 
Conducted by Medicare in collaboration with Premier, Inc., nationwide 
organization of not-for-profit hospitals. Top-performing hospital 
participants rewarded with increased payment for Medicare patients.
•	 Implemented in 2003. Phase II projects operated between 2007 and 2009. 
•	 Findings from initial years of demonstration are publicly available. Over initial 2 years, both 
nonparticipating (those only reporting data) and hospitals participating in P4P program, 
showed quality improvements. In 7 of 10 quality indicators, P4P hospitals showed greater 
improvements. After adjusting for baseline differences in study and control groups, 
incremental increases in quality attributed to P4P incentives declined. Preliminary results 
from first 4 years suggest participating hospitals raised overall quality by average of 17 
points over 4 years, based on their performance on more than 30 nationally standardized 
care measures for patients in five clinical areas. 
Medicare Hospital 
Gainsharing 
Demonstration 
and Physician–
Hospital 
Collaboration 
Demonstration
Both demonstrations test similar a gainsharing model. Overall 
concept is intended to allow hospitals to share efficiency savings with 
physicians under controlled setting in which quality of care standards 
are maintained or improved.
•	 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration implemented in 2008.
•	 Medicare Physician–Hospital Collaboration Demonstration implemented in 2009. 
•	 No evaluation findings publicly available.
CAD = coronary artery disease; CMS = Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; CoE = Center of 
Excellence; FFS = fee-for-service; MHSO = Medicare health support organization; P4P = pay for 
performance; PGP = Physician Group Practice.
Note: This table describes the demonstrations discussed in this chapter only and is not an overview of all 
Medicare P4P demonstrations.
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Medicare Coordinated Care Demonstration 
Project Overview 
The Balanced Budget Act of 1997 instructed the Secretary of Health and 
Human Services to conduct and evaluate care coordination programs 
in Medicare’s fee-for-service (FFS) setting (Peikes et al., 2009). In 2002, 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) selected 15 demonstration 
programs of various sizes and intervention strategies as part of the Medicare 
Coordinated Care Demonstration (MCCD). The demonstration’s goal 
was to identify intervention components that save the government money 
while maintaining quality of care or possibly improving the quality of care 
through better coordination of health care the chronically ill—without any 
Table 9-1. Overview of Medicare P4P demonstrations  
Demonstration 
Name Summary Description Demonstration Status and Available Findings
Medicare Acute 
Care Episode 
Demonstration
Most recent iteration of CoE P4P model. Demonstration offers bundled 
payments and increased flexibility in financial arrangements between 
participating hospital-physician consortia. Will also focus on methods 
for improved quality of care for bundles of heart and orthopedic 
hospital-based procedures. Approved demonstration sites will be 
allowed to use term “Value-Based Care Centers” in approved marketing 
programs.
•	 Implemented in 2009 
•	 No evaluation findings publicly available.
Premier Hospital 
Quality Incentive 
Demonstration
Demonstration recognizes and provides financial rewards to hospitals 
that demonstrate high-quality performance in hospital acute care. 
Conducted by Medicare in collaboration with Premier, Inc., nationwide 
organization of not-for-profit hospitals. Top-performing hospital 
participants rewarded with increased payment for Medicare patients.
•	 Implemented in 2003. Phase II projects operated between 2007 and 2009. 
•	 Findings from initial years of demonstration are publicly available. Over initial 2 years, both 
nonparticipating (those only reporting data) and hospitals participating in P4P program, 
showed quality improvements. In 7 of 10 quality indicators, P4P hospitals showed greater 
improvements. After adjusting for baseline differences in study and control groups, 
incremental increases in quality attributed to P4P incentives declined. Preliminary results 
from first 4 years suggest participating hospitals raised overall quality by average of 17 
points over 4 years, based on their performance on more than 30 nationally standardized 
care measures for patients in five clinical areas. 
Medicare Hospital 
Gainsharing 
Demonstration 
and Physician–
Hospital 
Collaboration 
Demonstration
Both demonstrations test similar a gainsharing model. Overall 
concept is intended to allow hospitals to share efficiency savings with 
physicians under controlled setting in which quality of care standards 
are maintained or improved.
•	 Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration implemented in 2008.
•	 Medicare Physician–Hospital Collaboration Demonstration implemented in 2009. 
•	 No evaluation findings publicly available.
CAD = coronary artery disease; CMS = Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services; CoE = Center of 
Excellence; FFS = fee-for-service; MHSO = Medicare health support organization; P4P = pay for 
performance; PGP = Physician Group Practice.
Note: This table describes the demonstrations discussed in this chapter only and is not an overview of all 
Medicare P4P demonstrations.
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net increase in Medicare spending. The MCCD used a randomized intent-to-
treat (ITT) design. Eligible beneficiaries in areas served by the 15 programs 
were randomized on a 1:1 basis to the intervention and control groups. Four 
programs requested a stratified randomization process. 
Project Status 
Programs began enrolling beneficiaries in the intervention group over summer 
2002, followed by a 3-year evaluation period. Beneficiary participation was 
voluntary. CMS paid a negotiated monthly management fee that ranged 
from $80 to $444. The average fee across the 15 programs was $235 (Peikes et 
al., 2009). Fees were limited to 20 percent of the historical average monthly 
PBPM costs of the chronically ill, given that savings on Medicare outlays were 
unlikely to be greater. After the 6-month enrollment period, CMS paid no fees 
on intervention beneficiaries who were not enrolled or had decided to drop 
out. Programs had to be budget neutral and were at financial risk if savings 
in Medicare outlays on intervention beneficiaries were less, on a monthly 
basis, than the monthly fee. Calculations of savings also included Medicare 
expenditures incurred by intervention beneficiaries who dropped out of the 
demonstration, thereby putting programs at risk for lower enrollment rates. 
None of the programs charged beneficiaries to participate. Three types 
of quality measures were used in evaluating the programs: (1) Medicare 
claims were used to identify six disease-specific and preventive process-of-
care indicators; (2) claims data were also used to track hospitalizations of 
eight ambulatory care sensitive conditions thought to be avoidable through 
improved care management; and (3) a beneficiary survey collected responses 
related to health education received from the programs, functional status, 
knowledge and adherence to medication and other protocols, and perceived 
quality of life. 
The participating sites were a broad mix of disease management 
organizations, including commercial ones, academic medical centers, and 
community hospitals (an integrated delivery system, a long-term care facility, 
and a retirement community). The selection provided an opportunity to 
compare cost-effectiveness between two competing disease management 
models, one relying on commercial vendors and another grounded in 
physician practices. Programs served beneficiaries in diverse geographic areas, 
including Maine (statewide), southern Florida, South Dakota, Phoenix, and 
central California. 
 Overview of Selected Medicare Pay for Performance Demonstrations 229
The programs targeted Medicare-aged and disabled beneficiaries with 
coronary artery disease (CAD), CHF, diabetes, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease (COPD), and a few minor chronic conditions. In identifying eligibles, 
10 programs required at least one hospitalization (6 stipulated that the 
hospitalization be related to a target chronic condition), 4 excluded the 
nonelderly, 13 excluded end-stage renal disease (ESRD) beneficiaries, 9 
excluded long-term nursing home residents, and all but 1 program excluded 
patients who were terminally ill, had AIDS, or had similarly complex 
conditions.
The number of beneficiaries in each program was generally small. The 
largest 3 programs had between 2,289 and 2,657 total beneficiaries and 
had only roughly as many in the intervention group. Three programs had 
between 90 and 115 intervention patients and fewer than 250 including the 
control group. Overall, 18,402 beneficiaries were spread across 15 programs. 
Consequently, the study’s power to detect significant differences was low, 
although the evaluators generally had more than 90 percent power to detect 
a 20 percent or greater gain in outcomes and cost savings in the intervention 
over the control group. None of the programs appear to have had 80 percent 
statistical power to detect intervention gains of 10 percent or less. (Peikes et al., 
2009, p. 608).
Participants varied widely across programs by geographic area (Peikes et al., 
2009). A few sites had no minorities, whereas Georgetown University had 63 
percent African American and Hispanic enrollees. Medicaid eligibility ranged 
from 0 percent to 28 percent. CAD and CHF generally were the dominant 
diagnoses, with significant numbers (>20 percent) of beneficiaries who had 
COPD, cancer, or stroke. Jewish Home & Hospital was exceptional with 33 
percent of enrolled patients having dementia. 
All of the programs assigned enrollees to a registered nurse care 
coordinator. Eleven programs contacted patients 1 to 1.5 times on average 
per month by telephone, and 3 contacted patients 4 to 8 times per month. 
All but 1 educated the patients regarding diet, medications, exercise, and 
self-care management. The University of Maryland did not educate patients 
but simply tested the effect of home monitoring of vital signs. One-half used 
transtheoretical or motivational interviewing approaches to behavior change. 
Most taught patients how to better communicate with their physicians 
using role playing. Only 4 programs concentrated on improving physicians’ 
adherence to evidence-based practice guidelines. To avoid costly readmissions, 
10 programs kept timely information on hospitalizations and emergency room 
visits that would allow them to intervene quickly post-discharge.
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Findings to Date
Peikes and colleagues have already published findings for this project (2009). 
Similar to the Medicare Health Support Pilot Program’s disappointing results, 
this demonstration found no statistically significant improvements in clinical 
outcomes or savings to Medicare. Of the 15 programs, only 1 (Mercy) had 
a statistically significant reduction in hospitalizations relative to its control 
group, controlling for patient characteristics. All of the programs saw increases 
in Medicare expenditures for care for the intervention population between 
baseline and the demonstration period. None of the 15 programs produced 
any statistical savings in Medicare outlays on services relative to the control 
group, but 2 had higher costs. Peikes and colleagues based these findings 
on regressions controlling for age, gender, race, disabled/aged entitlement, 
Medicaid coverage, and whether beneficiaries used skilled nursing facility or 
hospital services prior to the demonstration. 
Once they added monthly fees to estimate savings net cost, 9 out of 15 
programs had statistically higher costs to the Medicare program than did their 
control group (Peikes et al., 2009, p. 612). The one site with a reduction in 
hospitalizations had a large management fee that overwhelmed its (statistically 
insignificant) $112 in PBPM savings, resulting in higher net total Medicare 
costs. 
Treatment beneficiaries were more likely to report having received 
education on diet, exercise, and disease warning signs than their corresponding 
control group. However, the “treatment group members were no more likely 
than control group members to say they understood proper diet and exercise” 
or that they were adhering better to prescribed diet, exercise, and medication 
regimens (Peikes et al., 2009, p. 613). Clinical measures showed few, scattered 
effects of self-reported flu and pneumococcal vaccinations, mammography, 
or other routine diabetic and CAD tests. No pattern of patient responses 
suggested that preventable hospitalizations had been reduced. 
Care coordination activities, as practiced in the 15 varied interventions in 
this study, “hold little promise of reducing total Medicare expenditures” for the 
Medicare chronically ill (Peikes et al., 2009, p. 613). Two programs did show 
some promise in reducing hospitalizations and costs, however, suggesting that 
care coordination might be at least cost neutral. 
The demonstration’s main limitation was the small sample size and lack 
of statistical power to detect smaller savings rates. The study was unable to 
confirm a statistically significant savings rate of 9 percent at the 10 percent 
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confidence level for the most successful site. This program also had one 
of the highest average monthly management fees, due in part to extensive 
registered nurse face-to-face contact with patients. A possible major reason 
for the lack of success in both Medicare savings and better health outcomes 
is the absence of a true transitional care model in which patients are enrolled 
during their hospitalization. Studies have shown the approach to significantly 
reduce admissions within 30/60 days post-discharge when the patient is at 
high risk of being readmitted (Coleman et al., 2006; Naylor et al., 1999; Rich 
et al., 1995). “By providing close links between the patient’s nurse coordinator 
and physician, [with] substantial in-person contact between the patient and 
the care coordinator, . . . the medical home model may be able to replicate or 
exceed the success of the most effective MCCD programs” (Peikes et al., 2009, 
p. 617).
Medicare Health Support Pilot Program
Project Overview
Section 721 of the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and 
Modernization Act of 2003 (Pub. L. 108–173, also called the Medicare 
Modernization Act, or MMA), required the Secretary of Health and Human 
Services to provide for the phased-in development, testing, evaluation, and 
implementation of chronic care improvement programs (McCall et al., 2007). 
CMS selected eight Medicare Health Support (MHS) pilot programs under 
Phase I. The MHS initiative’s principal objectives were as follows: to test a 
P4P contracting model and MHS intervention strategies that may be adapted 
nationally to improve clinical quality, increase beneficiary and clinician and 
provider satisfaction, and achieve Medicare program savings for chronically 
ill Medicare FFS beneficiaries with targeted conditions of heart failure and/or 
diabetes. 
This initiative provides the opportunity to evaluate the success of the “fee 
at risk,” P4P, model. MHS disease management organizations enjoy flexibility 
in their operations, coupled with strong incentives to expand outreach and 
refine intervention strategies to improve population outcomes. The MHS 
pilot program is distinct, legislatively, from most demonstration programs. A 
congressionally mandated pilot can be expanded easily into a national program 
if it reports positive results during the pilot phase; no additional legislation is 
required. 
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The MHS pilot’s overall design follows an ITT model (McCall et al., 2007). 
Medical health support organizations (MHSOs) are held at risk for up-front 
monthly management fees based on the performance of the entire eligible 
Medicare population randomized to the intervention group and as compared 
with all eligible beneficiaries randomized to the comparison group. Beneficiary 
participation in the MHS programs is voluntary and does not change the 
scope, duration, or amount of Medicare FFS benefits that beneficiaries 
currently receive. The traditional Medicare FFS program continues to cover, 
administer, and pay for all Medicare FFS benefits, and beneficiaries do not pay 
any charge to receive MHS program services. 
After the initial 6-month outreach period, the MHSOs accrue management 
fees for only those beneficiaries who verbally consent to participate and only 
during participation periods. Participation continues until a beneficiary 
becomes ineligible for the MHS program or opts out of services provided by 
the MHSO. To retain any monthly fees, MHSOs originally had to achieve 5 
percent savings relative to the comparison group. Savings are defined as the 
difference in mean Medicare PBPM spending on services between the entire 
intervention and comparison groups, multiplied by the total number of eligible 
months in the intervention group. CMS subsequently dropped the 5 percent 
minimum savings requirements.
To retain all of its accrued fees, an MHSO had only to reduce average 
monthly payments equivalent to the monthly management fee. Because small 
differences remained in Medicare PBPM payments between intervention and 
comparison groups, CMS made an actuarial adjustment in the intervention 
PBPM for any difference from the comparison group in the 12 months just 
prior to each MHSO’s start date. The MHSOs must also meet quality and 
satisfaction improvement thresholds or pay back negotiated percentages of 
their fees.
Project Status
Eight MHSOs launched their programs between August 1, 2005, and January 
16, 2006. Several programs serve urban and suburban populations, whereas 
others target metropolitan and rural communities. Among the populations 
served are significant minority populations of African American, Native 
American, and Hispanic beneficiaries. During the second year of operations, 
three organizations requested early termination of their programs, primarily, 
they stated, out of concern that the 5 percent savings requirement plus 
savings covering accrued fees was too ambitious a goal. The MHS pilot targets 
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beneficiaries with the threshold condition(s) of heart failure and/or diabetes 
from among the diagnoses listed on Medicare claims. 
CMS prospectively identified 30,000 eligible beneficiaries from each MHSO 
area and randomly assigned them to intervention and comparison groups in a 
ratio of 2:1 under an ITT evaluation model. With 240,000 pilot beneficiaries, 
it is the largest disease management randomized trial ever conducted. 
Randomization produced statistically equivalent demographic, disease, 
Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) risk score, and economic burden 
profiles between the intervention and comparison groups. 
All programs provide MHS participants with telephonic care management 
services, including nurse-based health advice for the management and 
monitoring of symptoms, health education (via health information, videos, 
online information), health coaching to encourage self-care and management 
of chronic health conditions, medication management, and health promotion 
and disease prevention coaching. Only a few of the MHSOs actively serve an 
institutionally based population. Most of the MHS programs have an end-of-
life intervention. Several of the MHSOs rely on sophisticated predictive models 
using proprietary logic with more than 100 variables to identify gaps in care, 
create risk strata scores, and achieve operational efficiency. MHSOs that found 
that their own stratification models did not adequately discriminate among 
different risk groups have relied on Medicare’s HCC scores to target their MHS 
populations.
Findings to Date
Results available at this writing include the first 18 (of 36) pilot months 
(McCall et al., 2008a). Beneficiary participation averaged 84 percent across 
the eight MHSOs and ranged from a high of 95 percent to a low of 74 percent. 
Refusals explain nearly 0.4 percent of the 16 percent average nonparticipation 
rate. Defining active engagement as having five or more calls or two or more 
home visits over 18 months, MHSOs worked actively with two in three 
intervention beneficiaries (65 percent). Only two (of seven reporting) MHSOs 
achieved positive improvements in patient overall satisfaction, although a 
majority increased the number of beneficiaries who had received help to set 
goals for self-care management. None of the MHSOs demonstrated consistent 
positive intervention effects across six physical and mental health functioning 
indicators relative to the comparison group.
Out of the 40 evidence-based process of care tests (eight MHSOs, five 
process rates), 16 were statistically significant, all in the positive direction; 
however, the absolute rate of change was very small (perhaps not an 
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unexpected finding given the relatively short period of time elapsed during 
the intervention). MHSOs had the greatest success in improving cholesterol 
screening among heart failure and diabetes beneficiaries: 9 gains out of 16 
were statistically significant (McCall et al., 2008a). MHSOs did less well 
in improving urine protein screening and eye exams. Only one MHSO 
significantly improved on all five concordant care processes, and a second 
MHSO improved on four of five. Despite gains in several process measures, 
none of the MHSOs were able to reduce the mortality rate among intervention 
compared with comparison group beneficiaries. 
During the pilot, all-cause admission rates ranged from a low of 767 
to 1,078 per 1,000 intervention beneficiaries (McCall et al., 2008a). Heart 
failure and diabetes together were minor reasons for Medicare admissions 
(16–19 percent; roughly one in six). None of the eight MHSOs succeeded 
in statistically reducing hospitalization rates among intervention compared 
with comparison group beneficiaries. Although four of the eight MHSOs 
achieved Medicare savings during the pilot’s first 18 months, none of the gains 
were statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. McCall and 
colleagues found no significant differences within disease cohort. Although 
savings among intervention beneficiaries willing to participate were somewhat 
greater, none were statistically significant. Savings rates between 1.0 percent 
and 2.1 percent fell far short of the MHSO budget neutrality criterion that 
ranged from 4.7 percent to 9.3 percent for the same MHSO. Sample sizes were 
large enough to detect savings rates as low as 3.5 percent to 4.5 percent of 
average PBPM costs. Medicare savings net of fees were negative for all eight 
MHSOs through 18 months, implying negative returns on investment. All 
MHSOs experienced substantial regression-to-the-mean PBPM growth across 
both intervention and comparison groups. 
With 16 successes out of 40 possible gains in evidence-based process-of-
care measures, the cost per successful improvement was approximately $15 
million, based on $235 million in Medicare fees through 18 months (McCall 
et al., 2008a). The cost would be $6.6 million per percentage point quality 
improvement. There did not appear to be any correlation between MHSOs that 
“saved” money and their quality of care improvements. 
Taken together, the findings from this demonstration were disappointing 
in terms of both clinical and cost impact. Results from this project show that 
third-party care management is a difficult model under which to achieve 
measurable clinical improvement and net savings.
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Care Management for High-Cost Beneficiaries Demonstration
Project Overview
Medicare beneficiaries with multiple progressive chronic diseases are a large 
and costly subgroup of the Medicare population. The Congressional Budget 
Office estimated that in 2001, high-cost beneficiaries in the top 25 percent 
of spending accounted for 85 percent of annual Medicare expenditures 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2005). Beneficiaries who had multiple chronic 
conditions, were hospitalized, or had high total costs had expenditures that 
were twice as high as those for a reference group. Further, these beneficiaries 
currently must navigate a health care system that has been structured and 
financed to manage their acute, rather than chronic, health problems. When 
older patients seek medical care, their problems are typically treated in discrete 
settings rather than managed in a holistic fashion (Anderson, 2002; Todd et al., 
2001). Because Medicare beneficiaries have multiple conditions, see a variety of 
clinicians and providers, and often receive conflicting advice, policy makers are 
concerned about the care that beneficiaries actually receive (Jencks et al., 2003; 
McGlynn et al., 2003). 
Congress mandated the Care Management for High-Cost Beneficiaries 
(CMHCB) Demonstration to address current failings of the health care 
system for chronically ill Medicare FFS beneficiaries. In July 2005, CMS 
announced the selection of six care management organizations (CMOs) to 
operate programs in the CMHCB Demonstration (McCall et al., 2008c). The 
demonstration’s principal objective was to test new models of care for Medicare 
beneficiaries who are high cost and have complex chronic conditions, with 
the goals of reducing future costs, improving quality of care, and improving 
beneficiary and clinician/provider satisfaction. 
The CMHCB initiative employs a mixed-mode experimental design 
(McCall et al., 2008c). Two interventions are population based, whereas the 
other four are provider-based and provider-care services to a “loyal” patient 
population (Piantadosi, 1997). As a trial, it is unusual in employing a “pre-
randomized” scheme, assigning eligible beneficiaries to an intervention 
or comparison group before gaining consent to participate. The Medicare 
program pays CMHCB organizations a monthly administrative fee 
per participant, and the organizations may participate in a gainsharing 
arrangement with the government contingent on improvements in quality, 
beneficiary and clinician/provider satisfaction, and savings to the Medicare 
program over a 3-year period. Participating organizations are held at risk for 
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all fees based on the performance of the full population of eligible beneficiaries 
assigned to the intervention group (an ITT model). CMS developed the 
CMHCB Demonstration with considerable administrative risk as an incentive 
to reach targeted beneficiaries and their providers and to improve care 
management (i.e., 5 percent savings requirement). 
Beneficiary participation in the CMHCB Demonstration is voluntary 
and does not change the scope, duration, or amount of Medicare benefits 
they currently receive. Beneficiaries do not pay a charge to receive CMHCB 
Demonstration program services. After the initial 6-month outreach period, 
the MHSOs accrue management fees for only those beneficiaries who verbally 
consent to participate and only during participation periods. Participation 
continues until a beneficiary becomes ineligible for the MHS program or opts 
out of services that the MHSO provides. Beneficiaries who become ineligible 
during the demonstration program are removed from the intervention and 
comparison groups for the total number of months following loss of eligibility 
for purposes of assessing cost savings and quality, outcomes, and satisfaction 
improvement.
Project Status
The participating sites implemented this demonstration with some differences. 
Among the six CMO programs, CMS assigned the two community-based 
programs—Care Level Management and Key to Better Health—approximately 
15,000 and 5,000 intervention beneficiaries, respectively, in Southern 
California and New York City (McCall et al., 2008c). In contrast, for the four 
remaining programs, which are integrated delivery systems, CMS chose their 
intervention population based on a minimum number, or plurality, of visits to 
participating physicians and hospitals. The four provider-based organizations 
were Massachusetts General Hospital, Montefiore Medical Center, Texas 
Senior Trails, and the Health Buddy Consortium. Each CMO worked 
collaboratively with CMS to finalize its intervention population definition 
for the demonstration. All programs include high-cost beneficiaries and/or 
beneficiaries with high HCC risk scores. The definition for high cost and cut-off 
of the HCC score varies by program. 
CMS awarded contracts under this initiative to CMOs offering approaches 
that blend features of the chronic care management, disease management, and 
case management models. Their approaches rely, albeit to varying degrees, on 
engaging both physicians and beneficiaries and supporting the care processes 
with additional systems and staff. They proposed to improve chronic illness 
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care by providing the resources and support directly to beneficiaries, using 
their existing relationships with insurers, physicians, and communities in their 
efforts. 
Although each of the CMOs has unique program characteristics, they 
share some common features (McCall et al., 2008c), which include educating 
beneficiaries and their families on improving self-management skills; teaching 
beneficiaries how to respond to adverse symptoms and problems; and 
providing care plans and goals, ongoing monitoring of beneficiary health status 
and progress, and a range of resources and support for self-management. 
Findings to Date
No evaluation results of this demonstration are publicly available to date.
Cancer Prevention and Treatment Demonstration
Project Overview 
Racial/ethnic disparities in cancer screening and treatment have been well 
documented. Minority populations are less likely to receive cancer screening 
tests than are white populations and, as a result, are more likely to be diagnosed 
with late-stage cancer (Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research [AHQR], 
2004; National Institutes of Health & National Cancer Institute, 2001). For 
those with a positive test result, racial/ethnic minorities are more likely to 
experience delays in receiving the diagnostic tests needed to confirm a cancer 
diagnosis (Battaglia et al., 2007; Ries et al., 2003). Similarly, differences in 
primary cancer treatment, as well as appropriate adjuvant therapy, have been 
shown to exist between white and minority populations (AHQR, 2004). 
Although ability to pay is one of the explanatory factors, researchers have 
found similar disparities among Medicare beneficiaries. 
To address this problem, Congress mandated that the US Department 
of Health and Human Services conduct demonstrations aimed at reducing 
disparities in screening, diagnosis, and treatment of cancer among racial and 
ethnic minority Medicare-insured beneficiaries (Section 122 of the Medicare, 
Medicaid, and State Children’s Health Insurance Program [SCHIP] Benefits 
Improvement and Protection Act of 2000). 
CMS decided to assess the use of patient navigators in reducing racial 
disparities. Patient navigators are individuals who help steer, or “navigate,” 
Medicare beneficiaries through the health care system (Brandeis University 
Schneider Institute for Health Policy, 2003). Patient navigators primarily have 
helped cancer patients (Dohan et al., 2005; Hede, 2006); their use for cancer 
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screening and diagnosis is more limited, although some recent studies are 
promising (Battaglia et al., 2007).
Project Status
CMS issued an announcement on December 23, 2004, soliciting cooperative 
agreement proposals for the Cancer Prevention and Treatment Demonstration 
(CPTD) for Racial and Ethnic Minorities. In particular, the announcement 
sought demonstration projects that targeted four legislatively mandated 
minority populations: American Indians, Asian Pacific Islanders, African 
Americans, and Hispanics. Following review of all applications and 
negotiations with individual sites, CMS announced the selection of six CPTD 
sites on April 3, 2006. 
Each site has two study arms: screening and treatment. Both study arms 
have one intervention group and one control group. CMS assigned to the 
treatment arm participants with a diagnosis of breast, cervical, colorectal, lung, 
or prostate cancer who have received some form of treatment within the past 
5 years; it excluded from the study those who have received treatment in the 
past 5 years for another type of cancer care. All other participants are assigned 
to the screening arm. The study uses a randomized ITT design; therefore, 
participants enrolled in the screening arm remain in that arm, even if they are 
diagnosed with cancer over the course of the study. 
Each site developed its own navigation model to ensure that the 
intervention was culturally sensitive to the needs of each minority community. 
Three of the sites adopted a nurse/lay navigation model in which nurses play a 
leadership and oversight role, supported by lay navigators from the community. 
The other three sites rely almost entirely on lay navigators (community health 
workers) who provide the bulk of services to intervention group participants. 
Sites using the nurse/navigator model have more thoroughly developed 
patient-flow algorithms that may result in better monitoring of care over time. 
This model also includes more direct interaction with primary care providers 
in the community, thus allowing them greater influence over screening rates. 
Control groups in each arm receive relevant educational materials. 
Each demonstration project has three sources of funding: (1) start-up 
payments, (2) payment for administration of CMS-mandated participant 
surveys, and (3) capitated payments for navigation services (Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services [CMS], 2008a). The first source was a one-time 
$50,000 payment at the beginning of each project. As part of the second source, 
the sites received a fixed payment for each baseline survey they completed 
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on participants in both the intervention and control groups, as well as for 
an exit survey administered at the end of the demonstration period for all 
participants. Sites also received payments for administering an annual survey 
to all intervention group participants. The third source was a capitated monthly 
payment to each site for all intervention group participants, which covered the 
cost of navigation services and varied across sites. The normal Medicare claims 
process handled billing and payment for all clinical screening, diagnosis, and 
treatment services.
Each site focuses on Medicare beneficiaries from a single racial/ethnic 
minority group. This substantially strengthens the experimental design, 
because intervention and control participants share the same racial/ethnic 
background and are drawn from the same community. 
The screening intervention group received navigation services to help 
ensure that participants undergo the appropriate screenings for breast, cervical, 
colorectal, and prostate cancer in accordance with Medicare coverage policy 
for preventive services (CMS, 2009b), as well as clinical practice guidelines. 
Intervention participants received navigation services to ensure completion of 
all primary and secondary cancer treatments and all necessary follow-up and 
monitoring.  
Findings to Date
Findings to date, based on site visits and CMS enrollment data, focus on 
implementation issues (Mitchell et al., 2008); Medicare will not assess 
demonstration impacts until the demonstrations end in late 2010. Five of 
the six sites (all but Josephine Ford Cancer Center) encountered difficulty in 
identifying eligible beneficiaries and enrolling them in the demonstration, 
resulting in substantially fewer participants than initially projected. At the 
end of year 1, projected enrollment was 6,484 in the screening arm. After 15 
months, the number of screening participants totaled 4,138, more than half of 
whom were enrolled at Josephine Ford.
Enrollment in the treatment arm fared even worse, with none of the sites 
meeting their year 1 goals. After 15 months, only 300 treatment participants 
were enrolled, compared with the originally projected 1,276 for year 1. (The 
majority of treatment participants also are at Josephine Ford.) Challenges 
included a larger-than-expected proportion of the population enrolled in 
managed care (an exclusion criteria for CPTD); limited electronic medical 
record systems or linkages between existing systems; a lack of current 
partnerships with community agencies serving their targeted minority 
population; and lack of identification, recruitment, and retention of qualified 
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staff. For some sites, actual implementation did not begin until well after the 
October 1, 2006, start date because of delays in institutional review board 
approval and staff recruitment. 
Because staffing and other costs were not quickly offset by capitation 
payments owing to slower-than-expected enrollments, CMS increased 
capitation and lump sum payments for debt relief. In some instances, CMS also 
renegotiated total enrollment goals. Total CMS spending on the CPTD remains 
unchanged, however (i.e., not to exceed the $25 million obligated by Congress).
physician-Focused p4p Demonstrations
Medicare has also experimented through demonstrations with physician-
focused P4P. The rationale behind this group of projects is that, regardless of 
the institutional site of care, physicians are the primary drivers behind care 
treatment decisions, influencing both costs and outcomes. Therefore, initiatives 
that improve the incentives for physicians to improve quality and efficiency 
of care, in theory, could have a powerful impact on health care systems 
performance.
Physician Group Practice Demonstration
Project Overview
The Medicare Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration, Medicare’s first 
physician P4P initiative, establishes incentives for quality improvement and 
cost efficiency at the level of the PGP. The Medicare, Medicaid, and SCHIP 
Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000 included a legislative 
mandate for the PGP Demonstration. 
The premise of the PGP Demonstration is that PGPs can achieve higher 
quality and greater cost efficiency by managing and coordinating patient care. 
The physician groups participating in the PGP Demonstration engaged in a 
wide variety of care management interventions to improve the cost efficiency 
and quality of health care for Medicare FFS patients (RTI International, 2006). 
These interventions include chronic disease management programs, high-
risk/high-cost care management, transitional care management, end-of-life/
palliative care programs, practice standardization, and quality improvement 
programs. In addition, PGP participants use information technology, such as 
electronic medical records, patient disease registries, and patient monitoring 
systems, to improve practice efficiency and quality of care delivered to patients, 
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and to better understand the utilization of services by the Medicare FFS 
population.
The PGP Demonstration tests whether care management initiatives generate 
cost savings by reducing avoidable hospital admissions, readmissions, and 
emergency department visits, while at the same time improving the quality 
of care for Medicare beneficiaries. This demonstration is a shared-savings 
clinician and provider-payment model in which participating physician 
groups and the Medicare program share savings in Medicare expenditures. 
In effect, this model is a hybrid between the FFS and capitation payment 
methods (Wallack & Tompkins, 2003). Medicare continues to pay physicians 
and provider organizations under FFS rules, and beneficiaries are not enrolled 
(i.e., they retain complete freedom of provider choice). However, participating 
physician groups are able to retain—through annual performance payments in 
addition to their FFS revenues—part of any savings in Medicare expenditures 
that they generate for their patients.
This shared-savings payment model gives participating clinicians and 
providers a financial incentive to control the volume and intensity of medical 
services, such as what exists under capitated payment. Moreover, physician 
groups retain a higher portion of savings as their measured quality of 
care increases. In this way, incentives for both cost efficiency and quality 
improvement are introduced into FFS payment. Because participating 
clinicians and providers retain only part of the savings generated by reducing 
expenditures, incentives for underservice and risk selection are lower than 
under full capitated payment. Another difference from capitation is that the 
Medicare program shares in any savings, benefiting from cost-efficiency 
improvements and lowering government expenditures. 
As a Medicare FFS innovation, the PGP Demonstration does not have 
an enrollment process whereby beneficiaries accept or reject involvement. 
Therefore, CMS employs a methodology to assign beneficiaries to participating 
PGPs based on utilization of Medicare-covered services. CMS assigns 
beneficiaries to a participating PGP if the PGP provided the largest share (i.e., 
the plurality) of outpatient evaluation and management (E&M) visits to the 
beneficiary during a year. A beneficiary is assigned to the PGP for the entire 
year even if the visit occurred late in the year. The assignment methodology 
incorporates outpatient E&M services provided by specialists as well as 
by primary care physicians. Beneficiary assignment is redetermined after 
each year based on that year’s utilization patterns. This algorithm assigns 
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beneficiaries uniquely to a single PGP, obviating issues of shared responsibility 
or rewards among multiple PGPs serving overlapping patient populations. 
Approximately 50 percent of beneficiaries who were provided at least one 
Medicare Part B physician service by the PGP during a year are assigned to the 
PGP; groups with greater primary care orientation have more patients assigned 
(Kautter et al., 2007). PGPs generally retain approximately two-thirds of their 
assigned beneficiaries from one year to the next. 
Local Medicare beneficiaries not assigned to the participating PGP serve 
as the comparison population. A PGP’s comparison group resides in its 
service area, which is defined as counties in which at least 1 percent of a PGP’s 
assigned beneficiaries reside. These counties typically include 80 to 90 percent 
or more of a PGP’s assigned beneficiaries. Each participating PGP’s service area 
may differ across years to reflect changes in the location of the PGP’s assigned 
beneficiaries.
Demonstration savings are computed as the difference between the 
expenditure target and the PGP’s expenditures in the performance year. A 
PGP’s annual expenditure target is calculated as PGP’s Base Year Expenditures 
× (1 + Comparison Group Growth Rate). Both the PGP base year expenditures 
and the comparison group-expenditure growth rate are adjusted for case-mix 
change between the base and performance years. 
If the participating PGP holds the expenditures for its assigned beneficiaries 
to more than 2 percent below its target, it is eligible to earn a performance 
payment for that performance year (Kautter et al., 2007). The net savings 
are calculated as the amount of annual savings that exceeds the 2 percent 
threshold. The net savings are divided, with 80 percent going to the PGP 
performance payment pool and Medicare retaining 20 percent as program 
savings. The PGP performance payment pool is then itself divided between a 
cost-performance payment and a maximum-quality performance payment. 
The shares of the cost and maximum-quality performance payment change 
from 70 percent/30 percent in performance year 1 to 50 percent/50 percent 
in performance year 3 and after. The Medicare program determines the 
actual quality performance payment based on the percentage of the PGP 
Demonstration’s quality targets that the PGP met in the performance 
year. Performance payments are capped at 5 percent of the PGP’s target 
expenditures.
The PGP demonstration includes 32 quality measures covering five 
modules: (1) diabetes mellitus, (2) heart failure, (3) coronary artery disease, 
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(4) hypertension, and (5) preventive care. The 32 quality measures are a subset 
of those developed by CMS’s Quality Measurement and Health Assessment 
Group for the Doctors Office Quality Project (CMS, 2005). 
PGP participants are eligible to earn quality performance payments if they 
achieve at least one of three targets. The first two are threshold targets and the 
third is an improvement target: 
•	 The	higher	of	75	percent	compliance	or	the	Medicare	Health	Plan	
Employer Data and Information Set (HEDIS) mean for the measure (for 
those measures where HEDIS indicators are also available). 
•	 The	70th	percentile	Medicare	HEDIS	level	(for	those	measures	where	
HEDIS indicators are also available). 
•	 A	10	percent	or	greater	reduction	in	the	gap	between	the	baseline	
performance and 100 percent compliance (e.g., if a PGP achieves 40 
percent compliance for a quality measure in the base year, its quality 
improvement target is 40 percent + (100-40)*10 percent = 46 percent).
Including both threshold and improvement targets gives participating 
groups positive incentives for quality whether they start out at high or low 
levels of performance. Groups starting at low levels of quality might view 
threshold targets as unachievable. 
CMS uses claims data to calculate 7 of the 32 quality measures; it uses 
medical record abstraction or other internal PGP data systems for the other 
25 measures. Claims measures receive a weight of four points compared with 
one point for medical records measures, reflecting the larger sample size of 
beneficiaries used in calculating claims measures. To calculate a PGP’s quality 
performance payment for a demonstration year, we sum the points for each 
quality measure where at least one of the three targets was attained, then divide 
this sum by the total possible points for all quality improvements and apply the 
resulting ratio to the maximum quality performance payment.
Project Status
The PGP Demonstration began April 1, 2005, and has continued to run for 
more than 5 years. Calendar year 2004 is used as a baseline for cost and quality 
performance assessment. 
Ten large multispecialty physician groups participated in the PGP 
Demonstration. CMS selected them through a competitive process based 
on organizational structure, operational feasibility, geographic location, and 
implementation strategy. Large PGPs were selected to ensure that participants 
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would have the administrative and clinical capabilities necessary to respond to 
the PGP demonstration’s incentives. The participating PGPs all had at least 200 
physicians and together represented more than 5,000 physicians. They included 
freestanding group practices, components of integrated delivery systems, 
faculty group practices, and physician network organizations. The number 
of Medicare FFS patients assigned to the 10 participating physician groups 
ranged from 8,383 to 44,609, and totaled 223,203. Overall for the 10 physician 
groups, the percentage of assigned patients that were female was 57.5 percent, 
dually eligible for Medicare/Medicaid was 13.3 percent, and aged 85 or older 
was 10.3 percent. These distributions were broadly similar to the Medicare FFS 
population (CMS, 2006).
Findings to Date
CMS has reported the evaluation of results through the second demonstration 
year (CMS, 2008b; Sebelius, 2009). In the second performance year, 4 of 
the 10 participating physician groups earned $13.8 million in performance 
payments for improving the quality and cost efficiency of care as their share of 
a total of $17.4 million in Medicare savings. This compares to two physician 
groups that earned $7.3 million in performance payments as their share of 
$9.5 million in Medicare savings in the first year of the demonstration. In the 
first demonstration year, two PGPs accrued “negative savings” of $1.5 million 
combined. In the second demonstration year, one PGP accrued “negative 
savings” of $2.0 million. Subtracting the incentive payments to the PGPs and 
negative savings from Medicare savings, the net savings to the Medicare Trust 
Fund was $1.6 million in the second demonstration year and $0.7 million in 
the first.
Medicare expenditures were $120 per person, or 1.2 percent less than target 
(expected) expenditures per beneficiary for the combined 10 PGPs in the 
second demonstration year. This reduction was statistically significant  
(p < .01). However, when adjusted for predemonstration expenditure trends, 
the reduction in expenditures was $58 per person, or 0.6 percent less than 
the target, and not statistically different from zero. The majority of the second 
year demonstration savings occurred in outpatient, not inpatient, services. On 
average, outpatient expenditures were $83 per person year less than expected, 
whereas inpatient expenditures were $25 per person year less than expected 
and not statistically significant. Across the 10 PGPs, actual expenditures 
were lower than target expenditures for beneficiaries with diabetes mellitus 
($224 per person year lower), CAD ($555 per person year lower), and COPD 
($423 per person year lower). No statistically significant cost reductions were 
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observed for beneficiaries with CHF, cancer, stroke, vascular disease, or heart 
arrhythmias.
All 10 groups achieved target performance on at least 25 of 27 quality 
measures applicable in the second performance year. Five of the 10 
participating groups achieved target performance on all 27 quality measures 
for diabetes, CHF, and CAD, compared with 2 that achieved benchmark 
performance on all 10 measures used in the first demonstration year. Between 
the base year and the second demonstration year, the PGP groups showed 
improvement by increasing their quality scores an average of 9 percentage 
points on the diabetes mellitus measures, 11 percentage points on the heart 
failure measures, and 5 on the CAD measures. 
Between the base year and second demonstration year, four of seven 
claims-based quality indicators (lipid measurement, urine protein testing, 
left ventricular ejection fraction testing, and lipid profile) showed greater 
improvement among PGP-assigned beneficiaries than among comparison 
beneficiaries. This improvement was statistically significant at the 5 percent 
level. The differences in the three other indicators (HbA1c management, 
eye exam, and breast cancer screening) between the PGP and comparison 
group beneficiaries were not statistically significant. The finding that 
participating PGPs improved their claims-based quality process indicators 
more than did their comparison group remained true even after adjusting for 
predemonstration trends in the claims-based quality indicators.
The PGP Demonstration shared-savings model changes payments to 
clinicians and providers, not the insurance arrangements of Medicare 
beneficiaries, who remain enrolled in the traditional FFS program 
with complete freedom of provider choice. The innovation of the PGP 
Demonstration model is that participating physicians and provider groups have 
the opportunity to earn additional performance payments for providing high-
quality and cost-efficient care. The financial risk to clinicians and providers 
is mitigated by the continuation of FFS payment, the use of clinician- and 
provider-specific base costs as a starting point for measuring savings, and the 
lack of penalties for underperformance. However, like all payment innovations, 
the PGP Demonstration shared-savings model faces some challenges. For 
example, it remains to be seen how much control a physician or provider group 
can exert over its assigned beneficiaries when they retain freedom of provider 
choice and have limited incentives to restrain their use of services. This issue of 
“attribution” is discussed in Chapter 7 of this book.
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Medicare Medical Home Demonstration
Project Overview
Policy makers are promoting the patient-centered medical home concept 
as a potentially transformative health system innovation. A medical home, 
in broad terms, is a physician-directed practice that provides care that is 
accessible, continuous, comprehensive, and coordinated and delivered in the 
context of family and community. Current interest in the medical home as 
the anchor for a patient’s interaction with the health care system stems from 
growing recognition that even patients with insurance coverage may not have 
an established access to basic care services and that care fragmentation affects 
the quality and cost of care that patients experience. Studies (e.g., Rittenhouse 
et al., 2009; Reid et al., 2010) suggest that the medical home might be a 
component of health care reform, particularly useful for patients with chronic 
conditions who typically receive care from many physicians, prescriptions for 
several medications, and, generally, face unique problems related to redundant, 
or, worse, inconsistent care that compromises quality and increases spending. 
The Tax Relief and Health Care Act of 2006 (TRHCA) mandated that 
CMS establish a medical home demonstration project to provide patient 
centered care to “high-need populations.” The legislation has targeted 
the medical home demonstration to a “high-need population,” defined as 
individuals with multiple chronic illnesses that require regular monitoring, 
advising, or treatment. CMS has decided to adopt a broad definition of the 
target population to include more than 80 percent of Medicare beneficiaries 
to broaden the scope and reach of the demonstration. The demonstration 
legislation provides that care management fees and incentive payments 
be paid to physicians rather than to practices per se, although qualifying 
physicians must be in practices that provide medical home services. To qualify, 
physicians must implement an interdisciplinary plan of care in partnership 
with patients, use clinical decision support tools to support practice of 
evidence-based medicine, rely on health information technology, and 
promote patient self-management skills. Additionally, the medical home itself 
is responsible for targeting eligible beneficiaries and for promoting patient 
access to personal health information, developing a health assessment tool 
for targeted individuals, and providing training for personnel involved in care 
coordination.
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Project Status
CMS has completed work toward a solicitation and final design for the 
demonstration, and sites were originally projected to be operational sometime 
in 2010. However, the Affordable Care Act health care reform legislation also 
includes a mandate for a Medicare Medical Home Demonstration. Therefore, 
CMS put the TRHCA-mandated demonstration on hold until the outcome 
of the health care reform legislation made clear the specific parameters for a 
congressionally mandated Medicare Medical Home Demonstration. At this 
writing it is unclear whether this originally mandated Medicare Medical Home 
Demonstration will be implemented or combined with an Affordable Care 
Act–mandated demonstration.
Medicare hospital-Focused p4p Demonstrations
A large proportion of Medicare expenditures goes to provide inpatient hospital 
services. As a result, Medicare has devoted significant attention to improving 
both the efficiency and quality of hospital care on behalf of its beneficiaries. 
Current demonstrations in the planning and development stage include 
projects aimed at implementing a new round of bundled payment/improved 
quality of care hospital-focused demonstration projects.
Medicare Hospital Heart Bypass Demonstration
Project Overview
Since the implementation of Medicare’s inpatient prospective payment 
system (IPPS) in 1983, the annual update in allowed charges nationally has 
capped Part A hospital payments per discharge for bypass surgery. Both 
hospital managers and policy makers have expressed major concern about 
the asymmetric Medicare financial incentives facing hospitals compared with 
physicians. Unlike hospitals (and surgeons paid a global payment), other 
physicians seeing a patient are paid for every additional service they provide. 
Surgeons are also paid more for more complex bypass surgeries. Moreover, 
all hospital support services (e.g., nursing) are essentially “free” to physicians, 
who bear none of the financial risk of higher use of these services as a result of 
longer hospital stays, more tests, and higher utilization of other hospital-based 
services. Misaligned physician incentives were thought to raise the cost of an 
admission.
An alternative strategy focused on the structural characteristics of clinicians 
and provider organizations that set them apart as Centers of Excellence (CoEs). 
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In this strategy, payers “reward” both hospitals and physicians in an indirect 
way by allowing them to market a CoE imprimatur to potential patients in 
their plan. The CoE concept is straightforward: a payer (such as Medicare) 
solicits applicants that are then thoroughly reviewed according to a set of 
structure, process, and outcome measures. The payer then authorizes those 
meeting high standards to market an imprimatur to subscribers or beneficiaries 
as a CoE for inpatient surgery. Payers, like Medicare, may also request 
discounts off the usual payment rates—particularly if the payer believes that 
its seal of approval is highly valuable to a physician or a provider organization. 
The approach is a win-win-win for the payer, the payers’ beneficiaries, and the 
hospitals and their medical staffs.
Project Status
In 1988, CMS solicited proposals from more than 40 hospital and 
physician groups to participate in the Medicare Participating Heart Bypass 
Demonstration (Cromwell et al., 1998). In the demonstration, the government 
paid a single negotiated global price for all Parts A and B inpatient hospital 
and physician care associated with bypass surgery (diagnosis-related-groups 
[DRGs] 106 and 107, bypass with and without cardiac catheterization). 
The intent of the demonstration was to encourage regionalization of the 
procedure in higher-volume hospitals and to align physician with hospital 
incentives under a bundled prospective payment. Hospitals shared the 
global payment with surgeons and cardiologists based on cost savings. CMS 
allowed participants to market a demonstration imprimatur as a “Medicare 
Participating Heart Bypass Center.” Medicare patients were not restricted to 
demonstration hospitals for their surgery.
In May 1991, after extensive evaluation of 27 final applicants, CMS began 
paying four provider groups, later expanded to seven. Initial discounts 
averaged 13 to 15 percent, depending on DRG (Cromwell et al., 1998). 
Discounts were substantial considering that CMS could not offer exclusive 
contracting to sites, nor did CMS allow the sites the right to market a true 
Centers of Medicare Excellence imprimatur. All participants said that they 
would have offered even deeper discounts had they been allowed to market a 
CoE imprimatur.
Findings to Date
Over the demonstration’s 5 years, the Medicare program saved $42.3 
million on the 13,180 bypass patients treated in the seven demonstration 
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hospitals (Cromwell et al., 1998). About 85 percent of the savings came from 
demonstration discounts, another 9 percent from volume shifts to lower-cost 
demonstration hospitals, and 5 percent from lower post-discharge utilization. 
In addition, beneficiaries (primarily their supplemental insurers) saved another 
$8 million, resulting in $50 million in overall demonstration savings. Total 
savings were $3,794 per bypass admission. Micro-cost analyses showed that 
three of the four initial sites experienced 10 to 40 percent declines in direct 
intensive care units and routine nursing expenses resulting in rising profit 
margins in spite of substantial discounts. Fewer surgeon requests for specialist 
consultations also produced Medicare savings (Cromwell et al., 1997b). 
One-third of demonstration patients surveyed were aware of the hospital’s 
demonstration status when choosing their site of surgery, and only one-third of 
knowledgeable patients said it had affected their hospital choice (Cromwell et 
al., 1998). Two-thirds of referring physicians were aware of the demonstration 
hospital’s status , but this knowledge reportedly had little effect on their 
referral recommendation compared with the general reputation and their 
own familiarity with the hospital’s staff. That the marketing of the imprimatur 
influenced only one in nine patients raises questions about the effectiveness 
of “consumer-driven” health care based on more information, given the 
government’s goal of regionalizing bypass surgery to improve community-wide 
outcomes. 
Controlling for risk factors (e.g., age, gender, ejection fraction, comorbid 
illnesses), demonstration hospitals exhibited a statistically significant decline in 
annual inpatient mortality (one-half of a percentage point from a mean of 4.6 
percent). One-year post-discharge mortality exhibited the same rate of decline. 
The two sites with above-average mortality achieved statistically significant 
declines in mortality during the demonstration. The CMS-funded evaluation 
found a small, positive trend in complication rates that did not result in greater 
mortality and no significant trend in the appropriateness rating of bypass 
patients when angioplasty was an alternative (Cromwell et al., 1998).
Expanded Medicare Heart and Orthopedics CoE Demonstration
Project Overview
The first Medicare Hospital Heart Bypass Demonstration illustrated the 
potential of using the CoE imprimatur to self-finance higher quality care. 
Having proof of concept, CMS developed a follow-on demonstration with 
more cardiovascular procedures and a few major orthopedic procedures, such 
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as hip and knee replacement. The demonstration also was intended to provide 
a true test of the value of the CoE imprimatur to applicants.
Project Status
In 1997, CMS initiated a two-stage process that began with a pre-application 
form to nearly 1,000 hospitals seeking Medicare’s CoE imprimatur in the San 
Francisco and Chicago regions. CMS received 538 pre-applications and invited 
160 heart and orthopedics hospitals to submit full applications (Cromwell et 
al., 1997a). (Most pre-applicants did not meet the minimum-volume criteria.) 
Eventually, 123 (75 percent) submitted full applications. CMS then convened 
10 government panels comprising expert clinicians from inside and outside 
the agency to conduct in-depth reviews of the applications. At the end of 
an intensive 3-month period, the panels recommended 31 (of 70 invited) 
cardiovascular and 42 (of 53) orthopedic applicants for final approval. The 73 
winners represented 14 percent of the original 538 submitting pre-applications, 
suggesting a very select group of high-quality hospitals. 
Discounts from the accepted applicants ranged widely from zero percent to 
35 percent. Excluding 9 zero-discount applicants (of the 70 eligible applicants), 
the mean heart bypass discount was 9.3 percent (Cromwell & Dayhoff, 1998; 
Cromwell et al., 1997a). Two-thirds of the proposed discounts ranged between 
5 and 14 percent. Part B physician discounts averaged 17 percent less than 
hospital Part A discounts. Four out of 10 applicants (including 8 monopolists) 
were considered dominant in their market and submitted discounts a full 3 
percentage points lower than nondominant applicants (significant at the 1 
percent level). However, another 25 percent of dominant providers offered 
discounts of 13.6 percent or more. Applicants operating in duopoly markets 
offered discounts more than twice as great (10.7 percent) as monopolists. High-
cost (to Medicare) providers offered substantially greater discounts. The 18 
applicants in very high health maintenance organization (HMO) penetration 
areas (>40 percent) offered discounts nearly 6 percentage points lower than 
those in low HMO penetration markets, a highly significant difference. This 
finding supports other research indicating that competitive pressures on prices 
may have already reduced costs with less financial leeway for further discounts 
(Hadley et al., 1996). 
Project Findings to Date
Ultimately, CMS never implemented the expanded CoE demonstrations 
because of opposition on the part of the health care provider community in 
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addition to other logistical complications internal to CMS. Any P4P approach 
will encounter opposition from some clinicians and provider organizations. 
The CoE approach was particularly contentious because rejected (or ineligible) 
clinicians and providers argued that patients would perceive them as being less 
qualified. Since 1997, CMS has failed in three attempts to implement a CoE 
imprimatur P4P demonstration.
Acute Care Episode Value-Based Purchasing Demonstration
Project Overview
The Acute Care Episode (ACE) Demonstration is the most recent iteration 
of the CoE P4P model. The demonstration, implemented in late 2009, 
offers bundled payments and increased flexibility in financial arrangements 
between participating hospital-physician consortia (CMS, 2009c). Under the 
demonstration, a bundled payment is a single payment for both Part A and 
Part B Medicare services furnished during an inpatient stay (McCall et al., 
2008b). Currently, under Medicare Part A, CMS reimburses a hospital a single 
prospectively determined amount under the IPPS for all the care it furnishes to 
the patient during an inpatient stay. Physicians who care for the patient during 
the hospital stay are paid separately under the Medicare Part B Physician Fee 
Schedule for each service they perform. The demonstration will also focus 
on methods for improved quality of care for bundles of heart and orthopedic 
hospital-based procedures. 
The Medicare program will permit approved demonstration sites to use 
the term “Value-Based Care Centers” in approved marketing programs. 
This demonstration is intended to provide an opportunity for Value-Based 
Care Centers to develop efficiencies in the care they provide to beneficiaries 
through quality improvement in clinical pathways, improved coordination of 
care among specialists, and gainsharing. This demonstration also provides an 
opportunity for Medicare to share savings achieved through the demonstration 
with beneficiaries who, based on quality and cost, choose to receive care from 
participating demonstration providers (CMS, 2009a).
Project Status
CMS selected six sites for ACE demonstration participation: Baptist Health 
System in San Antonio, Tex.; Oklahoma Heart Hospital LLC in Oklahoma City, 
Okla.; Exempla Saint Joseph Hospital in Denver, Colo.; Hillcrest Medical Center 
in Tulsa, Okla.; and the Lovelace Health System in Albuquerque, N.M. Under 
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this version of the CoE-type model, the bundled payment demonstration 
includes 28 cardiac and 9 orthopedic inpatient surgical services and 
procedures. CMS selected these elective procedures because volume for 
them has historically been high, and there is also sufficient marketplace 
competition and existing quality metrics. The ACE demonstration sites began 
implementation in 2009, with some procedures in some sites beginning 
implementation in 2010. 
Findings to Date
No publicly available findings are ready yet.
Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration
Project Overview
In the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 (DRA), Congress mandated CMS to 
develop initiatives for hospital value-based purchasing by 2009 (Lindenauer 
et al., 2007). Likely driving this mandate was interest in the earlier Hospital 
Quality Alliance (HQA) initiative, launched in December 2002 by the 
American Hospital Association, the Federation of American [proprietary] 
Hospitals, and the Association of American Medical Colleges. The Alliance 
was intended to build a collaborative relationship between private hospitals 
and the government to improve quality of care. The Alliance invited all 
hospitals to participate and report data on at least 10 quality indicators for 
clinical conditions such as heart failure and pneumonia. Building on this 
initiative, CMS tied Medicare hospital payment updates to reporting quality 
indicators, ultimately achieving a 98 percent participation rate among 
hospitals (Lindenauer et al., 2007, p. 487). CMS made hospital quality 
indicators available on its Hospital Compare Web site. In March 2003 CMS 
invited hospitals providing the quality indicator data to participate in its 
Medicare Premier Hospital Quality Incentive Demonstration (HQID), a P4P 
demonstration managed by Premier Healthcare Informatics. Nonparticipating 
hospitals could still report quality data but could not participate in the P4P 
program. 
The Medicare Premier HQID project recognizes and provides financial 
rewards to hospitals that demonstrate high-quality performance in areas 
of hospital acute care. CMS conducts the Medicare demonstration in 
collaboration with Premier, Inc., a nationwide organization of not-for-profit 
hospitals. Under the demonstration, top-performing participating hospitals 
receive increased payment for Medicare patients.
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Project Status
The Premier HQID phase one operated initially from 2003 through 2006. 
HQID paid bonuses for superior quality performance based on a limited set 
of 33 indicators, which spanned five clinical conditions: heart failure, acute 
myocardial infarction (heart attack), pneumonia, bypass surgery, and hip and 
knee replacement. Example indicators included the following:
•	 Heart	attack:	Percentage	of	patients	given	aspirin	or	beta	blocker	on	
arrival
•	 Heart	failure:	Percentage	of	patients	assessed	for	left	ventricular	function
•	 Pneumonia:	Percentage	of	patients	assessed	for	oxygenation	or	given	
antibiotics within 4 hours of arrival.
To be eligible in any year, practitioners and hospitals needed a minimum 
of 30 cases per condition. For each clinical condition, hospitals performing 
in the top two deciles of all participants received a 2 percent or 1 percent 
bonus payment per Medicare patient along with their regular Medicare 
prospective payment. Bonuses were expected to be paid for by 1 to 2 percent 
payment penalties on Medicare payments for participants falling into the 
lowest two performance deciles. Thus, the demonstration design is budget 
neutral, reallocating Medicare payments away from poor performing to 
high-performing hospitals based on a limited set of quality measures. 
Hospitals qualified for bonuses based only on whether their absolute level of 
performance was superior and not by their rate of improvement. Multihospital 
groups submitted bills and quality data as a single entity, thereby sharing in 
financial gains and possible losses. 
The primary metric in evaluating hospital performance was the 
improvement in their quality scores, even though financial incentives were 
based solely on absolute scores each year. CMS benchmarked performance 
improvements several ways. First, it developed a comparison group by 
matching each participating hospital with one or two HQA hospitals that 
agreed to participate in the HQID based on number of beds, teaching status, 
region, urban/rural, and ownership status (for-profit vs. nonprofit). Second, 
CMS benchmarked participant quality improvements against all HQA 
facilities, using linear regression methods with change in overall quality as the 
dependent variable. Third, to address a potential volunteer bias, CMS repeated 
multivariate analyses of performance by including all HQID hospitals in the 
intervention group following a clinical trial, ITT experimental design.
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Of the 421 hospitals invited to participate in the P4P program, 63 percent 
accepted and began providing data on 33 quality indicators (Lindenauer et 
al., 2007, p. 488); 11 facilities eventually withdrew. Patient admission was the 
unit of observation for quantifying changes in process outcomes. CMS based 
approximately 117,000 P4P patients and 192,000 control patients for statistical 
testing with no apparent adjustment for clustering effects on variance in the 
207 participating and 406 nonparticipating hospitals.
A second phase of the Premier Hospital demonstration is continuing, 
allowing for an additional 3 years of implementation and testing of new 
incentive models. Currently, about 230 hospitals continue to participate in this 
phase of the demonstration.
Findings to Date
Lindenauer and colleagues (2007) have published initial findings for this 
demonstration. Over 2 years, both nonparticipating hospitals (those only 
reporting data) and hospitals participating in the P4P program, showed quality 
improvements. In 7 of 10 quality indicators, P4P hospitals showed greater 
improvements (Lindenauer et al., 2007, p. 489). In these findings based on 
early years of the project, performance increases varied inversely with baseline 
rates. For example, among acute myocardial infarction (AMI) patients, the 
highest-performing quintile showed increases in composite process scores of 
7.5 percentage points above the control group beginning from a baseline score 
of only 73 percent. The poorest-performing quintile saw a relative increase in 
its composite AMI score of only 2.4 percentage points (and a 1.1 percentage 
point decline from 97.9 percent to 96.8 percent). After adjusting for baseline 
differences in study and control groups, the incremental increases in quality 
attributed to P4P incentives declined. 
Bonus payouts to hospitals participating in the P4P program averaged 
$71,960 per year per hospital, but they ranged widely from $914 to $847,227. 
Similar “losses” among the lowest-performing hospitals offset these bonus 
payments. Bonuses and penalties, however, were not based on rates of 
improvement over baseline but on absolute levels during the demonstration 
period. Hospitals in the lowest two deciles (or quintile) in terms of rates of 
improvement during the demonstration had the highest average baseline 
scores and tended to receive most of the bonuses. Hospitals in the highest 
demonstration quintile based on rate of improvement still had the lowest 
scores by demonstration’s end and paid a disproportionate percentage of the 
bonuses.
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With very small P4P financial incentives, this demonstration found 
relatively small improvements in several quality process indicators. Because 
of the large sample sizes, the analysis could detect and accept very small 
quality improvements of less than 1 percentage point. For example, baseline 
composite process scores for AMI increased from 88.7 percent to 94.8 percent. 
After adjusting for study-control differences in patient characteristics and 
volunteerism, the P4P effect fell to 1.8 percentage points, or an improvement 
from 88.7 percent to 90.5 percent. Baseline process scores for the other two 
conditions averaged roughly 80 percent for AMI, suggesting high adherence 
levels as well. We do not know from this demonstration how effective a larger 
financial incentive (and penalty) might be for another group of hospitals with 
much lower adherence rates.
According to Lindenauer and colleagues (2007), hospitals that already had 
the highest average baseline performance received the majority of performance 
bonuses. In fact, many of the hospitals with the greatest improvements in 
quality incurred payment penalties because their scores remained in the 
lowest quintile by the end of the demonstration. Another concern in using 
process measures at the hospital level was the narrow range of indicators. 
Using just 33 indicators to track quality in a few broad reasons for admission 
may be too narrow to accurately represent differences in absolute quality or 
rates of improvement in quality. Also of concern was the limiting of payment 
reallocations between just the bottom and top quintiles based on quality scores. 
In the longer run, this could discourage hospitals unable to achieve the highest 
quintile from continuing to strive (at high internal cost) to further raise quality. 
The evaluation of the Premier demonstration is ongoing. Preliminary 
results from the first 4 years of the demonstration suggest that participating 
hospitals raised overall quality by an average of 17 points over 4 years, based on 
their performance on more than 30 nationally standardized care measures for 
patients in five clinical areas (heart attack, coronary bypass graft, heart failure, 
pneumonia, and hip and knee replacements (CMS, 2009d).
Medicare Gainsharing and Physician Hospital Collaboration 
Demonstrations
Project Overview
Ever since CMS implemented hospital prospective per case payments using 
DRGs (through the IPPS) in 1984, hospital managers and researchers have 
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raised concerns about the misalignment of hospital and physician incentives. 
At the time, per case DRG payment represented an unprecedented bundling 
of facility services in a single Part A payment, including routine and intensive 
care unit nursing, operating room, and other ancillary services. Physicians, 
by contrast, remained under a fractionated Current Procedural Terminology 
billing system with thousands of codes that encouraged them to continue 
providing separate services with no incentive to conserve health care costs. 
The overall concept of gainsharing is intended to allow hospitals to share 
efficiency savings with physicians in a controlled setting in which quality of 
care standards are simultaneously maintained (or improved). 
To test the gainsharing concept under Medicare, Congress mandated two 
separate but very similar demonstrations. Under Section 5007 of the DRA, 
Congress required CMS to conduct a qualified gainsharing program that tests 
alternative ways that hospitals and physicians can share in efficiency gains. 
Similarly, under Section 646 of the MMA, Congress authorized the Secretary 
of Health and Human Services to conduct a Physician Hospital Collaboration 
demonstration as part of the larger Medicare Health Care Quality Initiative 
(CMS, 2010b). Like the Gainsharing Demonstration, the purpose of this 
Physician Hospital Collaboration Demonstration is to test gainsharing models 
that facilitate collaborations between physicians and hospitals to improve 
quality and efficiency. 
Under both demonstrations, incentive payments made to physicians under 
the Physician-Hospital Demonstration must tie directly to improvements in 
quality and/or efficiency, and cannot be based on other standards (such as 
volume or patient referrals). Physician payments are limited to 25 percent of 
Medicare payments made to physicians for other similar patients. Payments 
must also be based on a methodology that is replicable and auditable, and the 
demonstration must—at a minimum—be budget neutral. 
However, unlike the Gainsharing Demonstration, which has a distinct 
hospital-based focus, the Physician Hospital Collaboration project places 
particular emphasis on participation of integrated delivery systems and 
coalitions of physicians in collaboration with hospitals. The project also places 
a greater emphasis on improved efficiency and quality of care over a longer 
episode of care, including post-acute services, beyond the acute-care stay.
Both of the current Medicare gainsharing demonstration initiatives are 
modeled on an earlier project that, because of legal challenges, was never fully 
implemented. In 2001, the New Jersey Health Association (NJHA) submitted 
 Overview of Selected Medicare Pay for Performance Demonstrations 257
an application to CMS to run an eight-hospital all-payer refined DRG (APR-
DRG) Demonstration of gainsharing in its state (NJHA, 2001). Introducing 
all the facets that other gainsharing proposals are likely to include, this 
gainsharing methodology was likely the most complex ever proposed. The New 
Jersey plan was to establish maximum pools of Part A hospital savings for each 
APR-DRG in the hospital to be shared with the medical staff. These pools were 
limited to 25 percent of total Part B outlays. Next the pools were converted to a 
per discharge basis for each APR-DRG based on average costs of the lowest 90 
percent of cases (i.e., so-called Best Practice Norms). 
Excluding the most expensive cases from the target baseline cost per 
discharge was the primary mechanism to achieve reductions in hospital 
costs. Once the demonstration site identified responsible physicians, they 
became eligible for gainsharing, depending on how the average cost of their 
cases related to the mean cost of the 90 percent baseline group of cases. The 
demonstration standardized baseline and demonstration cases for case severity 
and inflation. In the early demonstration years, responsible physicians could 
participate in gainsharing, even if they failed the Best Practice Norms, as long 
as they showed reductions in their Part A costs per case. The demonstration 
carved out gainsharing pools for hospital-based and consulting physicians to 
partially shelter them from lost billings associated with shorter stays and less 
testing.
The demonstration used process and outcome indicators to restrict 
gainsharing to physicians maintaining high-quality standards. Physicians in 
the NJHA project were put at risk for excessive post-acute Medicare outlays 
from any source (including outpatient physician services: “any absolute 
increase in Medicare PAC [post-acute care] payments per discharge [must] 
be smaller than any absolute decrease in Part B inpatient physician payments 
per discharge” [Cromwell & Adamache, 2004]). The two demonstrations also 
differed in that CMS negotiated up-front discounts in its cardiac DRG global 
Part A and B rates, whereas New Jersey hospitals had to reduce baseline Part A 
and B inpatient outlays by 2 percent after adjusting for inflation and case-mix 
changes.
Project Status
CMS solicited volunteer participating sites for the Gainsharing Demonstration 
in fall 2006 (CMS, 2010a), with applications due November 17, 2006. CMS 
initially selected five sites from this solicitation for participation but also 
issued a new announcement to resolicit for rural demonstration sites. CMS 
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designated five sites as potential Medicare Gainsharing Demonstration 
participants. Two sites signed terms and conditions and initially participated in 
the demonstration: 
•	 Beth	Israel	Medical	Center	(BIMC),	New	York,	New	York
•	 Charleston	Area	Medical	Center	(CAMC),	Charleston,	West	Virginia
These two demonstration sites began the implementation process as of October 
1, 2008. Charleston Area Medical Center withdrew from the demonstration 
effective December 31, 2009.
The BIMC site includes all DRGs in its demonstration. Enrollment is 
voluntary for physicians. A pool of bonus funds will be prospectively estimated 
from hospital savings based on variances from best practices. If no hospital 
savings are realized, no bonuses will be allocated to participating physicians. 
In the BIMC model, each patient is assigned to one practitioner who will 
take financial responsibility for the care of the patient. For medical patients, 
the “responsible physician” is the attending physician. For surgical patients, 
the responsible physician is the surgeon. The actual bonus paid to physicians 
is called the performance incentive, which is calculated as a percentage of 
the maximum performance incentive, based on performance. Gainsharing 
payments are capped according to CMS policy at 25 percent of the physician’s 
affiliated Part B reimbursements. BIMC proposes a range of physician quality 
standards, which, if not met by individual physicians, would make them 
ineligible for the gainsharing bonus (Greenwald et al., 2010a).
The CAMC gainsharing model focused on cardiac care. Each cardiac-
related DRG included in the demonstration had established savings initiatives. 
CAMC measured participating physicians on several grounds to ensure that 
quality of patient care remained the same. Worse performance on any of the 
following standards for an individual physician made that physician ineligible 
to receive the gainsharing bonus (Greenwald et al., 2010a).
CMS has solicited participants for the Physician Hospital Collaboration 
Demonstration in this project and selected the NJHA/New Jersey Care 
Integration (NJCI) Consortium, Princeton, N.J. (with 12 hospitals), targeting 
all inpatient Medicare beneficiaries, to participate in the demonstration 
(CMS, 2010c). The 12 hospitals participating in the NJCI Consortium began 
implementing the demonstration in July 2009.
The NJCI Consortium sites will include all DRGs in their demonstration. 
Enrollment is voluntary for physicians. Physicians must have at least 10 
admissions at the consortium member to be eligible for incentive payments. 
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In the NJCI model, each patient is assigned to one practitioner who will 
take financial responsibility for the patient’s care. For medical patients, the 
“responsible physician” is the attending physician. For surgical patients, the 
responsible physician is the surgeon. Up to 12.5 percent of internal hospital 
savings will be available for incentive payments (Greenwald et al., 2010b) 
Physician incentive payments will consist of two parts: a performance 
incentive and an improvement incentive. In the initial year, the improvement 
incentive will be two-thirds of the gainsharing payment, and the performance 
incentive will be one-third. In year 2, the maximum improvement incentive 
is reduced to one-third, and by year 3, the improvement incentive will be 
eliminated, with all funds directed to the performance incentives. A physician’s 
peer performance incentive is based on his or her average cost per case relative 
to the best practice cost per case of a cost-efficient peer group. The NJCI 
Consortium proposes a range of physician quality standards to ensure that 
patient safety and quality of care. In addition, the consortium proposes to 
track and review several parameters for any unusual or exceptional changes 
(Greenwald et al., 2010b).
Findings to Date
No publicly available evaluation findings are ready for either the Medicare 
Gainsharing or the Physician Hospital Collaboration demonstrations.
Medicare Demonstrations and the Future of Pay for Performance
The examples cited previously in this chapter and in earlier chapters make 
up only a partial list of Medicare demonstrations related in some way to P4P. 
Previous chapters (especially Chapters 1 and 2) also discuss private-sector 
P4P initiatives implemented by a range of sponsors (see Table 1-1 in Chapter 
1 for a complete list of all demonstrations). Because the Affordable Care Act 
health care reform legislation mandates dozens more P4P, accountable care 
organization and other value-based purchasing projects and demonstrations, 
the range of models, provider types, payment incentives, and other variations 
will only expand in the next 5 years. 
Conspicuously missing from these lists of P4P initiatives is a nationally 
implemented program for P4P. Of course, P4P initiatives sponsored by 
regional employers and insurers will logically remain focused on the issues 
and needs of these regional sponsors. Resources to fund implementation, 
evaluation, and refinement of P4P models may be scarce. In contrast, the 
Medicare program presents a very likely candidate for eventual national 
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implementation of P4P initiatives. Medicare is the largest US insurer and 
sponsor of a national program with access to implementation and evaluation 
funding from Congress. It is curious then that given the extent of Medicare 
P4P demonstrations currently completed or ongoing, no serious move toward 
national implementation of any of the existing P4P models is currently under 
serious consideration. Chapter 11 of this book discusses this issue and explores 
the challenges of implementing Medicare P4P on a national level.
references
Agency for Healthcare Quality and Research. (2004). National healthcare 
disparities report, 2003: Summary. Retrieved March 24, 2010, from http://
www.ahrq.gov/qual/nhdr03/nhdrsum03.htm 
Anderson, G. (2002). Chronic conditions: Making the case for ongoing care. 
Baltimore, MD: Partnership for Solutions, Johns Hopkins University, and 
the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.
Battaglia, T. A., Roloff, K., Posner, M. A., & Freund, K. M. (2007). Improving 
follow-up to abnormal breast cancer screening in an urban population. A 
patient navigation intervention. Cancer, 109(2 Suppl), 359–367.
Brandeis University Schneider Institute for Health Policy. (2003). Cancer 
Prevention and Treatment Demonstration for Ethnic and Racial Minorities. 
Retrieved March 24, 2010, from http://www.cms.hhs.gov 
/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/CPTD_Brandeis_Report.pdf 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2005, November). CMS Physician 
Focus Quality Initiative: Chronic disease and prevention measures. Baltimore, 
MD: CMS.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2006). Health Care Financing 
Review, statistical supplement (Publication No. 03477). Available from  
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/review/default.asp.
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2008a, October 1). Cancer 
Prevention and Treatment Demonstration for Ethnic and Racial Minorities: 
Fact sheet. Retrieved November 12, 2009, from http://www.cms.hhs.gov 
/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/CPTD_FactSheet.pdf 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2008b, August 14). Physician 
groups earn performance payments for improving quality of care for patients 
with chronic illnesses. Retrieved November 12, 2009, from http://www.cms 
.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/PGP_Press_Release.pdf 
 Overview of Selected Medicare Pay for Performance Demonstrations 261
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2009a). CMS announces sites for a 
demonstration to encourage greater collaboration and improve quality using 
bundled hospital payments. Retrieved November 12, 2009, from http://www 
.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/ACEPressRelease.pdf 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2009b). Quick reference 
information: Medicare preventive services. Retrieved November 12, 
2009, from http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MLNProducts/downloads/MPS_
QuickReferenceChart_1.pdf 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2009c). Acute Care Episode 
Demonstration. Retrieved March 9, 2010, from http://www.cms.hhs.gov 
/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/ACEFactSheet.pdf
Centers for Medicare &Medicaid Services. (2009d). Medicare demonstrations 
show paying for health care quality pays off. Retrieved July 13, 2010, from 
http://www.cms.gov/HospitalQualityInits/downloads 
/HospitalPremierPressReleases20090817.pdf 
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2010a). DRA 5007 Medicare 
Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration solicitation. Retrieved March 9, 2010, 
from http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads 
/DRA5007_Solicitation.pdf
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (2010b). Physician-Hospital 
Collaboration Demonstration solicitation. Retrieved March 9, 2010, from 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/downloads/PHCD_646_
Solicitation.pdf
Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. (2010c). Press release: Medicare 
demonstrations show paying for quality health care pays off. Retrieved March 
9, 2010, from http://www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release 
.asp?Counter=3495 
Coleman, E. A., Parry, C., Chalmers, S., & Min, S. J. (2006). The care transitions 
intervention: Results of a randomized controlled trial. Archives of Internal 
Medicine, 166(17), 1822–1828.
Congressional Budget Office. (2005). High-cost Medicare beneficiaries. 
Retrieved March 24, 2010, from http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/63xx 
/doc6332/05-03-MediSpending.pdf 
Cromwell, J., & Adamache, W. (2004). Rates and savings report: Final design 
report. CMS Contract No. 500-92-0013. Waltham, MA: RTI International.
262  Chapter 9
Cromwell, J., & Dayhoff, D. A. (1998). An analysis of proposed discounts 
under the Medicare Participating Cardiovascular and Orthopedic Centers 
of Excellence Demonstration: Draft report. Health Care Financing 
Administration Contract No. 500-95-0058-004. Waltham, MA: Health 
Economics Research, Inc.
Cromwell, J., Dayhoff, D. A., McCall, N., Subramanian, S., Freitas, R., Hart, R., 
et al. (1998). Medicare Participating Heart Bypass Center Demonstration: 
Final report. Health Care Financing Administration Contract  
No. 500-92-0013. Retrieved January 11, 2011, from  
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/reports/downloads/CromwellExecSum.pdf;  
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/reports/downloads/CromwellVol1.pdf;  
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/reports/downloads/CromwellVol2.pdf;  
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/reports/downloads/CromwellVol3.pdf 
Cromwell, J., Dayhoff, D. A., Subramanian, S., & Hart, R. (1997a). Medicare 
Negotiated Bundled Payment Demonstration: Full application banking 
report. HCFA Contract No. 500-92-0013. Waltham, MA: Health Economics 
Research, Inc.
Cromwell, J., Dayhoff, D. A., & Thoumaian, A. H. (1997b). Cost savings and 
physician responses to global bundled payments for Medicare heart bypass 
surgery. Health Care Financing Review, 19(1), 41–57.
Dohan, D., & Schrag, D. (2005). Using navigators to improve care of 
underserved patients: Current practices and approaches. Cancer, 104(4), 
848–855.
Greenwald, L., Cromwell, J., Adamache, W., Healy, D., Halpern, M., & West, 
N. (2010a). Evaluation of the Medicare Gainsharing Demonstration: Design 
report. CMS Contract Number HHSM-500-2005-00029I; Task 3. Waltham, 
MA: RTI International.
Greenwald, L., Cromwell, J., Healy, D., Adamache, W., Drozd, E., Bernard, S., 
et al. (2010b). Evaluation of the Medicare Physician Hospital Collaboration 
Demonstration: Design report. CMS Contract Number HHSM-500-2005-
00029I; Task 17. Waltham, MA: RTI International.
Hadley, J., Zuckerman, S., & Iezzoni, L. I. (1996). Financial pressure and 
competition. Changes in hospital efficiency and cost-shifting behavior. 
Medical Care, 34(3), 205–219.
 Overview of Selected Medicare Pay for Performance Demonstrations 263
Hede, K. (2006). Agencies look to patient navigators to reduce cancer care 
disparities. Journal of the National Cancer Institute, 98(3), 157–159.
Jencks, S. F., Huff, E. D., & Cuerdon, T. (2003). Change in the quality of care 
delivered to Medicare beneficiaries, 1998-1999 to 2000-2001. JAMA, 289(3), 
305–312.
Kautter, J., Pope, G. C., Trisolini, M., & Grund, S. (2007). Medicare Physician 
Group Practice Demonstration design: Quality and efficiency pay-for-
performance. Health Care Financing Review, 29(1), 15−29.
Lindenauer, P. K., Remus, D., Roman, S., Rothberg, M. B., Benjamin, E. M., 
Ma, A., et al. (2007). Public reporting and pay for performance in hospital 
quality improvement. New England Journal of Medicine, 356(5), 486−496.
McCall, N. T., Cromwell, J., & Bernard, S. (2007). Evaluation of Phase I of 
Medicare Health Support (formerly Voluntary Chronic Care Improvement) 
Pilot Program under traditional fee-for-service Medicare: Report to Congress. 
CMS Contract No. 500-00-0022. Retrieved March 24, 2010, from http://
www.cms.hhs.gov/reports/downloads/McCall.pdf 
McCall, N. T., Cromwell, J., Urato, C., & Rabiner, D. (2008a). Evaluation of 
Phase I of the Medicare Health Support Pilot Program under traditional fee-
for-service Medicare: 18-month interim analysis. Report to Congress. CMS 
Contract No. 500-00-0022. Available from http://www.cms.hhs.gov/reports 
/downloads/MHS_Second_Report_to_Congress_October_2008.pdf 
McCall, N. T., Dalton, K., Cromwell, J., Greenwald, L., Freeman, S., & 
Bernard, S. (2008b). Medicare Acute Care Episode Demonstration: Design, 
implementation, and management: Design report. CMS Contract No. 500-
2005-00291. Waltham, MA: RTI International.
McCall, N. T., Urato, C., Spain, P., Smith, K., & Bernard, S. (2008c). Evaluation 
of Medicare Care Management for High Cost Beneficiaries (CMHCB) 
Demonstration: Second annual report. CMS Contract No. 500-00-0024, T.O. 
# 25. Waltham, MA: RTI International.
McGlynn, E. A., Asch, S. M., Adams, J., Keesey, J., Hicks, J., DeCristofaro, A., et 
al. (2003). The quality of health care delivered to adults in the United States. 
New England Journal of Medicine, 348(26), 2635−2645.
264  Chapter 9
Mitchell, J. B., Holden, D. J., & Hoover, S. (2008). Evaluation of the Cancer 
Prevention and Treatment Demonstration for racial and ethnic minorities: 
Report to Congress. Available from http://www.cms.hhs.gov/reports 
/downloads/Mitchell_CPTD.pdf 
National Institutes of Health & National Cancer Institute. (2001). Voices of a 
broken system: Real people, real problems. President’s Cancer Panel. Report 
of the Chairman, 2000−2001. Available from http://deainfo.nci.nih.gov 
/advisory/pcp/video-summary.htm 
Naylor, M. D., Brooten, D., Campbell, R., Jacobsen, B. S., Mezey, M. D., Pauly, 
M. V., et al. (1999). Comprehensive discharge planning and home follow-up 
of hospitalized elders: A randomized clinical trial. JAMA, 281(7), 613–620.
New Jersey Hospital Association. (2001). Medicare demonstration performance-
based incentives. Prepared for the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services. Princeton, NJ: New Jersey Hospital Association.
Peikes, D., Chen, A., Schore, J., & Brown, R. (2009). Effects of care coordination 
on hospitalization, quality of care, and health care expenditures among 
Medicare beneficiaries: 15 randomized trials. JAMA, 301(6), 603−618.
Piantadosi, S. (1997). Clinical trials: A methodologic perspective. New York: 
Wiley-Interscience.
Reid, R. J., Coleman, K., Johnson, E. A., Fishman, P. A., Hsu, C., Soman, M. P., 
et al. (2010). The Group Health Medical Home at year two: Cost savings, 
higher patient satisfaction, and less burnout for providers. Health Affairs, 
29(5), 835–843. 
Rich, M. W., Beckham, V., Wittenberg, C., Leven, C. L., Freedland, K. E., & 
Carney, R. M. (1995). A multidisciplinary intervention to prevent the 
readmission of elderly patients with congestive heart failure. New England 
Journal of Medicine, 333(18), 1190–1195.
Ries, L. E., Eisner, M. P., Kosary, C. L., Hankey, B. F., Miller, B. A., Clegg, L., et 
al. (2003). SEER Cancer Statistics Review, 1975−2000. Available from http://
seer.cancer.gov/csr/1975_2000/. 
Rittenhouse, D. R., & Shortell, S. M. (2009). The patient-centered medical 
home: Will it stand the test of health care reform? JAMA, 301(19), 
2038–2040. 
 Overview of Selected Medicare Pay for Performance Demonstrations 265
RTI International. (2006). PGP site visit reports. Retrieved November 12, 2009, 
from http://www.cms.hhs.gov/DemoProjectsEvalRpts/dowloads/PGP_Site_
Visit_Reports.zip 
Sebelius, K. (2009). Report to Congress: Physician Group Practice Demonstration 
evaluation report. Retrieved January 31, 2010, from http://www.cms.hhs 
.gov/reports/downloads/RTC_Sebelius_09_2009.pdf.
Todd, W., & Nash, T. (Eds.). (2001). Disease management, a systems approach to 
improving patient outcomes. New York: Jossey-Bass Publishers.
Wallack, S. S., & Tompkins, C. P. (2003). Realigning incentives in fee-for-
service Medicare. Health Affairs (Millwood), 22(4), 59–70.

Evaluating Pay for Performance 
Interventions
Jerry Cromwell and Kevin W. Smith 
Chapter 10
Current and potential approaches to paying for performance vary widely. 
As payers implement new models for pay for performance (P4P), they must 
test these models to determine whether they do improve performance. 
Interventions differ considerably in their design and implementation. A few 
evaluations of interventions are based on randomized trials, although most 
are observational studies. A lack of rigorously constructed comparison groups 
hampers much of the existing evaluation literature on P4P, particularly in the 
private sector. In their systematic review of the effects of financial incentives on 
health care quality, Petersen and colleagues (2006) found that nearly half of the 
eligible studies neither involved a concurrent comparison group nor compared 
quality indicators at baseline. 
In this chapter, we explore many of the technical challenges of deriving 
scientifically rigorous estimates of P4P impacts. We begin by reviewing 
common threats to the internal validity of findings that introduce positive 
or negative bias in the quantitative estimate of P4P effects. We suggest using 
comparison groups to isolate a true P4P effect in an unbiased manner. After 
reviewing internal threats, we review the theory and approaches underlying the 
selection of comparison groups. We emphasize the importance of establishing 
a balance between intervention and comparison groups on the baseline level 
and in the rate of growth for any outcome variable of interest. We also consider 
the need to isolate the true P4P effect from exogenous shocks that may be 
contemporaneous with the intervention and suggest two approaches: first, 
one can isolate the true P4P effect by forming a comparison group ex ante, or 
before the demonstration begins (called “propensity score matching”); second, 
one can statistically correct imbalances ex post, or after the demonstration 
is over (called “ex post regression matching”). Having considered alternative 
ways to form the comparison group, we then introduce two external threats 
to valid findings that are quite common in P4P demonstrations. These threats 
undermine the generalizability or replicability of P4P effects to a national 
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program. In the last section of the chapter, we summarize how five Medicare 
P4P demonstrations formed their comparison groups, and we critique their 
success in avoiding the various threats discussed earlier in the chapter. Where 
appropriate, we note the inherent limitations that enabling legislation places on 
Medicare demonstrations. 
Internal threats to Validity 
Internal threats pertain to the validity of estimated intervention effects 
exclusively among the demonstration population. External threats arise from 
extrapolating intervention effects to other populations. We organize internal 
threats into six broad categories:
1. changes over time (or history)
2. differential selection of study and control groups
3. statistical regression
4. statistical significance
5. differential mortality
6. instrumentation
Changes Over Time
“History” threats result from changes in the experimental setting that may 
explain (confound) intervention performance. In P4P evaluations, changes 
in medical technology, clinical practice, and payment methods may affect 
intervention outcomes in positive or negative ways. For example, minimally 
invasive heart surgery, endoscopic vascular surgery and diagnostic testing, new 
cancer and psychotropic drugs, laser surgery, and numerous other technologies 
have completely changed the context of costs and quality of care. Relatively 
recent changes in clinical practice include the dramatic shift to outpatient 
surgery, greater reliance on antipsychotic drugs, and evidence-based treatment 
protocols. In addition, third-party insurers like Medicare constantly change the 
way they pay for services by altering the basis of payment (per admission, per 
procedure), accounting for local input cost differences, and adjusting for cost 
inflation.
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Differential Selection
Different study and control subjects can also invalidate estimates of 
intervention effects. Randomized trials are least subject to selection bias. 
However, beneficiaries in most P4P demonstrations must agree to participate 
or at least be informed about an intervention. For demonstrations involving 
explicit care management, beneficiaries must be officially contacted and agree 
to talk with case managers. Some beneficiaries refuse formal invitations to 
undergo active case management, although this is generally only a small 
percentage (e.g., 5–10 percent). Other beneficiaries are simply unreachable 
or uninterested. Often, they have moved out of the area, have new telephone 
numbers, are institutionalized, or are otherwise unreachable. Nonparticipants, 
not surprisingly, often are more expensive to reach, more costly to treat, and 
sicker than those who agree to participate. These tendencies can introduce a 
bias in population studies using an intent-to-treat evaluation design because 
intervention staff do not have the opportunity to interact with groups that may 
be more or less amenable to the intervention.
Further selection occurs when disease management care teams actively 
work with a smaller group of participants (i.e., engage in targeting; McCall et 
al., 2008). Success critically depends upon the accuracy of the algorithms for 
targeting participating patients at high risk of using health care services or 
having lifestyle and medication issues. To date, targeting strategies have not 
proved successful (McCall et al., 2008).
Provider-based demonstrations are more vulnerable to selection bias than 
are randomized trials because of their implicit hierarchical sampling method. 
Providers and their extended networks can work only with their own “loyal” 
patients and cannot manage patients who are seen primarily in other practices. 
Patients loyal to a particular provider group introduce two potential selection 
biases in evaluating group performance. They may be different from the local 
(potentially control) population with the same chronic condition who may not 
have a usual source of care. They may be better or less well educated, younger 
or older, and have more or less insurance. In addition, the care they receive 
within the intervention network may not be comparable to the care available to 
the average person outside of the network.
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Statistical Regression
Medicare demonstrations commonly select unusual, or even extreme, 
populations to participate; selection is usually based on high costs or poorer 
health status. This tendency can expose demonstrations to potentially serious 
regression-to-the-mean (RtoM) effects.1 RtoM effects also arise from repeated 
observations on the same set of subjects. In the subsequent demonstration 
period, however, costs among intervention patients are likely to gravitate 
toward mean annual costs of all patients with a similar disease. This tendency 
exacerbates the RtoM effects that result from random selection and adds to 
the estimated bias in the intervention effect. A simple pre/post experimental 
design could show much lower intervention costs that result simply from RtoM 
in studies conducted without matched control groups.2 
RtoM creates problems even if subjects are randomly sampled. One way 
to think about it is to assume that subjects have been sampled at one point 
in time. Some will likely have very high costs and others will have low costs. 
In a regression of costs on an intervention indicator, the resulting coefficient, 
or intervention effect, will not necessarily be biased if the comparison group 
was well matched. However, the standard error of the estimated effect will 
be higher than if one had a more permanent measure of each subject’s 
costliness (Greene, 2000, p. 277). RtoM effects reduce the likelihood of finding 
a statistically significant intervention effect due to the transitory nature of 
extreme changes in health care utilization in either direction. Over time, any 
initially high-cost outlier group quickly bifurcates into a smaller group of 
continually high-cost beneficiaries and a larger group whose costs fall (rise) 
rapidly from earlier extremely high (low) levels. Short-run, random costs 
obscure the underlying effect of the intervention that may not be discernable 
through the statistical “noise” from the churning of subjects from low to high 
cost and vice versa. RtoM that occurs between baseline and a subsequent 
1 RtoM was first explored by Francis Galton (1822–1911); Galton, Carl Friedrich Gauss, and 
Adrien Marie LeGendre are the fathers of the modern regression analysis that is so popular 
among social scientists (Stigler, 1986). In his famous study of sweet peas, Galton noticed a 
“reversion” in pea size in the second generation toward the overall mean size. He observed the 
same inverse correlation between the heights of parents and their children. “Reversion” later 
became “regression,” and originally meant, in Galton’s framework, regression to the mean in the 
natural order of things. 
2 Flawed designs that do not include control groups may explain why some commercial disease 
management organizations claim to have achieved large reductions in costs of younger workers 
who have only one chronic illness.
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period, also called regression attenuation bias, is generally greater in truncated 
samples, as seen in equation 10.1 (Barnett et al., 2005, p. 217): 
 RtoM = {σ2w / [σ2w + σ2b].5}C(z), (10.1)
where σ2w = the within-individual or within-group variance over time, and 
σ2b = the between (or across) individuals variance. C(z) reflects the additional 
impact of taking a truncated sample of the entire population and is determined 
as 
 C(z) = φ(z) / Φ(z), (10.2)
where φ(z) and Φ(z) are the probability and cumulative density functions of 
the random normal distribution of z underlying the truncated sample. If the 
demonstration has selected subjects because of particularly high costs, as in 
the Care Management for High-Cost Beneficiaries Demonstration described 
later in this chapter, z = (c – μ) / σt, where c = the cutoff value, μ = the mean of 
the entire population, and σt = the overall variance in the population (i.e., the 
square root of [σ2w + σ2b]). 
For example, if c = $6,000, μ = $3,000, σ2w = 4 × 106, σ2b = 2.25 × 106, 
and σt = $2,500, then z = $3,000 / $2,500 = 1.20. The probability density 
φ(1.2) = 0.194, and the cumulative Φ(1.2) = 0.885. The resulting RtoM 
effect = (4 × 106 / 2,500)[0.194 / 0.885] = $3,504. Working with a cost outlier 
sample greater than a $6,000 cutoff should reproduce a new mean that is 
$3,504 lower in the subsequent period before including any intervention 
effects. 
Equation 10.1 shows that RtoM is greater when the within-individual 
variance over time caused by RtoM is greater. Observing a particular value for 
an individual at a certain point in time will be farther from the individual’s true 
average value if there is more variation in observations for each individual. 
In addition, the more extreme the cutoff point is in selecting the intervention 
sample from the general population, the greater the RtoM effects will be, 
thereby accentuating the underlying random variation within individuals.
Both sampling and analytic solutions can mitigate the effects of RtoM 
(Barnett et al., 2005). Random assignment of individuals to the intervention 
and comparison groups is one solution that can cancel out RtoM bias 
effects, but this solution does not eliminate statistical noise. Taking multiple 
measurements of the criterion variable in the base period, then applying the 
cutoff value to each person’s mean baseline value, should also reduce random 
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attenuation bias. Equation 10.1 is modified by dividing σ2w by the number of 
measurements per person. Once the within and between variance is known, 
we can use equation 10.1 to calculate RtoM effects. The result is subtracted 
from the overall change in the criterion variable, leaving the net effect of the 
intervention. 
An alternative parametric approach to control for RtoM uses analysis of 
covariance regression to isolate RtoM effects. The regression specification is 
 Ypt = α + βI + ρ[Ypb – Yb*] + ε (10.3)
 Ypt = (α – ρYb*) + βI + γYpb + ε ; γ = 1 + ρ; RtoM = ρ = γ – 1,  (10.4)
where Ypt = the value of the dependent variable for the p-th subject in the 
current (t) period, I = 0,1 intervention indicator, Ypb = the p-th subject’s value 
in the base period, and Yb* = the mean baseline value of Y across all persons. 
The ρ coefficient captures the average RtoM effect that is purged from Y, 
leaving the true β effect of being in the intervention (I).
Statistical Significance
Statistical noise is not an issue in determining actuarial savings, bonuses, or fee 
paybacks in Medicare demonstrations. The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services (CMS), however, does not make recommendations to Congress based 
on actuarial findings. Rather, the agency uses an evaluation firm to determine 
whether any savings or health improvements are statistically robust, thereby 
justifying program expansion beyond the limited demonstration.
Conventionally, evaluators use a two-sided 95 percent confidence interval 
to determine gross savings or quality improvements.3 A problem with two-
sided 95 percent confidence intervals is the high bar set for statistical savings 
(i.e., the bottom 2.5 percent of the distribution of savings). Should policy 
makers reject intervention savings if the savings could happen by chance only 
3–4 percent of the time? One would expect most P4P initiatives to reduce, not 
increase, Medicare outlays. This suggests that evaluators should use a one-sided 
t-test. If an evaluator actually found greater outlays in a demonstration, the 
evaluator generally would not attribute them to the intervention but rather to 
3 Pierre LaPlace originated the infatuation with such stringent levels of confidence in the 
early 1800s when he conducted tests of differential birth rates between London, Paris, and 
Italy (Stigler, 1986). For those analyses, LaPlace was working with hundreds of thousands of 
observations over many years and applied a 99 percent confidence level. Rarely do modern 
social scientists have the luxury of so many observations in making contentious inferences 
regarding social policies and programs.
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some other factor. Even less likely is a disease management intervention that 
causes a decline in quality. Using a one-sided test would make it more likely 
that evaluators would find that an intervention had reduced costs or improved 
quality, thus avoiding a Type II error (i.e., rejecting a true intervention effect).
Potential Type II errors plague provider-based demonstrations because of 
their inherently small samples. Many provider groups have few physicians and 
Medicare patients—especially when Congress mandates that demonstrations 
occur in particular areas such as rural counties. Demonstration sample sizes 
are further reduced when the government and management groups impose 
narrow beneficiary eligibility criteria (e.g., only heart failure beneficiaries, 
elderly minority cancer beneficiaries in Hawaii). In the Medicare Coordinated 
Care Demonstration, none of the demonstration’s 15 programs had even 80 
percent power to detect a savings rate less than 10 percent, and the evaluator 
had to reject savings of 20 percent or more. Congress further limits the size of 
demonstrations by putting a dollar limit on total up-front management fees or 
Medicare outlays. Underpowering provider-based demonstrations can result in 
the government’s rejecting potentially valuable interventions.4
On a technical level, many demonstrations involve repeated measurement, 
or longitudinal, designs in which the same beneficiaries are tested at different 
points in time. Using differences in each beneficiary’s performance between 
the base and demonstration periods halves the number of observations and 
produces a more conservative level of confidence in any intervention impacts 
(Rosner, 2006, p. 296).
Differential Mortality
All Medicare demonstrations lose beneficiaries from various forms of 
attrition. Demonstrations involving the Medicare chronically ill population 
are especially prone to monthly attrition of 1 percent or more. As sicker, more 
costly beneficiaries die or become otherwise ineligible, the overall intervention 
population becomes healthier, on average, and makes the intervention appear 
more successful on a cost basis.
4 Simple t-tests of mean differences in savings or quality improvement suffer from statistical 
noise created by differences in beneficiaries within intervention and comparison groups. 
Multivariate regression can filter out the variation created by age, race, Medicaid eligibility, 
disabled status, and the like, as discussed in ex post regression matching later in this chapter. 
The result is an outcome estimate adjusted for beneficiary characteristics with a lower standard 
error and detectable threshold. This method reduces detectable thresholds even in randomized 
demonstrations with equal percentages of key beneficiary characteristics. See the discussion of 
the Medicare Health Support Pilot Program later in this chapter.
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Attrition, even with initial randomization, can also introduce an imbalance 
between the original study and control groups before the demonstration’s 
start date. During the time between prerandomization and the beginning 
of recruitment, death or other factors produce small differences in the 
intervention and comparison populations.
Some demonstrations allow beneficiaries to enter and exit managed care 
during the intervention. This practice can produce spending gaps that bias 
estimates of performance between intervention and control groups. These gaps 
also create additional statistical noise and reduce the reliability of results.
Attrition in disease management demonstrations is substantial, and 
sites often request “refresh” samples. Usually analyzed separately, refresh 
populations suffer from smaller sample sizes and truncation in the number of 
months in which the intervention is active. Also, assuming that intervention 
staff have been learning how best to manage the original population, the 
refresh sample experiences a maturation effect that would not exist in a new 
national program with new disease groups.
Instrumentation
A constant threat to the validity of intervention success is how success is 
measured. Problems may stem from changes in data collection instruments or 
from imperfect measures of outcomes and from inconsistent data collection 
methods. Changes in outcome measurement for Medicare demonstrations are 
uncommon, but exclusion criteria in calculating costs and health outcomes 
can bias the performance of the intervention, even with an initially balanced 
comparison group.
Costs can be measured in dollars for both study and control groups but may 
be limited to Medicare outlays on health services and may exclude government 
and provider internal management costs and ignore savings to beneficiaries 
(e.g., the 20 percent coinsurance on Part B services). Excluding certain 
services (e.g., postdischarge utilization) provides an incentive for intervention 
providers to discharge their patients early if savings are based only on inpatient 
costs. Demonstrations may also exclude hospice and end-stage renal disease 
utilization because they are beyond the control of intervention providers. 
These exclusions encourage interventions to transfer demonstration eligibles 
to these services to reduce within-demonstration costs. In this case, both the 
demonstration and national programs overestimate total program savings.
Quality is an even more difficult outcome to measure than costs (see 
Chapter 5). Because quality is a latent, multidimensional construct that must 
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be quantified to be evaluated, 1, 2, or even 10 measures may not adequately 
capture the true quality impacts of an intervention. If evaluators choose 
measures badly, an intervention can appear to have no quality impacts at all. 
To date, no P4P demonstrations have used rewards and penalties for outcomes 
such as mortality, functional status, or quality of life. An intervention could 
possibly score well on several process-of-care indicators and yet have no 
statistical impact on mortality, morbidity, and functional status.
P4P interventions that focus on particular diseases depend upon the 
consistent reporting of diagnostic codes from the International Classification 
of Diseases, Ninth Revision (ICD-9). Inconsistent disease reporting can 
lead to including patients who do not actually have a particular illness in an 
intervention for that illness. Moreover, if changes in the frequency of comorbid 
conditions and complications affect P4P bonuses or penalties, providers have a 
financial incentive to overreport the former and underreport the latter.
Determining the Counterfactual
Internal threats of history, differential selection, statistical regression, and 
experimental mortality raise the question of what would have happened in the 
intervention group without the intervention. This question is known as the 
“counterfactual” and is critical in avoiding most internal threats. Simple pre/
post experimental designs that compare provider performance before and after 
the introduction of a new P4P program are open to criticism because other 
temporal changes (or exogenous shocks to previous trends) may be partially, 
if not totally, responsible for causing observed changes in performance. For 
example, a local economy might experience a cyclical downturn, or a new 
technology might revolutionize medical practice (e.g., angioplasty making 
heart bypasses unnecessary). These and other phenomena may explain changes 
in beneficiary or provider behaviors.
The common approach to inferring intervention effects that has gained 
widespread acceptance is the counterfactual model of causality—sometimes 
known as “Rubin’s causal model” (Holland & Rubin, 1988; Rosenbaum & 
Rubin, 1983). The counterfactual model posits that each individual subject 
(e.g., a patient in a hospital or medical home) has two potential outcomes: 
one if the subject is treated by the intervention and another if the subject is 
untreated by the intervention. The difference between these two potential 
outcomes is considered an unbiased estimate of the effect of the intervention 
for that subject. Unfortunately, while we can directly observe an outcome for 
a subject participating in an intervention, we cannot observe their outcome 
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without treatment. The untreated outcome is therefore counterfactual in the 
sense that we cannot simultaneously observe both what would happen under 
intervention and what would have occurred in the absence of the intervention. 
There are three ways to form a counterfactual:
•	 Predict	what	outcomes	would	be	using	study	baseline	information.
•	 Form	a	control	or	comparison	group	and	use	its	performance	during	the	
demonstration period to benchmark intervention performance.
•	 Use	a	comparison	group	and	further	adjust	for	any	remaining	imbalances	
in characteristics relative to the intervention group before benchmarking 
performance.
Consider Figure 10-1, which plots per beneficiary per month (PBPM) 
average costs across base and intervention periods. Assume that the 
intervention population exhibits trend line a'b'c' during the base year before 
the start of the intervention. A counterfactual estimate of performance using 
just intervention beneficiaries can be forecasted using regression modeling of 
the type
 PBPM Costspt = f[time, Zpt] . (10.5)
PBPM Costspt = PBPM costs of the p-th patient in time t; Zpt = vector of 
causal factors (e.g., age, health status) tracked for the p-th beneficiary across 
Figure 10-1. Trends in intervention and comparison groups with 
imbalanced cost levels
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t months; and time = a separate time indicator to capture inflation and other 
forces not captured in Z. If equation 10.5 predicted cost dʹ, midway through 
the demonstration, whereas the intervention group achieved cost level e, then 
the P4P cost-saving effect is (dʹ– e). Macroeconomic analysts of the national 
economy often use this method when no control group is available. 
Two drawbacks to this approach are (1) the prediction errors surrounding 
point dʹ, based on short base periods and few causal variables, are highly 
correlated with cost increases; and (2) the baseline data used in the predicting 
equation may not capture exogenous shocks (e.g., payment changes, 
epidemics). Thus, it is more common to form a control or comparison group 
and use its performance during the intervention period as a benchmark. 
(Comparison groups apply to quasi-experimental designs with nonrandomized 
control groups. We use comparison rather than control hereafter because of 
the general lack of randomized designs in health payment demonstration 
research.) In Figure 10-1, a hypothetical comparison group shows a cost 
trend line of abc during the base period and a cost trend line of cd during the 
demonstration period. As drawn, the comparison group was not perfectly 
balanced on costs with the intervention group. Comparison PBPM costs 
were (aʹ – a) dollars less than costs for the intervention group at the start of 
the base year. We also assume that no exogenous shocks occurred; hence, the 
comparison slope of cd = the slope of abc. 
A naïve calculation of the intervention effect halfway through the 
demonstration is the observed difference (e – d) > 0, or dissavings, which 
we can decompose into an initial imbalance (dʹ – d) and the true, unbiased 
intervention effect (e – dʹ):
 (e – dʹ) = (e – d) – (dʹ – d) (10.6)
Because (dʹ – d) = (bʹ – b), the true intervention effect is recovered by simply 
subtracting out the initial cost imbalance:
 (e – dʹ) = (e – d) – (bʹ – b). (10.7)
If (bʹ – b) = $40 and (e – d) = $30, then the true intervention effect = $30 – $40 
= -$10 and not (e – dʹ) = +$30. In Medicare demonstrations, independent 
actuarial contractors often use equation 10.7 to estimate the financial savings 
for a particular intervention. Making base period adjustments sometimes 
favors or disfavors a participating organization in a demonstration.
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The adjustment is more complicated with exogenous shocks and 
imbalances—not only in base period cost levels, but in trends as well, as 
Figure 10-2 shows. The comparison group begins the base period with 
cost α. Through 12 base period months, comparison costs rise β2 > 0 dollars 
per month. The intervention group starts with costs β1 > 0 greater than the 
comparison group that rise monthly by (β2 + [β3 > 0]), resulting in beneficiary 
monthly costs of f dollars at the demonstration’s go-live date. Thus, at the 
demonstration’s start, intervention costs are even higher than comparison costs 
than at the beginning of the base period (i.e., [f – g] > β1). A “shock” to the 
system is assumed to begin during the intervention period; this shock has the 
general effect of lowering both the comparison and intervention cost trends by 
β4 < 0 dollars monthly. It could be exogenous to the system (a new cost-saving 
drug) or endogenous (RtoM from selecting high-cost beneficiaries). 
Figure 10-2. Trends in intervention and comparison groups with 
imbalanced cost levels and trends
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The intervention is assumed to have an additional β5 cost-reducing 
impact over and above the negative shock effect. β5 is the true, unbiased, 
intervention effect. The mid-demonstration average costs are Yid and Ycd for 
the intervention and comparison groups, respectively. Evaluating intervention 
savings averaged at the demonstration midpoint produces dissavings of 
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(Yid – Ycd) > 0, instead of negative, lower costs. This calculation overestimates 
the intervention effect, which is negative. The standard difference-in-
differences (D-in-D) method produces savings of (Yid – Ycd) – (Yib – Ycb), 
which adjusts for cost differences at the midpoint of the base period. This 
D-in-D effect in a 36-month demonstration can be expressed using growth 
rates as
 D-in-D  = (30 – 6)β3 + (30 – 12)β5, (10.8)
assuming no group differences in attrition or Z level or growth imbalances. 
β1-level imbalances cancel out, but β3 does not unless it is equal to zero, which 
is not the case in Figure 10-2 (the intervention base year slope is greater than 
the comparison slope). Suppose β3 = $10 and β5 = -$5. This would produce a 
D-in-D estimate of intervention dissavings equal to (30 – 6) × $10 + (30 – 12) 
× (-$5) = $240 – $90 = $150. The D-in-D bias = $150 – (-$90) = $240, 
or 2.5 times the true estimate in absolute terms. Such a large discrepancy 
has occurred because the baseline difference in growth rates was so large, 
and in the opposite direction, compared with the intervention effect. The 
baseline growth rate imbalance also ran a longer time (24 months) than the 
intervention effect did (18 months).
Another common way of controlling for unbalanced baseline values is to 
measure intervention performance exclusively in terms of growth rates, not just 
over the base year but from the midpoints of the base year and demonstration 
period. That is, intervention savings are determined by multiplying the 
intervention group’s average base period costs by the differences in comparison 
and intervention growth rates: 
 Savings = Yib[%ΔYcd – %ΔYid]. (10.9)
where %ΔYcd and %ΔYid = the percent change in comparison and intervention 
PBPM costs between the base and demonstration period midpoints. If 
comparison costs grow faster than intervention costs, then positive savings 
are generated; the opposite is true if intervention costs rise faster than 
comparison costs. Now, assume α = $1,000, β1 = $50, β2 = $10, β3 = $5.25, β4 
= -$2.50, and β5 = -$1.25. Intervention costs start $50 higher and grow $5.25 
per month faster than comparison costs, $10. A shock reduces the rate of cost 
increase by $2.50 per month in both groups during the demonstration period, 
but intervention costs grow an additional $1.25 slower. Dissavings based on 
equation 10.8 are $103.50, compared with -$27.00 per month of true savings by 
mid-demonstration, based on equation 10.9 (-$1.25). 
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In most instances, using the differential growth rate method will not 
produce such erroneous estimates of savings because comparison and base 
period imbalances are generally not as pronounced as in our example. The 
point, however, is that success in isolating P4P effects depends on how well 
matched control groups are on both levels and growth rates. Balancing the 
comparison group on average baseline costs is insufficient when using the 
D-in-D method. The comparison group must also be balanced on baseline 
trends. Whether the comparison group is, in fact, dually balanced at baseline 
is an empirical, hence statistical, question. If baseline intervention costs 
average 2 percent more than comparison group costs but the difference is 
not statistically significant, then no adjustment should be made for baseline 
imbalances in cost levels. If 2 percent were statistically significant, we would 
have to assume a consistent difference over time that then should be adjusted 
for when determining the counterfactual benchmark. 
Statistically testing differences in baseline trends is much more difficult 
than in testing differences in levels because doing so requires a test of multiple 
observations over time. Using t-tests for beginning and end periods in the base 
period is a weak approach because one or both observations may not represent 
the overall trend. A better approach is to estimate the trend line through 
several subperiod points (e.g., monthly or quarterly average costs). For short 
trend lines, which are common in demonstration designs, few observations are 
available (e.g., 12 months or 4 quarters), resulting in relatively high standard 
errors of estimated growth rates. In these circumstances, rejecting the null 
hypothesis that baseline trends do not differ between the intervention and 
comparison groups is subject to Type II errors (i.e., rejecting true baseline 
differences in growth rates).
Regardless of the results of statistical tests of baseline differences in levels 
and trends, using an unbalanced comparison group can bias intervention 
effects. The gold standard of research designs is the randomized trial. With 
randomization, two groups should have no systematic differences, on average, 
in their baseline levels or trends. Netting out the performance of the control 
group leaves the intervention effect as a residual D-in-D. Nevertheless, 
balanced randomization requires large enough sample sizes to ensure that 
any meaningful imbalances disappear, usually within 30 cases (Rosner, 2006, 
p. 184). Very few Medicare demonstrations, unfortunately, have the ability to 
randomize subjects (later in this chapter, we describe how a few prominent 
demonstrations have selected comparison groups). In the next section, we 
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review two methods for balancing study and comparison groups in quasi-
experimental designs: (1) ex post regression matching and (2) propensity 
score matching. Both methods are becoming more common ways of balancing 
the two groups and raising the confidence that policy makers can have in 
demonstration findings.
Ex Post Regression Matching
In quasi-experimental demonstration designs, available data, short start-up 
periods, and preferences of participating sites for matching on only one or 
two characteristics (e.g., age, baseline costs) may make forming a balanced 
comparison group infeasible. Also, not being able to evaluate intervention 
subgroups, especially beneficiaries who agree to participate in a Medicare 
intervention, is a real drawback to policy makers and interveners, who often 
wish to have the program evaluated on the patients who are willing to undergo 
the intervention. 
We can use ex post regression matching to address both of these drawbacks. 
Consider the following fully interacted model that uses a D-in-D regression 
approach to isolate the impact of a P4P intervention on the rate of growth in 
costs with one explicit group characteristic Z (e.g., percent disabled): 
 Ypt = α + β1Ip + β2t + β3Ipt + β4tDt + β5tDtIp (10.10)
   + μZp + γ1ZpIp + γ2tZp + γ3tZpIp + γ4tZpDt
  + γ5tZpDt Ip + εpt, 
where
•	 Ypt = the cost of the p-th beneficiary in year t;
•	 Ip = an intervention indicator: 1 = in intervention; 0 = in comparison 
group;
•	 Dt = a demonstration period time indicator: 1 = during demonstration; 
0 = base year;
•	 Ipt = an interaction term tracking time changes (t) in Y for the 
intervention group;
•	 tDt, tDtIp = interaction terms tracking time changes only during 
the demonstration period for the control and intervention groups, 
respectively;
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•	 Zp = an unmatched, observable characteristic of p-th patient in the t-th 
period;
•	 tZp × Dt × Ip = interaction term tracking changes in only the intervention 
group during the demonstration period, adjusted by the patients’ Z value;
•	 α,	βx, μ, and γy = regression coefficients; and
•	 εpt = regression error term for costs unexplained by included variables.
The α, β, μ, γ and I, t, and D values together reproduce Figure 10-2. 
Table 10-1 presents the full-effects matrix. The sums of coefficients in each 
cell are an exact analog to a nested cross-tabulation of means of the two 
demonstration groups at the midpoints in each of two periods. Definitions are 
as follows: 
•	 Zio, Zco = intervention and comparison average Z values at the start of the 
base period (e.g., percent female); 
•	 tib = (ti – tib), tcb = (tc – tcb) = average number of months of eligibility, 
adjusted for attrition, for intervention and comparison beneficiaries 
halfway through the base period; 
•	 ti, tc = average total number of months of eligibility of intervention and 
comparison beneficiaries; 
•	 tid, tcd = average number of months of eligibility of intervention and 
comparison beneficiaries during the intervention; and 
•	 Zi,12, Zc,12 = intervention and comparison average Z values in month 12 at 
the start of the demonstration period. 
Excluding Z from the regression model produces beta coefficients that reflect 
all of the uncontrolled factors affecting levels and trends in costs in the 
intervention and comparison groups.
Beginning with the base period comparison group cell, α + μZco = the 
comparison group’s mean cost at the beginning of the base period. μZco 
accounts for the initial comparison cost specific to a Z variable (e.g., poor 
health status), weighted by γ1, or the marginal effect on cost of a higher 
percentage of the comparison group in initially poor health. β2 is the 
comparison group’s monthly change in cost unrelated to Z (Z-neutral). 
Multiplied by tcb, the average number of attrition-adjusted baseline eligible 
months for comparison beneficiaries halfway through the base period, tcbβ2, 
captures the growth effects of any other factors besides Z. Zcotcbγ2 reflects the 
additional baseline cost growth contributed by the Z variable. 
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Table 10-1 allows for several imbalance effects. The difference between the 
intervention and comparison groups’ base period average costs is found in the 
difference row in the first column. β1 + μ(Zio – Zco) + γ1Zio is the difference in 
intervention versus comparison base period cost levels including the separate 
Z variable effects. μ(Zio – Zco) is the group difference in initial base period Z 
values, weighted by the comparison group’s marginal effect, μ, of Z. γ1Zio is the 
cost effect of the intervention Z value over and above μ. Similarly, γ2(Ziotib – 
Zcotcb) is the impact of the Z differences on midpoint baseline average costs, 
weighted by the comparison group’s marginal trend factor, γ2. γ3Ziotib is the 
additional intervention Z effect from having a different base period growth 
rate. β3tib is any additional, Z-neutral cost impact of a different baseline growth 
rate in the intervention group. Demonstration period differences in mean 
intervention-comparison group costs build on initial period level and growth 
imbalances. β4, β5, γ4, and γ5 (second column) add potentially new differences 
resulting from shocks and true intervention effects. 
The elements that make up the lower right cell in Table 10-1 are the most 
interesting. They represent an expanded version of the D-in-D intervention 
effect in equation 10.7. The eight terms capture all of the possible ways 
that the intervention may have altered the expected cost levels during the 
demonstration. 
Table 10-1. Difference-in-differences mean predicted costs with imbalances
Base Period 
(D = 0)
Demonstration Period  
(D = 1)
Difference
Intervention 
(I = 1)
α + β1 + (μ + γ1) Zio
 + tib(β2 + β3)
 + Ziotib(γ2 + γ3)
α + β1 + ti(β2 + β3)
 + tid(β4 + β5)
  + Zio[μ + γ1)+ ti(γ2 + γ3)]
 + tidZi,12(γ4 + γ5) 
(ti – tib)(β2 + β3) 
 + tid(β4 + β5) 
 + (ti – tib)Zio(γ2 + γ3) 
 + tidZi,12(γ4 + γ5)
Comparison 
(I = 0)
α + μZco
 + tcbβ2
 + Zcotcbγ2
α + tcβ2 + tcdβ4
 + Zco(μ + tcγ2)
 + tcdZc ,12γ4
(tc – tcb) β2 + tcdβ4
 + Zco (tc – tcb)γ2
 + tcdZc,12γ4
Difference β1 + β2(tib – tcb) + β3tib
 + μ(Zio – Zco) + γ1Zio
 + γ2(Ziotib – Zcotcb)
 + γ3Ziotib
β1+ β2(ti – tc) + tiβ3 
 + β4(tid – tcd) + tidβ5
 + μ(Zio – Zco) + γ1Zio 
  + γ2(tiZio – tcZco) + γ3tiZio 
 + γ4(tidZi,12 – tcdZc,12)
 + γ5tidZi,12
[(ti – tc) – (tib – tcb)]β2 
 + (ti – tib)β3
 + (tid – tcd)β4 + tidβ5
 + γ2[(ti – tib)Zio – (tc – tcb)Zco]
 + γ3(ti – tib)Zio 
 + γ4(tidZi,12 – tcdZc,12)
 + γ5tidZi,12
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To illustrate the effects of the eight possible terms in the D-in-D calculation, 
we developed a simulation model to test the effects of various imbalances. The 
results are shown in Table 10-2. The first column assumes no imbalances from 
differences in intervention and comparison group costs at the beginning of 
the base period (Zio = Zco = 0.1, or 10 percent) or from any differences in base 
period growth rates (i.e., β1 = β3 = γ1 = γ3 = 0). 
It also assumes no differences in the 1 percent attrition rates between study 
and control groups; that is, (tid – tcd) and (tib – tcb) = 0. The only D-in-D effects 
are those due to nonzero β5 and γ5 values. The β5 coefficient was assumed to be 
one-half as large as the decline in the comparison group’s growth rate due to a 
shock after the base period, which, in turn, was assumed to be -25 percent of 
the 1 percent monthly comparison growth in costs during the base period, or 
-0.005. Starting base period costs were decomposed into a $1,000 mean PBPM 
Table 10-2. Simulation effects of intervention, imbalances, and attrition on per 
beneficiary per month costs
Simulation Effects Ba
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[(ti – tc) – (tib – tcb)]β2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -20.97
(ti – tib)β3 0.00 0.00 0.00 69.93 0.00
(tid – tcd)β4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.24
tidβ5 -16.65 -16.65 -16.65 -25.39 -14.03
γ2[(ti – tib)Zio – (tc – tcb)Zco] 0.00 3.33 13.32 13.32 -1.05
γ3(ti – tib)Zio 0.00 0.00 0.00 20.98 0.00
γ4(tidZi,12 – tcdZc,12) 0.00 -0.83 -3.33 -3.33 0.26
γ5tidZi,12 -0.83 -1.25 -5.00 -7.62 -0.70
Total -17.48 -15.40 -11.66 67.89 -31.25
Percent PBPM Cost -1.44 -1.27 -0.84 4.89 -2.57
PBPM = per beneficiary per month.
Baseline Complete Balance Parameters:
α  = $1,000; μ = $500; β1 = 0; γ1 = 0
β2  = 0.01α; β3 = 0.5(0.01)(α + β1); β4 = -0.25β2; β5 = 0.5(-0.25)(β2 + β3) 
γ2  = 0.01μ; γ3 = 0.5(0.01)(μ + γ1); γ4 = 0.25γ2; γ5 = 0.5(-0.25)(γ2 + γ3)
Zio = Zco = 0.1; attrition = 0.01 per month
tib  = tcb = 5.62; tid = tcd = 13.32; ti = tc = 18.94
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in Z-neutral costs plus another $500 in PBPM costs associated with a single Z 
variable (e.g., percent disabled). 
These assumptions result in β2 = $10 per month increase in Z-neutral 
comparison group costs, and another γ2 = $5 monthly increase resulting from 
Z. Assuming the base period ran 12 months and the demonstration period was 
36 months with a constant attrition of 1 percent per month, tidβ5 = 13.32(-1.25) 
= -16.65. The intervention’s cost effect via Z was γ5tidZi,12 = (-1.25)(13.32)
(0.1) = -0.83, assuming the percentage disabled did not change during the 
demonstration. The Z effect is only 5 percent of the Z-neutral β effect because 
of the compound assumption: μ = 0.5α and γ1 = 0.10. The overall effect of 
the intervention on PBPM costs was -$17.48 in savings, or 1.4 percent of the 
comparison group’s mean PBPM cost during the demonstration period. This 
amount is the average dollar savings per month per beneficiary that resulted 
from the intervention’s effect being half as large (-0.125) as the 25 percent 
reduction caused by the negative shock in the comparison (and intervention) 
group’s 1 percent monthly cost growth in the base (and demonstration) 
periods. (We assumed that RtoM would slow the rate of cost growth in both 
groups.) 
In Table 10-2, the second and third columns show the intervention effects of 
a 50 percent imbalance only in the Z variable—first, when Zco = 10 percent and 
then when Zco = 40 percent (β1 = β3 = γ1 = γ3 = 0). The (γ2 + γ4) rows capture 
the effects of the Z imbalance on differential cost growth. The γ2 effect of 3.33 
in the second column is the higher growth that occurs in the intervention 
during the demonstration period caused by, say, a higher percentage disabled 
(i.e., 15 percent versus 10 percent). The γ4 effect debits the γ2 effect by -0.83 
because the demonstration period’s shock effect is working off a higher Z value 
at the start of the demonstration. The net Z imbalance effect is $2.08 higher 
costs. With a much higher percentage disabled in the base period (i.e., 60 
percent intervention, 40 percent comparison group), the Z imbalance increases 
by a factor of 4 under the model’s assumptions, resulting in higher mean 
intervention costs of $10 ($13.32 – $3.33) during the demonstration period. 
Note, too, that under our assumption, the intervention’s γ5 effect becomes 
more negative with a higher percentage disabled in the intervention group. 
This phenomenon occurs because we assume that the constant γ5 intervention 
effect on Z is working on a higher Z-related cost at the beginning of the 
demonstration period. A disabled rate of 60 percent among the intervention 
group versus 40 percent among the comparison group results in intervention 
savings falling from -$17.48 to -$11.66, a one-third reduction.
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Column 4 shows the impact when we assume that the intervention group 
begins with 5 percent higher Z-neutral and Z-related costs at the start of the 
base period (β1 = 50, γ1 = 25) and the intervention’s percentage disabled is 60 
percent versus 40 percent in the comparison group. This produces $69.93 in 
higher intervention group costs averaged halfway through the demonstration 
from higher base period Z-neutral growth on a base of $1,050, which is offset 
somewhat by -$25.39 because of the intervention’s cost reduction effect during 
the demonstration. Z-specific level and growth imbalances add another $23.35 
that offsets intervention-induced cost reductions. Thus, level and growth 
imbalances appear to make the intervention group more expensive than the 
comparison group when the true intervention effects, β5 + γ5, reduce costs by 
-$33 (-$25.39 + -$7.62). The standard D-in-D model that compares average 
changes in mean costs between the base and demonstration periods fails 
to adjust for differences in base period growth trends that build upon cost 
imbalances from the start of the base period. 
The last column simulates the impact of a doubling of the 1 percent 
beneficiary attrition rate in the intervention group during the demonstration 
period. In this case, the β2 effect is negative and substantial (-$20.97) given 
the other baseline parameters. The β2 effect is negative because intervention 
beneficiaries, on average, remain in the demonstration period a shorter 
time than comparison beneficiaries and experience a censoring in their 
underlying monthly growth in costs. This negative effect is partially offset 
by $5.24 more in β4-related costs because intervention beneficiaries are not 
experiencing the cost-saving effects as long as the comparison group is, over 
the full demonstration period. The net attrition effect of -$31.25 slightly 
overstates intervention cost savings of -$14.73 (-$14.03 + -$0.70). Note that 
this exercise assumes that intervention attrition is randomly distributed among 
beneficiaries, which is unlikely to be the case. If higher attrition occurred 
among the more costly, sicker beneficiaries, then apparent (but not true) 
savings would be greater. That is, early intervention mortality saves money.
Inserting additional Z characteristics into the regression model will help 
to purge the crucial β3 coefficient of imbalances in levels and growth rates. 
Nonetheless, unobservable Z characteristics may still bias the results. In 
provider-based P4P interventions, these variables might include intervention-
comparison group differences in risk taking, local competition, staffing quality, 
efficiency levels, and Hawthorne effects of simply being monitored. A few of 
these characteristics may be quantifiable with some effort, but staff quality, 
Hawthorne effects, and such will likely remain uncontrolled, although they 
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are technically accounted for in the β3 and β5 coefficients. Because the missing 
characteristics are likely to contribute to the intervention’s ostensible success 
in a simple D-in-D test, one should be cautious in interpreting intervention 
success even after using ex post regression matching. 
Propensity Score Matching
A common alternative to using regression to statistically adjust for study-
control imbalances ex post is to conform the comparison group as closely as 
possible to the intervention group ex ante. The objective of propensity score 
matching is to create a comparison group that is similar to the intervention 
group on the basis of observed characteristics. The mechanism for this 
matching is the propensity score—the probability that a subject would 
be selected for the intervention, conditional on measured characteristics 
(Rosenbaum & Rubin, 1983). Typically, one would identify a pool of untreated 
subjects and merge this pool with the intervention subjects. One would then 
estimate a logistic regression by regressing intervention status (1 = intervention 
group, 0 = comparison pool) on a set of characteristics that is available for all 
subjects. Using the logistic equation, one can then estimate the probability 
that each potential comparison subject would have been a member of the 
intervention group if he or she had been asked. This estimated probability is 
the propensity score, which condenses information from all the characteristics 
into a single score (Rubin, 1997). Propensity scores are particularly useful 
when many continuous variables are available for comparison.
One can plot the distribution of propensity scores in each group to 
examine the overlap in scores. Intervention group subjects will often have 
higher propensity scores than those in the comparison pool, as illustrated 
by Figure 10-3. One can infer causal effects only for regions of overlap in the 
scores because subjects with low propensity scores are very unlikely to have 
been selected for the intervention. Strictly speaking, one should also omit 
intervention patients outside the region of overlap from the analyses, although 
this may be objectionable in studies that initially have only small numbers of 
intervention participants.
Once all subjects have a propensity score, a common approach is to divide 
all subjects into quintiles of propensity scores and then to select equal numbers 
of intervention and comparison subjects from each quintile. If a large enough 
pool of comparison subjects is available, it may also be possible to select 
multiple comparisons for each intervention subject (called “many-to-one 
matching”). 
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There are three main methods for estimating intervention effects using 
propensity scores. The first is simply to conduct comparative analyses using the 
propensity-matched comparison group because it serves as a counterfactual 
for inferring intervention effects without any further adjustment. If we observe 
all relevant confounding characteristics, then the difference between the 
outcomes for the intervention and comparison groups provides an unbiased 
estimate of the true effect of the intervention. This is a strong assumption, and 
in practice, the propensity score approach may remove much but not all of the 
potential selection bias in the estimate. The threat of bias is especially strong 
when the available observed characteristics include only demographic variables 
or administrative data that are not causally related to the actual selection 
mechanism.
The second method is to employ the propensity score as a covariate in the 
statistical model estimating intervention effects. The third method is to weight 
the results by the propensity score. All nonintervention subjects form the 
comparison group, and their outcomes are weighted by their propensity scores. 
Subjects with higher weights are more likely to be intervention subjects; hence, 
their performance justifies a higher weight. Recent simulation work, however, 
suggests that many propensities close to 0 or to 1 may compromise the validity 
of using a continuous weighting approach (Schafer & Kang, 2008). 
Figure 10-3. Hypothetical distribution of propensity scores by group, 
showing regions in which scores do not overlap
N of subjects
No overlapNo overlap
Propensity score
0 0.5 1
Intervention subjects Comparison subjects
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In practice, the propensity score approach has several limitations when 
applied to P4P analyses. One problem is that policy makers and program 
developers may not be familiar with the propensity score approach. They 
may not trust the extent to which the propensity score actually adjusts for 
potential biases, although recently policy makers appear to be more open to the 
method (see the discussion later in this chapter on Medicare provider-based 
demonstrations). Traditionally, policy makers and participating sites have 
preferred a matching approach in which the matching factors and comparisons 
are more readily apparent. 
A second drawback is that propensity scoring may be difficult because of the 
nature of P4P outcomes. The most straightforward application of propensity 
scores occurs when the outcome is a single measure that applies to all patients. 
However, most quality indicators are relevant only for select subgroups of 
patients (e.g., mammograms for women aged 50 or older, hemoglobin A1c tests 
for persons with diabetes). Technically, the propensity score approach requires 
a separate comparison group for each of these outcomes, which would each 
require separate propensity models as well. One way to address this complexity 
might be to use propensity scoring to identify a single overall comparison 
group. For example, patients from a set of physician group practices might 
be matched by propensity scores with patients from a comparison set of 
physician group practices. One could then proceed under the assumption that 
any subgroups within the intervention and comparison groups (e.g., diabetic 
patients) were comparable for analysis purposes. 
external threats to Validity
Even if comparison groups were well matched with intervention groups, and 
even if adequate adjustments produced statistically balanced groups ex post, 
policy makers would still have to extrapolate responses to P4P incentives 
from small samples of intervention organizations and beneficiaries to the 
whole population in a national program. Two particularly relevant threats 
to external validity, or “to what populations, settings, treatment variables, 
and measurement variables can [the intervention’s] effect be generalized,” 
(Campbell et al., 1963, p. 5) are as follows:
1. interaction of selection and the experimental (intervention) variable, 
or the selection of unique participants who respond differently to an 
intervention than most other groups; and
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2. reactive effects to experimental arrangements, in which respondents and 
interveners respond in part to an intervention simply by being in an 
experiment. 
Selection-Intervention Interactions
Under internal threats, differential selection occurs when the intervention 
selects subjects (e.g., beneficiaries) who differ in important ways, affecting 
outcomes from subjects in the comparison group. External interactive selection 
threats often result from systematic differences in the whole population of 
subjects in different geographic areas regardless of whether they end up in 
the intervention or control group. Threats to generalizability also depend on 
beneficiary eligibility criteria.
Cultural differences across areas may inhibit changes in eating habits. 
Getting exercise may also be more difficult in an inner-city environment than 
in other areas. Introducing the same disease management program in both 
rural Appalachia and Salt Lake City is likely to produce very different results 
simply because of differences in each area’s underlying health needs. Areas with 
greater need for health care services may result in greater intervention gains in 
health outcomes and possibly lower costs from changed lifestyles than would 
occur across a nationwide program.
Population-based P4P demonstrations put sites at risk for intervention 
nonparticipants, in which case the overall probability of intervention success is 
inversely related to the beneficiary participation rate assuming nonparticipants 
perform more like the control group. Beneficiaries in some areas will be 
more or less willing or capable of participating than in other areas. Moreover, 
populations most in need may be the least likely to participate because of 
poorer health status, poverty, language, and other factors.
Success also depends upon participants’ ability to access the health care 
system for key tests, check-ups, and timely treatment. Distance and scarcity 
of primary care physicians and hospitals with state-of-the-art equipment are 
both problems in rural areas. Some P4P interventions that extend a Centers 
of Excellence imprimatur to selected providers depend on local competition 
for their success (Cromwell et al., 1998). A Centers of Excellence imprimatur 
extended to a monopolistic hospital will not show the same shift in patient 
volumes as it would to a hospital in a competitive market.
Provider-based demonstrations present particularly serious interactive 
selection threats to generalizing findings. Because all provider applicants 
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are volunteers, they automatically differ (often in unmeasurable ways) from 
other potentially qualified providers who decide not to apply. As volunteers, 
participants are likely to be more comfortable with and adaptable to incentives 
in the intervention. High-occupancy hospitals are likely to be more interested 
in avoiding unnecessary admissions. Teaching hospitals, which place a higher 
value on quality, research, and prestige than community hospitals do, are likely 
to be more inclined to participate in quality-enhancing demonstrations.
Often, demonstration applicants already have exceptional staff 
available to implement the intervention. In fact, CMS usually insists on 
this. Demonstration staff tend to have previous experience with similar 
interventions, have more extensive training, and be more innovative than 
clinicians elsewhere. They are likely to be more familiar with evidence-based 
practice and the research literature. Moreover, charismatic leaders with a 
personal interest in the success of their proposed intervention often are integral 
to demonstration success. Although national programs can disseminate 
intervention protocols to other practitioners in other settings, they cannot 
transfer the original staff and working environments. 
Expenditures made by providers before the demonstration, called 
infrastructure sunk costs, lower their financial risk of participating in a 
novel payment reform. Providers tend to apply only if they have already 
made considerable investments, such as electronic medical records, in the 
intervention. They build on existing investments and simply spread their fixed 
costs over more patients. Far less infrastructure capacity would be available to 
other provider groups in a national program. 
The more risk-averse the provider group, the less likely it is to participate 
in a demonstration when profits are at risk. Dominant market providers 
are often more risk-averse than smaller competitors and do not participate 
because they enjoy a secure financial position. P4P gainsharing demonstrations 
depend on the willingness of physicians to share financial risk and bonuses 
with hospitals. Physician-hospital organizations that agree to participate in 
these demonstrations are more willing than other groups to reduce inpatient 
consulting services. Gainsharing incentives are more attractive to providers 
who have been practicing less efficiently in the past. These providers are most 
likely to make improvements and capture whatever rewards are offered. 
Reactive Effects to Experimental Arrangements
Three kinds of reactive effects to P4P interventions can limit the 
generalizability of a demonstration’s findings to a national program. First, 
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almost by definition, applicants to CMS demonstrations are innovative 
risk takers. They have fewer qualms about being closely monitored by the 
government, submitting the necessary data for evaluation, and permitting 
probing interviews regarding their operations, intervention strategies, and 
challenges. They are naturally more adaptive and flexible in structure and 
philosophy than most nonapplicants. Their management also tends to be more 
confident that they can bring the demonstration to a successful conclusion. 
Implementing the intervention in other sites will likely meet more internal 
resistance with less management support, less data support, and thus less 
success.
Second, CMS assigns each site a demonstration project officer who 
interacts with site management regularly and ensures that the site adheres to 
the terms and conditions of the demonstration contract. All sites also have a 
CMS research project officer who oversees the independent cost and quality 
evaluator. Consequently, providers and disease management organizations may 
spend more time contacting patients than they would without such intensive 
oversight (i.e., the Hawthorne effect). Moreover, in interviews, demonstration 
site staff may tend to report what evaluators want to hear, downplay problems, 
and generally overstate their successes. In any case, a national program is 
unlikely to have such intensive government oversight.
Third, CMS contractors provide nearly all P4P demonstration sites with 
periodic updates in their cost and quality performance. Although to some 
degree sites are able to track their performance using their own data, they 
need Medicare to provide them with utilization and spending statistics for 
services outside their network. Commercial disease management organizations 
depend to an even greater extent on the government for data because they 
have no immediate access to any Medicare claims. A large, geographically 
diverse, national program is unlikely to match the cost, rapidity, and depth 
of information that CMS provides to demonstration sites. Without such 
feedback, such groups would find it difficult to make midcourse corrections 
in their intervention implementation protocols, resulting in less satisfactory 
performance than among better-informed demonstration participants.
examples of Demonstration Comparison Groups 
Having reviewed the internal and external threats to valid P4P findings and 
ways that comparison groups can be balanced to ensure valid inferences, 
we next describe how a select number of Medicare P4P demonstrations 
constructed the counterfactual comparison group and the problems inherent 
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in deriving valid, unbiased findings. To illustrate the different needs and 
kinds of comparison groups, we divide demonstrations into those that are 
population-based and those that are provider-based. We further stratify 
provider-based demonstrations by whether they cover essentially all Medicare 
services or just hospital inpatient services. We further stratify all-services 
demonstrations into those that cover all beneficiaries and those that cover a 
subset of high-cost and/or high-risk beneficiaries. The last subset includes 
most of the disease management interventions. Demonstrations we selected for 
special study are as follows:
1. Medicare Health Support Pilot Program (MHS): population-based, all 
services
2. Indiana Health Information Exchange Demonstration (IHIE): 
population-based, all services
3. Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration: provider-based, all 
services, all beneficiaries 
4. Care Management for High-Cost Beneficiaries Demonstration (CMHCB): 
provider-based, all services, high-cost and high-risk beneficiaries
5. Medicare Hospital Gainsharing Demonstration: provider-based, hospital 
services, all or selected diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) 
Medicare Health Support Pilot Program
In randomized clinical trials, beneficiaries are usually asked to participate in a 
trial, then the investigators randomize them to the study or control (placebo) 
group. In population-based demonstrations such as the MHS pilot,5 CMS first 
solicited applications from commercial disease management organizations to 
recruit and then manage the intervention group mostly using registered nurses 
in remote call centers. Once CMS selected applicants within their proposed 
geographic areas, the agency then prerandomized beneficiaries meeting heart 
failure and diabetes eligibility and minimum cost thresholds to intervention 
and control groups. We discuss threats from historical trends and differential 
selection three ways, involving the prerandomization process, the success 
in engaging beneficiaries, and the way CMS addressed discontinuities in 
eligibility.
5 The Care Level Management and Key to Better Health interventions in the CMHCB 
Demonstration also involved prerandomization.
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Prerandomization selection problems. In MHS, prerandomization took 
place 3–8 months before the disease management organization began 
to actively recruit beneficiaries. At each site, 30,000 beneficiaries were 
randomized on a 2:1 ratio to the intervention and comparison groups. Because 
beneficiaries had not been screened for their willingness to participate, 
participating sites had to recruit beneficiaries appearing on their assigned list 
of intervention beneficiaries. The demonstration’s financial incentives followed 
a standard intent-to-treat design. Sites were financially responsible for the cost 
and outcome trends of all intervention beneficiaries and not just those they 
recruited. This strategy minimized any incentive to recruit only beneficiaries 
thought to be most successful in the intervention. 
CMS expected such large sample sizes to balance intervention and 
comparison groups in terms of cost levels and baseline growth rates (i.e., 
minimize differences in history and differential selection). Subsequent analysis, 
however, showed a cost imbalance of 1–4 percentage points for or against 
the site. Most of this difference occurred during the 3- to 8-month hiatus 
between randomization and the start date. Although the differences were 
statistically insignificant, the fact that sites had to achieve at least 5 percent 
lower intervention costs during the demonstration or return all fees made such 
differences meaningful. During financial reconciliation, the program eventually 
made an actuarial adjustment to pilot period costs for any difference between 
intervention and comparison group costs caused by the lagged start date. Some 
organizations benefitted from the adjustment and others were penalized by it. 
Adjusting performance for only statistically significant base year differences 
may have been more justified. In a separate analysis, evaluators used ex post 
regression to control for minor imbalances in patient characteristics (e.g., age, 
gender, race, severity scores) that might cause different rates of cost growth in 
the intervention and comparison groups (McCall et al., 2008).
Engagement problems. The MHS intervention did not recruit all 
beneficiaries who were randomized to the intervention group and alive at the 
start date. The program was unable to reach some beneficiaries because they 
were in institutions, their addresses and telephone numbers had changed, 
or they had moved out of the area. A few beneficiaries were too cognitively 
impaired to participate. Others refused when asked; some refused because they 
had a terminal illness with short life expectancy and others did not want to be 
bothered. For whatever reason, the engaged intervention group was healthier 
than either the pool of intervention nonparticipants or the entire comparison 
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group. This phenomenon produced an additional imbalance between the 
benchmark comparison group and those whom the sites were actually 
counseling. Failure to achieve the required level of savings may be out of the 
site’s control to some degree. This failure also posed a political disadvantage 
with the prerandomization strategy when sites complained that they ought to 
be judged on the participants they did have rather than on nonparticipants. 
Evaluating success only on participants can be a persuasive argument with 
politicians who are unfamiliar with the intent-to-treat logic of a clinical trial.
Participation discontinuities. In clinical trials, all intervention subjects are 
followed for the length of the trial; beneficiaries in population-based Medicare 
demonstrations such as the MHS pilot, however, may drop out from the 
intervention within the first few months or even days.6 Even if participants and 
nonparticipants incur similar costs, differential attrition can bias the estimate 
of intervention savings, as we showed when analyzing the D-in-D method 
(see Table 10-2). Shorter average participation in the intervention group can 
produce lower average monthly costs in that group than in the comparison 
group because the truncated time period censors the effects of positive cost 
increases in general.
Of particular concern is any differential mortality of beneficiaries who 
die only a few days or weeks after the start of the demonstration. Those 
beneficiaries remain in the analytic database, usually with a very high monthly 
cost, although the disease management organization had little chance to 
intervene in these cases. Although the frequency of such cases should be 
similar in the intervention and comparison groups if the groups are balanced 
at the start date, they can add substantial noise to any statistical test of 
intervention success. 
The MHS used two approaches for dealing with dropouts in evaluating 
costs. The simplest approach is to drop beneficiaries with fewer than 
1–3 months of eligibility, assuming that the intervention would have had no 
time to interact with them. The second approach weights the monthly costs 
by the fraction of time they were eligible in either the intervention or control 
group. Weighting mimics the actuarial approach of simply summing costs 
incurred regardless of a beneficiary’s duration in the intervention and dividing 
by all eligible months. 
6 Techniques exist for adjusting patient dropouts and drop-ins in randomized clinical trials 
(Rosner, 2006, pp. 422–423). Drop-ins are patients who receive the treatment outside of the 
intervention.
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Almost all Medicare demonstrations also experience intermittent eligibility 
that produces “involuntary noncompliance.” In the MHS pilot, some 
beneficiaries experienced ineligible spells because they lost Medicare Part A 
or B coverage, joined a managed care plan, or experienced other disqualifying 
events. Beneficiaries were allowed to return to the intervention, and some did. 
Disease management organizations argue that they should not be responsible 
for any utilization or adverse events that occurred while beneficiaries were 
ineligible, and CMS agreed. Yet gaps in cost (and quality) measures can 
introduce bias if related in any way to intervention status.
Instrumentation problems. As in many other demonstrations, the MHS 
excludes certain services from its cost calculations. Usual exclusions include 
hospice, end-stage renal disease, and nursing home costs. The MHS pilot 
also allowed sites to choose up to 14 different quality process measures 
to demonstrate that quality of care had not been compromised by disease 
management. Some sites chose as few as 4 indicators that covered both heart 
failure and diabetes. Although evaluators applied the same exclusion criteria 
to the comparison group, the exclusions raise questions about the validity of 
intervention performance.
Statistical significance and regression-to-the-mean problems. Despite 
substantial variation in beneficiary cost levels and growth rates, the large 
sample sizes in the MHS pilot generated levels of statistical significance on the 
order of 3.5–4.0 percent of the comparison group’s PBPM cost. Given the 5 
percent minimum savings requirement, the demonstration required study and 
control sample sizes of 20,000 and 10,000, respectively, in each of eight sites. 
Both groups also exhibited substantial RtoM in demonstration period costs. 
The large cost increases experienced by beneficiaries with low costs in the 
base period made it particularly difficult for sites to target beneficiaries at high 
risk for cost increases. Most targeting algorithms focus on beneficiaries who 
experienced unusually high utilization in the base period. 
Selection-experiment interactions. The eight MHS sites were distributed 
around the country. Some were more urban than others. Although none of the 
commercial interventions were successful in controlling costs (McCall et al., 
2008), geography could have been responsible for some of the null findings. 
Local beneficiaries may have been less responsive to management counseling 
or less likely to participate and comply with recommendations. The local 
supply of primary care physicians and hospitals may have biased results against 
disease counseling. The fact that all eight interventions used registered nurses 
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in remote call centers to counsel participants suggests, however, that geography 
did not play a critical role because the selection of area did not correlate with 
the key intervention activity. If several sites had been successful, then policy 
makers could have been confident that the success would generalize to other 
areas in a national program.
Reaction to experimental arrangements. The major concern with most 
CMS demonstrations is their replicability. Because commercial disease 
management organizations do not provide direct care to a predetermined 
set of their own patients, no concern exists about replicating the remote call 
center approach elsewhere. However, CMS staff perform a close oversight role 
on demonstration groups in tracking quarterly contacts and performing other 
such tasks. The agency also provides sites with quarterly cost information. 
Whether such support would exist in a national program is unclear. (See 
Chapter 11 for a longer discussion of this topic.) 
Indiana Health Information Exchange Demonstration 
IHIE is a population-based P4P initiative that includes all health insurers and 
physician practices treating the majority of patients in the greater Indianapolis 
area. The program makes incentive payments to provider groups and also 
provides them with claims and clinical information to improve quality. The 
demonstration is still in progress and no findings are available as of October 
2010, but because of the need for regional approaches to solve problems in 
care discontinuities, reviewing the way the comparison group was formed is 
valuable.
For the IHIE Medicare demonstration, savings are based on the differences 
in cost trends between demonstration groups in Indianapolis and in a set 
of comparison cities. Nine similarly sized potential metropolitan statistical 
areas (MSAs) were identified in the Indiana region of the country. The 
program identified a final set of comparison MSAs based on 14 indicators 
(see Table 10-3). The nine candidate MSAs were ranked from 1 to 9, relative 
to Indianapolis, on the 14 characteristics using an absolute difference from 
the IHIE measure. In producing an overall ranking for each MSA, Medicare 
per capita spending levels and growth rates were weighted 5, mortality was 
weighted 3, and all other characteristics were weighted 1. Medicare spending 
was weighted 5 times more than most other characteristics because of the 
shared savings model used in the demonstration. 
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Medicare Expenditures per 
Beneficiary, 2005
7,303 8,428 7,415 7,192 7,374 7,094 7,358 7,154 6,784 7,632 5
Medicare Part A Share per 
Beneficiary, 2005
0.57 0.59 0.58 0.55 0.57 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.56 0.57 1
Percent Change in Medicare 
Expenditures per Beneficiary, 
2000-2005
47.2 45.2 42.4 46.5 40.5 28.3 44.7 41.5 34.2 37.5 5
Hospital Beds per 10,000 
Population
21.9 35.9 24.3 33.4 30.6 29.2 31.9 27.1 35.0 34.4 1
Patient Care Physicians per 10,000 
Population
26.1 36.0 26.9 25.7 32.3 24.8 27.7 32.0 29.8 27.2 1
Advantage Share of Medicare 
Beneficiaries, 2003
0.143 0.180 0.118 0.130 0.042 0.138 0.036 0.034 0.111 0.212 1
Population, 2004 2,058,221 2,137,073 1,693,906 845,646 1,621,613 1,925,319 1,200,847 1,515,738 803,801 2,787,701 1
Population Density, 2004 468 1,066 425 495 420 245 290 1,038 184 297 1
Elderly Share of Population, 2002 0.116 0.144 0.100 0.135 0.104 0.114 0.122 0.124 0.109 0.128 1
Aged and Disabled Medicare 
Beneficiaries, 2003
277,165 337,978 192,187 132,487 190,606 245,834 173,845 213,907 98,110 404,793 1
Aged Share of Medicare 
Beneficiaries, 2003
0.842 0.883 0.847 0.851 0.849 0.854 0.818 0.865 0.858 0.851 1
Age-Adjusted Elderly Mortality 
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Median Income, 2002 46,265 42,726 46,881 42,658 49,314 49,529 43,470 48,607 47,745 45,729 1
Poverty Rate, 2002 0.089 0.105 0.095 0.094 0.088 0.085 0.106 0.105 0.089 0.099 1
Weighted Average Rank 4.750 7.08 2.83 4.83 6.42 4.83 4.38 6.13 4.83
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We selected Columbus, Ohio; Louisville, Kentucky; and Milwaukee, 
Wisconsin, as comparison market areas. They were also the cities best 
matched to Indianapolis when using equal weights for all characteristics. 
Simulation analysis using historical data indicated that Medicare weighted 
average expenditure growth in the three comparison cities was 1.72 percentage 
points lower than in Indianapolis. A minimum threshold of 1.75 percentage 
points (based on a statistical 95 percent confidence interval for savings) 
was recommended before paying bonuses to ensure real savings from the 
intervention.
History and Differential Selection. The CMS implementation contractor 
faced a challenge in forming the IHIE comparison group because beneficiaries 
could not be drawn from the immediate area in which the intervention was 
taking place. Balancing on costs requires balancing on both utilization rates 
and payer prices. Selecting similar beneficiaries in the same market area usually 
does this. The implementation contractor used population size and density 
as matching characteristics to approximate the area’s capability of supporting 
expensive new technologies. Mortality served as a proxy for area quality of care 
and health status deriving from lifestyles and access to key services. Hospital 
and physician supply indicators also capture differences in utilization. The rate 
of growth in hospital spending approximated expected spending trends in 
general. Medicare spending and growth rates were also weighted more heavily 
than other variables to ensure a balance on both levels and trends. 
Although matching comparison with intervention beneficiaries one-to-one 
is common practice, using this procedure is questionable when whole cities 
are the unit of analysis. Choosing a single city as a comparison risks failure 
to capture some unmeasured shocks to either group over the demonstration 
period. A more statistically sound approach would be to match multiple 
comparison cities with the intervention city. The IHIE contractor eventually 
selected three well-matched cities, but one could argue for selecting several 
more cities and then averaging performance over the larger group to minimize 
the bias from shocks isolated in one or two cities. The researcher must trade off 
the possible prediction error from using fewer comparison cities with the error 
when using less well-matched cities. 
Statistical significance. The fact that evaluators will compare IHIE 
performance in Indianapolis with performance in three nearby cities raises a 
concern about the unit of observation. In each area, evaluators will evaluate 
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all Medicare beneficiaries, thereby guaranteeing the statistical power to detect 
small changes in costs in each city. This, in turn, also guarantees the ability to 
detect small differences in cost trends between Indianapolis and the other three 
cities that, together, form the counterfactual comparison group. Evaluators 
will determine performance based on relative trends and not levels in base 
and demonstration period mean costs. This approach factors out differences 
in levels but not in baseline growth rates, which is why evaluators give a high 
weight to rates of cost growth when selecting the comparison group.
Selection-experiment interactions. The most important drawback to 
regionally grounded demonstrations is the possibility of a serious correlation 
between the intervention site and the experiment. If only one city participates 
in a regional demonstration with only three comparison cities, they will all 
look alike in terms of the matching characteristics (e.g., Medicare spending, 
medical supply, population). Consequently, policy makers will not know 
whether a demonstration that is successful in Indianapolis will be equally 
successful in Mobile, Alabama; Manchester, New Hampshire; Chicago, Illinois; 
or Boise, Idaho, which are cities with very different cost and utilization trends 
and Medicare penetration.
Reaction to experimental arrangements. Siting a demonstration based 
on sharing patient information across practices in Indianapolis is subject to 
serious threats of special experimental circumstances. The Regenstrief Institute 
at the University of Indiana is the primary group that supports the computer 
exchange of information. The institute has been a premier organization 
in conducting computerized analyses of local health care utilization and 
costs for more than 25 years. Very few other groups in the country (e.g., 
Intermountain in Utah) would be capable of implementing the IHIE model 
without major infrastructure and networking investments. Thinking of the 
IHIE demonstration as a proof of concept may make more sense. If the initial 
demonstration is successful, a larger demonstration with several information 
exchange groups would be necessary to justify a national program. 
Physician Group Practice Demonstration
Most Medicare demonstrations do not involve the strict randomization 
found in randomized clinical trials or population-based disease management 
initiatives. CMS conducts most demonstrations with provider groups that 
use their own “loyal” patients (CMS’s term) as intervention participants. The 
first, and largest, provider-based PGP demonstration currently involves 10 
large physician practices with between 8,000 and 44,000 Medicare patients 
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(Kautter et al., 2007). Most of the practices are part of a larger integrated 
delivery system anchored by a major acute care hospital. The demonstration 
bases savings on risk-adjusted differences in increases in intervention and 
comparison group costs per beneficiary and determines PGP bonuses in 
each year of the demonstration. Because the program determines savings and 
bonuses annually, this determination requires an ex post determination of 
beneficiary loyalty each year to each PGP. Beneficiaries have been assigned, or 
are loyal, to each demonstration PGP if they have multiple office-type visits to 
PGP physicians during the previous 12 months. (See Chapter 9 for details of 
the assignment process.)
Once intervention beneficiaries have been identified at year’s end, a new 
comparison group is constructed each year based on revised PGP patient-
flow information. CMS’ implementation and evaluation contractor performs 
this elaborate, hierarchical, computer-intensive process. First, the evaluators 
identify comparison counties for each PGP that have at least 1 percent of the 
PGP’s own eligible patients. Together, these counties include 80–90 percent 
of all PGP Medicare patients. Second, the evaluators identify all beneficiaries 
in each comparison county that had at least one ambulatory Medicare visit 
claim in the base year (i.e., beneficiaries had to be accessing the health care 
system). No loyalty constraints were placed on the eligibility of comparison 
group beneficiaries. Consequently, the evaluators test each PGP’s performance 
against regular fee-for-service Medicare beneficiaries regardless of whether 
they received treatment from another large PGP outside of the demonstration. 
Third, evaluators average costs at the county level. Fourth, evaluators weight 
county averages by the county’s share of PGP-loyal beneficiaries to produce an 
overall base and demonstration year average beneficiary cost. Fifth, evaluators 
use Medicare concurrent Hierarchical Condition Category (HCC) scores 
to risk-adjust beneficiary costs in both groups in the base year and each 
subsequent year. Evaluators calculate an aggregate average HCC score for the 
comparison group using the same PGP weighting procedure that was used 
to determine average costs and then use these scores to adjust for differential 
changes in case-mix costliness between the intervention and comparison 
groups. 
History and differential selection. Because savings are based on differences 
in intervention and comparison cost trends, differences in average costs 
during the base period cancel out. Because some of the PGPs dominate their 
local market and draw from widely dispersed areas, evaluators believed that a 
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patient-flow method of identifying comparison beneficiaries would be superior 
to using either a prespecified georadius around each PGP or administrative 
units such as nearby counties or metropolitan areas. Weighting each 
comparison county by its contributing share of PGP beneficiaries produces 
a single, synthetic market area believed to be identical in utilization patterns 
and unit costs of services for both intervention and comparison beneficiaries. 
How comparable the PGP approach to matching comparison with intervention 
beneficiaries is to a propensity score matching procedure is unknown. 
Nonloyal comparison and loyal intervention beneficiaries may also be on 
different growth curves during the base year. Any PGP cost savings, therefore, 
could be caused by previous PGP patient care patterns and not by offering 
additional bonuses for “bending the cost curve.” 
Differential mortality. The PGP demonstration is unique because it assigns 
beneficiaries at year’s end to loyal PGPs ex post. Beneficiaries can rotate in 
and out of both groups each year rather than being a constant set of subjects 
in either group. The same is true of counties that succeed or fail to meet the 
1 percent of PGP beneficiaries criterion. One advantage of this strategy is 
that it avoids the degradation in sample sizes that occurs in other Medicare 
demonstrations for the elderly. Its large sample sizes presumably guarantee that 
dropouts and drop-ins are random in intervention and comparison groups. 
The requirement that eligible comparison beneficiaries, like PGP beneficiaries, 
must access the health system each year reinforces this assumption. 
An unexpected drawback to assigning beneficiaries to PGPs only after the 
year is over is that it prevents CMS from providing the PGP interim utilization 
and cost information against a predetermined comparison group. As a 
substitute, the evaluation contractor provides PGPs with interim feedback of 
utilization and costs against a “simulated” comparison group. The simulated 
comparison group overlaps substantially, but not perfectly, with the final ex 
post comparison group.
Instrumentation problems. Adjusting cost trends for differential changes 
in HCC risk scores raises concerns about upcoding comorbid conditions. If 
PGPs began to code for more, and more serious, comorbid health conditions 
than they had in the past, practices could deflate their risk-adjusted rate of cost 
increases relative to physicians and hospitals in comparison groups that did not 
have bonus incentives. 
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Statistical significance and regression-to-the-mean problems. CMS 
purposely solicited only PGPs with very large numbers of Medicare 
beneficiaries because the agency recognized the high degree of cost differences 
among elderly beneficiaries. Using an annual rather than a monthly cost 
indicator also avoids the additional variation that occurs when very short-
duration beneficiaries have their costs adjusted upward to a full month. 
Because the program includes all beneficiaries rather than just the high-
cost chronically ill, the program experiences much less cost churning of the 
population caused by regression-to-the-mean. 
The PGP demonstration begins to cumulate bonuses only when 
intervention cost increases fall 2 percent below total comparison group costs. 
Originally, this criterion replaced any statistical determination of true savings. 
Later, CMS argued that no PGP should be able to accrue bonuses on very small 
rates of savings because of the sizable demonstration costs that the agency 
incurred. This requirement is not as stringent as the 5 percent criterion that the 
CMHCB demonstration used, requiring sites to return all management fees if 
cost increases were not at least 5 percent less than comparison group trends.
Selection-experiment interactions. Provider-based PGPs, almost by 
definition, operate within particular health and economic markets. For 
example, beneficiaries in some areas of the country may be more amenable 
to and more compliant with cost-saving initiatives than beneficiaries in other 
areas. Marshfield Clinic in central Wisconsin and Geisinger Clinic in central 
Pennsylvania are premier tertiary organizations that operate in essentially rural 
environments. Would these organizations be equally successful operating in 
the more economically and socially disadvantaged areas of large cities such as 
New York or Chicago? Could their approach to medicine be equally successful 
in rural McAllen, Texas, an area with one of the most entrepreneurial, high-
cost provider systems in the country (Gawande, 2009)?
Reaction to experimental arrangements. The unique characteristics of 
the participating PGP pose a larger threat to generalizability. These sites tend 
to have charismatic leaders and be trailblazers in providing cost-effective 
care. Moreover, they tend to be research-oriented institutions with strong 
experimental capacity. Some of these sites have very high hospital occupancy 
rates and benefit from avoiding unnecessary admissions. Moreover, CMS has 
provided each site with a remarkable amount of statistical information to help 
guide performance and tweak their intervention activities; this information 
would be prohibitively expensive on a national level.
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Care Management for High-Cost Beneficiaries Demonstration 
The CMHCB demonstration includes PGPs usually associated with a major 
tertiary acute care hospital (e.g., Montefiore Medical Center in the Bronx, New 
York City, or Massachusetts General Hospital in Boston). The original PGP 
demonstration included all assigned beneficiaries; however, in the CMHCB 
demonstration, each site is responsible for providing disease management 
services to high-cost and/or high-severity Medicare beneficiaries. Another 
way in which the CMHCB demonstration differs from the original PGP 
demonstration is that although physicians share in bonuses for quantified 
savings beyond 2 percent, CMHCB sites receive substantial up-front fees to 
manage a negotiated set of beneficiaries over 3 demonstration years. If sites 
have not saved at least 5 percent of the comparison group’s average PBPM cost 
by the end of the demonstration period, they must return all fees. 
In each site, the design of the comparison group strives to replicate as 
closely as possible the unique cost and diagnostic characteristics of the 
intervention group (e.g., annual baseline costs greater than $5,000 for 
heart failure or diabetic beneficiaries). As in the original demonstration, 
the process required first identifying comparable geographic areas, but 
comparison beneficiaries in those areas then had to be loyal to a subset of 
nondemonstration physician groups. 
Intervention PGPs tended to serve a large share of Medicare beneficiaries 
in their target areas. As a result, geographic comparison areas usually were 
counties or ZIP codes in other regions of a state that had demographic and 
health care utilization characteristics similar to those of the intervention area. 
CMS asked demonstration PGPs to identify other comparable PGPs in the 
designated comparison areas. Pilot tests indicated that their lists would not 
yield enough comparison beneficiaries and would require a claims-based 
approach to identify additional comparison PGPs. CMS identified several 
primary care PGPs in the comparison areas through their Tax Identification 
Numbers. Requiring a minimum of 20 percent of total PGP payments from 
office visits eliminated single-specialty practices. A final group of high-volume 
PGPs, similar to the intervention PGPs in their focus on primary care, was 
selected in each comparison area. 
To enhance cost equivalence, the final step in the selection process was 
to match comparison group beneficiaries to intervention group members 
based on monthly beneficiary costs in the base year. CMS matched the 
comparison group to the intervention group by defining three to five cost 
ranges, determining the distribution of beneficiaries across these ranges in 
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the intervention group, and then randomly selecting the same number of 
comparison beneficiaries in each category. This method produced equally sized 
comparison and intervention groups. As a final check, CMS also compared 
the two groups on a range of health status, payment category, and health care 
utilization variables.
History and differential selection. CMS closely matched CMHCB 
intervention beneficiaries on cost levels but not necessarily on baseline trends 
in costs. Actuarial reconciliation of cost differences raised (or lowered) the 
comparison group’s average PBPM cost by the ratio of base year intervention to 
comparison costs, thereby factoring out differences in cost levels. Paybacks of 
management fees became contentious when sites failed the 5 percent criterion 
and complained about imbalances in patient characteristics that might create 
different cost trends. (An earlier section of this chapter deals with biases that 
one or more imbalanced Z variables can create.) In all cases, ex post regression 
matching found little difference in patient characteristics between the two 
groups, although matching focused on cost categories. For an imbalance to 
make a material difference in savings, an imbalanced variable (e.g., minority 
status) had to (1) substantially affect the growth (not just level) in costs and 
(2) be very different on a percentage point basis. 
For example, a minority beneficiary, according to the regression coefficient, 
might have a $100 per month greater cost increase than a nonminority 
beneficiary—a meaningful difference. In addition, the intervention site may 
have served 10 percent minorities versus 5 percent in the comparison group, a 
100 percent difference. Yet the impact of this imbalance would have been only 
$5 (0.05 × $100),7 a trivial difference when compared with comparison PBPM 
costs that average $1,000 or more. As a practical matter, for an imbalance to 
have a meaningful effect on financial performance, the imbalance must be at 
least 20 percentage points or more and the Z-imbalance effect on cost growth, 
not levels, must be on the order of $200 or more. In demonstrations so far, 
imbalances rarely differ more than a few percentage points, even with 1,000 
beneficiaries, and when they do, the regression weight is usually statistically 
insignificant.
Differential mortality. Attrition due to death presents a definite problem 
in most provider-based demonstrations—particularly in the CMHCB 
demonstration because of its strict eligibility criteria. Death rates for 
7 This calculation is analogous to γ4(tidZi,12 – tcdZc,12) in the D-in-D (bottom right) cell of 
Table 10-1.
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Medicare heart failure and diabetes beneficiaries together average more 
than 1 percent per month. In negotiating inclusion and exclusion criteria 
with CMS, intervention sites had to choose between narrowing diagnostic 
characteristics that they believe are most amenable to intensive management 
and having a sufficient number of eligible beneficiaries to pay for the high 
fixed costs associated with the program. The problem could be exacerbated 
if the evaluator dropped beneficiaries who died in the first several months 
because the intervention could not have influenced their utilization and cost 
trajectories. 
Statistical significance and regression-to-the-mean problems. Narrowly 
defined eligible groups, along with high attrition rates, have resulted in 
intervention and comparison samples of 2,000–4,000 each with little power 
to detect cost trends as small as 5 percent of PBPM average costs. Infusions 
of refresh beneficiaries have not helped because those populations are even 
smaller and are evaluated separately. When evaluators find a sizable point 
estimate of cost savings still to be statistically insignificant, interveners 
blame CMS for not having taken the limited nature of the eligible pool into 
consideration.
Selection-experiment interactions. All provider-based demonstrations 
face the same threats to generalizing findings because of the one-to-one 
link between the particular intervention and the local health and economic 
markets. CMS could not immediately generalize the results from running four 
different interventions in Lubbock, Texas; Bend, Oregon; the Bronx, New York 
City; and Boston, Massachusetts—unless all four were (un)successful, in which 
case we would be more confident that success, or the lack of, would extend 
to other areas of the country. If any single intervention were successful, the 
most prudent decision would be to replicate the intervention in several other 
different areas to test how robust the results are in those local environments.
Reaction to experimental arrangements. Unfortunately, transplanting 
provider-based interventions is vulnerable to this last threat to generalizing 
results. CMS can reproduce disease management and efficiency protocols and 
insert them into other practices; the original, successful, staff generally cannot, 
although some staff could be used as implementation consultants. Very little 
qualitative research has been done on either the transferability of P4P protocols 
to other sites or the effects of local markets and staffs on outcomes. 
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Medicare hospital Gainsharing Demonstration
Another type of provider-based P4P demonstration more narrowly focuses 
on acute inpatient services with the goal of aligning physicians with hospital 
incentives to practice more efficiently. The Medicare Hospital Gainsharing 
Demonstration waived the Medicare prohibition against hospitals sharing 
savings from more efficient inpatient care with physicians. CMS allowed 
participating hospitals to share savings with their medical staff based on strict 
algorithms used to link individual physicians with the costs of inpatients for 
whom they were responsible. The program benchmarked trends in Medicare 
Part A and B inpatient costs per discharge against trends in a comparison 
group of similar hospitals.
The Charleston Area Medical Center (CAMC) in West Virginia presented 
a challenge in identifying a comparison group. CAMC is a 718-bed major 
teaching hospital with 70 percent of all beds in Charleston, a relatively 
modes-sized city. CAMC also entered a gainsharing arrangement with the 
medical staff only for a few major cardiac DRGs, including valve replacement, 
heart bypass, and angioplasty. CAMC had a 90–100 percent market share in 
these procedures, making it impossible to form a comparison group of local 
competitors. Selection of a comparison group focused on similar dominant 
hospitals in other smaller markets nationwide. To identify hospitals, the 
program used 11 criteria (see Table 10-4 on pages 44 and 45): bypass/
valve and angioplasty volumes were weighted 6, given existing literature 
on the importance of high volumes in producing better outcomes; bypass/
valve market shares were weighted 4 to reflect the unique effect that market 
dominance can have in setting local practice norms; acute care beds, Medicare 
discharge share, and number of residents were weighted 3 to capture the effects 
of size on cost and intensity. The rest of the indicators were weighted 1 when 
developing an overall similarity index with CAMC. The program derived the 
index as a weighted sum of a 1–10 ranking of absolute differences between 
CAMC and each hospital. Using these methods, CMS identified 35 comparison 
hospitals. The 10 hospitals most similar to CAMC formed the comparison 
group (see Table 10-4); all but two were also located in the South.
History and differential selection. This approach to comparison group 
selection is analogous to how cities were selected in the IHIE demonstration. 
The program encountered challenges typical in selecting comparison sites. 
First, determining whether comparison and intervention sites are on the 
same cost trend lines during a period prior to the demonstration is generally 
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infeasible. This phenomenon is particularly true of individual provider groups 
whose claims histories are a very small part of an enormous database that is 
costly and time-consuming to manipulate. Second, although the literature has 
identified many variables affecting cost levels, it has paid much less attention 
to variables that affect cost trends or to the γ coefficients appearing in equation 
10.10. Weighting bypass and valve volumes higher when selecting comparison 
hospitals seems logical, but these variables may not capture important 
differences in cost trends. Whether or not the hospital is a safety net provider 
in an inner city may be a better way of approximating the rate of cost growth. 
Teaching hospitals have generally exhibited higher rates of growth than 
other facilities because of their early adoption of new technologies, and thus 
residents per bed should have a higher weight.
The sites’ perceptions of who would be a good match further complicate the 
selection process. Early in the CAMC matching process, CMS considered using 
several hospitals outside the South as candidates for the comparison group 
but eventually discarded those hospitals because CAMC did not believe the 
markets or local practice norms reflected their own. How important regional 
differences are in predicting cost trends is also unknown.
Statistical significance. A primary advantage of having several comparison 
hospitals is greater statistical power to test for smaller cost-saving effects. 
The intervention sample is necessarily limited by the size of the hospital 
(or physician practice), which is sometimes relatively small. For CAMC, 
evaluators will have fewer than 800 bypasses and valves and roughly 1,100 
percutaneous transluminal coronary angioplasty (PTCA) cases to study yearly. 
The comparison group, however, will have more than 3,000 bypasses and valves 
and more than 6,000 PTCAs and will likely produce a much smaller standard 
error than for the intervention site by approximately the ratio of the square 
root of comparison to intervention beneficiaries. For bypasses and valves, the 
comparison standard error should be about one-half that of CAMC’s, ignoring 
intersite variation. CMS expects roughly the same gain for PTCAs.
Selection-experiment interactions. Sites such as CAMC present some of 
the biggest challenges from interactions between the site and the environment 
in which they operate. CAMC is one of the largest heart hospitals in the 
country, but it is located in a city of modest size in one of the poorer states in 
the country. The medical center has a complete monopoly in heart surgery 
for hundreds of miles. Matching the hospital with the environment is very 
difficult. The hospitals that most closely resemble CAMC are located in large 
310  Chapter 10
Table 10-4. Selection of comparison hospitals for CAMC
Medicare 
Provider 
ID Hospital Name City State
Mean 
Rank 
Score
Acute 
Care 
Beds
Medicare Volume
DSH Adj 
Factor
Number of 
Residents
Residents 
per bed
Medicare 
Case-Mix 
Index
CABGs/valves PTCA and Stents
Medicare Discharges 
 Number  Share
Hospital 
Volume
Hospital 
Share
Hospital 
Volume
Hospital 
Share
Weight:  3 1 3 6 4 6 4 1 3 1 1
510022 Charleston 
Area Medical 
Center
Charleston WV — 718 13,824 62% 751 100% 1,120 89% 0.12 116 0.16 1.82
490024 Carilion 
Medical Center
Roanoke VA 7.6 664 13,381 66% 386 80% 1,066 81% 0.07 83 0.12 1.76
200009 Maine Medical 
Center
Portland ME 8.5 581 11,033 47% 424 100% 896 94% 0.08 171 0.30 1.95
340002 Memorial 
Mission 
Hospital and 
Asheville 
Surgery Center
Asheville NC 8.6 646 16,194 65% 571 100% 750 100% 0.13 39 0.06 1.79
440002 Jackson-
Madison 
County General 
Hospital
Jackson TN 9.6 558 12,635 82% 326 100% 1,315 97% 0.16 18 0.03 1.74
010039 Huntsville 
Hospital
Huntsville AL 10.7 786 16,256 73% 359 100% 684 93% 0.07 31 0.04 1.66
340040 Pitt County 
Memorial 
Hospital
Greenville NC 11.5 618 12,619 100% 492 100% 749 100% 0.24 155 0.27 1.96
110107 Medical Center 
of Central 
Georgia
Macon GA 12.8 534 11,606 68% 493 82% 1,323 77% 0.21 88 0.16 1.92
440063 Johnson City 
Medical Center
Johnson 
City
TN 15.5 478 10,734 77% 286 100% 755 100% 0.16 62 0.14 1.55
200033 Eastern Maine 
Medical Center
Bangor ME 15.6 302 8,388 76% 329 100% 658 100% 0.16 24 0.08 1.85
340141 New Hanover 
Regional 
Medical Center
Wilmington NC 15.9 539 13,331 84% 245 100% 563 100% 0.12 54 0.11 1.65
ID = identification number; CABG = coronary artery bypass graft; PTCA = percutaneous transluminal coronary 
angioplasty; DSH = disproportionate share hospital.
Source: 2008 Medicare Impact File.
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cities with major teaching programs. As a general rule, the more unique the 
hospital and surrounding market are, the more prudent it is to select several 
“somewhat matched” hospitals to cancel out any erroneous mismatches.
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Converting Successful Medicare 
Demonstrations into National Programs
Leslie M. Greenwald
Chapter 11
Ever since Medicare was implemented in the mid-1960s, this public program 
has been a leader in health care payment development and innovation, 
including pay for performance (P4P) reforms. Many of the P4P projects 
currently operating are Medicare pilot projects, or demonstrations, that test 
both the administrative feasibility and success of various performance models.
Though policy makers sometimes use the terms pilot testing and 
demonstration projects interchangeably, there are key differences. 
Demonstrations operate under specific legislative authority that allows the 
Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) Secretary to suspend 
(or waive) specific Medicare payment regulations for the purposes of testing 
policy alternatives. Pilot tests, likewise, test policy alternatives but do not 
operate under the Secretary’s somewhat limited demonstration authority and, 
therefore, may sometimes be more expansive. Pilot tests typically operate 
under specific project-by-project congressional legislative directive and so are 
less common than demonstration initiatives. 
P4P initiatives use both pilot tests and demonstrations to allow sponsors 
to identify models that best meet their intended goals and that can be 
operationalized at an acceptable level of cost and burden to health care 
organizations and clinicians, insurers, and other stakeholders. Pilot tests and 
demonstrations also enable sponsors to identify opportunities for improvement 
and modify aspects of new initiatives that do not work—all on a manageable 
scale. Despite this long history of demonstration programs particularly 
related to innovative payment approaches such as P4P, findings from major 
demonstrations rarely become part of permanent Medicare program policy. 
This chapter examines reasons that Medicare’s significant experience in 
conducting demonstration projects to test program innovations has a less 
lasting impact on the current national program than might be expected. 
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Important early policy Changes
Medicare’s demonstration programs yielded some important policy changes 
in its early years. In the late 1970s, Medicare granted demonstration waivers 
to novel hospital “prospective payment rate-setting” systems in several states; 
Medicare paid the hospitals set fees in advance for groups of services. In 1984 
Medicare established its own national Inpatient Prospective Payment System, 
which bundled all hospital services into a single per-case rate for nearly 
500 diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). The background research for such a 
revolutionary change in payment came from the New Jersey hospital DRG 
demonstration (Hsiao et al., 1986). Medicare eventually extended prospective 
payment systems to post-acute care, rehabilitation, and psychiatric hospitals, 
skilled nursing facilities, home health, and hospice services, in all cases 
beginning initial implementation with either pilot tests or demonstrations. 
After freezing payments for high-cost procedures in the late 1980s, 
Medicare then designed a prospective payment system for physicians. The 
Medicare fee schedule put thousands of services on a common scale based on 
physician work effort. Medicare also pioneered capitated rates for its managed 
care population, setting separate rates for every county in the United States. All 
these systems changes divorced payment from the costs of individual clinicians 
and provider groups, and they supported implementation of Medicare’s 
prospective payment systems. 
Caring for more than 35 million elderly and disabled beneficiaries 
provided the number of patients and data needed to develop these systems. 
The Medicare program generates significant amounts of administrative data 
available for the development, implementation, and efficient evaluation of 
a range of P4P models. Because of its size and financial importance in the 
marketplace, Medicare is often able to recruit providers and other willing 
organizations to its projects demonstrating P4P options. 
Of course, Medicare’s large scale and economic importance also translate 
to downsides for innovative payment policy development. Because Medicare 
is the largest health insurance program in the United States, any potential 
changes to it face close scrutiny. In general, Congress sets out in statute 
almost all key Medicare program parameters: from the ways clinicians and 
provider organizations are paid, to the policies governing the covered benefits, 
the provider groups and clinicians who can participate in Medicare, claims 
reporting requirements, and other operational policies. Federal regulation then 
fills in the details required by legislative changes in policy direction, including 
modifications to payment methodologies and rates. 
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The agency that administers Medicare (the Centers for Medicare & 
Medicaid Services, or CMS) is responsible primarily for operationalizing 
congressional mandates. This is not surprising in that Medicare’s scale and 
scope mean that any payment changes inevitably affect a range of powerful 
political constituencies, including large numbers of health care professionals 
and provider groups, health insurance plans that participate in Medicare, 
medical suppliers, and Medicare beneficiaries. Therefore, national payment 
changes stemming from Medicare demonstrations—such as P4P—prompt 
debates in a highly politicized forum and must consider the political 
environment as well as the research findings. Demonstrations offer an 
opportunity to test constituency and political responses to programmatic 
changes. 
Turning these lessons learned into national policies requires clearing 
several formidable hurdles. Given the number of P4P projects under 
Medicare’s experience with demonstrations, it is curious that policy makers 
have considered only limited and nonspecific moves toward national 
implementation of any existing P4P model. In this chapter, we are interested in 
understanding the following:
•	 Why	have	so	few	demonstrations	been	evaluated	as	“successful”	(i.e.,	met	
goals for generated savings and quality improvement)? 
•	 Why	has	Congress	failed	to	incorporate	under	national	payment	reform	
the lessons learned from Medicare P4P demonstrations?
•	 What	will	it	take	operationally	and	politically	to	apply	the	lessons	of	
successful P4P demonstrations to a national payment system?
The rest of this chapter comprises four broad sections to answer these 
three important questions. First, we describe the ground rules that Congress 
and CMS impose on the design of Medicare demonstrations, considering the 
impact of these rules on national implementation. Next, we discuss common 
threats to successful evaluation findings that limit the generalizability of 
Medicare demonstrations. Next we lay out the operational challenges of taking 
a small, geographically constrained demonstration to the national stage. Each 
section cites specific Medicare demonstrations described in Chapter 10 (refer 
to that chapter for details of these demonstrations). The chapter concludes 
with an analysis of the political challenges that Congress and CMS face in 
incorporating successful demonstrations into a national payment system.
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Demonstration Ground rules and practical Limitations
Medicare demonstration projects serve to test and evaluate policy innovation 
within specific boundaries. Section 402 of Public Law 92-603 grants CMS 
specific demonstration “waiver” authority for variations in the established 
payment regulations so long as these variations do not result in increased 
costs to the Medicare program. Known as demonstration payment waiver 
authority, this provision allows the DHHS Secretary to try alternative payment 
methods in small demonstrations prior to implementation in the full program. 
Although the Medicare demonstration statute permits the DHHS Secretary 
to waive certain Medicare requirements (such as cost-based or charge-based 
reimbursement) in conducting demonstrations, the statute’s language focuses 
on program efficiency and cost reduction rather than on quality enhancement. 
Some subsections, however, authorize demonstration projects to examine 
impacts of various provider payment methods on quality of care. 
In addition to this general demonstration authority, over the years Congress 
has also authorized projects to explore specific policy options, such as payment 
for case management for chronic illness, cancer prevention for ethnic and 
racial minorities, and telemedicine.1 Sections of the law appear to authorize 
alternative provider payment methods (such as negotiated or discounted 
fees, bonuses, or withholds) whose objective it is to save program funds,2 
but Congress did not draft the demonstration authority explicitly to permit 
these payment methods as incentives for meeting quality goals. Finally, legal 
interpretations of Medicare’s demonstration waiver authority typically limit 
projects to those that increase program efficiency (and generate savings) or 
that are at least budget neutral. Congress can specifically authorize additional 
spending for pilot projects through specific legislation. The Affordable Care 
Act contains many specific mandates for Medicare demonstrations and pilot 
projects. 
Despite the DHHS Secretary’s statutory authority to conduct them, 
Medicare demonstration projects that might disadvantage certain clinicians 
or provider organizations or beneficiaries relative to the status quo often 
1 These laws are printed in the pocket part following 42 USC section 1395b-1 in US Code 
Annotated and include specific standards for program design features, types of Medicare 
standards that can be waived, evaluation, and funding.
2 A court upheld the Secretary’s authority to test paying a single negotiated fee for outpatient 
cataract surgery under this statute in American Academy of Ophthalmology, Inc. v. Sullivan, 998 
F. 2d 377 (6th Cir. 1993).
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faced legal challenges. For example, the American Association of Health 
Plans in 1997 (US General Accounting Office, 1997) challenged the DHHS 
Secretary’s authority to test a bidding approach for Medicare managed care 
plans in Colorado (the competitive pricing demonstration, proposed before 
Congress enacted the Medicare+Choice Medicare managed care program). 
After the federal district court issued a temporary restraining order that raised 
questions about the Secretary’s authority to undertake the project, CMS did 
not implement it.3 Few courts have decided cases involving the Secretary’s 
authority to waive Medicare requirements as part of a demonstration 
project.4 Courts generally accord great discretion to administrative agencies 
in interpreting and implementing federal law, especially complex programs 
like Medicare.5 Similarly, legal challenges to CMS’s authority to conduct 
competitive bidding demonstrations for laboratory and durable medical 
equipment have led both of these potentially promising, competitively 
based pricing projects to be delayed, with little realistic hope of their being 
implemented.
The fate of attempts to establish competitive bidding for Medicare managed 
care is an illustration of the “not in my backyard” (NIMBY) syndrome. Three 
times CMS attempted to demonstrate competitive bidding bids in markets 
around the country, and all three attempts failed because of local political 
opposition (Nichols & Reischauer, 2000). In two of the three attempts to 
implement this controversial demonstration, congressional representatives 
quashed the effort once a city was targeted for fear of potential negative 
impacts on local clinicians and health care organizations and beneficiaries. 
By the third attempt, the project had been delayed so long that congressional 
and policy interest waned and was insufficient to counteract continued local 
opposition; the project was never implemented. 
Aside from the political challenges inherent in implementing 
demonstrations, the legal foundations for Medicare’s demonstration 
3 AAHP v. Shalala (D. Colo. Civ. Action No. 97-M-977, May 20, 1997). The case was dismissed 
when the Secretary agreed not to pursue the proposed demonstration project. 
4 Several cases unsuccessfully challenged the Secretary’s authority under 42 USC 1395b-1(F) to 
choose fiscal intermediaries and carriers based on competitive bidding that are not nominated 
by providers or carriers already in the program: Health Care Service Corp v. Califano, 601 F. 2d 
934 (7th Cir. 1979); Blue Cross Assoc. v. Harris, 622 F. 2d 972 (8th Cir. 1980); Blue Cross Assoc. v. 
Harris, 664 F. 2d 806 (10th Cir. 1981).
5 See cases cited in note 4.
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program also result in three practical limitations that nearly all Medicare 
demonstrations share: 
•	 Geographic and participant constraints: specific legislative mandates 
often dictate where a demonstration takes place and who is invited to 
participate. Limiting geographic areas for participation can in turn limit 
the national generalizability of the demonstrations. 
•	 Voluntary participation by both clinicians and providers and by 
beneficiaries: only willing groups and beneficiaries choose to participate. 
This condition also limits the generalizability of demonstrations because 
only selected organizations with a narrow range of characteristics 
participate. 
•	 Medicare budget neutrality: the government must at least break even 
or save money on every Medicare demonstration. The condition limits 
Medicare from testing a wider range of projects that may have unclear 
cost impacts or even short-term additional costs, but the potential for 
longer-term gains. 
Geographic and Participant Constraints
As a public program, fee-for-service (FFS) Medicare operates under an 
“any willing provider” legal requirement. Health care professionals and 
provider organizations that meet specified Medicare conditions (including 
certification and acceptance of Medicare payment amounts and balance billing 
limitations) are welcome to participate in the program. The same is not true 
in demonstrations. Almost all demonstrations are geographically limited so 
as to confine the “experimentation” to a manageable number of clinicians 
and provider organizations or to target the demonstration to providers who 
have specific capabilities. CMS issues a solicitation for participating clinicians 
and providers and then selects from among what appear to be the most 
qualified. Congress, Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and CMS 
staff impose project expenditure caps that usually constrain the number of 
providers and beneficiaries an agency can take. Sometimes CMS fails to select 
a qualified applicant, resulting in protests and, in extreme instances, pressure 
from Congress to expand eligibility. Such politically motivated geographic 
expansions often dilute the demonstration’s focus on the most qualified 
applicants and the model to be tested, resulting in evaluations with unclear 
findings. 
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Voluntary Participation
For research purposes, the law limits demonstrations to voluntary participation 
on the part of both clinicians/providers and beneficiaries. CMS cannot require 
hospitals, physicians, and other providers to participate in demonstrations. 
Similarly, the agency must notify Medicare beneficiaries of a demonstration if 
it will affect them, and it must offer them the opportunity to drop out of the 
demonstration at any time; clinicians and providers have nearly the same rights 
(often at the end of a demonstration year). An agency cannot place limitations 
on the range of legally entitled Medicare services available to beneficiaries. 
The extent of selection bias that this voluntary participation introduces 
varies by the nature of the intervention and by whether both clinicians and 
providers and beneficiaries must be recruited. This selection bias is potentially 
serious when clinicians and providers have to recruit beneficiaries with specific 
characteristics into the demonstration, which was the case in the Medicare 
Health Support (MHS) and Care Management for High-Cost Beneficiaries 
(CMHCB) demonstrations (Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services [CMS], 
2009b), in which only higher-cost beneficiaries with specific diseases were 
eligible to participate. Voluntary participation was less an issue, however, 
in the Medicare Physician Group Practice (PGP) and Hospital Gainsharing 
demonstrations, which required recruiting providers but not beneficiaries with 
any specific characteristics (Sebelius, 2009).
Still, some important differences might exist between demonstration 
beneficiaries and regular FFS beneficiaries treated in nondemonstration 
settings. To preserve its neutral role, the government almost never promotes its 
own demonstrations through the media or other sources. Provider groups are 
left to market “weak” imprimaturs to beneficiaries with strict oversight by CMS 
to ensure fair and accurate information is given to potential beneficiaries.6 
Randomization is almost never applied under Medicare demonstration 
projects because, although this approach would result in stronger evaluation 
results, excluding potentially eligible beneficiaries from participation in their 
local markets has been considered politically unpalatable. 
6 One example has been the CMS reticence to refer to some demonstration providers as Centers 
of Excellence (CoEs), approving instead titles such as Participating Medicare Heart Bypass 
Center. Providers complain that such titles have little value in gaining market share, even when 
an expressed goal of the demonstration was to regionalize care in higher-quality institutions.
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Budget Neutrality
Unless specifically authorized by Congress, Medicare demonstrations 
operating under waiver authority must be at least budget neutral, meaning 
that the total costs under the demonstration cannot exceed those predicted 
under the existing statutory program. OMB must review and approve 
the budget neutrality of the demonstrations. OMB usually requires some 
savings to compensate for additional operational costs incurred during the 
demonstration (e.g., extra CMS monitoring staff, independent contractors who 
help set up and evaluate each demonstration). The MHS disease management 
(DM) pilot originally had a 5 percent savings minimum or organizations 
had to give back all of their specific DM fees (McCall et al, 2008). CMS staff 
inserted this requirement in response to the federal legislation that groups 
must be able to demonstrate that they can bear “financial risk.” After the first 
6 months, CMS waived the 5 percent requirement and changed to the budget 
neutrality standard because DM organizations’ initial savings predictions were 
unrealistically high. The PGP Demonstration, by contrast, has no upfront 
management fees but gives Medicare the first 2 percent of savings while 
sharing with providers any additional savings above 2 percent (Sebelius, 2009). 
The Medicare Hospital Gainsharing and Acute Care Episode (ACE) P4P 
demonstrations do not invoke budget neutrality per se because no additional 
payments were made to providers under this demonstration, but OMB did put 
limits on the amount of profit-sharing that physicians can receive from their 
hospital partners (CMS, 2006, 2009a). 
Because clinicians and provider organizations must apply (or otherwise 
actively volunteer) to participate in a demonstration while demonstrating 
budget neutrality at a minimum, demonstrations have a distinct “carrot” bias 
toward those clinicians and provider organizations who have the necessary 
resources and believe the proposed changes will favor their organization. 
Thus, under most conditions, testing provider organizations’ and clinicians’ 
behavioral responses to CMS’s simply paying less rather than more is not 
possible. CMS would get few, if any, physician or hospital groups to apply if 
the intervention were to test responses simply to lower physician conversion 
factors or DRG payment rates. Nor would provider groups volunteer for a DM 
demonstration if the intervention simply reduced payments for poor quality 
of care. A win-win, silver-bullet philosophy has therefore pervaded Medicare’s 
demonstration authority simply as a practical effect of these combined 
requirements for both budget neutrality and voluntary participation. 
 Converting Successful Medicare Demonstrations into National Programs 323
Given these inherent limitations, CMS has tended toward payment carrots 
in demonstration projects in four different ways. First, one of the strongest 
incentives that the government can offer demonstration applicants is up-
front fees to cover any administrative costs associated with the intervention. 
In several CMS DM demonstrations (e.g., the Medicare Coordinated Care 
Demonstration, MHS Demonstration, and the CMHCB Demonstration), CMS 
pays up-front monthly management fees to cover extra management resources 
of commercial vendors and provider groups. Costs are substantial for DM 
interventions that require sophisticated electronic medical records and support 
staff staying in close touch with high-risk beneficiaries. On the downside, 
because OMB generally requires demonstrations to be budget neutral, sites 
failing to generate Medicare savings are at risk of needing to return all or 
most of their up-front fees. This process has been contentious, even though 
applicants sign contracts with the explicit acknowledgment that retaining 
fees is contingent on savings. Prolonged legal negotiations often ensue, with 
arguments over technical design and implementation issues.
Second, shared savings is another way of encouraging participation, but it 
entails considerably more financial risk for applicants who have to make initial 
investments on their own. In the PGP Demonstration, physician groups are 
encouraged to reduce overall billings (from themselves and other health care 
providers) on Medicare patients for whom they provide most of that patient’s 
primary care (Sebelius, 2009). In return, they share in resulting program 
savings. By design, Medicare payments must decline more than the savings 
bonuses paid out. 
Third, CMS also uses nonfinancial carrots along with required savings to 
attract applicants to some demonstrations. In Medicare’s Participating Heart 
Bypass Center Demonstration, 10 hospitals originally applied, and 7 eventually 
participated by offering Medicare up-front reductions on DRG payments for 
bypass and valve surgery (Cromwell et al., 1998). In return, they were given 
the right to market a form of Centers of Excellence (CoE) imprimatur. A major 
incentive to participate in CMS demonstrations affecting payments has been 
competitive pressures at the local market level. If Medicare were to designate 
one hospital a CoE for cardiovascular or orthopedic care, other local hospitals’ 
volumes for these lucrative services may be threatened. 
The fourth reason for offering payment discounts with no financial carrot 
is physician gainsharing in any hospital cost savings, generally disallowed 
under Medicare rules and regulations. Both the Participating Heart Bypass 
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Center and the Hospital Gainsharing demonstrations offer this incentive to 
the clinician staff in order to align their incentives with the bundled payment 
incentives the hospital faces in caring for Medicare patients (CMS, 2006; 
Cromwell et al., 1998).
threats to evaluation Findings
The previous sections describe how Medicare’s demonstration waiver authority 
faces both political and legal constraints that can limit the ability of CMS and 
policy makers to implement promising innovative program concepts. Once a 
demonstration can overcome these hurdles of authority and design limitations, 
it must then be implemented and evaluated to assess its effectiveness in 
accomplishing its goals. In evaluating demonstration success, at a minimum 
policy makers such as members of Congress, DHHS, and other stakeholder 
groups need to know whether evaluation findings are a valid indicator of 
an intervention’s impact on health care costs, quality of care, or both. If the 
answer is no, or even maybe, then it would be premature and potentially both 
financially and politically risky to promote the intervention to a national 
program. Unfortunately, Medicare demonstrations face a wide range of threats 
to robust evaluations. These difficulties in fully evaluating demonstration 
outcomes in turn undermine support for national implementation. Before a 
demonstrated intervention can be promoted to a national level, it must first 
be deemed a success, at least according to the available evaluations. Many 
Medicare P4P projects have been subject to formal evaluations.
Each demonstration defines success differently, but to be successful, 
demonstration interventions must do the following:
•	 reduce	Medicare	costs,	holding	quality	of	care	constant;	
•	 improve	quality	of	care,	holding	costs	constant;	or
•	 both	improve	quality	of	care	and	reduce	costs.
Policy makers often use both actuarial and research evaluation methods to 
consider demonstration success. Actuarial tests usually focus on a narrower 
definition of cost savings by determining whether the intervention cost less for 
enrollees than for a matched control group. Actuaries do not tend to consider 
broader questions of statistical reliability, and they apply their results only to 
the performance of demonstration participants (e.g., participating hospitals, 
DM organizations). Participants failing the actuarial test usually are required to 
pay back any fees to the government under the budget neutrality clause in their 
CMS contract. 
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By contrast, research evaluation tests do consider the statistical reliability 
of the results, using standard confidence intervals. Evaluators test whether 
savings are statistically greater than zero. Because of the substantial variance 
in beneficiary monthly and annual costs, actuarial savings can be 5 percent or 
more yet not statistically different from zero. 
In recommending expansion of an intervention to a national program, CMS 
relies on the evaluator’s findings because the government must be fairly certain 
that the intervention will succeed in other environments entailing greater 
overall financial risk. To demonstrate 20 percent savings on just 100 patients 
in one county in one state would not justify a large national program because 
these results may not be replicable on a larger scale for a variety of reasons. 
Success on the national stage can be considered the product of expected 
savings per beneficiary and the number of beneficiaries enrolled in the national 
program. Both necessary components can be jeopardized by numerous 
internal and external threats to the validity of the evaluation inherent in the 
demonstration’s design and implementation. 
Quasi-Experimental Design
Rarely can CMS conduct a trial that randomly assigns beneficiaries to 
intervention and control groups; the MHS pilot, with 240,000 beneficiaries, 
is a notable exception. Nearly always the demonstration entails a quasi-
experimental design with hierarchical, or nested, assignment of beneficiaries. 
Under these designs, beneficiaries are assigned to evaluation groups by 
categories and subcategories according to characteristics that are relevant 
and hypothesized to affect the outcomes of the demonstration. Random 
assignment, although preferable from a research evaluation standpoint, 
is either administratively impractical or problematic because, under this 
approach, some otherwise eligible beneficiaries are excluded from the 
additional benefits provided under the demonstration; this is often considered 
politically unpalatable in a public program like Medicare. Even under 
demonstration provisions, Medicare does not have the authority to limit a 
beneficiary’s freedom to choose a Medicare participating provider. Because 
most applicants to demonstrations are groups of providers (e.g., hospitals, 
physician practices) rather than Medicare beneficiaries, random assignment of 
beneficiaries to intervention and control groups has not been possible. Patients 
are naturally loyal to their clinicians and providers; Medicare cannot require 
them to switch to another.
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Nor is it acceptable to randomize beneficiaries to an intervention arm 
within a provider group because of likely spillover effects onto control 
beneficiaries in the same group. Spillover effects are essentially unintended 
consequences that may affect behavior of others not directly involved in 
an intervention. An example of a spillover effect would be a physician’s 
changing the way he or she treats all patients (i.e., those participating in the 
demonstration and those not participating) as a result of what the physician 
learns or is exposed to through the demonstration intervention.
The best that demonstration evaluators can do is to match the comparison 
group as closely as possible with loyal intervention beneficiaries. (See 
discussion in Chapter 10 on strategies for matching intervention and control 
groups.) Rigorous matching can filter out most of the threats to the internal 
validity of an evaluation that are associated with history, regression to the 
mean, and experimental mortality, but some level of threat remains. The 
following discussion summarizes the threats that arise from the “loyal patient” 
structure of most P4P demonstrations.
Willingness to Take Risks
Clinician or provider demonstration applicants, by virtue of applying to a 
P4P demonstration, are more willing to take risk than those who do not. That 
quality may stem from their internal culture of innovation and passion for 
improving the delivery of health services. It may also be a result of their having 
already invested heavily in the intervention’s infrastructure (e.g., medical 
homes with extensive information technology [IT] medical record systems), 
their already being efficient and able to offer deeper payment discounts, or 
their having a specially trained and experienced staff and a charismatic leader 
familiar with the intervention. Their patients may be particularly healthy (or 
unhealthy), less costly, and more compliant with the intervention requirements 
than are those in the general population. Clinicians and provider groups may 
be particularly good at targeting beneficiaries most in need, or they may be 
part of a larger network of providers with more control over where patients 
go for care. Being larger, they can spread intervention fixed costs across more 
participating beneficiaries than can other practices. Groups that apply may be 
in particularly competitive markets and seek an advantage from marketing a 
Medicare imprimatur that may increase their market share. They may work 
in markets with greater health needs that the intervention addresses, or where 
patients have greater access to lower-cost alternatives to expensive hospitals. 
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The demonstration’s design can influence an evaluation’s conclusion of 
success. Clinicians and health care organizations may not be responsible for 
certain services (e.g., post-acute care) that encourage early discharges and 
lower hospital costs. They may receive considerable government support in 
terms of claims and administrative data that demonstration sponsors and 
participants use to help monitor progress and refine the intervention. The very 
fact that the government is closely monitoring the intervention is likely to 
redouble practitioners’ and providers’ efforts and keep members of the group in 
the intervention. Medicare may have chosen a particularly unusual, high-cost 
population for the demonstration that will likely regress to the mean during 
the demonstration period. Even if the comparison group similarly regresses to 
the mean, the churning of patients will add to the statistical “noise” and reduce 
the likelihood of significant results. Beneficiary exposure to the intervention 
may be short, either because the demonstration period is too short to capture 
longer-term success or because something delays patient recruitment into 
the intervention. These threats undermine the replicability of demonstration 
results in a much larger program. The biases that voluntary participation and 
geography introduce suggest less success per beneficiary for other provider 
groups elsewhere in the country. They also suggest less interest in other groups 
that are not in the same position to take advantage of the incentives and 
support associated with the demonstration. 
Given the number and range of demonstrations that Medicare has 
undertaken, it is puzzling that so few have succeeded and become eligible 
for expansion to a national program. Although Medicare has tested and 
implemented a range of demonstrations over its almost 50-year history, very 
few demonstration projects become incorporated into the national program. 
Occasionally, failure of demonstrations to become national programs results 
from a lack of applicants or from early dropouts—not from factors affecting 
the few that remain.7 Demonstrations may fail to attract a large enough group 
of voluntary participants initially, sometimes because of long and complex 
application and approval processes. Others may begin implementation with a 
robust group of participants but lose some as the demonstration proceeds as a 
result of operational difficulties, costs, or other reasons. More often, however, 
7 Medicare’s Residency Reduction Demonstration in New York had 49 participating hospitals 
early on but only 6 completed the full 3 years. Five of six completers successfully reduced their 
resident counts, although they may have intended to do so anyway (Cromwell et al., 2005).
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participants are unable to show cost savings, although most show modest gains 
in quality indicators. 
One P4P initiative that did show significant success in cost savings was 
the Medicare Participating Hospital Heart Bypass Demonstration. The 
demonstration realized substantial savings from discounts on hospital 
payments, with some regionalization of surgery performed at greater frequency 
by providers with lower mortality rates (Sebelius, 2009). Yet, as successful 
as this initiative was, CMS never pursued a national program. The next two 
sections consider why successfully demonstrated and evaluated Medicare 
program innovations do not seem to be extrapolated to national programs, 
particularly for P4P models.
Operational Challenges to National Implementation
Many significant obstacles impede P4P models’ implementation as national 
programs. Some barriers stem from practical operational problems inherent 
in the way these promising projects begin as demonstrations or other pilot 
projects. These challenges arise from many of the models’ dependence on 
achieved savings for financing, their operational complexity, and their high 
operational and data requirement costs. 
Paying for Innovation
Current Medicare policy often focuses on finding ways to improve the 
program’s efficiency and to lower its costs while maintaining or improving 
quality of care. Therefore, most new initiatives—including P4P—aim at either 
achieving savings for Medicare or, at a minimum, funding the new quality 
improvement programs from efficiencies gained (termed budget neutrality). 
The fiscal realities of the Medicare program and the political climate in 
Congress seem to suggest little interest in a major programmatic change 
that would significantly increase program costs. The promise of savings and 
increased efficiency accounts for the appeal of various P4P models under a 
variety of provisions in Affordable Care Act health care reform legislation 
passed in early 2010. 
The need to operate a successful clinical model that is funded on achieved 
savings creates a challenging obstacle to both implementation and evaluation 
of success. Some P4P projects have achieved sufficient efficiencies to cover 
operational costs and still net additional savings to the Medicare program; 
most notably, these are the original Participating Heart Bypass Center 
Demonstration and the top-performing Premier Hospital Quality Incentive 
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Demonstration. Others, once they factor in operational costs, find net savings 
difficult to achieve. For example, under the MHS pilot, none of the sites 
achieved the target 5 percent net savings and hence could not keep the up-
front management fees they had already received from Medicare. CMS is still 
evaluating performance for many of the other current Medicare demonstration 
projects. (See Chapter 2 for detailed discussions of relevant Medicare 
demonstration projects and available evaluation findings.) 
The practical necessity that demonstrations rely on achieved savings to 
fund P4P initiatives entails what can amount to significant financial risk 
to both participating sites and the Medicare program. If these projects do 
not achieve savings, the Medicare program faces the often difficult task of 
negotiating close-out of operating sites. Because they can measure savings only 
retrospectively, lack of achieved savings can also represent potential additional 
costs to Medicare. For participating sites, focus on achieved savings often 
means that providers must bear the financial risk of the operating costs of 
the P4P intervention. For example, clinicians and provider organizations that 
invest in care models, additional staff, and/or upgraded data collection and 
health IT systems may or may not receive the expected performance-related 
payments. All these factors may make P4P models that are funded by achieved 
savings too risky for some groups and, on a large scale, for the Medicare 
program.
Start-Up and Implementation Operational Complexity
Many P4P models that include carefully defined performance metrics can 
entail significant operational complexity, both in the process of designing 
demonstrations and throughout implementation. Negotiating the specific 
terms and conditions of the measures, payments, and other operational 
specifics may be enormously time-consuming and thus expensive both for 
the Medicare program and for participating clinicians and provider groups. 
Experience from the Medicare demonstrations suggests that the parties make 
these decisions based on detailed negotiations that attempt to address very 
specific facility/practice small-scale concerns. For example, despite initial 
interest from a range of hospital-based organizations, only a subset of the 
original applicants to the Medicare Hospital Gainsharing, Medicare Physician–
Hospital Collaboration, and ACE demonstrations actually participated in 
the project because sites found it difficult to reconcile their internal goals for 
participation with the CMS requirements for savings generated, evaluation 
reporting, and/or other mandated guidelines. In several recent cases 
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(e.g., Medicare Hospital Gainsharing and ACE demonstrations), years have 
passed between the selection of potential demonstration participants and 
the official start of the demonstration projects. It is not unusual for sites to 
withdraw during this period. 
Negotiated issues, such as specifics of payment mechanisms, risk 
responsibilities, and other terms and conditions, are extremely important to 
both Medicare and potential sites. Still, the negotiation period is costly for 
both—a factor that adds to these projects’ overall operational complexity. This 
approach of individually negotiating performance metrics and payment terms 
may not ever be feasible at a national level from either a timeliness or a cost 
perspective. Reaching agreement on these important specifics on a national 
scale would only increase this complexity. The difficulty of gaining agreement 
on details such as which is the appropriate entity to be monitored and “paid” 
for performance (e.g., the group practice versus the individual physician) will 
be magnified at the national level. Geographic differences in practice patterns 
may also complicate a nationally agreed-upon standard. 
Once policy makers and purchasers set the performance standards, payment 
amounts and conditions, and other operational details, implementation is very 
data intensive and therefore costly. Who would bear this cost? The Medicare 
program, which is under persistent pressure to reduce costs? Where would 
these additional resources come from? Experience from several of the current 
Medicare demonstrations suggests that reconciliations necessary to finalize 
payments for each initiative can sometimes be arduous and contentious. 
Because CMS commonly assesses performance of these initiatives relative to 
comparison groups, determining whether demonstration participants have 
achieved performance targets—and, consequently, whether they can be paid—
requires a significant amount of data processing and analysis.
Historically, the reconciliations—even for a limited number of 
demonstration sites—have sometimes taken more than a year following 
queries and questions on methodology from affected sites. The processing 
of site-specific reconciliations at the national level would likely be time-
consuming and expensive at best—and, at worst, potentially unworkable if 
actual performance payments lag so far behind interventions as to have little 
behavior-changing incentive value. Policy makers considering nationalization 
of similar demonstrations would need to identify a method for streamlining 
final payment reconciliations that is at the same time clearly tied to individual 
performance. Thus far, this kind of streamlining has been elusive.
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Data Demands
One factor related to the high operational costs of P4P initiatives is their 
data intensity. The data necessary to set and evaluate standards are usually 
significant. For example, some demonstrations require additional clinical 
diagnostic and outcome information beyond what is available on Medicare 
claims. Other demonstrations require reporting of internal provider micro-
cost data, necessary to understand how and where the demonstration achieved 
savings and whether savings are likely to be generated by other similar 
health care provider organizations should the demonstration be expanded 
or nationalized. To the extent that some standards require data that are 
unavailable from administrative sources (such as Medicare claims), a high 
degree of variability is likely in terms of either provider ability or willingness to 
collect and report accurate data. Many P4P models require an analysis of costs 
and/or other performance metrics for each individual patient followed by an 
analysis of comparison group patients—a resource-intensive activity.
Although advances in health IT have made the necessary data collection 
and analysis more feasible than we could have imagined even 10 years ago, 
these costs for participating providers can be substantial and often difficult to 
justify in an era of shrinking Medicare and private reimbursement. Initiatives 
to improve electronic health records and overall health IT systems may make 
these data requirements more feasible in the future, though currently these 
costs can create a barrier to participation. 
In addition to the necessary collection and analysis of requisite data to 
measure performance, clinicians and providers must contend with regulatory 
requirements to protect the privacy of these data. Meeting data privacy 
and protection requirements, set forth in the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA) and subsequent regulatory requirements, 
increases the complexity and price of collecting much of the data necessary 
for P4P. Detailed clinical and health status information not available 
through administrative claims sources is an example of HIPAA sensitive 
data often necessary for P4P initiatives. Therefore, national implementation 
of P4P models, which rely on data that exceed typical administrative data 
collection, will raise the costs of participation for both Medicare and provider 
organizations and clinicians. As a result, these additional data needs may, as a 
practical matter, limit participation either to those initiatives with the greatest 
potential savings or to participating clinicians and provider organizations that 
can afford the additional expense. 
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Implications for the Future: political Challenges to National 
Implementation 
The previous sections focused on the programmatic, evaluation, and 
other analytic challenges to national implementation of Medicare P4P 
demonstrations. An additional obstacle further accounts for the dearth of 
demonstration projects that actually transition to a national program: politics. 
As noted earlier, Medicare is the largest insurer in the United States and as 
such has enormous market influence. Changes to the Medicare program have 
a substantial impact on a large proportion of the US economy, affecting a wide 
range of direct medical care clinicians and provider organizations, insurers, 
medical device/supply manufacturers and distributors, the pharmaceutical 
industry, beneficiaries, and other stakeholder pocketbooks. This makes 
change a highly visible and potentially politically dangerous activity for those 
who hold this responsibility. Demonstrations, particularly the majority that 
are designed with voluntary participation, and ones that are crafted to offer 
primarily positive rewards and incentives, are much more palatable politically 
than national implementation that would in many cases remove such impact-
limiting features. 
In addition, because legislative action determines virtually all central 
provisions of Medicare program eligibility, program payments, and benefits 
offered, the authority for significant change rests mostly with elected officials 
(i.e., Congress) rather than with political or career executive branch staff 
at DHHS or CMS. This is not to imply that DHHS and CMS staff have no 
impact or influence on the program; CMS staff are in fact responsible for 
the myriad of details that govern the program and operationalize day-to-day 
policy. Still, elected officials with accountability to a wide range of interests and 
organizations focused on self-interest rather than improved performance of 
the Medicare program are the ones making major programmatic changes such 
as national implementation of P4P models. The Affordable Care Act health 
care reform legislation includes specific language to create a Medicare Center 
for Innovation within CMS, likely to create a forum for reform more removed 
from the congressional political arena. 
The fact that most major policy changes to Medicare occur through federal 
legislation significantly hampers significant and innovative change to the 
program. Recognizing this principle, some early health care reform proposals 
considered shifting cost-cutting policy implementation to the Medicare 
Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) or other nonelected entities. 
Other proposals would extend to the DHHS Secretary the authority to expand 
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successful demonstrations on a national level (Weaver & Steadman, 2009). The 
Affordable Care Act ultimately tasked MedPAC with several studies related 
to Medicare payment reform. The legislation also tasks the DHHS Secretary 
and, by extension, the DHHS agencies with literally hundreds of health care 
reform-related projects aimed at improving quality of care and expanding 
access, in addition to dozens of P4P-related demonstrations and pilot 
initiatives. These wide-ranging reform initiatives may introduce more examples 
of demonstration projects that may improve quality and lower costs at some 
level. Still, the fragmented nature of this “thousand points of light” approach 
to policy making may not address the core question: Why is it so politically 
difficult to enact large-scale Medicare policy innovations? 
Theoretical Explanations 
Various theories of political decision making may hold some answers. One 
classic theory describes policy making along the lines of a cost/benefit 
analysis (Wilson, 1973). Proposed policies have certain constituencies or 
supporters, and these groups can be either distributed (such as the tax-paying 
public) or concentrated (such as a special interest group). As a balance to 
the support gained from different types of constituencies, costs associated 
with certain policies can be borne either by a broad or distributed group 
(such as a general tax increase) or by a concentrated group (e.g., the cost 
associated with a regulation on a specific industry). Policies that have both 
distributed constituencies and costs can succeed through political strategies 
that advocate majoritarian politics, essentially on the logic that a lot of good 
can be achieved for a lot of people with only limited costs per person (Wilson, 
1986). In contrast, the process of entrepreneurial politics refers to distributed 
constituencies but concentrated costs. In this case, policies with these 
characteristics can be advocated by arguing for large benefits to large numbers 
and with costs borne only by a limited group. A third strategy focuses on 
policies with concentrated benefits but distributed costs: client politics. Policies 
with client political strategies can face an uphill battle because they argue for 
limited benefits for the few and a cost burden on many. Finally, policies with 
both concentrated costs and benefits are commonly interest-group politics 
(Wilson, 1986). 
The purpose of this theoretical model is to describe the most common and 
successful ways for politicians to approach prospective policies, weighing both 
their potential benefits and their real costs. The perceived distributions of 
costs versus benefits can predict the kind of political coalitions that are likely 
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to form successfully around policies that fall into each category. Policies that 
can be driven by majoritarian politics will likely have the largest supportive 
constituencies; those supported by interest group politics have the smallest 
(Wilson, 1986). Unfortunately, Medicare program policy, particularly 
any aspect that affects payments, does not fit neatly into Wilson’s political 
constituency model. This may explain partly why policy change and innovation 
within Medicare are relatively rare: essentially, significant Medicare policy 
change requires a unique political strategy. 
Described within the Wilson framework, additional programmatic costs 
for Medicare are often widely distributed in that tax revenues frequently 
finance them. However, specific providers affected by payment changes—
particularly those that cut payments and generate any kinds of savings—bear 
these concentrated costs. When payment changes increase reimbursement, we 
commonly see disagreement and competition for resources among different 
provider groups and medical specialties—hence, a lack of consensus on policy 
direction is the norm.
On the benefit side, policy makers see Medicare beneficiaries as a large 
and powerful political constituency around which a majoritarian political 
consensus might form. Current Medicare policy options such as P4P, however, 
rarely grant additional benefits to large groups without additional costs. 
Moreover, like provider organizations and clinicians, Medicare beneficiaries 
rarely speak as a group, leading to lack of agreement concerning the most 
desired benefits or the appropriate costs to support them. This conflict with 
theory on building political constituencies to support policy making suggests 
that significant policy changes to Medicare have difficulty creating viable 
groups of political supporters. Finding the ideal win-win situation in making 
major Medicare changes is difficult. Strong and united coalitions fail to form, 
which results in an absence of innovations in policy making.
Punctuated Equilibrium 
Although Wilson’s classic theory may explain in part why successful coalitions 
for major policy change can be difficult to achieve, other political theories may 
suggest hope for major policy changes within Medicare of the sort that might 
be suggested from the Medicare P4P demonstration and pilot projects. True 
and colleagues (2007) describes a policy model of “punctuated equilibrium”: 
long periods of equilibrium, during which small incremental change is the 
norm. According to this theory, policy stability rather than drastic change 
typifies American policy making. Instances of major change sometimes 
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disrupt, or punctuate, these periods of equilibrium, however. Punctuated 
equilibrium theory suggests that, under most circumstances, political discourse 
that generally reinforces existing policies with only small marginal changes 
drives stable policies. Wildavsky (1964) has also cited the tendency for policy 
driven by small incremental change to describe federal budgeting.
True and colleagues (2007) note that although maintenance of the policy 
status quo and general lack of policy change are the norm, simple observation 
suggests that in some instances—albeit infrequent—major change does 
occur. This occurrence is more likely when a particular issue gains increased 
prominence on the overall political agenda because of political newcomers, a 
crisis, or both. As media attention or other external pressure raises an issue’s 
visibility, the likelihood of a major change increases significantly. 
The actions of these newcomers and the extra attention also tend to 
remove certain issues from their typical forums for debate, such as within 
congressional committees. Status quo forums, in which many issues are 
considered simultaneously, have been described as “parallel processing.” When 
certain issues rise to higher-level political institutions, however, such as the 
interest of a new president, they move to a policy forum of serial processing by 
macropolitical institutions (Jones, 1994). It is under these circumstances that 
major change is most likely (True et al., 2007). 
Passage in 2010 of the Affordable Care Act health reform legislation, 
championed as a key priority of then-popular President Obama, is consistent 
with this theory (i.e., attention from a political newcomer and the news media 
or other organizations outside the normal political institutions make change 
possible—but they cannot guarantee it). Original versions of health care 
reform supported by the Obama Administration called for more substantial 
policy changes, including development and implementation of a public health 
care option. As a compromise to accomplish enactment of some measure of 
health care reform, more modest initiatives including dozens of P4P-related 
demonstration initiatives were mandated. Inclusion of these models based on 
the Medicare demonstrations, referred to generally as models of accountable 
care organizations, does suggest hope for applications of the lessons learned. 
Unfortunately, the current debates also underscore the serious difficulties 
surrounding policy change driven by Congress (the primary political 
organization responsible for Medicare change). 
Political scientists often refer to Congress as “the broken branch” because 
of persistent shortcomings “in the ethical process, the failure to improve the 
quality of deliberation in committees, and the many moves to restrict the role 
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of the minority” (Mann et al., 2008, p. x). Essentially, the common view is 
that Congress, driven by partisan politics and the pressures of a “permanent 
election,” has great difficulty enacting policy of any type, including the annual 
mandated federal government appropriation bills. It is hardly surprising that 
any policy making that requires difficult choices for the Medicare program 
will face great barriers in a largely dysfunctional legislative body. No matter 
the policy change advocated, it will harm some likely powerful constituency in 
some way, and major costs at a minimum will be concentrated and sometimes 
distributed through large increases in taxes. Given that significant Medicare 
policy changes are often lose-lose rather than win-win, that such changes are 
infrequent should not be much of a surprise. 
To illustrate these political dilemmas, consider a theoretical, modest P4P 
model that would pay a bonus, on a national level, to provider organizations 
and clinicians who meet specific improved quality performance metrics. 
Funding for this bonus would come from an overall lowering of base payment 
rates for all similar providers. The primary political landmine for elected 
officials would be the outcome that some clinicians and providers would be 
paid more and others less than the status quo, creating winners but also losers. 
Because most providers participate in Medicare, it is the largest US insurer, 
and because these clinicians and provider organizations depend on this steady 
stream of revenue, this modification would potentially create a large number 
of losers, who may in turn pressure Congress to hold them harmless to policy 
change. 
Such political pressure may then put a strong emphasis on the use of only 
carrots, or win-win, P4P scenarios. More politically appealing proposals 
include the use of lower fee updates or fee freezes (as opposed to actual 
reductions) and payment for higher quality or process improvements (such as 
data reporting) but no penalties for relatively inefficient providers. Carrot-only 
approaches may be feasible on a small demonstration scale. Their potential cost 
implications for Medicare program spending if they do not achieve (at least) 
budget neutrality, however, make such methods untenable and impossible to 
implement. 
Using Carrots Rather Than Sticks
One way in which Congress had attempted to shift the burden of politically 
difficult payment and improved-efficiency models was to rely on incentives 
for clinicians and providers to make simultaneous price reduction and 
quality improvement changes themselves, using internal mechanisms. These 
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approaches, including competitive bidding, bundled payment, and the CoE 
models, give participants some type of reward (e.g., access to bonus payments, 
competitive advantage in Medicare markets, and/or use of an imprimatur 
for marketing purposes). Still, even these indirect models can encounter 
significant problems in building successful political constituencies. Congress 
overturned competitive bidding for Medicare laboratory services based on 
lower pricing and minimum quality standards, for example, because of political 
pressure from the laboratory industry—despite specific authorization initially 
by legislative mandate. In this case, large national laboratory firms launched a 
campaign that convinced Congress that any limits on laboratory access would 
be potentially detrimental to beneficiary choice, and CMS (under significant 
pressure from Congress) halted the demonstration just as implementation 
was set to begin in 2009. Similarly, in the mid-1990s, Congress specifically 
mandated, then canceled, competitive bidding for Medicare managed care after 
local lawmakers raised objections in multiple designated demonstration sites.
For competitive bidding, selection of starting demonstration sites has 
invoked strong NIMBY responses from lawmakers, despite their professed 
support for the general concept of market-driven competition as a mechanism 
for improved quality and lower cost. Medicare Advantage payments feature 
competitive bidding. However, given that bidding under Medicare Advantage 
payment rules is pegged against a known, administratively set benchmark 
and that final payment rates include minimum payment rates, it poses little 
price-reducing risk to bidding insurers. In this case, Congress is able to take 
credit for implementing “competitive bidding” though under such constrained 
regulations that the impact—political or otherwise—is limited.
Although pressure to reduce—or at least not increase—Medicare program 
expenditures is a constant factor in congressional political deliberation, this 
pressure clearly is not sufficiently strong to force specific action. Congress, 
unlike most states and localities, is under no legal obligation to pass fiscally 
balanced budgets. This situation has allowed Congress annually to overturn 
requirements to cut Medicare physician payments in adherence with 
sustainable growth limits. Therefore, although Medicare demonstrations 
have suggested numerous policy innovations that might cut programmatic 
costs, Congress has likely little political motivation and certainly no legal 
requirement to enact them.
Awarding marketing imprimaturs as rewards for quality standards and 
Medicare savings has also faced political opposition. Follow-ons to the 
original successful CoE demonstrations for cardiac care encountered political 
338  Chapter 11
issues from the perceived impact of selective designation of the valuable CoE 
title. Competing local provider groups and clinicians argued that using this 
imprimatur in marketing gave awardees an unfair advantage. Designers of the 
demonstration considered this imprimatur simply an objective assessment of 
participating groups’ outcomes and performance, as well as a reward for giving 
Medicare discounts. Partly in response to this issue in the earlier project, the 
current implementation of this model (the ACE Demonstration, implemented 
in five sites in 2009) is permitted to market itself as a “Value-Based Care 
Center” instead, a potentially less valuable term than the original CoE label. 
Another politically unpalatable feature of P4P models implemented on a 
national scale may be the additional required administrative and operational 
costs. Experience from the Medicare demonstrations suggests that terms and 
conditions of demonstration participation and payment are based on detailed 
negotiations that attempt to address very specific facility/practice small-scale 
concerns. Gaining agreement on thorny details such as the appropriate entity 
to be monitored and “paid” for performance (e.g., small rather large group 
practices) will be magnified at the national level. Geographic differences in 
practice patterns may also complicate a nationally agreed-upon standard. Once 
CMS sets the performance standards, payment amounts and conditions, and 
other operational details, implementation is very data-intensive and therefore 
costly. Experience from several of the current Medicare demonstrations 
suggests that reconciliations necessary at payment points for each initiative can 
be arduous and contentious. All these challenging aspects provide Congress 
and other policy makers ready fodder for discussion and study—rather than 
forward momentum and national implementation. 
Summary
Change is complicated for a program like Medicare, which has enormous 
market power, is a critical source of revenues for most US providers of care, 
and provides essential benefits to a large and vulnerable beneficiary population. 
It should not be surprising that members of Congress support concepts such 
as P4P, but only insofar as the effects do not negatively affect segments of their 
local constituencies. The political status quo of making incremental rather than 
major policy change certainly applies to Medicare. As a result, despite the long 
history of policy experimentation through Medicare demonstrations and pilot 
tests, few if any of these projects result in national program changes. Such is the 
case with P4P models. 
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Whether the current focus on implementation of health care reform, and 
the legislation’s numerous calls for new and expanded P4P demonstrations, 
can change these political realities remains to be seen. Several of the current 
Medicare P4P demonstrations are highlighted in health care reform efforts 
even though many have yet to be evaluated—and not one of the demonstra-
tions has been converted to national implementation. That said, the lessons 
learned from demonstrations can be a road map to continued health policy 
reform. The good news from Medicare’s extensive demonstration experience in 
P4P is that the problems and challenges in many of these models are generally 
well known and, as such, can be addressed and accounted for—if the nation 
sees either a political constituency for real change or a rare confluence of events 
that opens a policy window enabling real progress to occur. 
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Conclusions: Planning for  
Second-Generation Pay for Performance
Michael G. Trisolini, Jerry Cromwell, and Gregory C. Pope
Chapter 12
As discussed in earlier chapters, pay for performance (P4P) is intended to 
provide a way of responding to several major deficiencies in the fee-for-service 
(FFS) reimbursement system that prevails in US health care. Of particular 
concern are the lack of (1) accountability for the range of different types of care 
that patients may receive, (2) incentives for coordinating care across clinicians 
and providers or over time, (3) incentives for improving quality or reducing 
costs, and (4) incentives for constraining the volume of care. P4P programs 
attempt to remedy these deficiencies by assigning responsibility for overall 
quality of care and efficiency results, measuring performance, and rewarding 
documented improvements. P4P programs can work, in theory, because they 
closely link financial incentives with measurable performance results. 
In practice, unfortunately, in recent years P4P has not lived up to the 
enthusiasm it initially generated in health policy circles. P4P literature 
reviews have shown mixed results (Chen et al., 2010; Christianson et al., 2008; 
Integrated Healthcare Association, 2009; Lindenauer et al., 2007; McDonald 
et al., 2009). As often occurs with health policy innovations, advocates who 
embraced the core logic but underestimated the complexities of the health care 
system in which it had to operate clearly oversold the P4P concept (McDonald 
et al.). In the national debates over health reform legislation in 2009 and 2010, 
some politicians touted P4P as a win-win silver bullet for curing the problems 
of the health care system. Yet if P4P were as easy to implement and as effective 
as they claimed, it would already have been implemented much more broadly.
The institutional, economic, and clinical complexities of the health care 
system demand more sophisticated approaches; we term these “second-
generation” P4P initiatives. The challenge is to design these second-generation 
P4P programs in ways that achieve significant improvements in quality and 
cost outcomes, are acceptable to legislative bodies, and are acceptable to 
physicians and patients.
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This concluding chapter draws on the analysis and lessons from earlier 
chapters and provides recommendations for improving P4P programs in the 
future. We first review the main problems with private markets and incentives 
in health care that motivated the development of P4P programs. We next 
review the challenges in developing effective P4P programs that led to the 
major shortcomings of the first generation of P4P programs. A set of policy 
and implementation recommendations—to improve on current initiatives 
and develop more effective second-generation P4P programs—follows that 
discussion. We conclude with an analysis of the P4P provisions in the 2010 
health care reform law, the Affordable Care Act, suggesting ways that the 
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) could 
best implement these provisions. Congress grants the DHHS Secretary fairly 
wide latitude for implementing the law’s P4P provisions.
the Challenges for private Markets and Financial Incentives in 
health Care
When considering ways to design and implement new P4P arrangements 
in health care, policy makers must take into account the three main reasons 
that public and private health care payers need to carefully design financial 
incentives. First, consumers are relatively uninformed about the optimal 
methods for diagnosing and treating their diseases. Consequently, they must 
rely on physicians and other clinical experts for advice and decisions regarding 
their care. This asymmetry in information between patients and clinicians 
gives the latter opportunities to act as “imperfect agents” and sometimes 
overprescribe services or provide substandard quality. 
Second, insurance coverage, designed to spread risk and improve access 
by reducing financial barriers to necessary care, desensitizes patients to the 
cost implications of physicians’ testing and treatment recommendations and 
professional referrals. This means that patients feel free to utilize health care 
services that may sometimes be unneeded or of marginal benefit.
Third, the health care industry suffers from a serious lack of vertical 
integration for patient care. Too often, no one person or group is responsible 
for coordinating all of a patient’s care (Guterman & Drake, 2010). Rather, 
incentives abound to bounce patients among primary care physicians, different 
types of specialist physicians, clinics, hospitals, and post-acute care. Rapid 
technical change has exacerbated this problem. Physicians have increasingly 
turned to providing specialty or subspecialty care, leading to more referrals and 
greater fragmentation of care. Outdated piecework physician payment systems 
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have perpetuated fragmentation of care and discouraged vertical integration of 
services, leaving the nation with provider-centered instead of patient-centered 
medicine. Private and public payers reimburse physicians, hospitals, and other 
provider organizations according to what they provide and not necessarily 
according to what patients need. Hereafter we use the term provider to 
encompass all health care professionals and provider organizations. 
For these and other reasons, paying for performance, or value, makes sense 
if it can effectively address these problems. The question is how payers can best 
design and implement P4P programs to motivate providers and insurers to 
improve quality and reduce costs. 
Challenges in Developing effective pay for performance 
programs
A major limitation of P4P is that despite the appeal of its basic logic, it is often 
difficult to implement well in practice. First-generation P4P programs failed 
to fully consider the complex nature of the health care sector—with its often 
multiple layers of policies, institutions, and stakeholders—that can mitigate 
P4P incentives or redirect them toward unintended consequences. 
Herzlinger (2006) reminds us of six broad forces that operate in the 
health care sector: (1) players, who represent the broad range of often-
feuding stakeholders in health care, including physicians, hospitals, 
insurance companies, pharmaceutical companies, government agencies, 
and others; (2) funding, characterized by third-party reimbursement of 
medical services with little cost sensitivity among consumers and confusing 
payment arrangements for providers; (3) policy, reflecting the broad range of 
government regulations for ensuring the quality of care, improving access, and 
containing costs; (4) technology, characterized by rapid development, diffusion, 
and often high costs; (5) patients, who increasingly want a more active role 
in decisions about their health care and who sometimes represent a threat to 
providers, given the prevalence of malpractice litigation and the often high 
price of malpractice insurance; and (6) accountability, which some stakeholder 
groups seek as a way to rein in costs and ensure quality. To be more effective, 
the second generation of P4P programs needs to better account for the 
complexity these six forces represent. 
In this book, we have identified five broad issues for designing and 
implementing successful P4P programs, which policy makers must address 
in the context of this complexity. We need to consider all of these issues in 
new and innovative ways to develop more effective second-generation P4P 
programs:
344  Chapter 12
1. Whom to Pay
Although P4P can potentially realign incentives in health care to counteract 
the trend toward increased fragmentation and encourage quality and efficiency 
improvement, finding provider groups who are willing to take responsibility for 
all of a patient’s care is challenging. Payers have sometimes implemented P4P 
for solo practitioners or small group providers in such a way that the incentives 
affect only the small percentage of the patient’s overall care provided in their 
office visits. This arrangement will not mitigate—and may even exacerbate—
the fragmentation of the health care system. P4P needs to be better targeted to 
enable its incentives to motivate more global viewpoints on a patient’s overall 
care, from all providers treating the patient. This issue has posed a particular 
challenge in rural areas, where small practices may be the only kind that small 
local populations can economically support and geographic distances make 
coordination of care more difficult. 
Larger organizations can manage a broader range of care, take more 
financial risk, and make performance measurement more reliable. However, 
incentives for individual clinicians may be diluted in larger organizations 
facing only a group incentive.
2. How to Measure Performance
Achieving reliable, valid, and comprehensive measurement of quality and 
cost performance in a field as complex as health care is challenging. Quality 
measures depend on broadly accepted clinical guidelines for diagnosis 
and treatment of individual diseases and for preventive care. However, 
strong evidence bases for clinical guidelines are often lacking, such as for 
the increasing numbers of aging patients who suffer from multiple chronic 
diseases. Moreover, quality measures based on structure (input) or process of 
care guidelines may have only limited direct influence on outcomes of care 
such as morbidity, mortality, and quality of life. Focusing quality measurement 
only on clinical areas that have guidelines available runs the risk of providing 
disincentives for equal attention to other types of care. Outcomes may be 
too rare (e.g., mortality) to be useful in evaluating routine quality, and many 
factors outside the providers’ control may influence them.
Cost measures usually need detailed case-mix adjustment or risk 
adjustment for performance to be measured in ways that are fair to providers 
who are treating sicker patients. The available risk-adjustment models 
work better for some diseases than others, and all of the models have some 
limitations in their ability to explain the statistical variation in health care 
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costs among sicker and less sick patients. In which situations do these 
models provide statistical adjustments that are sufficient for measures of cost 
performance that are fair to providers treating different patient populations? 
The answer is still a topic of debate. Moreover, even with risk adjustment, the 
underlying (random) variation in medical costs is substantial. Without very 
large sample sizes (tens of thousands of patients), it may not be possible to 
reliably distinguish small to moderate cost-control or efficiency gains from the 
normal variation in costs.
3. How, and How Much, to Pay
Financial incentives that are too small to have a significant impact on provider 
behavior have been a common problem in P4P programs to date. In part, this 
stems from the typical P4P model of voluntary programs with only positive 
incentives (i.e., viewed as experimental, P4P cannot be too aggressive so as 
to keep volunteer provider organizations from dropping out of the program). 
Few P4P programs have been mandatory or included negative incentives or 
penalties, although the Affordable Care Act does include some mandatory 
up-front reimbursement reductions in its new hospital value-based purchasing 
initiative. Striking a balance between positive and negative incentives, between 
incentives that may be too small or too large, and between voluntary and 
mandatory P4P programs are all ongoing concerns in the design of P4P 
programs. 
Structuring P4P financial incentives to achieve the intended goals 
while avoiding unintended consequences can also be difficult. Unintended 
consequences of P4P can be unfortunate: for example, an overemphasis by 
providers on the types of care measured for incentive payments at the expense 
of other types, a focus on patients considered likely to be more adherent to 
prescribed care and thus to boost performance scores at the expense of patients 
believed to be more difficult to treat, and increased competition among 
physicians and other health care professionals to earn financial incentives at 
the expense of clinical teamwork.
4. How to Evaluate Success in Pay for Performance Programs
Because of the diversity of P4P programs, generalizing from the success 
or failure of individual programs can be tricky. How do we determine 
whether evaluation results from one P4P program are relevant to programs 
implemented in other institutional settings, with other types of providers, and 
with other patient populations?
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For large-scale P4P programs, identifying randomized control groups or 
matched comparison groups to evaluate observed changes in quality and cost 
outcomes is often difficult. The challenge of controlling all of the variables at 
work while comparing health sector organizations may always limit the goal 
of rigorous evaluations. Organizations that are intended to serve as control 
or comparison groups must provide ongoing care to their patients at the 
same time and respond over time to their own—often varying—policy and 
institutional contexts by revising their programs, staffing, care patterns, and 
technologies. 
Balancing quality and cost outcomes is another important issue. Many P4P 
programs have focused on quality outcomes, some have included performance 
measures for both quality and cost, and some have required simultaneous 
improvements in cost and quality outcomes to achieve improvements in value. 
The Affordable Care Act has taken the last approach, by focusing on value-
based purchasing programs. These programs require, for example, mandatory 
reductions in hospital reimbursement, which can then be earned back through 
P4P bonus payments linked to performance on quality measures. Determining 
the appropriate combinations of quality and cost performance incentives is a 
topic of ongoing debate for design of P4P programs.
5. How to Tailor Pay for Performance Programs to Varying Institutional 
Settings and Provider Cultures
As discussed in Chapter 2, myriad P4P schemes can emerge from various 
combinations of the key elements of accountable providers, targeted services, 
types of care processes and outcomes, performance measures, and bonus 
payment incentives and methods. Given the lack of compelling evidence for 
particular approaches, payers have experimented with many different P4P 
models in different institutional settings and types of provider organizations. 
For example, P4P incentives often run the risk of being mitigated or 
misdirected to unintended consequences in situations where there are 
multiple layers of health system institutions, including payers, managed 
care organizations, physician-hospital organizations, physician groups, and 
physician practice settings. 
Organizational or regional provider cultures, which range widely on a 
continuum from competitive and fragmented to collaborative and coordinated, 
can also influence approaches to the design of P4P programs. For example, 
at the more fragmented end of the spectrum stands McAllen, Texas, “the 
country’s most expensive place for health care,” according to Gawande (2009). 
“In 2005 and 2006, patients in McAllen received 20 percent more abdominal 
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ultrasounds than in nearby El Paso, 30 percent more bone-density studies, 
60 percent more stress tests with echocardiography, ... one-fifth to two-thirds 
more gallbladder operations, knee replacements, breast biopsies, and bladder 
scopes [and] two to three times as many pacemakers, implantable defibrillators, 
cardiac-bypass operations, carotid endarterectomies, and coronary-artery 
stents.” Yet Gawande (2009) found no evidence that physicians in McAllen 
were trained differently from those in El Paso. In this situation, small P4P 
incentives would likely have little impact, given the focus of providers on the 
much larger FFS payment streams.
Gawande (2009) contrasted the situation in McAllen, Texas, with the 
collaborative behavior evidenced at the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, Minnesota, 
where physicians are salaried and the focus is more on the needs of the patient, 
quality of care, and teamwork than on financial goals. Other examples of 
more collaborative and coordinated care include the Wisconsin Collaborative 
for Healthcare Quality and Kaiser Permanente (Greer, 2008; Tompkins et al., 
1999). Collaborative providers may facilitate second-generation P4P in several 
ways: (1) by serving as accountable providers representing a broader range of a 
patient’s care, (2) by implementing quality of care incentives that are consistent 
with the provider culture, and (3) by facilitating linkage of P4P incentives 
with other types of care coordination and quality improvement programs that 
may benefit from funding that is available in P4P programs but not under 
FFS. In this situation, small P4P incentives may have more impact in that 
they are consistent with the provider culture and complement other quality 
improvement programs.
policy recommendations for Second-Generation 
pay for performance programs
To better address the five broad issues identified in the last section 
regarding effectiveness of P4P programs, this section presents 10 policy 
recommendations to guide development of second-generation P4P. They are 
intended to guide policy makers and stakeholders in future efforts to make P4P 
programs more effective for improving quality and efficiency in health care. 
1. Make Providers More Accountable for Reducing Fragmentation 
of Care
To integrate vertically and coordinate the care that patients receive in multiple 
venues, one provider organization must be accountable. To date, the most 
notable accountable groups are managed care organizations that are insurer-
based, not provider-based. The piecework FFS payment incentives, coupled 
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with rapid technical change, unfortunately reinforce a lack of comprehensive 
patient care accountability among hospitals and physicians. The lack of 
accountable provider organizations has contributed to a lack of teamwork in 
medical care—both between physician groups and institutional caregivers 
and between physicians and other advanced practice clinicians (e.g., nurse 
practitioners, nurse anesthetists, psychologists). A failure to have one 
provider organization take responsibility for the total care of a patient has also 
reinforced fragmentation of care, costly care that is sometimes of marginal 
value, and less-than-desirable attention to quality. 
Fragmentation of care reflects the prevalence of small, independent 
physician practices in the US health care system. Overall, about one-third of 
physicians practice in solo or two-physician practices, 15 percent are in group 
practices of three to five physicians, and only 6 percent are in practices of 51 or 
more physicians (Boukus et al., 2009). A one- or two-physician practice cannot 
reap the scale economies inherent in an efficient division of labor involving 
nonphysician clinicians and other support personnel, health information 
technology (IT) systems, and facilities. To be cost-effective, nurses managing 
chronically ill patients must have sizable numbers of patients to work with. 
Electronic health record (EHR) systems that integrate information across 
multiple provider venues are quite costly unless spread across thousands of 
patients. 
We expect that no one model for integrated health care systems will be 
universal; rather, different models may work better in different regional and 
organizational contexts. In some areas, the larger and more collaborative 
systems like the Mayo Clinic, Kaiser Permanente, and Geisinger can form 
accountable care organizations (ACOs). ACOs are entities designed to take 
responsibility for all of a patient’s care, improve coordination of care and 
quality, take financial risk, and share in cost savings relative to external 
benchmarks in other markets. They are large enough in terms of physicians 
and patients to enable reliable and accurate quality and cost indicators to 
be calculated, to share data on performance results in ways acceptable to 
clinicians in their collaborative context, and to have the financial resources to 
bear significant risk. Many regions, however, in which physician practices are 
smaller and more fragmented, will need a different approach. 
One appeal of the recent policy movement to develop ACOs is that these 
organizations will simultaneously apply both P4P financial incentives and 
health care delivery system reforms to reduce fragmentation of care across 
providers (Devers & Berenson, 2009). The ACO concept has meant different 
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things to different people at times but usually includes several core elements. 
The first is a focus on the provider delivery system rather than private health 
insurance companies or public payers. The idea is that physicians or provider 
organizations manage themselves; “outsiders” are not doing the managing. The 
second element is the development of positive financial incentives to improve 
quality and reduce costs across services and providers, moving away from 
the prevailing FFS incentives for increasing quantity of care. Third, the ACO 
concept allows organizations to receive financial incentives for improving 
coordination of care across providers and sites of care, and enables more 
explicit team-based rewards to be provided using P4P. For example, P4P 
incentives could be directed toward a diabetes disease management program 
that requires teamwork among endocrinologists, primary care physicians, 
clinic nurses, diabetes educators, and home health agency nurses.
The medical home concept is another promising approach to improving 
provider accountability for patients opting to select a particular physician 
practice as their medical home. This concept also has varying definitions, but 
it usually entails patients’ choosing personal physicians or medical practices to 
serve as their “home” for managing and coordinating their full range of care. 
This arrangement is intended to improve coordination of care across providers, 
expand access to care, improve care management and quality of care, enhance 
use of EHRs and other health IT interventions, and enhance reimbursement 
to support care coordination and other medical home services, including P4P 
incentives for improving quality and reducing episode costs (Backer, 2009; Barr 
et al., 2006; Carrier et al., 2009).
Increasing accountability can also be linked to efforts to use P4P incentives 
to reinforce medical professionalism. That perspective is consistent with 
taking responsibility for the overall care of a patient. Physicians often view 
P4P programs in a negative light when implemented by distant, for-profit 
health insurance companies, but P4P could be viewed by physicians as an 
ally when implemented by local, physician-led ACOs. For example, P4P 
can provide additional revenue that gives physicians more time to establish 
stronger partnerships with patients, promote competent practice based on 
the best available evidence, improve chronic care management, and improve 
patient satisfaction (Mechanic, 2008). Supportive administrative systems, 
health IT systems, and medical culture are also needed to achieve these goals, 
but the financial incentives are an important foundation for other quality 
improvement systems. Physicians are actively seeking ways to make primary 
care more viable and professionally rewarding. Longer patient encounters 
350  Chapter 12
are more financially viable using teams with nonphysician providers when 
results achieved by teams yield extra P4P reimbursement. P4P revenue can 
thus open up ways of practicing that may enable primary care physicians to 
escape the “tyranny of the visit,” which is often their only way to gain adequate 
reimbursement under FFS (Trisolini et al., 2008). 
2. Focus Pay for Performance on Larger Provider Organizations, 
Not on Individual Physicians
Financial risk is a significant problem related to accountability for patients. 
Managed care organizations, when constituted as risk-bearing insurance 
companies, are required to maintain adequate financial reserves to ensure that 
providers will be paid for services rendered to their members. Some proposed 
P4P strategies would push P4P incentives down to the individual-physician 
level. Expecting small physician practices to bear the financial risk of cost 
performance measures is unreasonable, given small patient populations at 
the individual-physician level and often wide variation in costs for individual 
patients. Small patient populations for individual diseases also make reliable 
quality measurement difficult at the individual-physician level. Multispecialty 
physician group practices, hospitals, physician-hospital organizations, 
independent practice associations, integrated delivery systems, and managed 
care organizations are generally large enough in terms of patient sample 
sizes to justify P4P payments based on robust quality and cost performance 
measures. 
We believe that P4P for individual physicians would also undermine 
the current trend toward team-based care that is important to improve 
coordination and quality of care. Individual incentives can increase 
competition between providers and promote individualistic gaming behaviors 
such as hoarding of information and skills. P4P should encourage group 
rewards that promote teamwork by targeting larger physician groups, hospitals, 
or ACOs. 
P4P programs should include incentives that encourage formation of 
larger, multispecialty groups that can provide larger patient populations for 
improved performance measurement and facilitate coordination of care across 
specialties. Although most physicians in the United States remain in smaller 
practices focusing on a single specialty, many multispecialty groups also exist 
around the country. For example, insurers might reduce physician payment 
updates for solo or small group practitioners or make ACO membership 
mandatory for providers. 
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The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (2009) report outlined 
several advantages and disadvantages for both voluntary and mandatory ACO 
approaches. Encouraging voluntary ACOs would require positive financial 
incentives to entice physicians to join the ACOs, and thus may hamper their 
ability to enforce significant performance improvements because physicians 
could always drop out of voluntary ACOs. Payers could take a more forceful 
approach, however, and deny P4P incentive payments to physicians who are 
not members of a defined ACO. 
Mandatory ACOs would likely run into provider opposition but could be 
formed on a virtual basis among previously unaffiliated physician groups and 
hospitals. For instance, where a formal ACO does not exist, Medicare might 
hold providers located in defined geographic areas or those who admit to the 
same hospital to a fixed level of expenditures per beneficiary. Medicare might 
also impose mandatory cuts in reimbursement and allow providers in a defined 
geographic area to earn back the lost revenue through P4P bonus payments 
based on quality and efficiency performance. Either approach would put all 
providers in the area at financial risk for fragmented, uncoordinated care and 
encourage them to form an ACO to coordinate with one another and negotiate 
with Medicare. The mandatory approach may be needed in high-cost regions, 
such as McAllen, Texas, where providers would likely see few financial benefits 
from joining voluntary ACOs compared with continuing to pursue their 
existing high levels of FFS revenue. 
Virtual ACOs may be necessary to promote broader teamwork incentives 
in rural areas in which low population densities may not economically support 
larger physician groups and where physicians may be widely dispersed in solo 
or small practices. Community-wide incentives are one way to develop P4P 
programs in such settings, either through ACO programs or other types of 
regional coalitions that providers may organize. Technical assistance programs 
could support virtual ACOs to help small physician practices and hospitals in 
rural areas redesign their IT and clinical systems to improve coordination of 
care and develop more advanced care management systems. 
The Office of the National Coordinator for Health Information Technology 
has set up a nationwide network of Regional Extension Centers to help small 
practices adopt EHRs to improve the quality and efficiency of their care. 
National consultants support the Regional Extension Centers through a Health 
Information Technology Research Center that develops tools and resources the 
Regional Extension Centers use in their work with small physician practices. 
Similar technical assistance efforts could be initiated to support development 
of ACOs. Staff from provider groups that have experience with improving 
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care in rural areas, such as the Wisconsin Collaborative for Healthcare Quality, 
could be brought in to provide this technical assistance to support development 
of ACOs in rural areas.
3. Adopt a More Bundled Unit of Payment for Pay for Performance
Bundled payment methods can complement P4P programs by providing 
incentives for better management of resources within the package of bundled 
services (Guterman & Drake, 2010). Since the 1980s, when Medicare adopted 
per-case prospective payment through diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) for 
hospital payment, hospital and physician incentives have been misaligned. 
Hospitals have been at financial risk for excess services provided during an 
admission, whereas the physicians who order all of the hospital services are 
paid on a FFS basis. 
Medicare’s Hospital-Acquired Condition (HAC) and Present on Admission 
(POA) Reporting program exemplifies the current misalignment: the 
program penalizes hospitals for a list of complications occurring during 
a hospitalization, including a foreign body left after surgery and surgical 
infections. Medicare does not hold at any financial risk the physicians treating 
the patient—only the hospital. From a payment perspective, it is as if the 
physicians were not part of the team caring for the patient who experienced 
the medical errors. If P4P is to be successful, physicians must be considered 
an integral part of the care process, which means they must share in both the 
rewards for positive performance and in the penalties for poor care, along 
with the hospitals and other institutions. This can be accomplished by using a 
bundled episode payment unit for all physician and hospital inpatient services.
Inside hospitals, the government is now exploring bundling Medicare 
payment for physician services with payment for hospital services into acute 
inpatient episodes—usually based on the DRG system. Episode-based P4P 
programs could expand even further the span of accountability of hospitals 
and physicians by bundling post-discharge medical services into the inpatient 
global payment. Broader episode bundling including post-acute care may be 
slower in developing, however, given its increased complexity in comparison 
with the simpler episode-grouping approaches that include only inpatient 
hospital and physician services. 
4. Involve Patients, Not Just Providers, in Pay for Performance
A major concern of physicians under P4P programs is that patient 
adherence to their prescriptions and recommendations for tests, treatments, 
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pharmaceutical regimens, diet, and exercise can affect physicians’ measured 
performance on quality indicators. We view patients as a part of the process 
of producing health care services, and not merely as passive recipients of care 
provided by physicians and other health care professionals. As a result, patients 
also have some accountability for the outcomes that result from health care 
services.
Under the current system, patient accountability begins when people 
purchase health insurance. Poor health habits (e.g., smoking) may sometimes 
result in higher insurance premiums. However, the connection between 
them is often tenuous. Most workers, regardless of their health status, enjoy 
uniform commercial health insurance premiums paid on their behalf by their 
employers. Medicare does not account for patients’ health habits or adherence 
in setting the levels of copayments or deductibles that its beneficiaries must 
pay. It is only in the individual insurance market where poor health habits can 
result in higher premiums—if the individual can purchase coverage at all. As 
a result, physicians who may be at financial risk under P4P for patients’ poor 
health outcomes usually do not believe that patients will have any similar 
financial incentive for adherence to prescribed care or for improving their 
lifestyles or health-related habits in response to physicians’ recommendations.
In this situation, we recommend that P4P financial incentives be provided 
to patients as well as to provider organizations. These incentives could be 
implemented in several ways: through lower copayments, lower deductibles, or 
rebates from private insurance or Part B Medicare premiums based on quality 
and cost outcomes. The incentives could be based on performance measures 
similar to those used for providers.
A related approach would be to provide broader incentives for consumers 
to seek care from providers found to have lower-cost or higher-quality 
performance. Some employer-based, private-sector health insurance markets 
have implemented tiering of providers based on cost and quality, with lower 
patient cost sharing or premiums when patients choose higher-ranked 
providers. This approach has not yet been widely tested in public insurance 
P4P programs, but we view it as a logical extension of such initiatives because 
patients themselves are a part of the health care production process, and their 
behavior affects quality and cost outcomes. This is another way to expand 
P4P into its second generation, with broader packages of interventions that 
move beyond financial incentives targeted only at physicians and provider 
organizations, to also include financial incentives for patients.
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5. Quality Performance Payments Should Be Self-Financing Under 
Pay for Performance
Our belief, which the US Congress and the majority of Americans presumably 
share, is that we spend enough money on health care to insist that it be of high 
quality. As is well-known, the US per capita spending on health care is much 
higher than that of any other country; moreover, we have no clear evidence 
of better population health outcomes as a result (Institute of Medicine Board 
on Health Care Services, 2007). Thus, it is reasonable to expect P4P financial 
incentive payments for quality improvement to be self-financing. 
Self-financing of better quality can be achieved in P4P programs in at least 
five different ways; we use examples from Medicare to illustrate these methods. 
First, Medicare could reduce payments in cases where poor quality or medical 
errors are documented. The Deficit Reduction Act of 2005 HAC legislation 
prevents higher DRG payments to hospitals for any of 10 hospital-acquired 
conditions. The Affordable Care Act expands these DRG payment penalties for 
selected hospitals with high HAC rates.
Second, quality incentive payments could be contingent on demonstrated 
cost savings. This is the approach that Medicare’s Physician Group Practice 
Demonstration takes. Participating physician groups receive quality incentive 
payments in this demonstration only if they demonstrate significant cost 
savings in the same time period used for quality performance assessment.
Third, a group of providers could be put in direct competition with one 
another, so that reimbursement for the lower-quality providers could be 
reduced to fund P4P incentive payments for the higher-quality providers. 
Medicare’s Premier Hospital Quality Improvement Demonstration provides 
bonus payments for participating hospitals in the top two performance deciles 
and imposes financial penalties for hospitals in the bottom two performance 
deciles.
Fourth, reimbursement for all providers in a given region or nationwide 
could be reduced to fund P4P incentive payments for selected high-quality 
providers. This is the approach taken in the Affordable Care Act for its 
Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (HVBPP). Payments to hospitals 
nationwide will be reduced by a set percentage to fund P4P incentive payments 
for hospitals demonstrating high-quality performance. However, the total 
amount of the incentive payments cannot exceed the funding generated by 
the nationwide payment reduction. The Affordable Care Act uses a similar 
approach for private Medicare health plans. The Affordable Care Act cuts 
overall payments to these Medicare Advantage plans but specifies payment rate 
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bonuses of 1.5 percent in 2012, 3.0 percent in 2013, and 5 percent in 2014 and 
beyond for plans with four or more stars on a five-star rating scale for quality. 
The quality-adjusted payment rate is capped at what the rate would have been 
under payment methodology before passage of the Affordable Care Act.
Fifth, payers could offer providers the right to market themselves as a payer-
designated Center of Excellence if they could demonstrate high levels of high-
quality performance, and at the same time offer reimbursement discounts for 
the right to use the Center of Excellence imprimatur for marketing. Medicare’s 
Participating Heart Bypass Center Demonstration allowed highly qualified 
major heart hospitals to market a similar imprimatur. Participating hospitals 
were willing to offer Medicare substantial DRG payment discounts for the 
privilege.
When self-financing entails payment reductions to fund P4P incentive 
payments for high-quality performance, mandatory legislation such as the 
Affordable Care Act is usually required. Medicare’s Participating Heart Bypass 
Center Demonstration was an exception because hospitals valued highly 
the competitive advantage of marketing a Medicare Center of Excellence 
imprimatur and thus were willing to volunteer for the demonstration and pay 
for the marketing benefits through discounted DRG payments. Individual 
provider-funded P4P programs may remain mostly voluntary because these 
strategies require providers to take financial risks for the chance of receiving 
quality and cost performance bonuses.
6. Increase the Size of Financial Risks and Rewards in 
Pay for Performance
As noted in Chapter 2, most P4P systems began with incentives of limited 
size. Reasons for these size limits included concerns about the validity and 
reliability of quality measurement and data collection, controversy created by 
payment disparities among providers, and provider market power to resist P4P 
programs. Many P4P systems in the United States provide incentives of less 
than 5 percent of a provider’s total FFS income, percentages often viewed as 
insufficient to motivate major changes in care practices. In this situation, P4P 
incentives are usually inadequate to counteract the much larger payments and 
volume incentives from the prevailing FFS reimbursement system. 
P4P incentives will probably need to be increased substantially (i.e., up 
to 10 percent or more) to have a material impact on provider care patterns, 
innovation in care systems, and ultimately on quality and cost outcomes. The 
growing concerns over steadily rising costs of health care generally, and the 
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anticipated impact of the baby boom generation on Medicare, may enable 
public and private payers to experiment more boldly with P4P incentives. 
Although the United Kingdom enacted sizable P4P quality incentives, 
it was in the context of a very different health care system, with a much 
lower percentage of gross domestic product spent on health care. The UK 
implemented its P4P program with a goal of increasing incomes for general 
practitioners, with the understanding that this would increase costs for the 
National Health Service while also providing incentives for improved quality of 
care (Roland, 2004). 
In addition to increasing the positive incentives in P4P, payers should 
also expand their use of negative ones such as financial penalties or risks for 
providers, broader use of which would balance the P4P programs’ prevailing 
focus on positive incentives. Though it is important that providers not view 
P4P as including only negative incentives—and thus being punitive—including 
only positive incentives has not motivated significant levels of quality 
improvement or cost reduction. A likely reason for the limited impact of P4P 
programs to date is the limited downside risk to provider organizations for 
poor performance. If they perform poorly and fail to get P4P bonus payments, 
under most P4P programs they still receive their regular FFS revenue, which 
dwarfs the dollar amounts of the P4P bonuses. Thus provider groups do not 
lose much by failing to earn the P4P payments. However, if these penalties 
put some of the regular FFS revenue at risk, that may motivate much stronger 
efforts by providers to meet the P4P performance targets.
Using negative incentives would likely mean that P4P programs would 
need to be mandatory, because voluntary programs may not be able to 
enforce negative incentives and still convince provider organizations to join. 
We can view requiring P4P programs to be self-financing as a first step in 
this direction, such as by requiring mandatory reductions in reimbursement 
that providers can then earn back through improved quality performance. 
However, negative incentives could go further to put larger portions of FFS 
reimbursement at risk.
A historical example of successful financial incentives that put regular 
FFS revenue at risk, while balancing negative and positive incentives, was 
Medicare’s introduction of the DRG-based Inpatient Prospective Payment 
System for hospitals in the 1980s. Prospective payment had a potential for 
negative incentives because hospitals could lose money if costs were higher 
than the fixed level of reimbursement per admission under the DRG payment 
schedule. However, positive incentives balanced these negative incentives in 
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that if costs were lower than the fixed level of reimbursement, the hospitals 
could gain money. Moreover, the Inpatient Prospective Payment System was 
a mandatory program for most hospitals receiving Medicare reimbursement; 
thus, they could not opt out or fail to volunteer for this new program. This 
prompted a wave of innovation in hospitals that reduced lengths of stay for 
most admissions and shifted to outpatient settings many surgical procedures 
that had previously been done on an inpatient basis. 
A benefit of negative incentives is that they can be structured to avoid up-
front investments by Medicare or private payers to fund P4P bonus payment 
pools. They also do not require self-financing mechanisms, such as “shared 
savings” models, in which P4P programs must document cost reductions 
before positive bonus payments can be made for quality improvement. 
7. Make Quality Improvement Goals More Ambitious Under 
Pay for Performance
Applying more ambitious quality measures in P4P programs is another 
approach for achieving larger improvements in quality. In this book, we have 
explored several methods for determining quality improvements: (1) setting 
an individual quality target and paying only if it is achieved; (2) setting a target 
as the percentage difference the between current and an ideal performance 
rate; (3) a composite score based on weighted average performance across 
several different quality indicators; and (4) a composite score based on 
simultaneous achievement required across several different quality indicators 
(often referred to as “all-or-nothing” or “all-or-none”). Generally viewed as 
the most challenging, the all-or-nothing approach is our recommendation for 
making quality improvement goals more ambitious under P4P (see also Nolan 
& Berwick, 2006). 
It is clear that any composite score that allows above-target performance to 
offset below-target performance will minimize the provider’s financial risk and 
almost guarantee bonus payments—even without much effort. A better idea 
is to set a single target for the percentage of a physician group’s patients who 
achieve goals for all of the quality measures for a given disease such as diabetes. 
Percentage scores on all-or-nothing measures could result in baseline provider 
performance levels of 30 percent of patients or fewer achieving the goals for 
all measures. One recent study of 7,333 diabetic patients found that 34 percent 
received care reflecting all eight process measures studied, whereas only 16 
percent achieved targets for all three intermediate outcome measures studied 
(Shubrook et al., 2010). A P4P program benchmark based on these data could 
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provide the low initial levels of performance to enable more ambitious quality 
improvement goals to be set. To improve from 30 to 60 percent of patients on 
these all-or-nothing quality measures taken together, providers would likely 
have to make sizeable investments in quality improvement interventions, such 
as point-of-care quality monitoring, improved clinical reporting for feedback 
to physicians, and active exploration of new patient management methods.
Making quality improvements more difficult to achieve is challenging if P4P 
incentives—whether positive or negative—are voluntary. Ambitious quality 
improvement goals have sometimes been difficult for Medicare to negotiate 
with providers in voluntary P4P programs because providers have been able 
to opt out. If a P4P program is voluntary, with small positive incentives for 
improved quality, then most providers may simply choose to remain in the 
much larger FFS revenue system and bill for services without financial risk. 
Payers must realize that if they want substantial quality improvements in a 
voluntary P4P system, they will have to make the rewards greater. They must 
decide how much it is worth to have, for example, a 10 percentage point 
increase across a range of quality measures. For providers to voluntarily make 
the effort for such across-the-board gains will require substantial rewards. 
Naturally, invoking penalties for failing to achieve a broad 10 percentage point 
gain cannot be enforced under a voluntary arrangement.
In designing second-generation P4P programs, sponsors could also 
combine patients across chronic diseases to make quality improvement goals 
more ambitious. For example, the percentage of diabetics achieving goals 
for 10 different quality measures could be combined with the percentage of 
heart failure patients achieving all 10 of their disease-specific process of care 
and intermediate outcome goals. We would not expect most providers to 
achieve perfect scores on these ambitious measures, but the idea is to combine 
a number of desirable indicators to show increased room for improvement 
compared with reviewing each indicator individually. 
Another potential benefit of this all-or-nothing approach could be to 
achieve a tighter linkage between process of care measures and final outcomes 
such as reduced morbidity, mortality, and complication rates. Individual 
process of care quality measures, such as annual HbA1c testing, may have 
limited direct (short-term) impact on outcomes of care. However, patients 
who achieve clinical goals for a broader set of 8 or 10 process of care quality 
measures may be more likely to experience positive outcomes. When process 
measures are combined with intermediate outcome measures, such as HbA1c 
levels and blood pressure levels, then the linkage to final outcomes is expected 
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to become even stronger. Studies can be conducted to determine which groups 
of process and intermediate outcome measures are more closely linked to 
outcomes. This could also improve the credibility of P4P programs among 
physicians, who sometimes view individual process of care measures as of 
limited importance in isolation from other aspects of a patient’s care. 
Expanding direct use of outcome measures in provider performance 
assessment is another general approach in improving the quality measures 
used in P4P programs. Most P4P programs have focused primarily on process 
measures of quality because these are usually more acceptable to providers. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, many outcome measures currently available do 
have several limitations, such as low frequency, long time horizons, and the 
need for detailed risk adjustment to account for factors outside providers’ 
control that may affect outcomes. However, private-sector P4P programs 
have applied patient satisfaction outcome measures in P4P; and other types 
of outcomes, such as complications of chronic diseases and hospital-acquired 
conditions (HACs), are now being more broadly measured and reported for 
quality improvement programs and public reporting of quality. If ACOs can 
be implemented for specified geographic regions, they may provide sufficient 
numbers of patients to enable broader application of outcome measures as well. 
Another potential approach to making process quality targets more 
ambitious is to pay bonuses for the percentage of recommended care provided. 
In this approach, no specific target for performance is established, other than 
that 100 percent of patients should receive recommended care. Thus, even 
providers who are currently performing well will have an incentive to improve 
their performance until all of their patients are receiving care recommended by 
clinical guidelines.
8. Utilize Electronic Health Record Systems to Implement 
Patient-Specific Quality Targets
Even more sophisticated approaches to quality measurement may be on the 
horizon if the United States can surmount the hurdle of broad—nationwide—
implementation of EHRs in the next several years. In the future, EHRs could 
apply clinical decision support tools to link an individual patient’s own clinical 
data to the results of available clinical trials and clinical guidelines (Pawlson & 
Lee, 2010). This could enable quality measures to reflect more patient-specific 
assessments of appropriate care and not just population averages for people 
diagnosed with a given disease. For some diabetics, for example, controlling 
HbA1c to a level below 7 percent may not provide additional clinical benefits, 
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and 8 percent may be sufficient. Evidence-based quality measures are currently 
limited to targets for one clinical level because of the administrative burden 
and high cost of designing and implementing measures that consider a patient’s 
other comorbid diseases. 
EHRs could make patient-specific quality targets a reality for second-
generation P4P programs. Payers could use P4P incentives to encourage 
providers with EHRs to implement and apply clinical decision support tools for 
patient-specific quality measures by providing higher levels of bonus payments 
for these more sophisticated measures. 
9. Acknowledge That Clinical Uncertainty Will Limit the Scope of 
Pay for Performance
Medicine is far more complex than it was 50 years ago, as evidenced by the vast 
array of drugs, medical specialties, treatments, devices, surgical procedures, 
and sites of care. At the same time, despite medical advances, uncertainty 
continues to be a prominent characteristic of medical practice. For example, 
given a range of presenting symptoms of patients with multiple chronic 
diseases, what is the right test to do, drug to prescribe, specialist to refer the 
patient to, or procedure to perform? Will the intervention lead to a successful 
outcome despite the possibilities of interactions between different diseases and 
different pharmaceutical treatments? 
Payers are now promoting evidence-based medicine to develop clinical 
diagnosis and treatment guidelines that are grounded in systematic reviews of 
the available scientific studies of diagnosis methodologies, drugs, and other 
treatments. At one level, this appeals to physicians’ scientific training. Others 
in the medical profession, however, have complained that it leads to “cookie 
cutter” medicine—there is no such thing as “the average patient”—and limits 
their autonomy. Moreover, evidence-based clinical guidelines are not currently 
available for many of the more complex medical situations that lack detailed 
scientific research, such as treating elderly patients who have multiple chronic 
diseases, which may include diabetes, heart failure, coronary artery disease, 
hypertension, chronic kidney disease, cancer, chronic obstructive pulmonary 
disease, and others.
Cognitive problems are also more prevalent in the elderly than in other 
population groups. These deficits can inhibit physicians’ efforts to promote 
patients’ adherence to prescribed medications, testing, and other interventions 
needed to treat multiple chronic diseases. The clinical uncertainty that persists 
in these and other areas of medicine may limit the ability to accurately measure 
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cost and quality performance of providers and thus also limit the size and 
scope of P4P programs and the bonuses or penalties that they provide for 
physicians and provider organizations. 
Although we believe that a larger role for P4P is needed in health care 
reimbursement systems to counterbalance the weaknesses of FFS discussed 
above, policy makers also need to acknowledge the long-term need for a 
balance between P4P and FFS. At present the role of FFS is too large, but P4P’s 
role will need to focus on clinical areas where programs can establish broadly 
accepted guidelines so that they can measure performance with confidence.
10. Acknowledge That Pay for Performance Is Necessary but Not 
Sufficient for Improving Quality 
Some advocates have billed P4P as sufficient on its own to improve quality of 
care, but we view P4P as necessary but not sufficient for quality improvement. 
Applying P4P programs where possible can be an improvement over relying 
solely on FFS reimbursement systems, because P4P can provide the direct 
incentives for quality improvement that FFS lacks. However, it is doubtful 
that P4P programs alone can achieve a high-quality and cost-effective health 
care system. Financial incentives are only one lever and can only go so far in 
ensuring that the health care system provides the highest-quality care. A better 
perspective on P4P is that it can promote health care system benefits with 
incentives that increase pressure for improving quality, provided that other 
policy, health care delivery system, health IT, and organizational factors are 
also aligned toward those same goals. We can use this perspective to consider 
ways to tailor P4P programs to varying institutional settings and provider 
cultures.
For example, P4P programs could be jointly implemented with other 
quality-improvement programs such as the Wisconsin Collaborative 
for Healthcare Quality, which was explicitly designed as a physician-led 
intervention: it comprises mainly medium and large physician groups but also 
includes hospitals and health plans (Greer, 2008). The Wisconsin Collaborative 
for Healthcare Quality pursued goals of reinforcing the medical profession’s 
norms of peer support, sharing treatment ideas and knowledge so that all 
could improve together, and vesting ownership of quality improvement 
systems in the medical profession rather than external organizations. Physician 
participation and leadership in the Collaborative led to “… 1) acceptance of 
measures as valid indicators of performance; 2) “apples-to-apples” comparisons 
with colleagues practicing in similar settings for reliable performance 
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benchmarks; and 3) opportunities to meet with peers to share strategies and 
practices employed by the high-performing organizations” (Greer, 2008). 
The Wisconsin Collaborative for Healthcare Quality represents one model, 
collaborative and locally organized, of a package of quality-improvement 
interventions that could be integrated with second-generation P4P programs. 
These programs could target the financial incentives to reinforce the goals and 
culture of the Wisconsin Collaborative for Healthcare Quality, so that together 
they could provide a more sufficient package of interventions for quality 
improvement. 
assessment of the pay for performance Components of the 
affordable Care act 
P4P played a fairly prominent role in the debate over the 2010 health care 
reform bill (HR 3590; the Affordable Care Act), which President Obama signed 
into law on March 23, 2010. (The reconciliation bill, HR 4872, subsequently 
amended the act in minor ways.) Members of Congress often cited P4P as a 
way to improve on the current FFS system during the debate over this bill. 
In this section, we provide an assessment of the main P4P provisions of the 
Affordable Care Act. 
In most cases the Affordable Care Act specifies P4P programs in only 
general terms; as mentioned, it delegates a substantial portion of the design and 
implementation details to the Secretary of DHHS. As a result, we anticipate 
that DHHS and, especially, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) 
staff will play major roles in developing the final specifications for these P4P 
programs, in shaping how they are implemented, and in working to make them 
as effective as possible for improving quality and reducing costs. Our objective 
in this section is to assess the provisions of that legislation that provided 
for implementation or planning of P4P programs in light of our 10 policy 
recommendations presented in the last section. 
We discuss six sections of the Affordable Care Act below, in order of their 
presentation in the legislation. In general, the Affordable Care Act refers to P4P 
programs using the rubric of “value-based purchasing,” indicating that they 
are pursuing both quality and cost goals simultaneously. However, we can also 
view these programs as P4P given their focus on measuring performance and 
providing financial incentives for improved quality and cost performance. 
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Section 3001: Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program 
The Hospital Value-Based Purchasing Program (HVBPP), which will be 
implemented in 2012, provides incentive payments to hospitals that meet 
performance standards for a range of quality measures, to be determined by 
the Secretary of DHHS. These measures will include, at least, those focused on 
acute myocardial infarction, heart failure, pneumonia, surgeries, health-care 
associated infections, and the Hospital Consumer Assessment of Healthcare 
Providers and Systems patient survey. Outcome measures will be risk adjusted 
to ensure that hospitals have incentives to treat severely ill patients. Efficiency 
measures will be added during 2014, including, at least, Medicare spending per 
beneficiary with case-mix adjustments for age, sex, race, severity of illness, and 
other factors to be determined. 
Congress explicitly linked this P4P effort to public reporting of the 
performance data. Hospitals must have reported the quality and efficiency 
measures used to calculate the incentive payments on the CMS Hospital 
Compare Web site for at least 1 year prior to the beginning of the first P4P 
performance period. 
Reducing routine DRG payments for all hospitals nationwide will fund the 
HVBPP incentives. CMS will reduce payments for all hospitals by a percentage 
of the base DRG payment for each discharge. The percentage reduction is 1.0 
percent in fiscal year 2013, 1.25 percent in 2014, 1.50 percent in 2015, 1.75 
percent in 2016, and 2.0 percent in 2017 and subsequent years. 
CMS will make bonus payments to high-performance hospitals by adding a 
percentage increase to the base operating DRG payment amount for a hospital 
for each discharge occurring in the fiscal year by a value-based incentive 
payment amount. However, the total bonus payments must not exceed the 
dollar amount funded for the HVBPP by the associated reduction in DRG 
payments to all hospitals. 
We believe that it is a positive step that the HVBPP balances negative and 
positive P4P incentives by reducing all hospital reimbursement and then 
requiring hospitals to earn back at least a portion of the lost revenue through 
quality measure performance. The HVBPP is mandatory and thus avoids the 
problems of voluntary P4P programs, which need to provide extra financial 
inducements to provider organizations to join the program, and which make 
negative incentives difficult to implement given that providers can opt out. 
However, perhaps because of the HVBPP’s mandatory nature, the size 
of the P4P incentives appears low, starting at just 1 percent and rising only 
to 2 percent of hospital revenues. The relatively small size of these financial 
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incentives may limit the impact of this program. One way to concentrate 
the effect of these incentives would be to target the bonus payments to the 
higher-performing hospitals. In 2008, Medicare paid $110 billion to short-
stay hospitals, for which DRG reimbursement mostly applies (CMS, 2009). 
Therefore, a 1.0 percent reduction in reimbursement under the HVBPP would 
generate about $1.1 billion that would be available for bonus payments. If the 
bonus payments could be concentrated on fewer hospitals, such as the top 25 
percent, then the payments could represent substantial additional revenue for 
those hospitals earning the bonuses.
If initial experience with the HVBPP is positive, and as performance 
measures are refined and extended to more conditions and domains, we 
recommend that Congress increase the payment amounts that are withheld 
initially but that hospitals can earn back through the P4P bonus payments. 
This step would provide both stronger negative incentives and stronger positive 
incentives for hospitals, both of which may result in larger impacts on quality 
and cost outcomes. DHHS has the responsibility to design the quality measures 
and the performance targets to be used, so it also has an opportunity to 
implement more ambitious quality measures and targets for measuring quality 
of care performance. Those can also lead to larger impacts on the quality of 
hospital services.
Section 3006: Plans for a Value-Based Purchasing Program for Skilled 
Nursing Facilities and Home Health Agencies
Section 3006 requires that the Secretary of DHHS submit to Congress two 
reports by October 1, 2011, containing plans for value-based purchasing for 
skilled nursing facilities and home health agencies. This provision provides 
latitude in designing these programs. It gives DHHS the opportunity to again 
include more powerful P4P design features, such as larger negative financial 
incentives, larger potential P4P bonus payments, and more ambitious quality 
measures and targets. 
Section 3007: Value-Based Payment Modifier Under the Physician Fee 
Schedule
Section 3007 requires CMS to establish a payment modifier to the physician 
fee schedule, based on performance on quality-of-care measures; it 
recommends but does not require use of composite measures and indicates 
that risk adjustment will be needed if outcome measures of quality are used. 
Cost performance will also be assessed and used in the payment modifier. 
 Conclusions: Planning for Second-Generation Pay for Performance 365
Implementation for some physicians will occur in 2015 (those physicians 
deemed appropriate for earlier implementation of this payment modifier by the 
Secretary of DHHS) and for all physicians in 2017. 
This provision of the health reform law also provides latitude in program 
design. This is a mandatory P4P program, but the legislation does not specify 
the size of the incentives. This flexibility will give DHHS and CMS the 
opportunity to include more powerful design features, such as larger negative 
and positive financial incentives, larger potential P4P bonus payments, 
and more ambitious quality measures and targets. The challenge will be in 
implementing these design features; as noted in our recommendations above, 
we believe that P4P incentives should not focus on individual physicians, but 
rather on physician groups or other larger provider organizations. Moreover, 
this P4P incentive faces the challenge of working with a fee schedule defined 
by thousands of procedure codes. As a result, we recommend that DHHS and 
CMS use the latitude the legislation gives them to focus these incentives on 
larger physician groups and provide a creative set of second-generation P4P 
design features to make this program more effective. 
Section 3008: Payment Adjustment for Conditions Acquired in 
Hospitals
Section 3008 reduces hospital DRG payments for admissions in which patients 
experienced HACs to 99 percent of the regular DRG payment the hospital 
would otherwise have received. However, this provision specifies that the 
hospitals for which this is applicable include only those in the top quartile 
of HAC rates, relative to the national average (after risk adjustment). Public 
reporting of the data is required; HAC results for each hospital are to be 
publicly reported on the CMS Hospital Compare Web site. Hospitals will have 
an opportunity to review the data and submit corrections. 
Section 3008 provides negative incentives by reducing reimbursement for 
some hospitals when patients experience HACs. Because it is mandatory, it 
provides stronger incentives than voluntary P4P programs. However, the size 
of the incentives appears low, with just a 1 percent reduction in revenue—and 
limiting even this to just the 25 percent of hospitals with the highest rates 
of HACs. These features may limit the impact of this program. This is an 
improvement on the prior HAC legislation from the Deficit Reduction Act, 
which did not impose penalties but only prevented higher DRG payments 
that would have resulted solely from HACs, but this new Affordable Care Act 
approach could be made still stronger.
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We recommend that Congress increase the size of the percentage cut in 
hospital reimbursement for admissions associated with HACs to at least 5 
percent and make it applicable to at least 75 percent of hospitals. With this 
approach, only the best-performing hospitals would escape these negative 
incentives and the program would likely have a much greater impact. 
Section 3021: Establishment of a Center for Medicare and Medicaid 
Innovation Within the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
The Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (the Innovation Center) 
is intended to test a broad range of innovative payment and service delivery 
models to improve quality and reduce costs. The legislation recommends 
testing 18 specific models, and it provides latitude for DHHS and CMS staff to 
fund pilot programs to test other models that they deem promising. Of the 18 
models recommended, at least 3 are P4P programs:
•	 varying	payment	to	physicians	who	order	advanced	diagnostic	imaging	
services according to appropriateness criteria for ordering these services;
•	 paying	providers	for	using	patient	decision-support	tools;	and
•	 providing	payment	incentives	for	cancer	care	based	on	evidence-based	
guidelines.
The Innovation Center holds promise for testing a broader range of P4P 
models than have been implemented to date, and it can provide a vehicle 
for implementing the second-generation P4P design features we have 
recommended in this chapter. A risk is that the Innovation Center’s focus 
on pilot programs may mean that its programs consist mostly of voluntary 
participation by provider organizations. This approach (as we have argued 
above) may limit the size of negative P4P incentives that can be implemented, 
and it may also limit how ambitious the quality measures and performance 
targets can be. Some mandatory programs may be needed to test the more 
aggressive second-generation P4P program designs.
Section 3022: Medicare Shared Savings Program
The Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) promotes the development 
of ACOs by groups of providers serving Medicare beneficiaries. ACOs that 
meet quality performance standards will receive P4P payments if they can 
also demonstrate savings in costs for the Medicare program. ACOs must 
have at least 5,000 beneficiaries assigned to participate in the ACO program; 
assignment of patients to an ACO is based on beneficiaries’ use of ACO-
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provided primary care. ACOs will continue to receive regular FFS payment 
under Medicare Parts A and B, but they will also receive P4P bonus payments 
based on shared savings if they meet quality performance standards.
The legislation defines Medicare savings as occurring when estimated 
average per capita Medicare expenditures for beneficiaries assigned to the ACO 
are at least a prespecified percentage amount below a benchmark spending 
level. CMS is to estimate this benchmark from 3 years of per-beneficiary 
expenditures for beneficiaries assigned to the ACO. CMS will then adjust 
this benchmark for beneficiary characteristics and other factors it deems 
appropriate; the benchmark is then updated (increased) each year by the 
projected national per capita absolute expenditure growth rate for Parts A 
and B services. ACOs can earn through P4P payments a percentage of the 
difference between the actual per capita expenditures of their patients in a 
given year and the benchmark level, subject to a requirement that a percentage 
of the savings goes to Medicare and an overall limit on the shared savings that 
the ACO can earn.
The MSSP includes several positive features we have recommended for 
P4P programs. It is self-financing because it requires that cost savings be 
demonstrated before P4P bonus payments are made (i.e., cost saving incentives 
are built into the program). CMS calculates cost savings based on all Medicare 
Parts A and B services, so that ACOs have an incentive to become accountable 
for the full range of care provided to their patients. The MSSP also allows for a 
range of different types of quality measures, so the P4P performance measures 
could include some of the more ambitious “all or nothing” quality indicators 
recommended earlier in this chapter. 
One concern is that the use of a national absolute benchmark update, 
coupled with the voluntary nature of the MSSP, may inhibit participation by 
provider groups in regions of the country with higher baseline costs and costs 
that are growing faster than the national average. In those regions, provider 
groups may consider that demonstrating Medicare savings against a national 
absolute cost-increase benchmark update is too challenging; as a result, they 
may be hesitant to join this ACO program voluntarily. For example, McAllen, 
Texas, may be considered a region in which ACOs could provide significant 
benefits by containing or even reducing the high rates of FFS reimbursement. It 
is unlikely, however, that providers in that city would join an ACO voluntarily 
while they are doing so well financially under FFS.
After initial experience with the ACO program, we recommend that 
Congress consider a mandatory ACO program, as discussed earlier in this 
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chapter, to enable more ambitious P4P incentives to be implemented more 
broadly across the country. A mandatory program would also allow the 
imposition of penalties (negative incentives).
Summing Up
This concluding chapter has identified numerous ways in which second-
generation P4P programs could improve and expand P4P. The first generation 
enabled exploration of the P4P approach and began to shift incentives away 
from the FFS focus on increasing volume of services to a new focus on 
quality improvement and cost containment. However, the first-generation 
P4P programs did not fully account for the complexities of the US health care 
system, so its impact did not live up to the initial enthusiasm it had generated 
in health policy circles. 
Second-generation P4P programs will offer a broader range of design 
features to address the fragmentation of care, the institutional complexities 
of the health care sector, and the need for stronger incentives. They will 
integrate P4P with complementary quality improvement and cost containment 
interventions, harmonize its focus with the norms of medical professionalism, 
and involve both patients and providers. They will also include more ambitious 
performance measures, balance negative financial incentives with positive 
ones, and explore how mandatory programs can be implemented to enable 
more significant improvements in quality and cost outcomes. In these and 
other ways, second-generation P4P programs will be better designed to achieve 
larger impacts in the health care sector.
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